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HAMIT ERSOY 
TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN WESTERN DEFENCE 
INITIATIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE 1950s 
ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how and why Turkey became involved in Western 
defence initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s -a period of 
exceptional significance for Turkey since it began with free elections that 
brought about a change of government and ended with a military coup 
that overthrew that government. It was also the period when Turkey was 
admitted to NATO and joined the Baghdad Pact as a founder member. 
British documents in the Public Record Office, Kew, American 
documents from the Library of Congress, Washington, DC., Turkish 
material from the Library of the Grand National Assembly and the 
National Library, Ankara, constitute most of the primary written research 
material. This is supplemented by information obtained in personal 
interviews with a number of politicians, diplomats and others with 
special knowledge of the subject. 
A brief introductory chapter outlines the relevant political background of 
the 1950s and records the research methods adopted. The following 
chapter contains a discussion of relevant theories. In Chapter In attention 
is turned to the historical background of the region including a brief 
survey of the countries concerned. Chapter IV offers a closer look at the 
Turkish historical development, the struggle for independence, Kemalist 
reforms, and the process of westernisation. 
Chapter V is concerned with the various western defence plans for the 
Middle East in the early 1950s up to the establishment of the Baghdad 
Pact. Chapter VI examines the formation of the Pact, the attempts that 
were made to expand it, and the regional repercussions to these 
developments. Chapter VIII deals with the collapse of the Pact and the 
impact of its failure. The final chapter contains the conclusions of the 
research - in essence that the Western defence initiatives in the Middle 
East mostly originated from the British, who were hoping to preserve 
their own interest in the region, and were adopted and promoted by the 
Turks, who were keen to gain Western acceptance and were willing to 
lend their support to these plans as payment for admission to NATO 
which they regarded as proof of significant advance along the road to 
westernisation. 
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NOTES ON THE TRANSCRIPTION AND 
PRONUNCIATION OF TURKISH WORDS 
Turkish words in the text are given in modem Turkish spelling. 
The Turkish alphabet is phonetic and presents few problems, but readers 
unfamiliar with it should note particularly the pronunciation of the 
following letters: 
c- is pronounced like the English j in jam. 
q- is pronounced like the English ch in church. 
g- is always pronounced hard like the English g in gun. 
g- after e, i, 6 or ii is pronounced like the y in English yes. After a, i, o or 
u it is itself silent and serves only to lengthen the preceding vowel. 
i- is pronounced like the English i in fit. 
Y, - is rather like the English i in fir. (The comers of the mouth should be 
pulled back when pronouncing 1). 
is pronounced as it is in German. 
is pronounced like the English sh in ship. 
ii - is pronounced with the lips forward and rounded as for the French tu. 
A circumflex over a vowel denotes a slight "y" sound between it and a 
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PREFACE 
The present research topic is the consequence of a change of direction 
necessitated by the 1991 Gulf War. Before that began I had intended to 
concentrate on Turkish-Iraqi relations, and to that end had undertaken 
extensive reading on Iraqi history and politics and attended classes to 
improve my Arabic before a proposed field trip to Iraq. When the course 
of world events rendered that visit impractical it became clear that it 
would be impossible to continue balanced research in sufficient depth on 
my original topic. I therefore sought a new topic, preferably one that 
would allow me to make use not only of the general skills I had by then 
acquired in research techniques, familiarity with computers, and so on 
but also to profit from the specific knowledge I had attained since 
embarking on research as a Ph. D. student. 
Several additional reasons prompted my present choice of topic: it was an 
aspect of international relations in which Turkey had played a key role 
(though my research later showed that this concept of Western defence 
did not originate in Turkish minds); substantial documentary sources 
were available, including material in the British Public Record Office at 
Kew, American documents, and records of Turkish parliamentary 
debates, as well as numerous books and articles; and a number of Turks 
who had been actively involved in the politics of the period were willing 
to speak to me about the subject. Baha Aksit, for example, was extremely 
emotional and eager to speak for hours, if not days. As he put it, "'the 
Democrat Party decade in the 1950s was the turning point for Turkey and 
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I for the whole world, because by siding with the 'Free World - the West - 
Turkey had changed the destiny of the world in favour of the Western 
democracies". 
The importance of this decade for Turkey reinforced my desire to study 
it. The events of this period not only set the course of future politics in 
the region, they also created a golden opportunity for Turkey to align 
with the West and secure a place under the Western defence umbrella. 
She played an important part in the Korean War, joined NATO, became a 
founder member of the Baghdad Pact, entered an irreversible process of 
dependence upon the United States by signing numerous agreements that 
tied the future of the country to Washington, applied for EEC 
membership -a goal that remains a major objective of Turkish foreign 
policy - and did all this while the country's first genuine multi-party 
democracy was beginning to function. 
A further attraction of this period and this topic was dearth of academic 
research into it, even in Turkey. In recent years many books and articles 
have been published about various aspects of the states that form the 
'Northern Tier': Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Most of 
these publications have dealt with the political and economic 
development of these countries, whereas their relationship with the 
superpowers was examined either briefly or not at all. There are very few 
works on this area in French or German, as France and Germany had no 
vital interests in this region in the 1950s. There were very few books 
even in Turkish, although Turkey is a regional country. Most importantly, 
there has been no genuine research based on the first-hand documents 
relating to Western defence attempts in the area. This thesis is largely 
based on the British and American documents. It also has the benefit of 
xvil 
the considered opinions given to me in private interviews of some of the 
prominent politicians and diplomats who were professionally involved in 
the policies concerned and of scholars who have subsequently assessed 
these policies. 
While all these views proved invaluable in helping to form my own 
judgements, I should of course state that the cpnclusions reached are my 
own. At the same time, I should note that, although I have had access to 
British and American documents relating to the 1950s, regrettably, the 
official documents of the regional countries are not available for 
inspection, so a definitive assessment of the topic must await the rise of 
less secretive regimes in the area. In Turkey I sought permission to 
consult the records in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in the Prime 
Ministry. At both I was informed that "no-one can have access to the 
archives relating to the Republic of Turkey". The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs gave me a certificate to that effect (see Appendix 1), but the State 
Archives Centre in the Prime Ministry declined even to issue any 
statement that the archives were not available to researchers. 
Despite that handicap, it is my hope that the research has helped to reveal 
the main issues quite clearly and contribute to an understanding of 
developments in the Middle East in the 1950s, particularly as direct 
access to some of the people involved in pqlicy making at the time has 
allowed me to compensate at least partially for the lack of regional 
primary documentary evidence other than what I was able to consult in 
the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in the form of 
records of Assembly debates and official statements that had been issued 




1.1 Background of Study 
The subject of this thesis is a very good example of an apparently regional 
project that reveals a great deal about the relations of Middle Eastern countries 
with outside Big Powers. 
The Middle East is generally acknowledged to be of critical importance to 
the superpowers. Its economic importance became crucial to the industrialised 
world with the discovery and exploitation of oil. These factors prompted both 
superpowers to make tremendous efforts to take control of the region or at least 
to deny their rival that control. Other rivalries grew with the creation of the state 
of Israel in an area that contains not only Jewish but also Christian and Muslim 
Holy Places, and this has added to the reasons why the Middle East never drops 
from the world's political agenda. 
In historical perspective, when our study begins, the Muslim Golden Age and 
the concurrent European Dark Age were, of course, long past. After the Second 
World War the countries of the Middle East, including Turkey, were obliged to ad- 
just their economic and political systems to the new post-war order. Both internal 
and external pressures forced them to make these adjustments. Similar pressures 
affected the regional players. The erstwhile "Great" Britain, debilitated by her 
efforts in the Second World War, was getting ready to transfer her responsibilities 




any return to isolationist policies and was accepting a global role. Our study covers 
the application of this global policy to the Middle East. 
Following the Second World War all sides were convinced that another global 
war meant the end of our planet. Yet none of the parties was ready to give up its 
imperialist ambitions for the sake of a universal peace. The determination of both 
superpowers to control more parts of the world and to influence more countries 
and spread their own political system is a major aspect of the background against 
which this study is set. 
Within the very complicated field of extremely elusive, unsettled and fast 
changing Middle East politics, this study is concerned only with political and 
military policies and it is focused on the Northern Tier. We have tried hard to 
avoid reference to other regional events and developments unless they had a direct 
impact upon or were directly influenced by developments in the Northern Tier. 
Many of the events that occurred within the Middle East during this period such 
as the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Suez crisis, the Cyprus problem, North African in- 
dependence, and the Kurdish issue merit separate studies but could be mentioned 
in this thesis only insofar as they were directly relevant to our subject. The the- 
sis is also limited in terms of time, being concerned with the 1950s and mentions 
earlier and later developments briefly and only when required. 
2 
1.2 Aim of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the Western defence 
initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s and the Turkish involvement in them 
were aimed at defending the region against "all" outsiders, in favour of regional 
countries or whether they were just a means to defend Western economic and 
political interests in the region while denying the other powers in general and the 
Soviet Union in particular benefit from the regional resources. It also examines 
whether these initiatives were indigenous or externally imposed. 
At the same time it questions the role of Turkey in this process and asks 
whether the T'urks were self-motivated in leading the regional countries to align 
with the West against the Soviet bloc or whether they were prompted by others 
to do so. It was hoped that an examination of Turkey's motives would answer the 
following questions: 
(1) Were the Turks genuinely expecting this regional alliance to guarantee their 
national security in the face of Soviet aggression as stated in various Turkish and 
Western official statements? 
(2) Or were they just paying the price of admission to NATO? 
(3) Was the new Turkish leadership, inspired by the history of pre-Republican 
Turkey, seeking an Islamic alliance and thus turning away from the course set 
by Atatiirk? In other words, did Turkish policy in the Middle East represent a 
divergence from the Kemalist line or was it a convergence with the West in keeping 
with Atatiirk's own ambitions? 
3 
1.3 The importance of the Problem 
The importance of this study is heightened because its concern with a vital 
region in a turbulent period of history sheds light on the nature of international 
relationships, and in particular the nature of alliances and relations between big 
powers and small powers, between advanced industrial powers and developing na- 
tions. 
The importance of the region has already been noted but the significance of 
the 1950s for anyone seeking a key to understanding the changing pattern of rela- 
tionships merits a brief comment. The decade was important because: 
(1) it was a period of decolonisation. 
(2) it was the first decade of the Cold War, which continued with some fluctu- 
ations until 1990. 
(3) the British were ceding their supremacy in the region to the Americans, 
so anyone who wishes to understand current American involvement in the Middle 
East should turn to the 1950s to study how they took on that role. 
(4) it was a period of coups and revolutions such as the coup in Syria in 1951, 
the Egyptian and Lebanese coups in 1952, the coup against Musaddiq in 1953, the 
coups in Pakistan and Iraq in 1958 and in Turkey in 1960. 
(5) it was the decade that saw the most dramatic socio-economic and political 
effects of commercial oil production. 
(6) it was the decade in which Israel, having achieved its recognition, struggled 
successfully to survive and by various strategies established itself more firmly in 
the Middle East. 
4 
(7) it was the first decade of Turkish multi-party democracy. 
(8) it was the first decade of Turkey's integration with the West on the insti- 
tutional level as she became a member of Western organisations such as NATO, 
OECD, the Council of Europe, etc., and signed many international treaties binding 
Turkey to the West. 
5 
1.4 Methodology 
Following a study of the various theories relevant to this field of international 
relations, and after becoming more familiar with the overall history of the period, I 
began to search for and study the documentary evidence and to conduct interviews 
with individuals who had been personally involved in events of the period or who 
had subsequently examined them closely. 
British documents in the Public Record Office, Kew, constitute some of the 
most useful source material for this thesis. All relevant documents of the 1950s and 
also documents about the 1937 Sadabad Pact have been consulted in the course 
of this research. 
The American documents which are published by the US Government Printing 
Office under the title Foreign Relations of the US constitute a second important 
source of material for the thesis. These were obtained from the Library of Congress, 
from which I subsequently collected additional material during my visit to the 
United States in 1993. 
Visits to the Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and to the 
National Library in Ankara gave me access to records of 1950s' debates and dis- 
cussions in the Assembly and to official statements that had been issued by the 
Turkish authorities about their foreign policy in general and the Middle East in 
particular. 
The non- availability of Turkish records comparable to the British records that 
were accessible in Kew proved frustrating but their lack was to some extent reme- 
died by the interviews I conducted during my two visits to Turkey in the course of 
the research. 
6 
I was fortunate to be able to discuss the Baghdad Pact and Turkey's role within 
it with former Foreign Minister ihsan Sabri Ca'layangil. Sadly, shortly after I had 9 
interviewed him his health failed and he died a few months later. Another very 
valuable interviewee was Baha Ak§it from whom I gained a unique insight into the 
thinking of the Turkish President, Prime Minister and other government leaders 
of the 1950s with whom he had been on close terms both as a friend and in 
some instances as personal physician. Hayrettin Erkmen impressed me not only 
by the breadth of his personal involvement in the events of the period but also 
by the depth of his academic grasp of the situation which he was able to review 
dispassionately and objectively. Another interviewee with the benefit of a relevant 
academic training as a graduate of and later teacher in the Political Science Faculty, 
Ankara University, was Semih Giinver. He had a sensitive awareness of Turkish- 
Arab relations in the period under discussion. 
Some other interviewees proved singularly useful contributors by touching upon 
aspects that discretion has until recently banned from open discussion in Turkish 
academia: the Kurdish and the Islamic elements in the picture. In this respect, 
Melik Firat, grandson of Sheikh Sait who led the Kurdish rebellion in 1925, shed 
great light upon Kurdish attitudes and Islamic developments, as also did Glyasettin 
Emre, Kendal Nezan and Abbas Vali. By adding greatly to my understanding of 
the feel of the period and of the personalities who made the policies that are studied 
throughout this thesis these interviews well repaid the considerable time they took 
to conduct, transcribe and digest. 
At conferences, workshops, seminars and lectures I was able to make other less 
formal contacts with many of the leading scholars who have studied this period 
and these further enhanced my knowledge both in general and in detail and alerted 
7 
me to many important lines of inquiry. The wide range of views they represented 
helped me to see the subject from different angles and allowed me to see it in 
perspective. International conferences were particularly useful in this respect by 
reflecting different national and even different continental attitudes. BRISMES, 
EURAMES and MESA conferences all gave valuable opportunities for me to assess 
these attitudes and also to test my own ideas. 
8 
1. Out line 
Naturally, only a fraction of the massive amount of material assembled could 
actuafly be incorporated in the thesis. This has been organised to offer first a 
historical background, then a consideration of relevant theories before a close ex- 
arnination of Turkey's role and Arab reactions. Thus, Chapter II is devoted to 
theories relating to this aspect of international relations, Chapters III and IV cover 
the history of the region as the Ottoman Empire collapsed and the smaller nation 
states emerged, Chapters V, VI and VII examine Turkey's role in the abortive 
attempt to implement Western defence projects and the effects of these actions 
upon Turkey's relations with the West and the Middle Eastern countries, with 
special emphasis on neighbouring states and the USA. Chapter VIII presents the 
conclusions of the research and indicates areas for further study. 
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Chapter II 
THE RELEVANCE OF THE MODERN THEORIES TO 
THE BAGHDAD PACT 
2.1 General 
In this chapter, we shall attempt to analyse some of the alliance theories and 
the patron-client relation approach within the context of great power-small power 
relationships in order to understand Turkey's attempts to promote a Western spon- 
sored defence pact in the Middle East in the 1950s. After presenting a picture of 
the general post-World War II situation we shall concentrate on formation of al- 
liances and how they are maintained. Later, we shall see how these theories apply 
to the Middle East, with special emphasis on Turkey. In the second stage we shall 
discuss the patron-client relation approach, which makes it easier to understand 
the process of alliance formation and its consequences. We shall conclude the 
chapter with a consideration of the Turkish case. 
Before analysing the theoretical background of the Western defence initiatives 
intended to form an alliance with the help of regional countries, we should remind 
ourselves of the general picture of the post-war world. The world system which 
emerged in the late 1940s was characterised by substantial bipolarity unlike the 
19th century European multipolar system. As is often the case when power is di- 
vided almost equally between two major powers, those two powers would naturally 
disagree on many issues. One consequence of this disagreement in this instance 
was the formation of two major blocs, forming the poles of the bipolar system. The 
10 
radical change that took place in American foreign policy at the close of World 
War II - when the United States shifted from a policy of "going it alone" to its 
new policy of "going it with others" - was the most influential factor shaping the 
post-war international order. US dominance, coupled with the desire to "go with 
others", remains valid in the New World Order of the 1990s as well. The United 
States became first Powerful, then one of the superpowers, and finally, after the 
collapse of the Soviet bloc, it became the "only" power. 
When the US realised after World War II that an effective collective security 
system had not been established by the UN, she began to construct a vast system 
of alliances against the Soviet Bloc. Among those were SEATO and CENTO. ' 
Those alliances should therefore be seen in the light of American global strategy 
rather than as regional initiatives. ' 
Conflict had developed in the late 1940s over Berlin, Iran, Greece, Turkey and 
later in the 1950s over the Middle East. The West countered these Soviet threats 
by the formation of NATO as the major western alliance. The Soviet Union also 
set up the Warsaw Pact with her satellites. The outbreak of the Korean War in 
June 1950 spread the contest to Asia, and led the United States to encourage the 
establishment of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. 
These alliances were formalised during a period of ambivalent international 
Holsti, Ole R., et. al., Unity and Disintegratzon in International Alliances; Com- 
parative Studies, John Wiley and Sons, London, 1973, p. 34. 
2 The alliances or pacts concluded under pressure or threats from a great power (cat and mouse 
theories) are called Al Capone alliances. Examples are those concluded between the USSR and 
the Baltic States in September and October 1939 or most of the 329 bilateral treaties, agreements, 
and protocols signed by the USSR and the East European countries in the ten years preceding the 
Warsaw Pact or similar alliances formed under the United States dominance. If some of these Al 
Capone alliances had not been made by the "free choice" of the weak states, the USSR would have 
occupied their territory directly. Not only had the weak states no choice about signing the treaties 
offered them, they could not align themselves with any other great power. This is true of certain 
western alliances too but to a different degree, as evidenced by the British treatment of Iraq and 
Egypt in the 1950s. It was not completely successful though. 
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developments. On the one hand, the end of the Korean War and Stalin's death in 
1953 led to some relaxation of tension 3 and to the 1955 Geneva Summit Conference 
which brought western and Soviet leaders together for the first time since the 
Second World War. On the other hand, the Soviet response to the 1956 Hungarian 
uprising caused further shock waves. Nevertheless a partial detente was maintained 
throughout the remainder of the 1950s and Soviet Premier Khrushchev visited the 
USA in 1959. 
While the Atlantic Alliance reposed upon the firm foundation of shared per- 
ception of the communist threat and reliance upon NATO to avert it, no such 
general and reassuring statement can be made about the Western alliances with 
nations outside Europe. Considering Asia and the Middle East, we agree with 
Arnold Wolfers that, 
Asian alliances, of which SEATO and the Baghdad Pact provide the outstanding 
examples, are of an entirely different type. They have three characteristics in com- 
mon: complementary interests tending toward transformation into incompatible ones, 
a radically unequal distribution of benefits, and ideological emphasis. 
These alliances, on the face of them, were conceived in terms of common action on 
behalf of common interests. However, in view of the remoteness of the apparent casus 
foederis, that is, Communist attack upon a member, and of the virtual impossibility, in 
case of such an attack, for most members to act in common, commitment to common 
action has receded into the background and been distilled into an anti-Communist 
ideological commitment. Of the Asian members, this commitment requires nothing 
more than membership in the alliance; it requires no common objective, policy, and 
action - beyond anti-Communism at home and abroad. Yet of the Western members, 
especially the United States, it requires specific policies and actions on behalf of the 
Asian members. ' 
Therefore, one can argue that when the Soviet Union protested to the regional 
countries about their membership of a Western sponsored defence project, namely 
the Baghdad Pact, the West encouraged those countries to firmly resist. For ex- 
3 Although it had little effect on Turkish foreign policy, in July 1953 the Soviets also officially 
withdrew all claims to Turkish territory. Dallin, David J., 'Soviet 
Policy in the Middle East, ' 
Middle East Affairs, (November 1955), p. 340. 
Wolfers, Arnold, Alliance Policy in the Cold War, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1959, pp. 202-203. 
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ample, as Baki stated to the author, "for the first and last time the US reacted 9 
within 24 hours to the Soviet protest against Turkey during the Syrian Crisis of 
1957. 
The regional members were interested in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact 
primarily because of the economic, military, and political support they received 
from the United States. Many of them regarded their membership in these alliances 
to constitute a special claim upon the American economic aid, American arms, and 
American political support for their special national aspirations. In other words, 
the American support was the price the United States paid for having the receiving 
nations as allies. 
Interview with Bagm. 
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2.2 Alliance Theories 
An alliance is a formal agreement between two or more nations' to collabo- 
rate on national security issues. Some authors used the terms alliance, coalition, 
pact and bloc interchangeably, whereas others distinguish among them on various 
criteria. Nor is there agreement on classifying types of alliances. Most authors 
seem to agree that the adjectives "offensive" and "defensive" are too value-laden 
to be of much utility. "Defensive pact, " "neutrality and non aggression pact" and 
"entente" are also used widely, but not necessarily uniformly. But the differences 
are not merely semantic, as authors diverge in their fundamental conception of 
alliances. They are variously considered as techniques of statecraft, international 
organisations, or regulating mechanisms in the balance of power. ' 
Affiliation theories approach alliance formation from a sociometric perspective, 
addressing themselves to the similarities and differences of two or more nations as 
an element in their propensity to align. The initial premise is that nations are 
likely to be selective in their choice of allies, exhibiting a preference for partners 
with whom they share common institutions, cultural and ideological values, or 
economic interests. 
Nations feel the need for allies when they are not strong enough to face poten- 
tial dangers alone. In choosing their allies they are obliged to weigh both external 
and internal factors: they must consider the international regimes concerned and 
also their own government's ideology and their nation's political, economic and 
military situation. So, the alliance formation process becomes quite complicated 
depending on the international regimes involved, its costs, risks, advantages and 
6 Morganthau, Hans J., Politics among Nahons: the Struggle for Power and Peace, 
Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967, p. 405. 
7 Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., p. 3. 
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disadvantages since smaller members of an alliance face tremendous constraints 
due to their affiliation to it. These constraints have considerable effects on their 
behaviour and, to a certain extent, determine how they will respond to each other, 
within or outside alliances. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and bear in 
mind the post-war bipolar international regime, in another words, the cold war 
conditions when the communist threat seemed very real. ' 
In a bipolar system, weak states seek different ways and means to attract the 
support of the big powers and influence their foreign policy in their favour. Weak 
states can strengthen the commitment of a great power by establishing a sym- 
bolic value -a reputation as a "bastion of democracy, " a model of a "harmonious 
alliance" or a "staunch resister of aggression. " The weak state in the alliance 
gives the great power an opportunity to demonstrate a benevolent attitude to- 
ward all weak states. (Turkey, for example, gave the Americans an opportunity to 
project a positive American image and thus, committed America to carrying on 
its favourable policy towards her after the Truman Doctrine. ) 
As Michael Handel rightly put it, when "treaties are made by the 'free choice' 
of two unequal partners, the issues of maintaining the sovereignty, independence, 
and integrity of the weak state are secondary. "' In elaboration he states: 
In some instances, the relationship between a great power and a weak can take on 
a less favourable form from the weak state's point of view. The weak state can still get 
protection or material aid in time of need, but in return it has to render services which 
considerably limit its freedom of action and decision on a large variety of international 
issues. On almost every issue it has to follow the great power's lead and continuously 
try to please it. Sometimes the weak state is asked to do so; sometimes, on its own 
initiative, it tries to guess what the great power would like it to do. 'o 
Surprisingly this threat still seemed very real to many educated people, even some Turkish intel- 
lectuals during my fieldwork in 1992. 
Handel, M., Weak States zn the Internatzonal System, Frank Cass, London, 1981, p. 
122. 
10 Ibid., pp. 131-32. 
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The validity of this assessment was especially apparent during the cold war 
period. Turkey's attitude towards the Middle East and her voting patterns in the 
UN during this period constitute a good example. Indeed, the chief result of the 
Baghdad Pact, as far as the regional countries were concerned, was to bring the 
rivalry of the two blocs into the Middle East and to divide the regional countries 
into different groupings. 
In fact, a respectable argument is that alliances act as conduits to spread 
conflict to regions previously free from it. 
Kautilya said that "a state located between two powerful states should seek 
collaboration and protection from the stronger of the two. "" It was indeed the 
United States economic, military and political power that attracted most of the 
poorer countries hoping that they would be provided with generous United States 
economic aid. This is another fact that indicates the Third World countries were 
after "money" rather than anything else. 
That party which is the keener of the two to maintain an alliance is naturally 
placed in the weaker bargaining position. It is frequently the case that the stronger 
alliance partner is the one which is keener to maintain the alliance and thus, is in 
the weaker bargaining position. This was true of the Turkish- American alliance. 
Nations join forces in order to aggregate sufficient capabilities to achieve certain 
foreign policy goals. One of the most important motives for alliance formation is to 
prevent any nation or combination of countries from achieving a dominant position. 
For example, the Baghdad Pact was basically set up to prevent a probable Soviet 
dominance in the Middle East whose oil was vital to the West. 
11 Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., p. 1. 
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Some writers suggested a relationship between a nation's political structure and 
its alliance policy. Queen Margaret poetically recorded this point in Shakespeare's 
Henry VI: 
For how can Tyrants safely governe home, 
Unlesse abroad they purchase great allyance 
? 12 
There could be more than one reason prompting a state to align with one or 
more external powers. Some of them are as follows: 
Having faced a perceived threat, weak nations will seek strong alliance partners. 
The Turkish alignment with the United States can, among other things, be seen 
in this context as a consequence of the Soviet threat against Turkey. 
Accepting this general view, Fox suggests that the small states turn to the 
"lesser of the two evils". In her view, the main external source of a small state's 
strength in dealing with one great power was "the knowledge, open to both par- 
ties, that there were behind the small state one or more other great powers. "" 
Turkey's policy towards the USSR in the 1950s constitutes a good example. In 
fact, Turkey consulted her allies before answering the Soviet protests concerning 
Turkey's membership of the Baghdad Pact. 
According to Fox geography is also an important factor in calculations of the 
small state and great state. " Turkey's geostrategic location and its importance to 
the defence of the Western world was indeed one of the major factors producing 
the Turkish-Western alignment in the 1950s. 
The attraction of strong states for the weak is based primarily on economic 
12 Ibid., p. 12. 
13 FOX, P. 8. 
14 Fox, op. cit., p. 8. 
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need. Indeed, one of the reasons for Turkey to align with the United States was to 
improve her badly managed economy and modernise it while guaranteeing security 
of the country and westernising its society. 
A weaker power will be commonly anxious to seek alignment with geograph- 
icallY remoter powers. This is accidentally also true for the Turkish case, but a 
country does not align with the remoter power just because it is remote. Turkey 
chose the West instead of the USSR for ideological, historical, economic and mili- 
tary interests. 
However in some exceptional cases, the alliance between the weak and great 
powers may be useful for both sides. " For instance, the alliance between the 
United States and Israel is useful for both sides, but this is not the case for most of 
the alliances. This pattern of patron-client relations developed between Israel and 
the United States ever since its establishment. While both sides benefited from 
this type of mutual dependence, it seems as if Israel gained even more for services 
she rendered her patron, at least in the short run. 
As far as survival of an alliance is concerned we note that a rigid alliance 
system is likely to suffer much greater disintegration than a loose one. " Indeed 
the Baghdad Pact was relative to the CENTO more rigid and therefore very short- 
lived. With the exception of Iraq the same members set up a looser alliance, 
CENTO, and it survived up to the end of the 1970s, possibly because the latter 
had, among other things, looser objectives than the former. 
Maintenance of an alliance may be more difficult than its formation. There are 
many factors affecting durability of an alliance. For example, domestic instability is 
15 Han, Sungjoo, 'South Korea's Participation in the Vietnam Conflict: An Analysis of the United 
States-Korean Alliance, ' OrbiS, 21(1978), pp. 897-898. 
16 Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., p. 29. 
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the national attribute most often associated with alliance disintegration. Unstable 
regimes may experience radical changes in elite which, in turn, result in shifting 
patterns of alignment. Qassem's shift from the Western alliance, the Baghdad 
Pact, to a Non-Aligned bloc following his successful July revolution is a case in 
point. 
An alliance has traditionally been regarded as an instrument of policy by 
means of which a nation may augment its own capabilities. Among the benefits 
that should accrue from alliance membership are enhanced security from external 
threat, reduced defence expenditures, and possible side benefits such as economic 
aid and prestige. Most of the weak states agree to the unfavourable conditions 
of an alliance to achieve these objectives. However, great powers also have their 
own priorities, which are mostly contrary to those of the weak states. Such an 
alliance could not survive without external support or without domestic political 
support. For a regime with shaky popular support a strong ally may be a necessary 
condition for survival. It is a matter for speculation how long for instance Nuri 
Said or the Shah would have remained in power without full British and American 
support respectively. 
Domestic political support for an alliance is also an important factor. Nuri 
Said found that his domestic political support was withdrawn when he followed a 
foreign policy that was identified with an attitude of the West and by looking at 
the world from the viewpoint of London rather than Baghdad he gave too little 
emphasis to locally more important issues. He placed co-operation with the West 
ahead of greater Arab nationalism and paid for it with his life. The alliance of 
the free nations, in so far as it depends upon a common evaluation of the external 
threat, is tenuous, and vacillating. 
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The effectiveness of an alliance is directly proportional to the stability of its 
members. Since none of the regimes of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact 
was stable the Pact itself quickly disappeared from the scene with the collapse of 
one member, Iraq, as a result of the military coup in 1958. Both the Pakistani and 
Turkish governments were also ousted from power by the year 1960. 
The stronger the polarity of the international system, the greater the cohesion 
of component alliances; conversely, the weaker the polarity, the less the alliance 
cohesion. The alliances formed during the cold war generally survived longer than 
those of pre-World War II, because the polarity of the international system was 
not so strong before the war. 
It is often claimed that the generality or scope of an alliance is inversely re- 
lated to its durability. It is easier to maintain co-operation for specific purposes in 
geographically limited areas than in global alliances that make a substantial claim 
on resources and freedom of action. Thus, it may be argued that in reality the 
scope of the Baghdad Pact was too wide. Contrary to the assertions of its regional 
promoters that it was brought into being to further regional co-operation and de- 
velopment, it was actually intended to struggle against international communism. 
Such a broad aim, which was not also fully shared by the regional members, was 
inimical to its durability. 
Another factor playing a crucial role in forming as well as maintaining an al- 
liance is the ideology. Ideology provides the rationalisation for many alliances. 
Ideology may also play a part in sustaining or dissolving alliance bonds. Arguing 
that a similarity in values adds to the durability of alliances Holsti states: "there 
is widespread affirmation, even by those who tend to minimise the importance of 
ideology in alliance formation. ... The greater the need to maintain ideological 
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homogeneity in an alliance, the greater will be the tendencies toward disintegra- 
tion. " " 
In alliances which are ideologically homogeneous, there are fewer problems of 
performance than in those that are ideologically heterogeneous. It was for this 
reason that the British diplomats emphasised the point that they had to create an 
ideology for the Baghdad Pact. " 
External threat is generally linked to both alliance formation and alliance co- 
hesion. The logical extension of these observations is that as the bond of fear 
dissolves, so do alliances. Indeed one cannot just claim that the Baghdad Pact 
dissolved simply because Iraq left it. Although that played a very important part, 
the detente between the superpowers played a more crucial role than anything else. 
Effective agreement on disarmament measures has also been associated with 
the dissolution of alliances. Those who assume that present levels of military arse- 
nals are the major source of international tensions might conclude that a disarmed 
world would be free of the kinds of external threat which have often given rise to 
alliance formation. 
Other popular propositions concerning the duration of alliances are those that 
examine the effects of size, structure, and purposes on the duration and termination 
of alliances. 
Palmerston once noted that nations have neither permanent enemies nor per- 
manent allies, only permanent interests. More recently Fedder has asserted that 
enmities and alliances are not "particularly viable" components of the interna- 
17 Ibid., p. 30. 
18 Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957: Near East 
Region, Iran, Iraq, Vol-12,7 June 1956, Meeting of Ambassadors of Baghdad Pact Powers, 
Department of State, Washington D. C., p. 305. 
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tional system. Why do some coalitions endure for relatively long periods, whereas 
others are stillborn virtually from the moment of conception? This is mainly due 
to the combination of most, if not all, of the factors mentioned so far. 
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2.3 Application of Alliance Theories to the Middle East 
When the Baghdad Pact was created, the international scene was governed 
by the bipolar system. The West was at pains to convince Third World coun- 
tries that there was an international communist threat to their existence. On one 
hand, Great Britain and the US had to reconcile their own views on several points 
regarding how to keep the Middle East under the Western control, on the other 
hand, both together had to convince the Middle Eastern countries themselves that 
the Communist threat was of prime importance. Indeed as summarised earlier, 
the patterns of relationships between weak and greater powers are very much ap- 
plicable to our case study. 
As previously mentioned, treaties signed between two unequal partners push 
the sovereignty, independence and integrity of weak state into second place. This 
is applicable to the Turkish pattern of foreign policy in general and in the 1950s in 
particular. Turkish diplomats extended their support to the extent that it became 
so embarrassing for the Americans that they felt obliged to advise the Turks not to 
follow the United States in the UN so closely. " It is also clear in many other basic 
Turkish foreign policy issues such as the Korean war, Middle East and Balkan 
defence initiatives, Turkish policy toward Israel, North African and many other 
Middle Eastern countries, etc. It could be said that Turkey did not try to make 
her own separate and independent foreign policy especially in the 1950s but left 
this job to Washington. All Iýirkey did was to follow the steps of America in the 
manner described by Michael Handel above. 
As stated earlier, the formation of alliances usually but spread conflict to re- 
19 Handel, op. cit., pp. 131-132; Singer, Marshall, Weak States in a World of Powers, The 
Free Press, New York, 1972, p. 315, and McGhee, George, The US-Turkish-NATO Mid- 
dle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine and Turkey's NATO Entry 
Contained the Soviets, MacMillan, London, 1990, p. 140. 
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gions where the alliances are formed, as the establishment of the Baghdad Pact 
increased the pace of the Superpowers contest in the Middle East. The point is that 
it was not only the USSR that made Al Capone alliances with her friends. Most of 
the Western alliances such as SEATO, CENTO, Central American Organisation 
etc. could be placed in the same category. 
In Asia, all that the West wanted was the maximum number of Asian allies 
and all that the Asian allies wanted was the maximum amount of Western support 
for their own specific national objectives in so far as the two interests could be 
said to complement each other, provided these objectives were compatible with 
those of the other allies. This compatibility, in view of the nature of the inter- 
ests involved, is bound to be precarious. Such alliances are bound to disintegrate 
whenever a latent conflict of interests between two allies or an ally and another 
nation becomes acute. The conflicts between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, 
between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus, and Iraq and Israel over the Palestinian 
issue are cases in point. In consequence, the United States engaged, as it were, in 
an armaments race with itself by proxy, its left hand supporting Pakistan by virtue 
of the alliance, its right hand aiding India by virtue of its vital interests. When the 
Iraqi coup occurred, the Baghdad Pact ceased to exist. Although it was succeeded 
by CENTO, the expectations from this new organisation were different. Whereas 
the Baghdad Pact had been exclusively military and political, CENTO's range of 
interests was wider and it was increasingly concerned with regional development 
and cultural activities, and the political and military expectations were consider- 
ably reduced. In this way it was hoped to keep the organisation in existence and 
enhance its standing. 
As stated earlier, the Asian pacts were meant to serve the American cause in the 
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first place. Commenting on the first step of the Baghdad Pact, the Turco-Pakistani 
agreement, an American Joint Chiefs of Staff paper mentioned that it was mainly 
a political ploy to awaken both states to "common external dangers and internal 
threats of subversion. "" Linked to NATO by Turkey and to SEATO by Pakistan, 
the Baghdad Pact was meant to close a gap in the encircling containment of the 
Communist bloc of nations. Although it was intended to promote good relations 
with the Arab states of the Middle East, all of them except Iraq regarded the 
Baghdad Pact as an effort to disrupt Arab unity, if not to perpetuate British 
influence in the area. The United States was not a member but increased its 
support for the Pact and its efforts to reconcile the aspirations of Arab nationalism 
with its own determination to limit the penetration of Russian influence into the 
Middle East. This met with indifferent success. " Moreover, the Middle East 
Resolution, or Eisenhower Doctrine, of March 1957 - by which the United States 
sought to repair the damage wrought by the fiasco of the British and French 
invasion of Egypt in the Suez war of October- November 1956 and their ignominious 
withdrawal under combined pressure from the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
the British Commonwealth - has been described by the Secretary of State as having 
"as much effectiveness as membership in the Baghdad Pact organisation. "" 
As far as the Baghdad Pact was concerned, Ayesha Jalal claimed that it was 
a United States creation to oust the United Kingdom from the region, it was 
not a joint, co-ordinated project against the USSR. " In fact, this is an extreme 
20 Joint chiefs of staff paper 2099/374,12.5.1954, cited in Aronson, Geoffrey, 
From Sideshow to 
Center Stage: US Policy toward Egypt 1946-1956, Lynne Rinner Publishing, Boulder, 
1986, p. 87. 
21 Jalal, Ayesha, 'Towards the Baghdad Pact; South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 
1947-1955, ý International History Review, (August 1989), p. 433. 
22 Dulles, J. Foster, New York Times, 31 January 1958. 
23 Jalal, Towards, op. cit., p. 433. 
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exaggeration of United States success. It is true that there was not complete 
agreement between Britain and the USA on every point regarding the Baghdad 
Pact, 2" but this does not suggest that the rivalry between the two was so high. 
Neither the British nor the regional members shared the American view that the 
Pact had to be set up solely against the USSR. What happened was that every 
nation thought of its own national interests and acted accordingly. That is, the 
United States expected to use the Baghdad Pact to contain USSR, the United 
Kingdom thought of using it to preserve, if not to promote the British interests 
in the region and the regional countries optimistically hoped to acquire through 
it more economic aid and political support mainly from the United States and 
Britain. 
It seems difficult, therefore, to see how the Baghdad Pact could have added 
to the security of the Middle East. Turkey, a member of NATO, had no real in- 
terest in propping up a decidedly inferior regional security organisation. Although 
Pakistan and Iran did have such an interest, nothing much came of their efforts 
to streamline CENTO and give it the same standing as NATO. And if General 
Qassem's coup of July 1958 in Iraq is any indicator, it did not help ensure the sta- 
bility the United States was seeking either. The reason why Turkey was involved 
in these initiatives could not be the fact that Turkey expected this regional defence 
organisation to guarantee her security. In fact, Turkey was simply asked to cover 
the "imperialistic face" of the West in the region and therefore it was acting on 
behalf of the West as well evidenced by then the Commander in Chief of 
Pakistan, 
General M. Ayub Khan's request. He "wanted Turkey to sponsor Pakistan as a 
member to the proposed command, as otherwise 
Middle East states, not to men- 
24 Ibid., p. 411. 
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tion the people of Pakistan, might interpret the decision as evidence of a British 
effort 'at consolidating ... their own imperial interests' . 1)25 So, it is clear that the 
regional countries were aware of the point that Turkey's duty or involvement was 
to be intermediary between the West and the regional countries and to create an 
image that this defence initiative was not western, alien or external but indigenous 
and regional so that it could be more appealing to the regional countries. However, 
for opponents of the West, Nasser's counter attacks made it clear that the Turkish 
rulers were puppets in the hands of the Americans and they were acting on their 
behalf and thus, the Baghdad Pact was a stillborn alliance. It would be an impor- 
tant omission if we did not mention one point here: Turkish involvement in the 
western defence initiatives in the Middle East was not due to any religious motive. 
Being a secular state and having the Western support and trust in this respect, " 
Turkey was not turning to the Middle East for religious motives but she was urged 
to use this means to strengthen the organisation later when Britain realised that 
the alliance was in need of an ideology to counterbalance the communist ideology. 
It may be worth noting that in many instances these alliances brought into 
partnership with the USA states that had very different systems of government 
and traditions markedly at variance with the democratic and human rights ideals 
that the US preached, yet those states were not obliged to conform to the norms 
of Western society, arguably because the US found it easier to deal with autocratic 
rulers than with liberal democratic regimes, especially in the Middle East. 
As stated earlier, the keener party is always in a weaker position and this party 
25 FO, 371,92876,17.12.1951. 
26 Britain was encouraging Turkey to take part in every organisation of Islamic Countries so that 
they would be sure that those establishments would be on secular grounds and not Islamic. So, 
the Turks were to be there not to launch an 'Islamic Union' rather to prevent any genuine 'Union 
of Islamic Countries', if there was any possibility of this. See Ibid. op. loc. 
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is usually the greater power. This was true of the Turkish- American alliance. Al- 
though some people thought Turkey was crucial to the US containment policy 
and so, theoretically, was in the stronger bargaining position, Turkey could not 
exploit this position, in part because of the ineptness of Turkish politicians whose 
eagerness to foster the alliance made Turkey the keener partner, and in part be- 
cause gratitude and unforced generosity are not a feature of international politics; 
American negotiators did not yield more than they were compelled to and Turkish 
negotiators failed to make them offer as much as might have been possible. 
Although the U-2 crisis in 1960 and the erection of Berlin Wall in 1961 appeared 
to revive the cold war again, the Cuban missile crisis persuaded both the Soviet and 
the American leaders to recognise the dangers of nuclear war. This realisation was 
apparently reflected in the signing in 1963 of the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
the first in a series of limited but nevertheless significant arms control agreements 
between the great powers. "The overall trend toward increased detente on a number 
of issues has been accompanied by a change in the structure of the international 
system. "" The tight bipolar system which emerged in the late 1940s became looser 
and consequently polycentrism began to take place in the international system. 
27 Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., pp. 89-90. 
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2.4 Patron-Client Relation Approach 
The patron-client relationship is one type of informal relationship between un- 
equal partners. The main characteristics of patron-client relations as they appear 
in the literature on this topic can be summarised as follows: 
1. They are instrumental relations between actors of unequal power and status (a 
superior patron and an inferior client) They are based on reciprocity (as distinguished 
from pure coercion) in the exchange of material goods or protection for services, loy- 
alty, and deference to the patron. Most often there is an imbalance in these relations 
favouring the patron, despite the reciprocity involved in the process. The relation in its 
pure form is conditional in character. 
2. The exchange is mutually valued by both parties. Coercion, manipulation, 
and authority can exist implicitly in the background but are not dominant. the power 
imbalance is not so great as to permit a pure command relationship. The relations are 
a balance between voluntarism and coercion. 
3. The Patron: The bargaining power of the patron is by definition greater than 
that of the client. The resources he has and the protection he can offer usually have a 
strong monopolistic element. The patron assembles clients on the basis of his ability to 
assist them. 
4. The Client: The client usually has a moral or contractual obligation which binds 
him to the patron. His position is determined by (a) the availability of other patrons 
who can render the same protection or material support. (b) and the mobility of the 
clients between alternative patrons. (c) the degree to which the patron is dependent on 
his client's services. " 
In fact, one can analyse alliance formation within the framework of a patron- 
client relationship. This makes it easier to perceive the process of formation and 
its consequences. The many reasons why weak states align with a great power 
include those on historical (colonial), economic, politico-military, ideological, psy- 
chological considerations. Depending on whichever reason is valid for formation 
of a particular alliance, the nature and the type of relationship between the client 
and patron may vary. For example, the patron-client relationship between former 
colonies and coloniser powers differs from other types of relationships such as those 
which were, say, generated from ideological or economic reasons. What might be 
28 Haudel, op. cit., p. 132. 
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termed "psychological reasons" may also play a part in the alliance formation pro- 
cess. For example, for a weak state to find a patron is perhaps unconsciously, 
"to find a scapegoat -a foreign country that can be blamed for domestic failures. 
Identifying one's state with a prestigious patron state can also be seen as a gratify- 
ing experience, permitting the weak country to enjoy the great power's reputation 
vicariously. "" Pakistan, Iraq or Iran might resent patronage by a country such 
as Turkey, whose standard of living is not much higher than their own, but they 
might accept as natural the patronage of a distant, materially richer and culturally 
different country, such as Great Britain, the USSR or the United States. Most of 
the Middle Eastern countries resented Saudi, Iraqi or Egyptian interference, but 
they all sought Russian or American patronage. 
When the relationships and alliance systems of great powers and weak states 
are seen in light of the patron-client model, it becomes apparent that both sides 
do benefit, even if asymmetrically. And just as in reality weak and powerful states 
exhibit overlapping characteristics and do not rigidly conform to ideal types, so 
too not only weak states, but also middle or even great powers (Britain, Canada, 
Australia) may become client states. Not infrequently Hegel's dialectic of "master" 
and "servant" persists, with the master needing the servant's services, and being 
to some degree dependent on the servant . 
30 However, in our case study, none of 
the regional members could be regarded as middle powers. Therefore, we should 
continue to discuss only the small power-great power relations and their alliances. 
Annette Baker Fox regards the small powers as "local powers whose demands 
are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas. "" More comprehen- 
29 Ibid., p. 148. 
30 Herz, John H., International Politics in the Nuclear Age, Colombia University Press, 
New York, 1967, p. 143. 
31 Fox, Annette B., The Power of Small States: Diplomacy in the World War II, 
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sively, Rothstein defines a small state as "a state which recognises that it cannot 
obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fun- 
damentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to 
do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also 
be recognised by the other states involved in international politics. "" 
Given the small states' general lack of military strength against the superpow- 
ers, they trade their political favours for superpower support. By becoming active 
and willing participants in superpower competition, they try to gain influence be- 
yond their own capabilities. In fact, Turkey's foreign policy towards the Soviet 
bloc and Non-Aligned movement in the 1950s constitutes a good example in point. 
Thus, a patron-client relationship is a form of bilateral interaction, but it differs 
from the other types by the dominance of several elements. First, the client state 
cannot, by itself, guarantee its own security and become a major power in the 
international system. Second, the client nation plays an important part in patron 
competition. The more benefit the patron obtains over its competitor through its 
association with its client, the more the patron state will value the relationship, 
usually in apparent contradiction to the material gains that the patron derives. 
Indeed, compared with advantages the US gained from her association with Turkey, 
the material gains of the US were little. Nevertheless, she attributed a considerable 
importance to Turkey, because Turkey's alignment with the West played a crucial 
role in the contest between the Western and Eastern blocs. 33 
Shoemaker suggests that patron-client relationships are primarily aimed at 
Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1959, p. 3. 
32 Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers, Columbia University Press, New York, 
1968, p. 29. 
33 Interview with Ak§it. 
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enhancing their respective security. There might be some other aspects, but "the 
security transactions are the most evident and pervasive. " He believes that arms 
transfers are a "powerful tool of influence" for the patron state. 34 
We agree with Shoemaker who argues that "when the ideological goals domi- 
nate the patron's hierarchy, it will seek to present the client to the outside world 
as a showplace of the patron's ideology and political system. "" Despite Turkey's 
Muslim population, secular nature and pro-western ideology has been always pre- 
sented to other regional especially Islamic countries as an "attractive model" to 
emulate. 
The primary difference between small and great states, which generally holds 
true regardless of time, situation or countries involved, is the scope their intention. 
While great powers "broaden their gaze to sweep the whole international arena, 
and thus their focus upon a particular small power tended to be fleeting and not 
especially directed to the particular interests of that state, " in contrast to this, 
the small powers, "were primarily concerned with their own fate, regardless of the 
larger constellations of power over which they could have no control. "" 
As regards to strategic goal of the patron, Shoemaker argues that the patron 
usually "seeks to control a vital piece of terrain owned by the client ))37 to gain some 
military advantages over the patron's opponents. This was the case in US search 
for an alliance in the Northern Tier in the early 1950s. The patron state may also 
seek to control a resource that is vitally important to its adversary, which was the 
case in Middle Eastern oil. 
34 Shoemaker, C. C. and Spanier, J., Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Cri- 
sis in the Nuclear Age, Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 15. 
35 Ibid., p. 18. 
36 Fox, op. cit., P. 181. 
37 Ibid., p. 19. 
32 
However, the client's goals substantially differ from those of the patron. To 
the client, the relationship may be its means of national survival, which appeared 
to be the case for Turkey after the Soviet territorial demands following the Second 
World War. Therefore, "client goals center around the nature of the threat that 
the client believes exists to its nation and government. ))38 
As Shoemaker suggests, in a high threat environment the client will be much 
more willing to meet the patron's demands. A desperate client under conditions of 
high threat "may be willing to grant considerable concessions to the patron, which 
it would not extend under less threatening conditions. "" 
Robert Rothstein is also concerned with small powers that "feel that they are 
potentially or actually threatened by the policies of the Great Powers. ""' 
We are sympathetic to David's overall claim that domestic threats represent 
an important source of external alignments, but we broaden our focus to include 
dynamics rooted in the domestic political economy. Domestic threats sometimes 
could be a social, ethnic, sectarian or religious upheaval, and sometimes economic 
mismanagement or any kind of economic problem as was in the case of Turkey in 
the 1950s. 
In support of the traditional alliance theory, Thucydides, for example, argues 
that mutual fear of a third party is the only solid basis on which an alliance 
can be formed and sustained, and Liska argues that "Alliances are against, and 
only derivatively for, someone or something. ""' In the face of external threats, 
38 Ibid., p. 21. 
39 Ibid., p. 22. 
40 Rothstein, op. cit., p. 4. 
41 Levy, Jack S. and Barnett, Michael M., 'Alliance Formation, Domestic Political Economy, and 
Third World Security, ' Journal of South East Asia Studies, (Winter 1990), pp. 21-22. 
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states seek alliances for the primary purpose of enhancing their effective military 
capabilities through combination with others. 
42 
The theoretical literature has always recognised that alliances involve costs and 
risks as well as benefits and that there are alternative means for meeting external 
security threats. Balance of Power theorists often note that states can rely on 
internal military preparations or external alliances. "' 
The alliances are formed to deal with external security threats. But political 
leaders form external alliances or alignments for another reason besides the security 
guarantees that they provide; namely to secure resources that they urgently need to 
deal with pressing internal problems and to reinforce their own hold on positions of 
political power. Allies often provide economic resources that benefit the economy 
as a whole or certain supporters of the regime in power, or military resources that 
can be used for internal as well as external security purposes. The resource- securing 
function of external alignments is particularly important for Third World leaders 
and its neglect in the theoretical alliance literature is a serious omission. 44 
Flow of aid from a great power to a small country is quite likely to make it 
more dependent and after some time a client state. George S. Harris, an American 
specialist on Turkey, made this point clear: "in a situation in which a flow of 
material aid plays a central part in the relationship between two states, it is always 
hard to escape entirely the suspicion that the smaller has become the client or 
satellite of the larger. ""' 
42 Ibid., p. 2 1. 
43 Ibid., P. 25. 
44 Holsti, Ole R., op. cit., p. 27. 
45 Harris, G. S., Troubled Alliance, Washington D. C., American Enterprise Institute, 1972, p. 
204. 
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Voting patterns of the UN provide another indicator of pattern-client relation- 
ships involving the US. Many analysts have used cross-sectional research designs 
to demonstrate that the UN voting patterns of states linked to America through 
trade or aid are likely to resemble the voting patterns of the United States. From 
this evidence they concluded that 
weaker states abandon their preferences on Foreign-Policy matters and instead seek 
the approval of the United States, anticipating that future American policy will reward 
and punish states in proportion to their compliance, thereby justifying and reinforcing 
the compliance logic. Thus, this theory simultaneously explains the behaviours of both 
the dominant and dependent state in an asymmetrical dyad. "' 
As will be explained later, Turkish foreign policy behaviours after Turkey's 
membership to NATO constitute an important example of such a case" that weaker 
states abandon their preferences on foreign policy matters and instead seek the 
approval of a greater power. 
The foreign policy behaviour of dependencies is viewed as partial payment in 
exchange for the maintenance of benefits they derive from their economic ties to 
the dominant country. 
As between individuals, so also patron-client relations between states may be of 
different degrees of intensity, dependence, and exploitation. They can range from 
an almost symbiotic relationship to a situation of almost unilateral exploitation. " 
In international relations, the main characteristic of the relations between pa- 
trons and clients is their informality; they are much less rooted in tradition and 
less uniform in character than formal alliances. In every instance, however, the 
client state makes decisions regarding its foreign policy with one ear to the wishes 
of the great power. These wishes do not have to be explicitly or formally presented 
46 Moon, op. cit., pp. 297-329. 
47 See the section on Conclusion with Special Emphasis on Turkey. 
48 Handel, op. cit., P. 133. 
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to the client. As Handel noted, on most occasions patron-client relations in the 
international arena of the 1970s were characterised by the tacit understanding of 
the client state, which knows what is expected of it by the great power and adjusts 
its policy accordingly. 
In the ideal form of patron-client relations (i. e. the non-coercive form), the 
client state voluntarily sets its own limits on action and makes decisions in sup- 
port of the great power, hoping by such acts either to get immediate positive 
rewards from the great power or to accumulate goodwill and credit for the fu- 
ture. " Therefore, the relationship between the United States and Turkey is not 
ideal and it is not at a level of a middle power and great power relationship. Thus, 
although it slightly changes from time to time, it is more dependent than a middle 
country is dependent on a great power. 
While great powers exert great efforts to turn independent countries into their 
client states, the over-zealous loyalty of a client state can sometime become em- 
barrassing. Marshall Singer cites the following example: 
I was once told by a representative of one of the Powers at the UN that he wished 
the delegates of his country's associated states would not always vote with his country 
on every minor issue, because it exposed those delegates to charges of being 'satellites' 
of the Power, and created the impression that the Power was forcing them to vote as 
they did. He cited a number of instances in which he was approached by delegates from 
weaker associated states asking him how his country intended to vote on an issue before 
they would decide how their delegation would vote. 'O 
This was similar to the attitude of the Turkish delegates to the UN in the 
1950s. " 
A client state behaves like a politically penetrated system. It takes decisions 
on foreign affairs as if a foreign state were participating in 
its decision-making 
49 Ibid., p. 134. 
So Singer, op. cit., p. 315. 
51 McGhee, op. cit., P. 140. 
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process. By its own choice it sacrifices some freedom of action. In such relationships 
the known "leader [patron] may use military bases supplied by smaller allies for 
operations that have nothing to do with alliance business and which these allies 
may see as disadvantageous to themselves. " 52 
In extreme cases a weak state may be militarily or politically penetrated to the 
extent that the great power is actually present in the decision-making process; but 
then the influence of the great power is gained by direct threats or coercion. Such 
circumstances are not illustrative of patron-chent relations but of protectorates, 
puppet states, or satellites. " The weak state does not enjoy the benefits of recip- 
rocal aid, nor can it decide to switch to another patron or quit the "arrangement" 
which has been forced upon it. In such cases the great power usually employs its 
own local agents, quislings, or parties. This was true in the Soviet satellite system 
and also in Iraq and Iran and many other countries that were dependent on the 
West. 
The first question that a client state must ask itself in formulating policy is: 
how will this affect relations with our patron? Rose suggested that for Nepal, 
it was impossible to have even an autonomous foreign policy and she could not 
decide on any matter in her own that might have affected her relations with India. "' 
Indeed, it is hard to suggest that any regional member dared to pursue a foreign 
policy that contradicted that of the United States in the 1950s. Turkey had always 
been repeating the slogan "peace at home, peace in the world", which is an empty 
expression and means nothing in reality. In fact, as will be explained in the fourth 
52 Knorr, Klaus, Power and Wealth: the Political Economy of International Power, 
MacMillan, London, 1973, p. 28. 
53 Bettes, R. R., 'The European Satellite States, ' International AffairS, 21(January 1945), pp. 
15-29. 
54 Rose, Leo E., Nepal's Strategy for Survival) University of California Press, Berkeley, 1971, 
p. 2 0. 
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chapter, Turkey did not attribute much importance to it when its national interests 
were not in conflict with those of the West, and expanded into the Sanjak of 
Alexandretta and Northern Cyprus. 
The patron sometimes may choose one of the client countries to play a "patron" 
role in the region as well. This can be done in different ways. Therefore, patron- 
client relations are not limited to the relations between a great power and a weak 
state. Turkey's attempt to play a regional role in the 1950s might be seen in this 
context, because, as stated earlier, Turkey did not have any particular interest in 
the region to follow such a policy. This patron-client relationship may emerge as 
a result of a different motive as well. One can often find dual layers of patronage. 
Sometimes weak states can try to behave as patrons of even weaker states. For 
instance, Egypt, at times a British client, tried to control and lead the Arab world. 
From time to time, Turkish leaders felt similar anxieties. Supported by the West, 
Turkey tried to lead the regional countries in the Middle East in the 1950s. (With 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, once again Turkey began to try to play this role 
through RCD (Regional Co-operation for Development) in the East and Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation Region, while she herself is an American client. ) 
Although none of thq regional members of the Baghdad Pact was incontestably 
a middle-ranking power, some aspects of patron-client relationship between the 
middle and great powers help us to understand some acts of Turkish authorities 
as they have some similarities. Compared with small or great powers, there is 
obvious difficulty in finding a simple and satisfactory definition of a middle power. 
On the whole, they exhibit the characteristics of the weak states, rather than those 
of the great powers. They can be divided into two categories: those with relatively 
small populations, but highly developed and efficient economies and 
those which 
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are highly populated but economically less developed. " VeUut describes them as 
44a state with a population of at least 50 million or a GNP of at least 10 billion 
dollars (as of 1958). " 
Carsten Holbraad defines them as "a state occupying an intermediate position 
in a hierarchy based on power ... a country much stronger than the small nations 
though considerably weaker than the principal members of the states system. "" 
When the patron-client relationship is between super or great powers and mid- 
dle powers, then the relationships are not so intense. They are to a large extent 
a function of the feeling of constraint on the part of the middle power. Finding 
itself following too closely the policy of a super power, the middle power becomes 
afraid of losing its own identity (which is always a psychological problem present 
in patron-client relations), because it has not developed its own distinct foreign 
policy. The best examples of this type of relationship are Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand. No American pressure was necessary to encourage New Zealand's 
participation in Vietnam. Like the Australians, New Zealand wanted to "invest 
in the future" by morally obliging the United States to come to its aid should 
the need arise. Indeed many clients of the United States furnished token aid to 
demonstrate their good will, hoping later to cash in on the so-called "Lafayette 
Syndrome. " 
Aside from the contradictory conclusions, a serious difficulty with most of 
these theories about the consequences of alliances is that virtually all of them are 
based on limited evidence, sometimes only on a single case. As some evidence 
5*5 Handel, op. cit., p. 23. 
56 Vellut, Jean-Luc., 'Smaller States and the Problem of War and Peace: Some Consequences of the 
Emergence of Smaller States in Africa, ' 
The Journal of Peace Research, 4(1967), p. 255. 




could be adduced for each theory, it is difficult to claim that they are wrong. The 
most obvious conclusion that emerges from this survey is that the literature on 
alliances is marked by competing explanations, none of which appears sufficient 
for a general theory, or to explain contradictory findings. Whether discussing the 
formation, performance, termination, or effects of alliances, we have repeatedly 
cited propositions which allegedly explain some fundamental issue, only to find 
that its exact opposite has been proposed by a different theorist. Indeed, it is not 
impossible to find contradictory propositions coexisting in the same source. 
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2.5 Conclusion with Special Emphasis on Turkey 
The Turks considered their alignment with the West in general and the United 
States in particular in the light of their long-pursued efforts of modernisation or 
Westernisation, which commenced during the Ottoman Empire and attributed 
a paramount importance to it. However, it was America's strategic interests in 
the region that were of prime concern to the Americans, the Westernisation of the 
Turkish society by itself was far less important for the Americans. In contrast with 
the values the United States stand for, she extended her recognition to the junta 
following the 1960 coup and more ironically promised more economic aid. This 
suggests that when the Americans opposed the Democrat Party for undemocratic 
laws and practices and economic policies it was not due to the American idealistic 
liberal and democratic values but to pursuit of perceived American interests. The 
United States just used the democratic shortcomings as a pretext to cut the flow 
of aid to the Democrat Turkey. When the United States finds a regime that does 
not suit her own national interest she cites the undemocratic social and political 
conduct, and undesirable economic policy of that country as a pretext to put her 
on a black list until she forces that country to concede. 
Despite a very clear pro-western foreign policy of the Democrat Party, it was 
unusual for the Turkish intellectuals or politicians to criticise the "state policy" 
even in the 1950s, most probably due to the tradition of one party rule era when 
the opposition were regarded as traitors should they criticise foreign policy or any 
fundamental domestic policy. Starting from the late 1950s Turkish intellectuals 
and politicians began to increase their criticism of the government's extreme and 
blind pro-western foreign policy. Many Turkish intellectuals and politicians mainly 
from the left wing believed that since the Truman Doctrine, Turkish foreign pol- 
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icy was left to American pohcy-makers' desires and decisions. They thought that 
Turkey seemed to have no foreign policy interests outside her alliance with the 
West and she just followed her Western allies' decisions and actions. This policy 
was especially clear in the 1950s. " In support of this view, Feroz Ahmad claimed 
that "throughout the fifties, Ankara pursued the foreign policy objectives set in 
Washington or London with conviction and without complaint. "" Vali made this 
point quite clear when he claimed how the Turks were wrong in identifying their 
national interests with those of the United States and not questioning foreign pol- 
icy issues according to their own national interests. He went further to suggest 
that "Turkey seemed to feel that ... what the United States wanted should not be 
questioned. "" Turkish academic, Mehmet G6nliibol levelled a much sharper accu- 
sation against the Turkish foreign policy decision makers: "Turkey found herself 
following the policies of the United States almost step by step both within and 
outside NATO, thus, reducing herself to the position of a satellite. "" 
The first public criticism in Turkey against American influence on Turkey ap- 
peared in 1959 concerning the bilateral agreement of 1959 between Turkey and the 
United States, which aimed to secure American assistance in the case of commu- 
nist aggression against Turkey. This agreement was a natural consequence of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, which promised American support to the Middle Eastern 
countries against any internal and external communist subversive actions. 
As will be seen below, some leftist Turkish intellectuals and politicians such as 
58 Uslu, Nasuh, Factors Affecting Turkish Ameri, can Relations 1960-1975, Ph. D. The- 
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60 Vali, op. cit., p. 71, and 356. 
61 G6nliibol , 
Mehmet, 'NATO, USA and Turkey, ' in Karpat, K. H., Turkey's Foreign Policy 
in Transition, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1975, p. 22. 
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Mehmet Ali Aybar, ilhan Selýuk and A-5. Esmer were of the view that Turkey was 
obliged to maintain a large army above its capacity just to defend American and 
NATO interests in the Middle East. While some argued that Turkey was forced 
by the United States to keep a large army beyond her needs, others suggested that 
Turkey followed such a policy regardless of American pressure just to please her 
allies, thus, to have an important place for herself within NATO or in the eyes of 
the American authorities. Perusal of American documents now available reveals 
that Turkey did indeed maintain much larger armed forces than the external threat 
really justified. 
One of the most repeated accusations concerned Turkey's military dependence, 
which appeared in the late 1950s and especially following the Johnson letter in 
1964, was that she was not able to use her army and arms for her own interests 
since her army was committed to NATO and arms were bought from the United 
States under certain conditions. 
Accusations were made about economic dependence as well. These could be 
summarised as follows: 
(a) The chief beneficiaries of American economic aid to Turkey were pro- 
American Turkish economic elite, multinational and American companies such 
as the consortium, which was established by several countries to supply economic 
aid to Turkey and the American aid agency, AID, and helped them to exploit 
Turkey's economic resources and direct the Turkish economy and involve other 
domestic affairs. 
(b) The Turkish economy came under the influence of the American economy 
as a result of American aid and foreign investment. The Americans deliberately 
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tried to prevent the development of the Turkish economy and especially its indus- 
trialisation. 
(c) The United States used its aid to Turkey as a lever to force Turkey to fulfil 
some American demands internally or externally. 
Many Turkish critics of America noticed that America's most important means 
of maintaining Turkey under her control were bilateral agreements signed since the 
Truman Doctrine. For example, the leader of the Turkish Labour Party, M. Ali 
Aybar claimed that these agreements put Turkey in a position of a dependent 
state. " 
Some even began to claim that almost all Turkish state activities fell under 
the full control of America. Vali said that in order to achieve military security 
and economic development the Turks threw themselves into the arms of their 
rich friend, the United States. " Another Cumhuriyet columnist, ilhan Selýuk 
claimed that Turkey was under the American occupation with American companies 
and experts in every corner of the country. 64 In the Turkish National Assembly 
Turkish Labour Party MP Muzaffer Karinca noted that "Turkey was caught in 
the net of American imperialism falling under American military and economic 
influence. " He also claimed that "Turkey's foreign policy was determined according 
to American foreign policy, her defence strategy was formed in accordance with 
American defence strategy. 
))65 
A. $. Esmer, a professor of international relations in the Faculty of Political 
Science, Ankara, succinctly expressed his views on Turkey's foreign policy of the 
62 Aybar, M. Ali, 'Dil Politikamiz Nasil Olmahdir, ' interview by Y. Qetiner, Cumhuriyet, 17.10.1964. 
63 Vali, op. cit., p. 116. 
64 Selquk, ilhan, Tencere: Sivri, ' Cumhurzyet, 17.08.1965. 
65 MMTD, term 2, meeting 1, vol. 4, pp. 469-470. 
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1950s: 
[Following Turkey's alliance with the USA and her membership to NATO] we signed 
numerous bilateral agreements with the United States and left our business in her 
hands. Our military is under the command of NATO, our bases are in the hands of 
the Americans, our security is dependent on America, our economic development is 
dependent on American aid. We saw it as our duty to support France, America and Britain in their dealings with the problems in Algeria, Vietnam and Suez. We also felt 
it our responsibility to defend Western colonialism in the Bandung Conference of Non- 
Aligned countries. In the UN voting we look at the arm of the American representative. 
We have not got the initiative in foreign policy. " 
Turkish authorities, categorically rejected these accusations and denied that 
Turkey was an American satellite. Their denials were so frequent that one could 
easily wonder why Turkish officials needed to issue so many. They only increased 
the suspicions of Turkey's dependence on America not otherwise, although even 
some American Ambassadors helped the Turkish authorities in this respect by 
making some statements that Turkey was not an American satellite. " In fact, the 
Turks' understanding of alliance responsibility prompted them to display loyalty 
through several statements and acts which could also be interpreted by the oppo- 
sition as following in the footsteps of their American patron. It is interesting to 
note here that this active involvement with the West caused considerable contro- 
versy. On one hand, the Democrats claimed that their active western alignment 
policy was necessary to allow Turkey to overcome her traditional inferiority com- 
plex and take her place at the heart of the world politics. That is, Turkey should 
involve herself in every international problem that the big powers were involved 
in. Indeed, it was, among other things, this Democrat mentality that sent the 
Turkish soldiers to Korea where hundreds of them died. On the other hand, the 
Republicans claimed that the Democrat Party rulers, after the self-restrained and 
reasonably independent period of Kemal and 
in6nii, obeyed the western imperial- 
66 Esmer, A. $., 'Uyduluk Siyasetine Son, ' Milliyet, 24.12.1965 and Uslu, op. loc. 
67 McGhee, op. cit., p. 140. 
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ist countries, especially the United States, treated them as masters, and violated 
the sovereignty and independence of the state by bilateral agreements, bases and 
laws for petroleum and encouragement of foreign investment. 
As a result of the widespread criticism of bilateral agreements the Turkish gov- 
ernment eventually felt obliged to do something about them in mid-1960s. Turkish 
rulers could not escape from the influence of the leftist media and public opinion 
and asked the Americans to reconsider the agreements to make some amendments 
in favour of Turkish sovereignty. So, this admission of the Turkish government of 
some important mistakes in making and implementing these agreements could and 
should be taken as a proof that the Democrat Party was indeed wrong in following 
the American line in their foreign policy so blindly. It was only in 1969 that the 
Turkish authorities succeeded (if it was really a success) in securing the revision 
of all fifty four agreements in the light of one general agreement. " 
It should be borne in mind once again that the United States was interested 
only in her own national interests in the region as far as her relations with Turkey 
were concerned. It would be naive to suggest that apart from her national interests 
she was ever genuinely interested in the "ideals" that she was supposedly defending 
all over the world, such as human rights, democracy, the market economy and so 
on. Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how the Americans had alliances 
with many kings, dictators and juntas all over the world, just as they recognised 
the Turkish military rule, because of their loyalty to the United States. Indeed the 
military junta earned recognition from the day the Turkish military took power 
as the first thing they did was to announce Turkey's loyalty to the 
NATO and 
CENTO c-dfiances. " 
68 Harris, Troubled, pp. 160-62. 
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As can be seen, in this chapter, we have demonstrated that both alliance 
theories and the patron-client relation approach are applicable to Turkish foreign 
policy behaviour in the 1950s. Affected by the external threat the Turks sought an 
alliance with the West. This alliance naturally created a dependent relationship 
between the two. As we suggested, this dependence was not desired by the Turkish 
leaders, but was unavoidable. In the short term, both sides benefited from the 
alliance. While by securing a permanent alliance with Turkey, the US increased 
her influence in the region, Turkey received a considerable amount of military and 
economic aid, she was admitted to NATO and most importantly this membership 
was regarded by the Turkish authorities as an approval for their Western identity. 
In the long term, the Turks felt increasingly frustrated because they had difficulties 
in pursuing their own foreign policy priorities. 
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Chapter III 
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT: THE MIDDLE EAST FROM 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO 
THE 1950s 
3.1 General 
3.1.1 Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire 
The main purpose of this chapter is to present an overall picture of what 
has been called the "Middle East" since 1924" when Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk of 
Turkey abolished the Caliphate. But in order to understand the problems of post- 
Ottoman developments in the Middle East it is first necessary to look briefly at the 
previous centuries of Turkish presence to note some factors that have influenced the 
subsequent course of events and have helped to create attitudes that still prevail. 
One influential factor is the nature of the Turkish acceptance of Islam. Whereas 
the Persians and Kurds became Muslim after they had been vanquished by the 
Arabs in the battle of Qadisiyyah" in 637 AD and subsequent conquests of their 
70 The term 'Middle East' was coined not by the people of the region but by Arnold Toynbee, who used 
it in the academic field for the first time in 1924 to imply that power in the region had been taken 
from Islam, so the Western-aligned secularists who ruled the area regarded it as between "East" 
and "West. " Thereafter the people of the region were content to use the term themselves. 
See for 
a detailed discussion on the history of the term "Middle East" the following articles: 
Keddie, Nikki 
R., 'Is there a Middle EastT International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, 4(1973), 
pp. 255-271 and Davison, Roderic H., 'Where is the Middle East?, 
Foreign Affairs, (juiy 
1960), pp. 664-675. 
71 During the reign of Umar, the second Caliph, Muslims conquered Mesopotamia and Iran which 
were mainly populated by Persians, Kurds and Armenians. 
It was only afterwards that the army 
of Islam reached Turan. Muslims aided by those converts 
in the area soon gained the allegiance of 
the Turks. 
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territories, most Turks were not defeated in battle but were drawn westward where 
many of them joined the armies of the Muslim rulers and adopted the faith. The 
Selýuks, who became a dominant Turkish group, followed their leader's example 
and embraced the Sunni form of Islam, as did their successors, the Ottomans, 
though many Turks were attracted by less orthodox varieties and by Shi'a teach- 
ings. But virtually all Turks professed Islam of one form or another. And what is 
important for our purposes, the government was always Sunni and from time to 
time even took up arms against the Shi'a, trying by every means to strengthen the 
Sunni position. Traditionally, in recognition of their ancestors' willing conversion, 
Turks describe themselves as "honoured by Islam. " 
Up to the time of their adoption of Islam most Turks had been nomadic. This 
mode of existence brought them into contact with various settled civilisations such 
as that of the Persians and gave them a capacity to accept new ways and adopt 
new cultures. But the nomadic way of life also required a readiness to fight. After 
adopting Islam Turkish warriors had an incentive to fight not only for existence 
in this world but also for spiritual rewards in the next. In effect, they thenceforth 
had religious sanction for the expansion they were already undertaking. 
Thus, the Turks were drawn further and further westwards where lay Christian 
territory to be conquered for Islam and tempting pasture lands for their flocks. 
Their new position on the frontier of the Islamic world gave them every opportunity 
to demonstrate their zeal for their faith and their military prowess which eventually 
gave them the leadership of the Islamic world. 
So, three Turkish ch4racteristics relevant to our present study can be discerned 
in earliest Ottoman times: allegiance to Islam, a martial tradition, and a westward 
attraction. 
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In the course of their westward march the Ottomans destroyed the Byzantine 
Empire and made Constantinople their own capital in 1453. For centuries Turkish 
rule extended well into Europe - twice reaching the gates of Vienna - and also cov- 
ered much of the world of Sunni Islam, including the holy cities of Mecca, Medina 
and Jerusalem. In their Golden age they seemed invincible but combination of 
internal and external factors led to their decline while the West grew ever more 
powerful. The Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699, involving significant territorial loss for 
the Ottomans, demonstrated that the their supremacy was no longer unchallenge- 
able. 
Painful acknowledgement that they had fallen behind the West prompted the 
Turks to try to catch up and obliged them to change the nature of their relations 
with the Europeans, whom they had always considered inferior. So, for the first 
time, they dispatched permanent representatives to European capitals. And from 
the eighteenth century onwards they attempted a series of reform measures. 
When Ottoman rulers realised that the Empire was threatened with demise, 
they embarked on desperate measures to prolong its life. In particular they sought 
to play rival European powers off against each other and, in similar vein, within the 
Empire among their Arab and Kurdish subjects they incited intertribal disputes. 
Abdulhamit, the first sultan to appreciate the Turkishness of the Empire and to 
rely upon the Turks, was a pastmaster at playing one group off against another. 
As Antonius notes: he had a number of picked emissaries in the guise of preachers 
whose real mission was to sow discord and fan animosity between feudal chiefs and 
the heads of the larger nomadic confederations, family quarrels, tribal disputes and 
blood-fpuds were exploited and promoted. " 
72 Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, Khayats, Beirut, 1961, p. 72. 
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Abdulhamit also recognised that the Caliphate had potential as a unifying 
force in a multinational empire and that by personally asserting his claim to the 
title of Caliph he could help to consolidate his own power. 
But non-Muslim forces had also achieved powerful positions in the adminis- 
tration during the nineteenth century, growing in strength throughout the reform 
process starting with the West ern-supported Tanzimat of 1839, on to the Isla- 
hat of 1856, the first Constitutional period of 1876 and the second of 1908, to 
the declaration of the Republic in 1923 and its subsequent reform measures. In 
this process the Young Turks, who revolted against Abdulhamit in 1908, were as 
ruthless as Abdulhamit in playing the ethnic card. They were initiaUy welcomed 
enthusiastically by the West. 
Nurturing imperialist and pan-Turanist ambitions, the Young Turks sided with 
Germany in the First World War. The consequences for the Ottoman Empire 
were catastrophic. The defeat made the dismemberment of the Empire inevitable. 
At first it seemed that the very heartland of Turkey too would be split up and 
that the Turks would be subjected to the humiliating conditions of the Treaty 
of Sevres that the Sultan felt obliged to sign. Resistance to these terms was 
organised by the "Anadolu ve Rumeli Miidafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti" which eventually 
produced the National Pact of 1920. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal the 
Nationalists proved victorious in the War of Independence, threw out the invaders, 
and negotiated a new peace treaty that was signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923. 
They went on to expel the Sultan, end the rule of the House of Osman, and on 29 
October 1923 to proclaim Turkey a Republic. This Republic is examined in the 
next chapter. 
In this brief summary we can select from the many complex reasons for the 
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decline of Ottoman society and government the following important internal and 
external factors. 
One major factor was the perpetual warfare in which the Ottomans were en- 
gaged, in the East with either Russia or Iran and in the West with various powers. 
From 1450 to 1900, Ottoman Empire was at war for an average of 61 of every 
100 years. Since the late 15th century, she has only been at peace four times for 
more than 15 years. In the 20th century, the Turks fought not only internally 
against nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire, but with Italy in 1911- 
1912, with the Balkan states in 1912-1913, and with the Allied Powers in the First 
World War, 1914-1918.73 
Obviously such military commitments are bound to weaken any nation and are 
likely to lead to its collapse after a major war, as indeed happened to the Ottomans 
after the First World War. 
Another factor was to be found in the Ottoman system of government, in par- 
ticular its over-reliance on the character of the sultan. When the sultan was good 
and successful the Empire flourished, but weak and dissolute sultans contributed 
greatly to Ottoman decline. The absolute power (at least in theory) of the sultan 
exacerbated the situation. By the time that pressure for reform obliged the sultan 
to share power it was too late to save the Empire. 
One of the common characteristics of empires, and the Ottoman Empire was 
no exception, is heterogeneity. This contributed to the decline of Ottoman society 
and state in modern times. As Ramazani notes: 
as the result of the perennial migration, invasions, and settlements of diverse peo- 
ples, society was fundamentally divided along numerous linguistic, racial, religious, and 
73 Ergil, Doku, From Empire to Dependence; The Evolution of Turkish Underdevel- 
opment, Ph. D. Thesis, State University of New York at Binghamton, 1975, p. 121. 
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sectarian lines. The expansion of the [Ottomans] also contributed to diversity within 
their societies, as evidenced by the imposition of Turkish hegemony over the Christians, 
'14 the Jews, the Arabs, the Kurds, and the Balkan peoples. 
A further cause of decline was intellectual rigidity. In the beginning Islarn had 
been a fundamental source of strength, helping to motivate the establishment of 
the Ottoman Empire and its swift expansion, particularly into the Christian West. 
However, this attitude was inimical to the transfer of technology from the West, 
which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was undergoing those profound 
changes that laid the bases of the growing moral and material power of European 
nation states. 
The Capitulations negotiated by certain European powers weakened the whole 
economic structure of the Ottoman Empire as well. These Capitulations paved 
the way for the first time for international interference. By means of them the 
Europeans sucked the life blood from the Ottoman economy through the centuries 
and finally brought the Empire to an end. Even when the Turks set up a modern 
Turkish Republic the effects of the Capitulations still persisted. Their legacy was 
a heavy burden to the young Republic until the Second World War. 
One of the Middle East's chief attractions for rival capitalist powers was the 
region's rich Oil fields. The importance the powers attached to this asset made 
them increasingly eager to occupy the area, particularly as there were no lands left 
to parcel out among themselves in the Americas or Africa. So territories such as 
i 
those of the weakened Ottoman Empire presented tempting prospects. 
Zionists were also eager to acquire a part of Ottoman territory. Their hearts 
were set upon Palestine and they refused to be deflected by offers of 
land in other 
74 Ramazani, Rouhollah K., The Northern Tier; Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey, D. Van Nostrand 
Com- 
pany, Inc., New York, 
1966, p. 45. 
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parts of the world. To counter this threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Em- 
pire Abdulhamit declared this land to be his private property and therefore not 
available for sale to would-be Jewish settlers. (The creation of the state of Israel 
is discussed later in this chapter. ) 
The Ottoman Caliphate was an important factor in Turkey's relations with 
the outside world, particularly Britain. As the British Empire contained as many 
Muslims as there were in the Ottoman Empire, the British were eager either to 
keep the Caliphate under control or to secure its abolition once and for all, since 
it was a potential threat to the British both regionally and globally. For example, 
a call from the Caliph for a jihad would constitute a threat to the British in any 
conflict in which they were opposed to Turkey. 
But Russian ambitions alarmed the British even more, so to defend their impe- 
rial interests in the East they sought to check Russian expansion into the Ottoman 
Empire and other parts of what later came to be known as the Northern Tier. Thus, 
the British were committed to maintaining the status quo in that region until the 
right time came to partition the Ottoman Empire. 
The First World War gave the Ottoman Empire the coup de grace. On the pre- 
text that the Ottoman Empire had sided with Central Powers, the Allies planned 
to divide it among themselves. Secret meetings were held between Great Britain, 
France, Russia, and Italy during the years of the war to achieve this. Despite ri- 
valries among themselves, the allies seemed determined to solve the long-standing 
"Eastern Question" and to destroy the "Sick man of Europe. " But, as Parker 
points out: 
the publication of the treaties by the Soviet Government in 1917 caused a special 
embarrassment, since the treaties showed how frequently in the 
Near East the same 
things had been promised to different parties. For example, two separate policies were 
pursued in Arabia, one conducted from India in support of 
Ibn Saud and the other 
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conducted from London in support of the Sheriff of Mecca. " 
This Soviet publication of secret treaties led to a deterioration of relations 
between the British and the Arabs, and these relations were further strained by 
the introduction of the Mandate system after the First World War. The treaties 
were briefly as follows: 
(1) The "Constantinople Agreement", signed by Britain, France and Russia on 
18 March 1915. 
(2) The "Secret Pact of London" signed by Britain, France, Russia, and Italy 
on 26 April 1915. 
(3) The "Sykes-Picot Agreement" signed by Britain, France, and Russia on 16 
May 1916. 
(4) "St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement" signed by Britain, France and Italy 
on 17 April 1917. 
In the event, the Ottoman Empire was broken up and a Mandate regime was 
imposed over its domain in Arab lands. 
75 Parker, John and Smith, Charles, 
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3.2 The Post-World War I Middle East 
Despite the fact that the Middle Eastern peoples had been, to some extent, 
exploited by the Ottoman Empire, which was largely indifferent to the "East", 
they had a better life then than after having their quasi independence. 
After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the lot of the non-Turkish sub- 
jects went from bad to worse. For centuries the Ottomans used Muslim subjects 
from the East in wars against the "infidel" West. But they concentrated most of 
their investment in the West, neglecting the development of the East. The splen- 
dours of Ottoman architecture, for example, are found in the West not the East. 
But the degree of exploitation these eastern subjects suffered under Ottoman rule 
was greatly preferable to what they had to endure under the Mandate system. 
Their new masters did not divide them just ethnically and religiously but also 
along completely arbitrary geographic boundaries. These new divisions created 
the fundamental problems in the Arab world that would last for decades, perhaps 
centuries. 
The way in which the West acquired the right of mandate indicates that the 
British had a leading role. While they had secret negotiations with their allies the 
English officials in the Middle East also had contacts with Arab leaders. 
To incite the Arabs to rebel against their Turkish masters the British con- 
tacted Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, and promised to set up an Arab Empire or 
Federation of Arab States in order to fan their desire of independence. 
However, 
the British and French were embarrassed by the Soviet disclosure of the secret 
agreements to dominate the region and they were 
further discomfited by President 
Wilson's declaration of his "Fourteen Points", the 12th of which said that the non- 
Turkish nationalities in the Ottoman Empire should 
be assured of autonomous 
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development. 
Consequently, the Arabs thought that the European Powers were ready to 
recognise their independence. Faisal, the son of the Sherif Hussein, attended the 
San Remo Conference held in April 1920, and defended Arab independence. He 
found that Britain and France had decided to establish a Mandate regime in the 
Arab countries, though they recognised his rule over Syria. Subsequently, Syria 
and Lebanon came under a French Mandate while Iraq, Jordan and Palestine were 
given to the British. The animosities thus, engendered by British and French deceit 
caused the Middle East to boil continuously in between the two world wars and 
the effects of Western Imperialism continue to the present day. 76 
76 Armaoglu, Fahir, Siyasi Tarth, 1789-1960, Seviný Matbaasi, 
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3.2.1 Iraq 
At the 1920 San Remo Conference, Britain was given a mandate over Iraq, 
and this decision was later ratified by the League of Nations. At the time of the 
Conference, Iraq was actually under British military occupation. Contrary to the 
terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement, this Mandate placed Mosul under British, not 
French, control. Following a positive outcome of a referendum in Iraq, the British 
appointed Faisal as King of Iraq. (The French had deprived him of the throne of 
Syria. ) To keep Iraq under its control Great Britain installed a feudal system in 
Iraq, thereby provoking the intense opposition of Iraqi intellectuals whether they 
were Kurds or Arabs. 
Confronted with vehement Iraqi nationalism, Britain prepared to relinquish 
the mandate and signed an agreement in October 1922 to adjust her relations with 
Iraq. But this did not lessen the pressure of Iraqi nationalists, and Britain was 
compelled to sign a new agreement on 14 December 1927 to reduce her control over 
Iraq. Eventually the British recognised the independence of Iraq by an agreement 
signed on 30 June 1930, and in 1932 allowed Iraq to become a member of the 
League of Nations. 
Nevertheless, a great majority of Iraqis, whether military or civilian, regarded 
their independence as incomplete so long as British forces were stationed in their 
country. The 1930s were a decade of instability marked by ethnic riots, tribal 
revolts, and sectarian disturbances. Among these were the uprisings of the Kurds 
in 1932 (crushed only with British assistance), " the Assyrians in 1933, and the 
tribal rebellion of 1935-1936 in the south (which was reinforced by Shi'a hostility). 
77 Olson 
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Moreover, in October 1936, Iraq underwent its first military coup. This was led 
by Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman, who aimed to put an end to this turbulence. 
The configuration of the new government reveals the orientation of their foreign 
policy. This government comprised not a single supporter of the pan-Arab cause. 
Sidqi was of Kurdish stock; Hikmat was mainly Turkish in origin and orientation. 
Also two of the ministers were Shi'a, and not one of the Ahali Party ministers 
was interested in Arab nationalism. Such a configuration produced foreign policy 
oriented not towards Arab countries but Turkey and Iran. Consequently, the 
Sadabad Pact was concluded between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan in 1937. 
However, in August 1938 while on his way to follow a Turkish military exercise, 
Bakr Sidqi, the leader of the coup, was assassinated in Mosul. " The following 
April, King Ghazi was killed in a traffic accident. As Faisal II was under age, the 
deaths of these leaders left the stage clear for Nuri Said, who had been educated 
in istanbul and was a fervent pro-British politician, to direct internal as well as 
external policy. 
In 1941 Rashed Ali Gailani, who succeeded Nuri Said as premier, staged a coup 
against the British. But Nuri Said was reinstalled by the British and he declared 
war on Germany in 1943. After the Second World War, limited parliamentary 
democracy was restored and political parties began operating again. 
In 1948 Iraqi troops were sent to fight the Israeli army but performed poorly. 
This disappointed the Iraqis who blamed King Faisal 11 and the Regent, his uncle, 
for the Iraqi humiliation in the war. As a result, Nuri Said banned political parties 
when he realised that he was not able to manipulate the elections or the electoral 
78 It is ironic to note that, exactly two decades later, another Iraqi leader who signed an agreement 
of alignment with Turkey was assassinated before he departed from 
Baghdad to Turkey. The only 
difference this time was that he was to leave Iraq by plane not car. 
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system. Moreover, by joining the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact on 24 February 
1955 and refusing to denounce the Anglo- French- Israeli offensive against Egypt in 
November 1956 he damaged his regime beyond repair. Finally, under the leadership 
of Abdul Karim Qassem and Abdul Salam, the Free Officers' Group, as it was 
later called, decided to abolish the monarchy, end the pro-Western foreign policy 
and adopt non-alignment instead, and establish a true parliamentary democracy. 
The royal family and Nuri Said himself were put to death within the first few 
days of the coup, and Iraq demonstrated its foreign policy switch by withdrawing 
from the "notorious" Baghdad Pact. But the third aim, establishment of a "true 
parliamentary democracy" has yet to be achieved in Iraq. 
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3.2.2 Syria and Lebanon 
Most Arab states have a comparatively short history as separate nations, hav- 
ing come into existence since the First or Second World Wars. The secret arrange- 
ments made during the First World War by the powers that were ultimately to 
triumph allocated control over much of the Arab world to Britain and France. But 
these colonial powers met with intense resistance in the region when they tried to 
rule it. 
In March 1920, a month before the San Remo Conference, a congress of artisans 
had convened and announced the formation of a Kingdom of Greater Syria that 
included Palestine and Lebanon and appointed as its monarch Faisal, the son of 
King Hussein of the Hijaz. The San Remo Conference, however, did not recognise 
this kingdom and separated Palestine from Syria and Lebanon. Subsequently 
France was given the mandate over Syria and Lebanon. 
Contrary to the terms of the mandate, France stationed a 90,000 strong army 
in Syria to keep it under control. This was necessary because the disillusioned 
Syrians felt compelled to resist the French. Faced with Syrian revolt, in July 1920 
General Gourand, the French High Commissioner, entered Damascus and ousted 
Faisal I from his throne. Henceforth Syria was under tight French control. 
Having taken control of Syria, the French decided to divide up the country 
in 
order to divide opposition to their rule. General 
Gourand, "enlarged the pre-war 
district of Christian Mount Lebanon by adding Muslim areas to 
its north, west 
and south and naming it the new province 
Greater Lebanon", 79 with which France 
maintained historical ties. Dividing what was 
left into four more provinces, namely, 
the autonomous provinces of Damascus and 
Aleppo, and the independent provinces 
79 Hiro, Dilip, Inside the Middle East, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
London, 1982, p. 41. 
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of Jebel of the Druzes and Latakia State of the Alawites, set up a federal state 
of Syria. This fragmentation provoked the Arabs to rebel. The French seemed to 
realise their mistake and duly recognised the "independence" of Lebanon in May 
1926 and that of Syria in May 1930, and proclaimed both to be republics. 
Popular protest led by the Nationalist Bloc against French rule in Syria closed 
public services, schools and bazaars for fifty days in early 1936. Further unrest 
in the 1930s was fomented by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy who launched a 
campaign against the British and French in the Middle East. France was compelled 
to sign new agreements with both Syria and Lebanon in September 1936 and 
November 1936 respectively and agreed to pull out of these countries. When Syria 
came under the control of the pro-German Vichy French government, the British, 
supported by Free-French leader Charles de Gaulle, attacked and defeated the 
Vichy forces in Syria and Lebanon in mid-1941. Having restored the constitution, 
the Free-French leadership called for parliamentary elections in Syria in 1943. At 
the end of World War II, France vainly attempted to reaffirm her ascendancy in 
Syria by force, and in April 1946 French troops left Syrian soil. 
Two years later, Syrian failure in the war with Israel led to a popular revolt 
against the authorities, and a military coup occurred in March 1949. It was in 
February 1954 that restoration of democracy was achieved following the downfall 
of Colonel Adib Shishakli, the military ruler of the country. 
After a few years of nationalist-leftist ascendancy in Syria, in 
February 1958 
the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria Was inaugurated amid high hopes 
for 
wider Arab unity and progress. Not unexpectedly, these 
hopes were disappointed 
and the United Arab Republic broke up in September 
1961 following the arrest in 
Damascus of Nasser's deputy, Abdul Hakim Amr, and the concurrent proclamation 
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by a group of Syrian officers of Syria's secession from the Union. 
Meanwhile, Lebanese politics fluctuated from one side to another and it re- 
mained under the constant pressure from both Western and nationalist Arab coun- 
tries led by Egypt throughout the 1950s until the American marines landed on its 
soil in 1958. Afterwards, Lebanon tried to remain neutral as much as possible. 
Yet it always remained open to the rivalry between the internal Arab groupings as 
well as the influence of Western powers. 
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3.2.3 Jordan 
Jordan, an impoverished and artificial state carved out by the British from an 
unlikely part of the Ottoman Empire, 110 was presented to Abdullah, whose elder 
brother was appointed to the Iraqi throne. The Hashemite family connection kept 
the two countries on close terms until the Iraqi revolution and the influence of Nuri 
Said with his close links with Turkey helped the development of cordial relations 
between Jordan and Turkey as well as Iraq and Turkey. These links were never 
strong enough, however, to drag Turkey into the Arab-Israeli conflict which was of 
prime concern to Jordan. The strong continuing British influence in Jordan and its 
concern for defence arrangements in the region was another factor drawing these 
countries together, but was not strong enough to tempt Jordan - fearful of Nasser 
- into the Baghdad Pact with Iraq, Turkey and British. 
In May 1923, Abdullah declared 'E-ansjordan "independent", but the 20 Febru- 
ary 1928 treaty between Britain and Transjordan confirmed British authority over 
the country. It was not until 22 March 1946 that full independence was achieved 
when Abdullah declared himself King and proclaimed a new constitution. A new 
agreement was signed by Britain and Transjordan, but this was resented by Jor- 
danians and a revised agreement was signed on 15 March 1948. King Abdullah 
merged the West Bank and East Jerusalem, which he had occupied in the 1948 
Israeli war, into his kingdom, which he renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. 
In May 1951 he was assassinated and succeeded by his son Talal, who, seven 
months later, was replaced by his son Hussein on the grounds of ill-health. Hussein 
maintained close relations with Iraq. Indeed, reconciled with Nuri Said, he set up a 
80 See for details on the establishment of the Hashemite power in Jordan, Robins, Philip, 
The 
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federation between Iraq and Jordan in 1958 in pursuance of his pro-Western policy 
against Nasser-led Arab nationalism. Within a few months both Nuri Said and 
the Iraqi royal house were executed by the new revolutionary regime in Iraq. But 
in Jordan King Hussein remained on the throne and has now been ruling for more 
than four decades. 
65 
3.2.4 Israel 
Since the outlines of the Arab-Israeli conflict that has been such a dominant 
feature of Middle East politics, especially since the foundation of the state of Israel 
in 1948, are so well known it is unnecessary to retrace at length its progress here. 
With regard to Turkey's relationship with Israel, it should not be forgotten that 
Palestine was ruled by the Turks from 1517 to 1917. As will be noted later, the 
secular Republic of Turkey granted recognition to Israel as early as 24 March 1949, 
but Turkey has always tried to keep aloof from the Arab-Israeli conflict and has 
successfully avoided active embroilment in it. British and US relationship with 
Israel also had their impact on the West's defence initiatives in the Middle East. 
Britain's role in the birth of Israel is well known. On 2 November 1917 the 
famous - or infamous - Balfour Declaration was announced by His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment and soon approved by the United States, France and Italy. It stated: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done 
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country. " 
The Balfour Declaration was very short but it was enough to meet Jewish 
aspirations. Subsequently, it had an immense impact on the Middle East politics. 
This declaration gave the Jews a new momentum in their struggle for a national 
homeland. 
At the end of the First World War three empires of the old order, i. e. the 
Russian Empire, the Ottoman Empire and the Austrian Empire all collapsed. As 
mentioned earlier, the victorious powers, which shaped the post-war order made 
some changes to the agreements relating to Palestine that they 
had previously 
81 Grant, Neil, The Partition of Palestine, World Focus Books, New York, 1973, p. 9. 
66 
signed. Accordingly, the British were granted a mandate over Palestine in order 
to implement the Balfour Declaration policy. Not ignoring the role of the United 
States, without the British support a national home for Jews could hardly have 
been achieved. The close co-operation between the Zionist Organisation and the 
British Government is illustrated by the surprising fact that the original draft of 
the mandate was actually drawn up by the Zionist Organisation. " 
All concerned, especially Britain, gravely underestimated the degree of political 
awareness among the Palestinians in their decisions. When the Jewish immigration 
increased, clashes started between the Arabs and the authorities whom they held 
responsible. Immigration sharply increased in 1920 and has continued at varying 
rates ever since. The Nazi assumption of power in Germany in 1933, created an 
excellent opportunity for the Zionists to exploit. They swiftly accelerated Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. This was "encouraged, organised and financed by the 
Zionist Organisation, "" making it impossibly difficult for Britain to keep it under 
control. 
Having seen that Britain was unable to cope with the problem, the Arabs 
put aside their differences and formed the Arab High Committee 
(AHC) in 1930 
to press for Arab independence and to put an end to Jewish 
immigration. They 
attacked the Jews for a time and eventually announced a general strike 
in 1936. 
Britain responded to this disturbances by sending the 
Peel Commission to Pales- 
tine. Having investigated the events, the Commission published its report 
in July 
1937. According to Grant, "its conclusions were clear-sighted and free 
from prej- 
udice. "" The report stated: "we have no 
doubt as to What were the underlying 
82 Ibid., p. 23. 
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causes of the disturbances. They were (a) the desire of the Arabs for national 
independence, and (b) their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish 
National Home. ... All the other factors were complementary or subsidiary. "" 
The report, therefore, stated that the mandate system would not work. The only 
solution was the partition of Palestine. It was resented by the Jews while the 
Arabs responded by renewal of resistance and the British could only postpone its 
implementation. 
Following the negotiations with the authorities, the Arabs called off the strike 
and never again managed to achieve unity. This left the field clear for Jewish 
terrorist organisations such as Irgun and Stern. New clashes took place, and Britain 
sent another inquiry commission. This, too, indicated that some concessions had 
to be made to the Arabs. The MacDonald White Paper of 1939 described the new 
British policy. It did not favour the views of the Zionists. It demanded "a state 
in which two peoples ... share authority in government in such a way that the 
essential interests of each are secured. "" With the exception of Mufti and AHC 
moderate Arabs accepted while the Jews regarded it as an utter betrayal. This, 
one can say, marked the beginning of the end for the alliance between the British 
and the Zionists who thereafter rebelled against their former benefactors. 
Having witnessed the killing of some of her prominent personalities by Irgun, 
Britain declared her intention of delivering her responsibilities for Palestine to the 
UN. The UN reached its Resolution of Partition on 29 November 1947. This was 
rejected by the Arabs but accepted by the Jews. Britain abstained from voting on 
the resolution and announced that she was to abandon the Palestine mandate on 
15 
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May 1948. Israel declared her independence on the same day and being ruled by a 
pro-Jewish President, Truman, the United States extended her recognition within 
the first hours and, as expected, the Arab forces began to attack the newly declared 
State of Israel. However, the forces of Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon 
and smaller numbers from Saudi Arabia and Yemen consisted of only 55,000 while 
the Israeli forces were around 100,000, a quarter of whom were veterans of World 
War II. By January 1949 the war was over and Israel occupied an area larger 
than the UN had proposed (80 per cent instead of 56). Yet the UN recognised 
and accepted Israel as a member on 11 May 1949. The Tripartite Declaration of 
25 May 1950 was aimed to prevent the "use of force ... between the any of the 
states" of the Middle East and thus the defence of Israel was thought to have been 
secured. When the West realised that it was not the case, Nasser's propaganda 
machine claimed, "a Western- sponsored pact might prevent a 'second round' with 
Israel. " " 
As for the Palestinians, 374 of their 807 villages within Israeli territory had 
simply disappeared by 1969. The Israeli government took over more than ten 
thousand business places and many more homes. Moreover, Israel confiscated 
something between 40 and 60 per cent of the possessions of departed Arabs and 
banned the Arabs from buying new land in the country. 88 
The State of Israel faced tremendous internal and external problems. Aston- 
ishingly the Israelis had to create a state out of nothing in the same place they had 
left about 2000 years ago. They needed more Jews to outnumber the indigenous 
Arabs. Even by encouraging, organising and financing immigration to Israel they 
were only able to achieve a Jewish majority in 1952. This continuous immigration 
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created constant problems of accommodation and employment. Not surprisingly, 
180,000 migrants left Israel, because, among other reasons, the Government could 
not solve these problems. " Integrating the newcomers into society was another 
formidable task, since they were coming from all over the world where they had 
been living in a completely different culture and environment. The Turkish Jews 
were the most successful in this regard. Another problem was teaching Hebrew, 
a language spoken only by a minority, to the new citizens who were speaking the 
language of nations they used to live with. 
In the sphere of foreign policy, apart from the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli War (to 
the Israelis, the War of Independence), the Israelis had to be ready to defend their 
territory against another possible attack. Therefore, they looked for regional as 
well as global powers to make alliances with. They felt very isolated in the first 
half of the 1950s. However, they successfully used the conflict between Egypt 
and the Western Powers, i. e. Britain and France, to break this isolation and to 
identify themselves with those major powers. In fact, to the Muslims in general 
and the Arabs in particular, Israel was regarded as a Western creation in the 
heart of the Islamic World to serve Western interests in time of crises and it 
was seen to be doing so. To the Arabs, Israel was essentially created in such 
a strategically important place to influence or control, if not to intimidate and 
threaten the regional countries whenever required. The successive wars, which 
took place almost every decade (1948-1949; 1956; 1967; 1973; 1982; 1991) served 
to confirm to the Arabs that they were right in this belief, even if it was not the 
West's aim, when they created Israel. It is interesting to note that at the time the 
Balfour Declaration was announced 85 per cent of the globe was under European 
89 Mehdi, M. T., Peace in the Middle East, New World Press, New York, 1967, p. 57. 
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occupation. " Therefore, as Said put it, the creation and protection of Israel in the 
Middle East was 
seen as extending, perpetuating even enhancing (to the advantage of the West) 
the age-old conflict between the West and the Orient, whose main surrogate was Islam. 
This was not only a colonial matter, but a civilisational one as well. ... Herzl used this idea, Weizmann used it, every leading Israeli since has used it. Israel was a device 
for holding Islam - and later the Soviet Union, or communism - at bay. ... Zionism 
and Israel were associated with liberalism, freedom and democracy. ... By contrast, Zionism's enemies were simply a twentieth century version of the alien spirit of Oriental 
despotism, sensensuality, ignorance and similar forms of backwardness. " 
Before closing the decade under discussion, it must be mentioned that Israel 
quite successfully used all opportunities to strengthen her position in the region. 
Having consolidated her national strength she emerged out of the Suez crisis vic- 
torious and very powerful. When coup d'etat occurred in Iraq, a member of the 
Baghdad Pact, Israel attempted to exploit this event too. Having some features in 
common with the ousted Iraqi rulers the Iranian Shah and to some extent Turkish 
leaders, too, were frightened by this and responded warmly to the Israeli proposal 
of a "Peripheral Pact" between non-Arab Middle Eastern countries, i. e. Shiite 
Iran, secular Turkey, Jewish Israel and Christian Ethiopia. Turkey strengthened 
its relations with Israel just five days after the coup in Iraq. Israel pressed the 
United States to help the three economically as well as politically. Subsequently 
the United States promised the three economic and political support. " 
Following the Western intervention in the Middle East 93 the United States 
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and the Soviet Union reached a modus vivendi in the region. This, in the Iong 
run, "meant that both the Great Powers accepted limitations - tacitly to be sure 
- of their own actions on the supposition that beyond a certain point a nuclear 
confrontation might be engendered. "" 
94 Merlin, Samuel, The Big Powers and the Present Crisis in the Middle East: 




Iranians had first appeared in world history in about 550 BC when Cyrus II 
revolted against the Medians (who are considered the ancestors of today's Kurds). ` 
Their rulers subsequently bore many different names, including Parthian (140 BC 
- 224 AD), Sassanian (224-642), Safavis (1502-1796), Qajars (1796-1925), Pahlavis 
(1925-1979), before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Like 
many other peoples of the region, the Iranians have a long tradition of subjection 
to despotic power. Edward Gibbon in chapter 3 of The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire noted, "When Persia was governed by the descendants of Sefi, a 
race of princes whose wanton cruelty often stained their divan, their table, and 
their bed with the blood of their favourites, there is a saying recorded of a young 
nobleman, that he never departed from the sultan's presence without satisfying 
himself whether his head was still on his shoulders. " 
In the nineteenth century Russia steadily encroached upon territories in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia to which Iran laid claim, eventually imposing the 
present border between the two countries. During the second half of the nine- 
teenth century Great Britain took an interest in both eastern and western Iran. 
The British had the dominant say in the delimitation of Iranian boundaries with 
Afghanistan and with Baluchistan, which was then part of India and is now 
in 
Pakistan. 
The 1905-1906 Constitutional Rebellion in Iran and the increasing German 
interest in Iranian affairs caused concern in Britain and Russia and prompted 
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them to sign a protocol in 1907 partitioning the country into three commercial 
interest zones: the northern part of the country was put under Russian control, 
the southern part under British control and a neutral zone was created in between. 
"All this was done without consulting the Iranian Government. "" 
In 1914 British and Russian troops occupied Tehran. The Bolshevik Revo- 
lution in March 1917 led to the withdrawal of Russian troops, giving the Turks 
an opportunity to invade Western Persia again, " but British troops remained. In 
1919 Britain pressured Iran into accepting a proposed treaty which, in effect, would 
have put it under complete British domination. In 1920 the Soviet Socialist Re- 
public of Gilan, an Iranian province on the Caspian Sea, was established with the 
help of Communist Russians, but it collapsed when the Russians signed a Treaty 
of Friendship with the Iranians and pulled their army out of Iran in 1921. " 
In 1923 Ahmet Reza Khan, the Minister of War, carried out a coup and became 
Prime Minister and while Ahmet Shah was abroad in October 1925 Ahmet Reza 
Khan ousted him and put an end to the Qajar dynasty. Subsequently, in December 
1925, the Majlis declared Reza Khan to be the Shahinshah of Iran. He signed a 
Treaty of Non Aggression and Neutrality with Russia on 1 October 1927, and 
thereafter Iran was free from outside interference until the outbreak of the Second 
World War. 
Iran attempted to keep its neutrality at the beginning of the Second World 
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War, but Britain and the Soviet Union were of the opinion that the Shah was 
inclined towards Germany so they occupied Iran on 16 September 1941. It is 
interesting that in both the 1907 and 1941 occupations the British and Russians 
were nominally allies against the same power, Germany, and, "in both cases as 
far as the Persians were concerned, the underlying rivalry was more apparent than 
the surface alliance, and a factor to be used and exacerbated as far as possible 
by the Persians in an attempt to exploit the disabilities imposed on them by that 
alliance. "" 
The Shah was compelled to leave the country and he died in South Africa in 
1944. As a result of Iran's impotence Russia was able to receive war materials via 
the Trans-Iranian Railroad, which was of special importance to the Allies, because 
it was the only route to Russia that could be utilised during all four seasons 
of the year, and the only one that was immune from Axis air and submarine 
attacks. As Sheehan puts it: "the Anglo-Russian occupation of Iran might have 
never occurred had the Iranian State Railway not existed. ""' By the end of the 
war the Soviet Union had enormously increased her influence in Teheran to the 
extent that two separate republics were established in northern Iran with their 
assistance and protection in 1945. When Russia withdrew from the country under 
increasing western pressure, it abandoned the Azerbaijani and Kurdish Republics 
to destruction by the Shah's army just as in 1921. By early 1947 the Shah's control 
had extended once again over the whole country. 
In October 1947, encouraged by the implied American promise of support, the 
Majlis reacted against the oil agreement which was signed on 
4 April 1946 between 
99 Marlowe, I., Iran: A Short Political Guide, Praeger, New York, 1963, p. 70. 
100 Sheehan, Michael K., Iran: The Impact of 
US Interests and Policies 1941-1954, 
Theo. Gaus' Sons, Inc., New York, 1968, p. 10. 
75 
Iran and Russia. This provoked furious Russian protests. In February 1949 the 
Shah banned the Tudeh party, the most popular and best organised one, on the 
grounds that a Tudeh member had attempted to assassinate him. Afterwards, in 
April 1949, two changes were made in the constitution to reinforce his power, and 
Iran began receiving a considerable amount of aid from the United States. It is 
interesting to note that the political vacuum created by outlawing the Tudeh Party 
was filled by the National Front, which was equally, if not more, disliked in the 
West. 
As Sheehan says, "Iranians have a tendency to be xenophobic. ""' So, the 
right and the left wing met on common grounds over the AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil 
Company). Both considered it should be expropriated. It was this understanding 
that brought about the nationalisation of oil on 15 March 1951. "' Hussein Ala, 
who became Prime Minister following the assassination of Razmara by the Fadayan 
Islam, resigned on 27 April, and the Majlis voted the 73-year old Dr. Muhammed 
Mosaddeq premier. "The Shah in the prevailing atmosphere, had no choice but to 
accede. " By the end of September, however, the British staff left the country'" and 
oil shipment was to halt for about three years. On 21 July 1952 the International 
Court decided it had no jurisdiction in the dispute between the Iranian government 
and the AIOC. This was considered a victory for Mosaddeq. 
In August 1952 the United States and Great Britain reached an accord on a 
common policy to be followed against Mosaddeq which marked the 
beginning of 
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the end for him. Having suspected that the British were about to stage a plot, 
Mosaddeq severed diplomatic relations between Britain and Iran on 16 October 
1952. The Shah was no longer in control of the country. When he appointed as 
premier General Zahedi'04 (whose son was married to the former Shah's daughter), 
Mosaddeq did not recognise him, and the Shah was obliged to leave the country 
in August 1953. But he was away for only a few days. 
At that point, Eisenhower authorised the CIA to organise and carry out a 
political coup. 'O' Kermit Roosevelt, a grandson of the former president Theodore 
Roosevelt, arrived in Teheran in early August and made the necessary preparations 
and improvised a plan called AJAX, and then staged the coup successfully. "' 
Despite American official denial of involvement in the coup, it was later known 
that 
... privately the president praised Kermit Roosevelt ... for acting 'intelligently, 
courageously, and tirelessly', even awarding him the National Security medal in secret, 
publicly Eisenhower cabled his congratulations to both General Zahedi and the Shah 
and on September 5 formally committed 45 million dollars on economic aid to the 
new Iranian Government. By 1954 the position and influence of the United States had 
become such that she was able to almost completely control the course of internal events 
in Iran. "' 
It was calculated that oil revenue plus American aid would justify the author- 
itarian nature and pro-Western tendency of the regime and inoculate the people 
against threats of communism from the left and xenophobic nationalism from the 
right. Consequently, the urgency of sustaining the 'centre' regime in Iran was fairly 
fully appreciated both in Washington and London. ""' 
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In January 1954 elections were held and in April an international consortium 
was formally set up to negotiate with Iran. The new government accepted the 
terms which Mosaddeq had refused after the act of nationalisation. "' The Shah 
was "determined never again to be placed in a position subordinate to that of 
his prime minister and ... slowly but surely established himself as the real chief 
executive, the fount of power... " 
Once he had all the power in his hands, between 1954 and 1960 the Shah 
appointed Zahedi, Hussein Ala, Manuchehr Eqbal and Sherif consecutively to the 
post of prime minister. He finally appointed pro-American Dr. Amini to carry 
out the reforms which were the condition for the new American Administration to 
continue support for the Shah. This was to be known as the White Revolution of 
9 May 1961. 
For three main reasons Iran's relations with Iraq were not very cordial. First, 
there was the question of Iranian access to the Shi'a shrines at Najaf and Ker- 
bela, second, the sufferings of the large number of Iranian subjects living in Iraq, 
and third, the disputed Shatt al Arab boundary. Her relations with Turkey and 
Pakistan were reasonably cordial apart from her suspicion that they might obtain 
from the US more favourable military and financial aid than Iran. 
To sum up, today's Iran is shaped by six major events that occurred in the 
twentieth century: the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911, the bloodless coup 
of 21 February 1921, the Anglo-Russian invasion of August 1941, the Oil 
Nation- 
alisation Crisis of 1951-1953, the White Revolution of 1961-1963, and 
finally the 
Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
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3.2.6 Pakistan 
Pakistan is a unique country in the modern world. As Callard states, "Pakistan 
was created to be the state organisation of the Muslim nation of the Indian sub- 
continent. ... It has no common language, nor uniform culture, and it is neither a 
geographical nor an economic unit. ""' 
Khalid Sayeed considered the Army Mutiny of 1857 or the First War for the 
Independence of India as a starting point for the history of the formation of Pak- 
istan. But this does not seem very convincing, because his main argument is 
based on a vague suspicion about the Army. It seems more reasonable to accept 
the date 1892 as the turning point for the Muslim demand for a separate state. 
This was when the British government introduced the principle of elections and 
the establishment of representative institutions. Thereupon the Muslims, having 
been alerted by Sayeed Ahmed Khan, the leader of the Muslim League, "expressed 
their apprehension of being dominated by a majority with whom they differed in 
every sphere of life. ""' 
Having been ruled by the Muslims for about one thousand years, the Hin- 
dus had no option but to embrace a policy of co-existence with the Muslims for 
centuries although there were some periods of tension between the two 
from time 
to time, for example when the British introduced laws favourable to the 
Hindus 
in 1892 and 1909. These laws exacerbated the rivalry between the two religious 
communities, but eventually, in 1916, the Congress-League 
Pact (otherwise known 
as the Lucknow Pact) was signed between the 
All-India Muslim League and the 
Indian National Congress. Most importantly, this pact produced a compromise 
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agreement and a separate Muslim electoral list. In general, from the second half of 
the nineteenth century both communities vainly resisted their common enemy, the 
British, until the Second World War, with many attempts being made by leaders 
of the political movements, namely, Sayeed Ahmed Khan, Muhammed Ali Jinnah, 
Liquat Ali, Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi to achieve Hindu-Muslim unity between 
1916 and 1940. Two helpful factors were the perception on the sub-continent that 
the British had incited the Arabs to rebel against their colonial masters, the Turks, 
whereas the British repressive measures in India drove the Hindus and Muslims 
into each other's arms. This unity reached its peak under the Caliphate movement 
1920-1922. 
In 1928 Nehru drew up a proposed constitution for immediate dominion status 
for India. This, although never adopted, frightened the Muslims since "it proposed 
a strong federal government and the elimination of separate electoral rolls and other 
mechanisms on which the Muslims depended to maintain a political foothold. ""' 
Two successive Indian constitutions were granted by Great Britain in 1919 and 
1935 but it was only "poison in the bloodstream of politics. " 114 
In 1940 the Muslim League passed the Lahore Resolution then under the lead- 
ership of Quaid-i Azam Muhammed Ali Jinnah and the Muslim masses enthusias- 
tically embraced the 'Two Nation Theory"" of the League "not because it was a 
revolutionary doctrine but because it confirmed the basic theme of the 
Qur'an. "11' 
It appeared that the Muslims often regarded themselves as an aggrieved mi- 
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nority in the pre-1940 period, but since then they were "no longer interested in 
constitutional safeguards and assurances. " 117 Then the dominant theme in their 
politics was not complaint against Hindu injustice but a demand for a separate 
political existence. 
Jinnah and Gandhi held talks in September 1944 to prevent the division of 
the 'Hindu homeland', but nothing useful emerged. Nevertheless, this meeting 
showed that now there were two leaders not one. At the end of 1944 two other 
prominent representative of their respective communities, Bhulabhai Desai, Leader 
of the Congress Party, and Luiaqat Ali, the Deputy Leader of the Muslim League 
Party, signed the Desai Luiaqat Pact that accepted Hindu-Muslim parity as the 
basis of a future interim government. But this, too, came to nought as Jinnah, 
the actual leader of the Muslim League, disapproved. In June 1945, on Lord 
Wavell's initiative, the Simla Conference was held to plan the defence of India 
and the formation of a reconstituted Executive Council. This also failed, due 
to a fundamental disagreement on how to nominate the Muslim members of the 
Executive Council. 
Following the December 1945 general election the British Government sent a 
Cabinet Mission to convene a constitution making body. The Mission soon realised 
that they were getting nowhere, either with the League or with the Congress. 
While Jinnah was demanding a full independent Pakistan, Gandhi was opposing 
any proposal but one India. The Mission declared its plan in May 1946, which 
turned down demands of the League as well as the Congress. The plan suggested 
a weak centre. It was accepted by the League's resolution of 
6 June, while the 
Congress announced on 25 June that these proposals 
fell short of their objectives. 
117 Ibid., 
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On 29 July the League announced that "the time has come for the Muslim nation to 
resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate 
their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the contemplated 
future caste-Hindu domination. ""' The Mission's effort succeeded in bringing the 
League into the Interim Government but could not prevent turmoil all over the 
country. Amidst the disastrous violence the withdrawal of Britain, as well as the 
division of the subcontinent became inevitable. 
On 3 June 1947 the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, issued a statement concerning the 
transfer of power, and subsequently the League and the Congress on 10 and 14 June 
respectively had no option but to accept it. On 15 August 1947 both Dominions 
enthusiastically declared their independence. 
There are different arguments regarding the division of the subcontinent. The 
Muslims often claim that Pakistan was created not only because the Muslims 
were intensely conscious of their national and cultural identity, but also because 
the Hindus were intolerant and exclusive. In fact, Hindu short-sightedness or 
exclusiveness were not only factors which created Pakistan. It is also not accurate 
to think that Muslim separatism was a product entirely of British machinations. 
It seems that Pakistan came into being, among the others, as a result of the 
combination of all these three factors. 
The declaration of independence was not the end but the beginning of a series 
of problems. Even the civil war, which extended to 1948, did not solve them, 
but 
merely produced new ones such as partition of the country, 
irremediable poverty, 
mutual enmity, ethnic and religious conflicts within and 
between the two parties. 
In general, Pakistan received 17.5 per cent of the assets and 
India 82.5 per cent, 
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but some changes were made afterwards. After independence half a million people 
- perhaps more - were killed violently and the greatest mass migration in world 
history took place. The number reached 50 million in 1965. 
On the whole, the poorer areas, which were lacking in industry were taken 
over by Pakistan. Its population was predominantly uneducated and unskilled. In 
Callard's words, "It was not self-sufficient in any important manufactured product 
and resources of fuel and power were pitifully inadequate. ""' 
Consequently, it was highly dependent on imports. The most severe economic 
burden upon its over-strained economy were the refugees that came in by the 
millions, most of them with nothing but a small bundle of personal possessions. 
Therefore, the task that faced Pakistan in its first decade was gigantic. 
It was unfortunate for Pakistanis to lose their two most pre-eminent leaders, 
Jinnah, who died in 1948, and Luiaqat Ali, who was assassinated in October 
1951. Pakistan has never since had such rulers who were revered as symbols of 
national integration and unity. Following them came those who ruled the country 
until 1960: Khwaja Nazimuddin, Ghularn Muharnmed, Muharnmed Ali, Iskander 
Mirza, Fazlul Huq, Shudrawardy, President Ayub Khan. 
It is worth noting that all members of the cabinet were from among the mem- 
bers of the Muslim League until its monopoly was broken by the Awami League. 
In March 1956 the first constitution was at last brought into operation and the 
country was declared to be the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. After two years 
in 
1958, the army appeared on the political scene and the Commander- in- 
Chief, Ayub 
Khan, staged a coup d'etat and ruled the country until 1969. 
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One of main problems facing Pakistan was the Kashmir question, over which 
war broke out in July 1947. Although the matter was referred to the UN in Jan- 
uary 1948, the war continued until 31 December 1948 when a truce was agreed 
by both sides. In January 1949 the UN cease-fire line, which quickly solidified 
into a de facto international boundary, was accepted as a temporary border. This 
issue prompted Pakistan to become the only major power seeking decisive mili- 
tary assistance from both the Western and Eastern blocs. Although her alliance 
with the West in general and the Pakistan-US Agreement of 1954 in particular, 
to use Brines words, "probably postponed the India-Pakistani war by a decade, it 
nevertheless became either the cause or the justification for an intensified Indian 
effort to integrate Kashmir politically. ""' The UN, which had failed to find a solu- 
tion in 1953, eventually recommended a settlement through direct Indo-Pakistani 
negotiations. But this seemingly insoluble problem is still before the UN. 
Pakistan was divided into five provinces, one of which was the present state of 
Bangladesh 1000 kilometres away from the rest of the country. The very existence 
of this widely dispersed nation was therefore strategically dependent on India. But 
the creation of Pakistan had been the product of lack of Mutual trust between the 
Hindus and the Muslims, and the existence of Pakistan further exacerbated the 
communal enmities and fears that had created it. Against that 
background, the 
survival of Pakistan in the face of the Indian threat was a major achievement 
for 
the country's leaders. 
While the first aim of Pakistani policy was simply to survive, the second main 
objective was to reinforce her position vis a vis 
India, which repeatedly threat- 
ened her. (As late as 1963 Nehru considered 
Pakistan a region "which should 
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be reincorporated into an Indian- dominated confederation. ")"' For Pakistan, all 
other foreign policy matters such as attempts to form close relationships with the 
Islamic countries of the Middle East, the agreement with the US, membership of 
the Baghdad Pact and of the SEATO, were subsidiary to the problems of survival 
and standing up to India. 
The problem of survival was made more difficult by the tremendous socio- 
economic problems facing the country. Pakistan, like Turkey and Iran, clung 
desperately to the US as the main source of international economic assistance. 
But this had the effect of isolating Pakistan from Arab co-religionists and from 
Afghanistan and also provoking the hostility of communist states. After the 1956 
Suez Affair, Pakistan was severely criticised on account of her military ties with 
the West. Regarding her alliance with the US, Ziring was of the view that after 
the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, it soon became evident to both countries 
that "neither could be expected to serve the interests of the other at the expense 
of its own interests. ""' Pakistan was less concerned with the containment of in- 
ternational communism, while the US saw no point in making an enemy of India. 
Pakistan's foreign policy can therefore be seen as a classic example of a weaker, 
smaller state driven by fear of its larger, stronger neighbour India, much as the 
foreign policies of Turkey and Iran were dominated by the 
fear of their Soviet 
neighbour. 
In short, Pakistan is, in Ziring's words, "in 
large measure a manifestation of 
acute emotion and fear as much as ambition and 
human aspirations. " 
123 
121 Choudhury, op. cit., p. 11. 
122 Ziring, L. et. al., Pakistan: 
The Long VieW, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 1977, p. 
22. 
123 Ibid., p. 3. 
85 
3.2.7 Egypt 
Strategically located at the nexus of Asia and Africa and situated in the middle 
of Arab World, Egypt is of great importance in the area and in the world in general. 
Egypt has always been a power in the Arab and Islamic World owing to its large 
population, military strength, advanced bureaucracy, often charismatic leadership 
and relatively developed economy. It is, in Borthwich's words, "a forerunner for 
the Middle East of social and political change, and a vortex in which all the modern 
Arab and Islamic social, political, and intellectual currents have swirled. ""' 
Egypt is one of the oldest and most famous civilisations in the world. The first 
Dynasty of Egyptian Kings began as early as the thirty second century BC. Egypt 
took a new turn when the Muslim Arab conquest in 642 ended the Pharaohs' as- 
cendancy and replaced it with a quickly spreading Islamic one. Indigenous people, 
mainly the Copts, mostly embraced Islam as their religion and Arabic as their 
language. Muslim Egypt was ruled by Fatimids (909-1169), the Ayyubids (1169- 
1252), the Mamluks (1252-1517), and the Ottomans (1517-1923) respectively. 
In Ottoman times, Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1789 opened a new page 
in its history and radically changed the minds of the country's rulers. Although 
Egypt was nominally a part of the Ottoman Empire after the French left in 1805 
under British pressure the Dynasty of Muhammed Ali, an Albanian, ruled the 
country until 1952. However, it was the British who practically ran the country 
from 1882 when they defeated Urabi Pasha and his forces, the 
first Egyptian 
nationalist movement, at the battle of Tel al 
Kebir. "The right to intervene was 
not questioned by most Victorian politicians 
if British interests were thought to be 
threatened. The invasion was justified as an attempt to save the 
Egyptian people 
124 Borthwick, op. cit., P. 149. 
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from a military dictator and to protect the Khedive from opposition. ""' 
The Suez Canal had been built by the French with Egyptian money, but due to 
the Egyptian ruler's financial irresponsibility Great Britain purchased the Egyptian 
shares in 1875. The ill-fated alliance between Turkey and the Germans in World 
War I subsequently left Egypt under complete British control. Like Urabi Pasha, 
Sa'd Zaghlul, who set up the Wafd in 1918 and attended the Peace Conference in 
Paris, was determined to fight against outsiders for a complete independence. But, 
on the whole, according to Hopwood, "the politicians rose through royal favour and 
British support and fell when these were withdrawn. ""' 
There were twenty Egyptian governments and eight sets of negotiations with 
Britain from which the former ceaselessly tried to obtain their independence dur- 
ing the 1918-1936. Although nominal independence was granted in 1922, nothing 
changed in practice. Nonetheless, the two sides were obliged to sign an agreement 
in 1936 in the face of an Italian threat from Libya and Abyssina. In fact, King 
Faruq, offended by the paper he was asked to sign, first complained, saying, 'but 
this paper is dirty, crumpled, and soiled to sign, however, the British Ambassador 
Sir Miles Simpson insisted and King Faruq had no option and complied. Rather 
than abdicate, the King asked Nahas Pasha, the British choice, to form the govern- 
ment. Both sides agreed on the status of Sudan, the capitulation, revision of the 
Treaty and Egyptian independence in accordance with this 'Treaty of Alliance. ' 
Egypt remained faithful to her undertakings to Great Britain during the Second 
World War, however, such "pressure and humiliation could not be forgotten, and 
125 Zayid, Mahmud Y., Egypt's Struggle for Independence, Khayats, Beirut, 1965, p. 28. 
126 Hopwood, Derek, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984, Unwin Hyman, London, 1985, 
p. 12. 
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served to strengthen the resolve to gain independence. ""' The Wafd had won a 
substantial electoral victory, but it had been kept out of power by the Palace 
between 1930 and 1936 and a power struggle went on unabated in the subsequent 
ten years. After World War II there were many political groups such as the Ikhwan 
al Muslimin (the Brethren), the Wafd, Young Egypt and the Free Officers that all 
had common demands; (a) evacuation of the British (b) the unity of the Nile Valley 
- Egypt and Sudan. - 
Anwar al Sadat, one of the Free Officers, speaking of period of 1945-1952, from 
the national standpoint said that during this period "Egypt lived in terror, with 
the severest restrictions of the freedoms of the meeting, speech and the press... It 
was one of the saddest periods in her history. " '2' According to Mahmud Y. Zayid, 
three main factors contributed to the awakening; (a) the increasing number of 
Arabs educated abroad or in similar schools in Egypt, (b) European interference 
and Egyptian financial crisis and (c) the teaching of Jamal al Din al Afghani, (1839- 
1897) who had worked for the regeneration of Islam and resistance to Europeans, 
particularly the British. If the British were hated occupiers, Faruq became the 
symbol of the corrupt ancient regime. Therefore, the first aim of a revolution was 
to rid the country of both. 129 
After a long period of preparation, the Free Officers comprising eleven junior 
officers staged a bloodless coup on 25 January 1952 and obliged King Faruq to 
abdicate in favour of his son and go into exile. Since his fatherly bearing and 
reputation as a humble pious Muslim contributed to his popularity among the 
127 Zayid, op. cit., p. 93. 
1218 Hopwood, op cit., p. 24 and Dikmeiian, R. H., Egypt under Nasir: A Study in PolZtzcal 
Dynamics, University of London Press, London, 1971, p. 19. 
129 At this point it is worth recording that the Egyptian revolutionary commanders of the 1950s were 
the Military Academy's recruits from the middle class, if not lower, who were admitted for the fixst 
time, as was the case with Qassem and his generation in Iraq. 
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people, the Free Officers Executive Committee chose General Nagib, as their leader 
for legitimacy. This Committee later renamed itself the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC). 
The conflict between the RCC and civil governments, which veteran politicians 
were asked to form, kept Egyptian politics in turmoil until Mid-1954. The RCC 
attempted to use three factors to establish popular bases of legitimacy: (a) abo- 
lition of monarchical rule, (19 June 1953) (b) Agrarian Reform Law, (September 
1952) and (c) reorganisation of political groups (1954). The Pro-Nagib alliance 
consisting of the Brethren, the Wafd and Leftist coalition protested in February 
against the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement in January 1954 by means of student and 
labour disorders. However, Nasser eventually eliminated pro-Nagib elements in the 
Army and put Nagib himself under house arrest on 14 November. Thus, Nasser 
won the power struggle against Nagib and his supporters. His strategy of eliminat- 
ing the 'weaker group first', such as the Communists, the royalists and the Wafd, 
successfully ended with the final reckoning with the Brethren, which was the most 
powerful organised group inside as well as outside the army until 1952. 
Subsequently, Gamal Abd al Nasser, the "Arab Atatiirk" , 
130 set up a military 
rule over Egypt which lasted until his death in 1970. He accomplished the poht- 
ical phase of the revolution by eliminating all organised opposition, while he was 
obliged to postpone the social phase of it until 1961. The Anglo-Egyptian Agree- 
ment on Suez in February 1952 had led the West to think that it was possible to 
include Egypt in a Western Defence Pact. Nasser and the Arabs in general, never 
considered the Soviet Union whose forces were thousands of miles away to be a 
threat to them. 13' Their concern was with their neighbour, the expansionist State 
130 Perimann, M., Egypt Versus the Baghdad Pact, ' Middle East Affairs, (March 1956), p. 100. 
131 In replying to the American authorities Nasser said "I must tell you 
in all frankness that I cannot 
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of Israel,... which had support of almost all the Christian World. The sudden 
declaration of the Baghdad Pact by Nuri Said in 1955 may be considered a turning 
point for Nasser to discover new bases for legitimacy of his regime. His bitterest 
enemies, the Brethren internally and Israel and the West externally created great 
opportunities for him to shift from internal affairs to the international arena. 
The internal factor was that the suppression of the Brethren and their religious 
message of Islamic brotherhood made Nasser champion first of Arab Unity and 
second of Islamic Unity. One of the external factors was Israel's attack on Gaza on 
28 February 1955 which proved his military weakness. Another one was that on 18 
July 1955 Dulles publicly announced the withdrawal of United States offer of aid for 
the Aswan High Dam. These factors combined to force Nasser to look for modern 
weapons from anywhere he could get them. When the West failed to provide these 
he turned to the Soviet Union with no hesitation and made the famous Czech arms 
deal in September 1955. The third factor leading Nasser to turn to the international 
arena and replaced Egyptian nationalism with Arab nationalism was the Baghdad 
Pact, which is at the heart of this thesis and will be discussed in detail in the 
following chapters. It is interesting to note that this shift of nationalism, closely 
resembles the case of Turkey, which was certainly not of the same magnitude as 
the Kemalist reversion from Pan-Islamism to Turkish nationalism. 
In fact this deal with the Czechs increased his popularity in the Arab World, 
because it proved that Egypt was now really free from the Western influence. 
see myself waking up one morning to find that the 
Soviet Union is our enemy. We do not know 
them. They are thousands of miles away from us. We have never 
had any quarrel with them. I 
would be laughingstock of my people if I told them they now 
had an entirely new enemy ... Nobody 
would take me seriously if I forgot about the 
British. " See FRUS, V61.9, pp. 19-25. 
132 All interviewees who were asked questions on the Arab-Israel conflict agreed that the 
Arabs rightly 
or wrongly perceived the State of Israel as the major 
threat to the Arab world and therefore they 
did not interest themselves in the Western defence projects. 
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There were some other factors, too, contributing to the increase of his popularity 
in the Arab World and in Third World countries at large. Nasser's successful per- 
formance in international affairs and his ideology of Arab Unity gained him great 
popularity in the entire Arab World. His prominent role at Bandung Conference 
and anti-Western neutralism further increased his prestige in the Arab and Non- 
Aligned countries. On the other hand, Great Britain, the experienced master of 
the Arab World, acted swiftly, directly and indirectly to try to recruit as many 
Arab countries as possible to the Baghdad Pact. The aim was that Egypt was 
either to become a member of the Pact or was to be isolated from other Arab 
countries and the latter would be rendered safe from Nasser's anti-Western propa- 
ganda. According to Dikmejian, "more than any other factor, the Western efforts 
to lure the Arab States into the new security system contributed the development 
of a more aggressive neutralism. " 133 As a matter of fact, most of the analysts agree 
that "the Baghdad Pact was the single most important variable in regional power 
politics which served to change the entire configuration of the forces in the region, 
thus, giving rise to new power alignments and constellations. " 134 
The invasion by Israel, France and Britain of the Suez to maintain the control 
of the Canal was a military defeat for Nasser but he successfully turned it into 
a political victory when the former invaders were obliged to withdraw from the 
region under pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States. This, too, 
furthered Egypt's popularity in the Arab World in particular and in Asia and 
Africa in general. 
Why was Egypt so influential in the Arab countries especially in their 
foreign 
133 Dikmejian, op cit., P. 111. 
134 Dawisha, A. I., Egypt in the Arab World: the Elements of Foreign 
PoliCy, John 
Wiley and Sons, New York, 1976, p. 11. 
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policy? There are some natural and historical reasons. These are its economic 
potential, size, population, stability, experience and religious intellectual leadership 
in the Arab World, particularly through the al Azhar, the pre-eminent university 
of the Muslim World. 
Moreover there had been a series of developments that alienated Egypt from 
the West in the middle of 1950s. These were the Baghdad Pact, the tripartite arms 
embargo, the Aswan High Dam controversy, the nationalisation of the Suez Canal 
and the Anglo- French- Israeli attack. 
Partly as a result of these events in the Middle East, Eisenhower, the President 
of the United States, announced the Eisenhower Doctrine in January 1957, which 
will be explained later in detail. This produced its first fruits when Saudi Arabia, 
formerly the staunch ally of Egypt, sided with the West immediately after the 
Doctrine's declaration. Consequently, within six months Egypt lost all her allies 
except Syria. The suspicion arose that it was perhaps for this reason that the West 
created the 1957 crisis in Syria in order to separate it, too, from Egypt. Tension 
increased to the extent that Turkey, the loyal member of the West since it joined 
NATO, hinted that "it may take action if the Communists come to power in Syria. " 
It was again for such reasons that Syria, not Egypt, asked for the union between 
the two, resulting in the proclamation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) on I 
February 1958. 
Reacting to this Union, Nuri Said of Iraq, whom thq Egyptians considered a 
stooge of the West, rushed to form an Arab Union Federation with Jordan on 12 
February. However, this was not enough to protect him from the Middle Eastern 
revolutionary generation of the 1950s and the Iraqi army led by Abd al 
Karim 
Qassem rid their country of this last symbol of the ancient regime. Nuri and 
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all members of the royal family were brutally killed in the first days of 14 July 
1958 revolution. Panicking at what had happened in Iraq, American marines and 
British paratroopers landed in Lebanon and Jordan respectively to protect these 
regimes against similar actions and if possible to restore law and order in Iraq. 
Thus, the balance of power once again changed in favour of Egypt after one year 
as far as the Arab East was concerned. When Abd al Salam Aref, the second man 
of the revolution, signed the Iraqi-UAR Mutual Aid Pact, he was sent abroad as 
ambassador. Iraqi-UAR relations were severed by activities of "Iraq first" elements 
consisting of the Kurds, National Democratic Party and al Ahali group incited by 
the external powers. So, at the end of the 1950s, relations between Egypt and Iraq 
became as unfriendly as they were when Iraq had sided with the West to form a 
Middle East defence pact. 
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3.2.8 The Kurds 
The Treaty of Sevres (August 1920) provided for the recognition or the creation 
not only of the Arab states of Hijaz, Syria and Iraq, also an Armenia state and plus 
an autonomous Kurdistan. The Turkish victory over the Greeks in the Turkish 
War of Independence and the subsequent Turkish alignment with the West dashed 
the Armenian and Kurdish hopes of independence. Nevertheless this dream of an 
independent Kurdistan remained on record in an international document and was 
not forgotten. The Treaty stimulated the hopes of the Kurds for independence 
in a united Kurdish State. After 1920 armed nationalistic risings occurred in all 
three countries. The Southern Kurds under Sheikh Mahmud resisted incorporation 
in Iraq for some years. In Turkey the most formidable revolt was that of Sheikh 
Said of Palu in the Kharput region in 1925, and there were others at Siirt, Ararat, 
and elsewhere. In Persia, in 1922, Sayid Taha and Ismail Agha Shikak achieved 
widespread successes for a time; and more recently in 1945-46 the Mukri Kurds 
set up the "Kurdish Republic of Mehabad. "' 
Since 1945 there had been little manifestation of Kurdish political nationalism 
in any of the three countries. The intellectual Kurdish leaders seemed to have been 
persuaded that for the time being, in the face of the opposition of the three govern- 
ments, nothing could be done; they could only wait in the hope that some future 
international upheaval would give them or their sons an opportunity of renewing 
their movement with some chance of success. "' They could not maintain a pop- 
ular opposition within these countries but they managed to organise themselves 
abroad. The activities of Kurdish elements and centres outside the three country, 
135 PRO, FO, 371,140682, E1821/20,29.4.1959. For a good account of Kurdish uprisings in the Middle 
East see 'The Kurds in Persia, ' 
Central As%an Remew, 7(1959), pp. 175-201. 
136 Ibid. op. loc. 
94 
increased considerably in the 1950s and they tried especially to influence Turkish 
Eastern provinces. Following the collapse of the Mehabad Republic of Kurdistan 
most of Kurdish leaders from Iran and Iraq were obliged to go to the USSR where 
they had stayed for more than a decade. 
The Kurds disliked the Baghdad Pact, "seeing in it a reinforcement of the 
Treaty of Sadabad (1937), which they have always regarded as aimed at the 
Kurds. " 13' They feared that close co-operation between the Turks, Arabs and Per- 
sians might result in a combined squeeze by all the three countries concerned on 
the Kurds. According to HM Ambassador in Tehran there was not such a feeling 
before the Baghdad Pact. "' 
The Baghdad Pact only strengthened the tendency of Kurdish malcontents 
to look to Soviet Russia for support. The British view on the question was that 
"the Russians may be able to develop anti-Pact themes in their propaganda for 
Kurdistan, and be listened to by some of the mullahs and tribal leaders. ""' Khad- 
duri also pointed out the danger of spread of communism among the Kurds and 
said "one of the purposes of the Baghdad Pact, it seems, is to co-ordinate" the 
work between the signatories against it. "' Therefore, there was a potential dan- 
ger of Kurdish nationalism. It constituted "a powerful weapon in the hands of 
the Rtissians if they should ever be in a position and wish to embarrass all three 
(repeat three) Governments concerned at the same time. From this it follows that 
137 Ibid.; Gunter, Michael, 'Foreign Influences on the Kurdish Insurgency in Iraq, ' Orzent, 34(1993), 
p. 105; also all of the Kurdish interviewees, namely Glyasettin Emre, Melik Firat, Abbas Vali 
and Kendal Nezan, claimed that Sadabad Pact was perceived as being against the Kurds. Other 
interviewees also said that the Kurdish question was one of the factors contributed to the formation 
of the Pact except Hfiseyin Bakci, who said he did not specifically study the Kurdish involvement 
in the process. 
138 PRO, FO, 371,127141, EP1821/1,29.1.1957, Tehran. 
139 PRO, FO, 371,127141, EP1821/1A, 14.2.1957, Tehran 
140 Khadduri, Majid, 'The Problem of Regional Security in the Middle East: An Appraisal, ' The 
Middle East Journal, 11(1957), p. 21. 
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all three Governments have a very strong common interest in damping down the 
present unrest in Kurdistan. """ However, after the collapse of the Baghdad Pact 
the union between three collapsed and instead of co-operating against the common 
threat they began to use each other's Kurds against one to another. "' This policy 
of oppressing their own Kurds and supporting others' Kurds was very detrimental 
to all Kurds. This has been the case since 1958 and has continued up to now to 
an increasing degree. 
Meanwhile the efforts to gain the Kurdish support through the radio broad- 
cast in the 1950s is also an indication demonstrating the influence of the Kurdish 
factor on the security of the regional members of the Baghdad Pact as well as on 
the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East. According to the British docu- 
ments, it seems that the Soviets were quite successful in using such ethnic means. 
The Soviet broadcast in Kurdish to pass on to the Kurds of the Middle East their 
message was very harmful for the West. For example, on the broadcast talk on 26 
July 1950 (17.30 FBIS), the speaker said that "the Kurds had been suppressed by 
the Turks and Arabs as well as by the British and American imperialists. But the 
Kurds were aware that their brothers in the USSR had obtained the full political 
and social rights of their country. " The Azerbaijani station went on to say that "the 
Kurds should be made aware of the USSR, because under Soviet leadership the 
vile imperialist policy could be abolished. ""' The radio told the Kurdish listeners 
that "the Kurds will establish their own country on the border of the USSR" and 
urged Iraqi Kurds "to awaken the people to the fact that Kurdistan is one country 
141 PRO, FO, 371,140682,1081/59G, 7.5.1959. 
142 Shikara, Ahmed A. R., 'Middle Eastern Politics between Domestic Constraints and International 
Intervention, ' Presented to BRISMES Annual Conference, Warwick, 8-11 July 1993, 
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and should be liberated. ""' 
The Egyptian Radio Kurdish service was no less provocative than the Azerbai- 
jani one. For example, concluding the Kurdish program, Cairo radio said "Dear 
Kurds, the history of the Kurds and Kurdistan is the most ancient and honourable 
of the histories of the world. Then why have we hitherto been separated from 
each other and dispersed? When shall we awake? When shall we see the birth of 
another son like Ahmed the son of Marvan to set us free? " 
145 
Soviet broadcasts in Kurdish ceased in August 1953. Thereafter, communist 
propaganda to Kurds was conducted through the communist parties in the various 
countries where they existed. It was difficult to assess the influence of communist 
doctrine on the Kurds as a group but some of the Kurdish leaders were no doubt 
genuinely attracted to communism but most of them were mere opportunists ready 
to flirt with any group which would advance their aims. 
After the coup, Iraqi radio was also broadcasting in Kurdish and appealing to 
the Iranian Kurds to unite with their brethren in Iraq where they were sharing 
equal rights with their Arab brothers. Iranians reacted to such broadcasts in the 
same way. They claimed that Iran was the fatherland of the Persians as well as 
the Kurds and the Iraqi Kurds must thus unite with their brethren in Iran. "' 
Meanwhile the Turks pursued a completely different policy to solve their Kur- 
dish problem. The Turks pursued with characteristic thoroughness not to say 
ruthlessness a policy of out-and-out assimilation seeking to extinguish all traces 
of a distinctively Kurdish culture and to transform the Kurds into Turks, having 
144 PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/20,1.8.1950. 
145 PRO, FO, 371,140683, Cairo Radio, Kurdish News BuRetin, No: 289,11.6.1959. 
146 PRO, FO, 371,133019, EP1055/2,23.10.1958, Tehran. 
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isolated them from outside Kurds. "They were already achieving some success 
but undoubtedly several generations would be required to turkify all Kurds. Peas- 
ants were fined for not speaking Turkish in the market-place. Talking a language 
which was never taught to them would have been a miracle, ""' HM Ambassador 
in Ankara reported. 
The Turkish authorities preferred to forget the Kurds and ignore their very 
existence. When the Kurdish question once again arose in the Middle East and 
this time it became an international problem, they were forced to think about 
it seriously for the first time. The General Inspector of the Eastern Provinces, 
Avni Dog'an, was therefore allowed to write a series of articles in the Turkish press 
that was the first of its kind. "The first thing one has to do in order to avert 
possible dangers is to face realities instead of ignoring them, " said Avni Dog'an 
in the daily, Vatan, in October 1958. Then he cited the fact that "The whole 
world is aware of this Kurdish movement and newspapers, scientific periodicals 
and foreign ministries are dwelling on the matter at great length. ... And yet we 
appear to think that all this will disappear if we keep silent about the whole issue. " 
He finally concluded that "we shall regret it forever if we are unable to save these 
valuable elements from internal and external provocations and give them a secure 
and tranquil life within the framework of the unity of the Turkish Republic. ""' 
The Turkish authorities must be regretting now in the 1990s that they did not 
heed the recommendations of this report. 
The Kurds of Iraq were less numerous than those of Persia and Turkey, but 
in view of their more privileged position they could with some plausibility assume 
"the role of the free nucleus of a United Independent Kurdistan. In 1918 Kurdish 
147 PRO, FO, 371,140682,1081/59G, 7.5-1959. 
148 PRO, FO, 371,140682,1081/59G, 7.5.1959, quoted from Vatan dated 23.11.1958. 
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was introduced by the British mihtary administration as the official language in 
Southern Kurdistan. Since then there has been in Iraq a regular if not very prolific 
output of periodicals, anthologies and new works of all kinds. ""' 
The Russians were prepared to exploit anything they could to encounter the 
Western propaganda in the Middle East. Therefore, the Shah was afraid of the 
Soviet Union stirring up trouble in Kurdistan. He wanted to know how far the 
West was ready to help Iran against the Kurds, who were supposedly backed by 
the USSR. However the British Ambassador could not give any guarantee until he 
received the positive American response. In addition, Great Britain believed that 
the Turks were also worried about communist activities among the Kurds and the 
growing Kurdish nationalism. Britain was also aware that Iran and Turkey were 
undoubtedly "comparing notes and working on each other's anxieties". "' 
Indeed HM Ambassador in Ankara reported that it was impossible for the 
UK to support an independent Kurdish State and "would inevitably alienate both 
TVrkey and Persia. But this should not prevent the USA from feeling the pulses of 
Turkey and Persia to see if they cannot allay Kurdish separatism by more generous 
treatment of the Kurdish minorities within their boundaries". "' 
In the 1950s, the regional member countries felt more than ever the need 
to combat the Kurds who were a potentially formidable threat to each country. 
However, as soon as Iraq had withdrawn from the Pact the Kurds raised their 
voice once again and became a central issue of foreign policy concerning all the 
three on which they found it hard to agree any more in the absence of the Pact 
and especially Iran and Iraq began to use each other's Kurds while they looked 
149 PRO, FO, 371,140682, E1821/20,29.4.1959. 
150 PRO, FO, 371,133019, EP1055/3,20.11.1958. 
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after their own Kurds to prevent them being exploited by the other. Turkey was 
to join this same policy only after the second Gulf war in 1990 by supporting the 
Iraqi Kurds against Saddam Hussein who lost his famous "mother of all battles" 
against the Allies led by George Bush. 
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Chapter IV 
HISTORY OF TURKEY TO THE 1950s 
4.1 Emergence of Kemalist Turkey 
Introduction 
Since it may be argued that Turkish involvement in Western defence initiatives 
in the 1950s is a function of Turkish attachment to the West, it is necessary to look 
in some detail at the process of westernisation in Turkey in order to appreciate 
what had by the 1950s become dominant mentality of Turkish policy makers. As 
explained in the previous chapter, although efforts to westernise the Ottoman 
Empire began in the eighteenth century, with every passing year it grew weaker 
and weaker. Abdulhamit's authoritarian attempts to slow down, if not reverse, the 
process of decline failed. To preserve the integrity of his empire he had pursued an 
adventurous but unsuccessful pan-Islamist policy and also sought to play off the 
European powers against each other as well as suppressing the ethnic groups that 
were seeking autonomy or independence. Nevertheless, it may be claimed in his 
favour that he lost less Imperial territory during his rule of thirty three years than 
did the Young Turks in only eleven years. In fact, the Young Turks' nationalist and 
pro-Western policy caused resentment and spurred the other ethnic groups within 
the Empire to revolt, and eventually the Empire came to the brink of collapse 
before World War I broke out. The War served simply to complete this process 
and relegate to the pages of history the last state to be ruled by the "Caliph of 
Islam. " At the end of the war the Turks acknowledged their loss of Empire and 
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could no longer lay claim to sovereignty over northern Africa, the Fertile Crescent, 
Iraq, Yemen, the Gulf States, the Aegean islands, Cyprus, and even many parts of 
Anatolia itself. 
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4.1.2 The War of Independence 
The innate fighting spirit of the Turks, who for centuries had been the guardians 
of Islam, would not permit them to submit passively to enemy occupation of what 
they regarded as the essential territories without which their nation could not 
survive. Resistance was organised by Associations for the Defence of Rights in 
Anatolia and Thrace. The Sultan appointed Mustafa Kemal, Inspector of the 
Ninth Army (later renumbered Third Army), which was commanded by Kazim 
Karabekir. Mustafa Kemal, who was given the wider task of restoring order in the 
Black Sea region and supervising the demobilisation of Turkish forces there, landed 
at Samsun on 19 May 1919 and actually proceeded swiftly to lead and organise 
nationalist forces to oppose foreign occupation. "' It was Karabekir's army that 
removed the remaining Armenians from the region. Although written evidence is 
hard to come by, some writers, such as Abdurrahman Dilipak, claim that Kemal 
was informally asked by the Sultan to organise a national resistance movement, be- 
cause the Government, being under the eyes and influence of the Entente Powers, 
could not do so itself. 163 
When Mustafa Kemal landed on Samsun on 19 May 1919 the Society for the 
Defence of the Rights of the Eastern Anatolia ($arki Anadolu Mfidaafa-i Hukuk 
Cemiyeti) had already called the local leaders for a meeting in Erzurum. He sent 
communiques to the commanders, governors, mayors and local resistance forces in 
the eastern provinces to continue the national struggle. The Erzurum Congress 
of July 1919 whose main subject was the protection of the eastern provinces, laid 
down the basis of the "national pact. " The main decisions were: "the nation would 
152 Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, London, 
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oppose every kind of foreign occupation ... and mandates or protectorates could 
not be accepted. " 154 The next congress held in Sivas in September reviewed the 
decisions taken in Erzurum Congress and gave the local resistance movements a 
national character. Consequently, all Societies for the Defence of the Rights were 
united under the name of Society for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and 
Thrace (Anadolu ve Rumeli Miidaafa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti). 
In October, on behalf of the Ottoman Government, Navy Minister Salih Pasha 
met Mustafa Kemal in Amasya, where they came to an understanding on holding 
general elections. The new Parliament declared the famous "national pact" (misak- 
1 milli) on 28 January 1920. The most important points of the Pact were that the 
areas inhabited by the Turks would in no circumstances be surrendered and the 
capitulations that had thwarted the political, judicial and financial development 
of the country, would never again be accepted. When the Ottoman government 
was paralysed by the Western influence in istanbul, the former Ottoman general 
Mustafa Kemal declared that the Turkish Grand National Assembly would meet 
in Ankara on 23 April 1920 and would have the sole authority to represent the 
nation. 
On the one hand, the National Forces were bound to fight against the European 
invaders, on the other hand, they were exposed to the local revolts incited by the 
istanbul Government. When the istanbul Government signed the Treaty of Sevres 
on 12 August the last ties were severed between the two. The Ankara Government 
strongly condemned those who signed it and began forming regular armies to resist 
its implementation. 
154 The General Directorate of Press and Information of Prime Ministry of the Turkish Republic, 
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The intact forces of Kazim Karabekir backed the Ankara Government on the 
eastern front and signed an agreement with the Armenians on 3 December 1920. 
On the western front, the units of the Society for the Defence of the Rights of 
Anatolia and Thrace were fighting against the Greek troops. After Ankara had 
endured months of gloom and pessimism, National Forces headed by ismet in6nii 
won their first victory against the enemy in April 1921. 
Following this Nationalist success, on 10 March 1921 the Entente Powers held 
a conference in London to make some concessions in the Treaty of Sevres to make 
it acceptable to the Ankara Government, but failed. When the Allied Powers came 
to realise that a Turkish victory against the Greeks was inevitable, first, Italian and 
later French forces withdrew from Anatolia in June and October 1921 respectively. 
Eventually the "Great Attack" (Biiyiik Taarruz) by the Turkish Army started on 
26 August 1922 and ended on 18 September with the liberation of the country 
from Greek occupation. 
Under French and Italian pressure the British Government agreed to cease-fire 
negotiations with Ankara and subsequently the convention of Mudanya was signed 
on 11 October 1922. It was now the right time to assure the Western Powers 
that the new state would never be the same as the "blood-stained" Ottoman 
Empire. The first indication, if not assurance of that, was the abolition of the six 
century-old Sultanate on 1 November. The peace conference started in Lausanne 
on 21 November, but was interrupted on 4 February 1923. This led Kemal to 
assure the Western leaders more clearly that he was sincere in his reform plans. 
On 17 February he held the famous Economy Congress, which continued until 4 
March, in izmir, during which he produced more tangible confirmation of that. 
For example, some discussions were devoted to non-economic social and political 
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matters such as the progress of Westernisation, the futility of purely military power, 
and perhaps most importantly the introduction of the Latin script. The Lausanne 
Peace Agreement was eventually signed on 24 July 1923. Although some matters 
such as finance, sovereignty of the Straits and the question of Mosul remained 
unsolved from the Turkish point of view, it was a victory for the Turkish diplomacy. 
It showed the world that the new Turkish Republic was now independent, vigorous, 
self-assured and determined to establish a strong position in the international 
arena. 
155 
1*5*5 Ibid., p. 46. 
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4.1.3 Foundation and Orientation of the Republic of Turkey 
The Treaty of Lausanne was generally considered by the new rulers as in- 
ternational approval for a completely different state from the Ottoman Empire. 
Some were later to claim that its foundations were laid down at the Lausanne 
1-16 Conference. Mustafa Kemal, who was "only anxious to see Turkey a secular 
Republic""' was determined to "turn Turkey into a European state and the Turk- 
ish people into a European nation, because he believed that there was only one 
type of real civilisation; the Western one. ""' He had been paying lip-service to 
Islam"' but, now he was recognised as leader of the country, he no longer needed 
to dissemble. Thus, he felt free to implement his reform program in order to put 
an end to the theocratic regime. 
Lord Curzon's conversation with the Chief Rabbi of Egypt, Haim Naum and 
his speech in the House of Lords concerning the recognition of the independence of 
Turkey gives us an outsiders' views about orientation of the Kemalist revolution. 
Strongly reacting against the recognition of Turkish independence, Lord Curzon 
said "the reality is that the Turks will never again recapture their former glories, 
because we have killed them morally and spiritually""' by establishing a secular 
Turkish state which was going to deprive the Turks from leading the Muslim world. 
156 Misiroglu, Kadir, Lozan Zafer mi Hezimet Mi? Sebil Yayinlari, istanbul, 1971, pp. 28-29. 
157 Price, M. P., A History of Turkey; From Empire to Republic, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
New York, 1961, p. 128. 
158 Vali, Ferenc A., Bridge Across the Bosporus; the Foreign Policy of Turkey, The 
Johns Hopkins Press, London, 1971, pp. 21-22. 
159 Ibid., p. 22. 
160 In Turkish: "i§te asil bundan sonraki Tfirkler bir daha eski satvet ve §evketlerine kavu§amayacaklardir. 
Zira biz onlari maneviyat ve ruh cephesinden 61diirmii§ bulunuyoruz. " Dilipak, Abdurrahman, 
Jn6niý D6neMi, Beyan Yaymlari, Istanbul, 1989, p. 91. We could not find Lord Curzon's 
statement but we suspect that there is such a statement, because in 'Parliamentary 
Debates' the 
following note is recorded: "... towards the absolute assurance regarding her future security given 
to Turkey, according to Curzon's statement ... " See 
Parliamentary Debates, V01.170,1924, 
p. 24. 
107 
It is believed that Haim Naum, told Lord Curzon that "if Britain recognised 
the territorial integrity of independent Turkey he would guarantee to tread Islam 
and the Turks' representation of it under foot. "161 
Although it was chiefly Kemal who oriented the new Republic as he wanted, 
one should bear in mind that his negotiations with the Italians, the French and 
particularly the British during and after the War of Independence also contributed 
the Republic's new orientation. Kemal desperately needed external support and 
obtained it at a critical time. 
Having internally as well as externally consolidated its Power) the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly declared the new country a Republic and appointed 
Mustafa Kemal its President virtually for life on 29 October 1923. Commenting 
on the newly adopted orientation of the republic, Karpat said that this declaration 
and one year later the abolition of the Caliphate proved that Kemal abandoned his 
old pro-Islamic attitude of 1919-1921 162 and became secular, if he was not already. 
Karpat went on to say that "this was a victory of the secular-modernists over 
conservative- religious""' in a struggle that had begun as early as the end of the 
eighteenth century. 
Once firmly established in office, Kemal unhesitatingly used his presidential 
powers and the support of the recently formed Republican People's Party to "im- 
pose his will upon, and to maintain the control of the assembly", "' which turned 
to be only a mere "debating-club, where members are at liberty to talk for hours 
161 In Turkish; "Siz Tiirkiye'nin miilki tamamiyetini kabul ediniz. Onlara ben islamiyeti ve islami 
temsilciliklerini ayaklar altinda ýjgnetmeyi taahhiit ediyorum. " See Dilipak, op. loc. 
162 Karpat, K. H., Turkey's Politics; The Transition to a Multi Party System, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, NJ., 1959, p. 45. 
163 Ibid., p. 44. 
164 Tachau, Rank, Turkey; the Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development, 
Praeger, New York, 1984, p. 38. 
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but never to make any constructive criticism and least of all to organise an effective 
opposition. """ Therefore, it has been argued that Kemal, a brilliant military tac- 
tician and a consummate political organiser'" used every opportunity to eliminate 
his opponents as happened after the Sheikh Said Revolt of 1925, the conspiracy 
against Kemal of 1926 and the Menemen incident of 1930. As Geoffrey Lewis put 
it, he made these events "the excuse for hanging or exiling virtually every promi- 
nent man known to be irredeemably opposed to his policies. " "' Once again Kemal 
proved that he was, in Bernard Lewis' words, 
a man of swift and decisive action, of sudden and often violent decision. A tough 
and brilliant soldier, ... he was in all things a man of immense will and abounding 
vitality. By his contemporaries he was often called a dictator, and in a sense he certainly 
was. But, ... his rule was very different than that of other [dictators]. 168 
Apart from his personal talents and the Western support for his plan of reforms, 
there was another factor that contributed to his successes in this field. This was 
the fact that in spite of the formal separation of military from civilian authority, 
he had the full support of the military for his far-reaching reform program. "' This 
support continued so long as the Presidency was in the hands of distinguished 
former soldiers: Kemal Atatiirk (1923-1938) and ismet in6nii (1938-1950). 
In fact, the political modernisation of the Ottoman Empire as well as Turkey"' 
happened to be almost always under the military aegis. "' "Thus, for nearly two 
165 Kruger, K., Kemaltst Turkey and the Middle East, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 
1932, p. 72. 
166 Harris, G., Turkey; Coping with Crisis, Westview Press, Croom Helm, London, 1985, p. 
56. 
167 Lewis, Geoffrey, Modern Turkey, Praeger, New York, 1974, p. 106. 
168 Lewis, Bernard, op. cit., p. 284. 
169 Tachau, op. cit., p. 77. 
170 The proportion of the recruitment to the bureaucracy from bureaucratic and military families, 
which reached its peak of 75 per cent during the period of the Young Turks and declined to only 50 
per cent in Kemal's period evinced this reahty. Dodd, C. H., 
Democracy and Development 
in Turkey, The Eothen Press, N. Humberside, 1979, p. 56. 
171 Tachau, op. cit., p. 76. 
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hundred years the soldier has been Turkey's foremost moderniser. ""' As a matter 
of fact, Kemal always regarded the military as both "the agent and guardian 
of the reforming ideals of his regime. ""' Indeed, the Turkish army proved this 
by remaining loyal to their "eternal chief", Atatiirk and protecting the Kemalist 
principles against either subversive or separatist ideologies of rightists, leftists and 
Islamists in 1960,1971 and finally 1980 at the expense of interrupting the course 
of infant Turkish democracy.. 
As can be seen, the new republic was founded on nationalist, secular and pro- 
Western bases. As Atatiirk was later to put it: "Turkey must be freed from some, 
if not all, of the 'backward-looking institutions' of Islam. ""' and "the truest order 
is the order of civilisation, "' scholarship and science (bilim ve teknik). We do 
not accept anything else. ""' In fact, this was not only a secularist but also a 
positivist manifesto. It was therefore quite evident that the new nation was in 
due course to take its appropriate place among the Western nations. However, to 
achieve such lofty aims it would first of all have to get rid of all 'backward-looking 
Islamic institutions. ' Thus, began the Kemalist reforms that were without parallel 
anywhere in the world. "' 
172 Rustow, D. A. and Robert, E. W., (ed. ) Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ., 1964, p. 352. 
173 Dodd, op cit., p. 135. 
174 Weiker, Walter F., The Modernzsation of Turkey; From Ataturk to the Present 
Day, HM Publishers, London, 1981, p. 2. 
175 The perception of the civilisation is explained later in this chapter. 
176 Atatfirk, Kemal, Atatilrkiýn Sjylev ve Demeýleri, 1908-1938, Voi. II, Tfirk 
inkilap 
Tarihi Enstitiisii Yayinlari, Ankara, 1991, pp. 214-215. 
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4.1.4 Kemalist Reforms 
The Kemalist reforms gave paramount importance to creating a modern coun- 
try on a European model out of the ashes of the oriental Ottoman Empire. Others 
before Kemal had nurtured the same ambitions but to achieve them it required 
both a man of his invincible determination and also propitious circumstances. His 
reform package was by no means entirely new. The westernisers in the Ottoman 
Empire had attempted to introduce similar reforms from the end of the eighteenth 
century. The pressure for such reforms started with the military following their 
disastrous defeat by the Russians in 1778. Kemal had studied the reasons for the 
failure of these earlier reformers and he seized his own more favourable opportunity 
to try again. Like them he had a concept of civilisation that was pro-Western so, 
his reforms were intended to make Turkey a completely different state from that 
of the old Ottoman Empire that the West had regarded as the number one enemy 
of the Christian World. As Weiker, like many others, comments: 
Many of the reforms which Kemal Atatiirk implemented were facilitated by events 
and trends of the Ottoman period. "' Some were even begun at that time. Actually, 
reformers had come to power in the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, but were able 
to achieve little in the way of development, because, among other things, Turkey was 
soon beset by the Balkan wars and World War L It remained for the Ottoman General, 
Mustafa Kemal (Atatfirk) to widen, deepen and quicken many of these changes. "" 
Indeed, the influence of the pro-Western elements on the Ottoman state and 
society had been immense. It is widely believed that in addition to the Tanzi- 
mat and Islahat reforms, the Young Turk Revolution prepared the ground for the 
Kernalist Revolution. "' 
In publications at home and abroad these reforms are often referred to as 
Kemalism, Atatiirkism, the Principles of Atatiirk, the Turkish Transformation or 
178 Interview with Emre and Firat. 
179 Weiker, op. cit., P. 1. 
180 Interview with Emre and Firat. 
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the Turkish Revolution. 1'1 We should look at the reasons and motivations behind 
it. 
One of the first fundamental reforms was the abolition of the Sultanate. But 
the way this was achieved provided a model for the method by which many other 
reforms were subsequently introduced. Mustafa Kemal generally proceeded as fol- 
lows: he would encourage Members of the Parliament whom he had carefully and 
appropriately selected for the particular purpose especially to prepare the public 
for the reform and then introduce necessary legislative measures in the Assembly 
after the reform had been widely discussed for a few days, weeks or months de- 
pending its nature. However, when he realised that the National Assembly seemed 
unlikely to pass the Bill he would cow its opponents. In the case of the abolition 
of the Sultanate, Kemal, an unusually perceptive, energetic and determined man, 
suddenly jumped on the desk and said quite clearly that "this will prevail even 
if some heads may roll in the process. ""' Thereafter, few dared criticise him to 
his face"'and MPs would agree to reforms even if they were actually opposed to 
them, since they knew the price for refusal could be death. Thus, it can be said 
that the reforms were all imposed upon society from above. "' 
He had already managed to separate the Sultanate from the Caliphate, a 
change that could scarcely be resisted on Islamic grounds. But, this, it seemed, 
did 
not decrease the danger to his regime. Being aware of the fact that the 
Caliphate 
was to remain a constant menace to his own power and the major obstacle 
in the 
Afetinan, A History of the Turkish Revolution and Turkish Republic, translated by 
Uysal, A. E., Pars Matbaasi, Ankara, 1981, p. 143. 
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way of reforms, '" he, therefore, after a preliminary campaign, abolished it on 3 
March 1924 and subsequently expelled the Caliph from the country. This was, one 
could argue, the most radical reform, not only in Turkey but also in the whole 
of Islamic World. No one could even imagine that it was possible to propose its 
abolition until the "right" time came. As Kruger comments "public opinion was 
unanimous in declaring that this step was madness on the part of Kemal, and 
might indeed have disastrous reactions, not only in Turkey, but throughout the 
Muslim world. " 186 
For the first time since the birth of Islam, this left the whole Islamic world 
with no Caliph, the dignitary who was regarded by many Muslims as their sole 
representative and the symbol of Muslim unity and cohesion. It left the Islamic 
countries in a state of disunity, disarray and complete confusion. They held the 
Turks responsible for the removal of the caliphate, and they suspected that Kemal 
was under British"' and Jewish influence. In fact, modern Turkey has never since 
had such an independent minded statesman who acted in accordance with his own 
convictions. 
One example of the reactions coming from the Muslim world was the case of 
the Indian Muslims who had sent a considerable amount of their gold and jewellery 
to the National Forces during the War of Independence. On behalf of the Indian 
Muslims, the Agha Khan and Ameer Ali sent a letter addressed to ismet in6nii, 
Turkey's "Second Man" (ikinci Adam) in which they stated that the Caliphate had 
a strong link with the past and Islam and therefore, had to be protected for the 
18'5 Karpat, op. cit., p. 44. 
186 Kruger, op. cit., p. 27. 
9 
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benefit of the Muslim peoples including the Turks themselves. Not surprisingly, 
Mustafa Kemal agreed with them in seeing this link. It was) in Bernard Lewis 
words, "precisely for that reason that he was determined to break it. ""' In fact) 
most of the reforms were intended to serve the very same purpose. 
Indeed, it was mainly the caliphate, the symbol of Islamic unity, that had kept 
other Muslim ethnic groups, under the banner of Ottomans for so long. With its 
abolition, the Kurdish ulamas and sheikhs, for example, saw no reason to submit 
to Turkish unIslamic administration. They rose in rebellion, led by Sheikh Said, 
to restore the caliphate in istanbul and, if that was not possible, to form their own 
national Islamic state. 189 
On the day of the abolition of the caliphate, the Assembly adopted some other 
parallel reforms as well. These were the closing down of all Muslim schools, not the 
Christian and the Jewish ones, and the establishment of a unified schools system 
under a secular Ministry of Education. A month later, on April 8, the Assembly 
abolished the Courts of the Islamic Shari'a. One day later the law allowing the 
public sale and consumption of alcohol was enacted. On 2 September 1925 the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly voted to abolish all Islamic orders (tarikats), 
the closure of the dervish lodges (tekkes) and tombs. This law became effective 
on 30 November. From 28 November the Assembly outlawed the wearing of any 
Islamic male headdress such as the fez and other forms of it without a peak or 
brim. On 30 November Imams of the Mosques were granted permission to wear 
the Islamic headgear only within the mosques. 
The Islamic Hijri Calendar and time system were replaced by the Gregorian 
188 Lewis, B., op. cit., p. 258. 
189 Interview with Firat. 
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Calendar and European time system on 26 December 1925. 
Mustafa Kemal discarded the Islamic Law, the Shari'a. In its place he intro- 
duced the Swiss Civil Code on 17 February 1926; the Italian Criminal Law on 
March 1; and the German Commercial Code of Law on April 22, with changes 
only to meet the peculiar conditions of Turkey. 
Meanwhile the first statue"'O of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of the secular 
Turkey, was unveiled in Sarayburnu, istanbul, on 3 October 1926. 
On 10 April 1928, the AssemblY amended the constitution and struck out 
the clause stating that Islam was the religion of the Turkish State, the clause 
committing the Assembly to the application of Islamic Laws and the requirement 
to swear in the name of Allah as one takes an official oath. "' 
On 24 May 1928, the Parliament forbade the use of Arabic numerals and 
adopted the numerals used internationally, on November 1 of the same year, it 
banned the use of the Arabic alphabet and chose the Latin Alphabet. This had a 
major effect on the irreversible process of the westernisation. Indeed, as expected, 
it successfully cut off links and connections with the past and Islam. People were 
virtually not allowed to learn and teach the Ottoman script"' owing to the fear 
that they might learn something about Islam from the books already written in 
that script. And there were virtually no Islamic books printed in the new Latin 
Alphabet. "' The Turks were bound to remain ignorant of Islam for decades to 
190 This is unanimously accepted as an unIslamic act as the very first aim of Islam was and is to put 
an end to all sorts of idols both on earth as well as in the hearts of the people. 
The statue was 
regarded as an idol. 
191 Webster, D. E., The Turkey of Ataturk, Social Process in the Turkish Reformation, 
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come. Arabic and Persian were taken out of the curriculum in the schools on 1 
September 1929. The international measurement system was adopted on 26 March 
1931. 
On 15 April 1931 the Turkish History Institute was established to rewrite 
Turkish history from beginning to end according to the new way of thought, which 
simply limited the Islamic part of the Turkish history to the Sultan's harem and his 
adventures. Briefly the Institute created a new theory to explain Turkish history 
by alleging that most of the ancient civilisations, if not an, stemmed from the 
Turkish civilisation. It even went on to claim that there was no great man in the 
world that was not a Turk. It was through such an approach that the reformers 
had hoped to change the Turkish mentality and instil the confidence that they 
lacked in their dealings with other "superior" nations. It even conducted a short- 
lived investigation into the measurement of the skulls of such "pure Turks" as 
Mimar Sinan and Yunus Emre but had to abandon this when the results were not 
encouraging. "" 
On 19 February 1932 the Turkish Language Institute was set up to perform 
similar reforms in the field of the Turkish language. Briefly, it aimed to improve 
the Turkish language within its own structure and purify it from the Persian and 
Arabic words and patterns. It attempted to secularise the language as the Turkish 
History Institute had rewritten Turkish history. The Institute propagated the Sun 
Language Theory, which, in parallel with the Turkish History Thesis, assumed 
that all world languages stemmed from Turkish. The reformers anticipated that 
this belief would help the Turks overcome the inferiority complex that they felt 
towards Persian and Arabic as well as European languages. In supporting this 
194 Dogan, Mehmet D., TiErkiye'de Darbeler, Miýcadeleler ve Siyasi 
Sistem, Rehber 
Yaymclhk, Ankara, 1991, p. 73. 
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idea, Mustafa Kemal stated that "this nation was not created to be ashamed of 
itself, but to be proud of it. ""' 
On 18 July 1932 the Arabic ezan (the call for prayer from the minarets) was 
replaced by a Turkish version, the first attempt of its kind ever in Islamic history. 
As a matter of fact, Kemal was contemplating more radical changes in the field 
of religion and made some attempts in this regard, but failed at the end. For 
example, a Committee was set up under the well-known scholar and politician, 
Fuat K6priilii, in 1928 to turkicize worship, to turn the mosque into a "Muslim 
church", with pews, organ and an imam- presenter, "" but the spirit of the time 
was not conducive to the realisation of this goal"' in the face of opposition. 
On 21 June 1934 the Assembly passed the Surname Law forbidding the use 
of any traditional family name and/or those with ethnic or religious connotation 
and replaced it with the Western tradition of surname. On 29 November 1934, the 
use of some titles such as "Haci, Molla, Hafiz, Hoca, Hazret, Pa§a, Bey, Beyefendi 
and Hanimefendi, "1" were forbidden, though it was never applied for the rulers 
themselves. On December 3, some Islamic garments were banned and on December 
5, Turkish women were granted all social and political rights that men enjoyed, 
thus, putting them ahead of their contemporaries in many European countries. 
On 5 January 1937, the Assembly put the "six arrows" into the constitution, 
thus, symbolising the fact that the Republican People's Party had completed the 
process of settling the constitutional foundations, on which the state affairs were 
dealt with. It demonstrated that the Party had no serious opposition and nobody 
195 Atatfirk, op. cit., p. 253. 
196 Eren, op. cit., p. 91. 
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would easily be able to change the fundamentals of the secular and nationalist 
state any more. 
On 15 April 1937, "61iim salasi" (the call to funeral service from the minarets) 
was banned. This was Mustafa Kemal's last effort to curb Islamic influence in 
Turkey before he died on 10 November 1938. 
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4.1.5 Post-Atatiirk Era 
Following Atatiirk's death, ismet in6nii, a staunch Kernalist and a close friend 
who is known as National Chief (Milli $ef), became President of the Republic, and 
Celal Bayar was appointed Prime Minister. Bayar, too, was an ardent admirer 
of Mustafa Kemal. (Turks still recall his declaration, "Atatiirk'ii sevmek milli bir 
ibadettir" (to love Atatiirk is a form of national worship). ) In 1950, after the 
first genuinely free multi-party elections, the DP replaced the RPP in government. 
Celal Bayar replaced ismet in6nii as President, and Adnan Menderes became Prime 
Minister. Despite these apparently major changes, it can be argued that until 
very recently Turkey has continued to be run by a small section of society that 
had established its Kemalist credentials. As far as the ordinary humble citizens 
were concerned the change of regime from sultanate to republic and the change 
of government from RPP to DP produced little change in their relationship with 
state institutions. Such individuals remained powerless and obsequious before a 
contemptuous bureaucracy. They passively accepted their lot as the docile servants 
of the state, ordered about in accordance with the whims of their rulers. Their 
attitudes did not change even after they had the vote. Turks traditionally have 
submitted loyally to the dictates of whoever is regarded as a legitimate ruler, and 
this tradition continues today. 
in6nii applied an even firmer, if not more dictatorial grip 
during his one party 
rule. "' Having exploited the war conditions he resorted to unjustifiable 
taxation 
and political restrictions. The Village Institutes were set up 
to train the new 
generation to protect and stiffen the Kemalist regime against communist, rightist 
and Islamist currents. On 10 January 1945, the 
Assembly purified the language of 
199 Eren, op. cit., p. 23. 
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the constitution and adopted new names for some months with Arabic names. 
Having assumed that the regime was free from any danger, the rulers prepared 
Turkey to hold its first direct election on 21 July 1946. Moreover, on May 1948, 
it approved the abolition of the Revolutionary Courts, which had already fulfilled 
their duty by executing many opponents of the regime in processes more remarkable 
for ruthlessness than for justice. As Ba§kaya, says, it was only possible to protect 
the reforms by force, because they were carried out by force. 200 
Kemalist progress in the cultural, religious and legal fields was almost com- 
pleted. At the end of the Second World War the democratic powers had defeated 
the dictatorships in Germany, Italy and Japan; it was time for Turkey to line up 
with the honourable victorious Western countries. So, the new international order 
as well as the frustration of the people who had been harshly repressed for three 
decades obliged the Republican People's Party to accept its overwhelming defeat 
in the general election and transfer power to the Democrat Party on 14 May 1950. 
Turkey then speeded up its socio-economic and political transformation and 
integration with the European democracies. The Democrat Party enacted a law 
to safeguard Atatiirk's sacred position. Subsequently, the Kemalist regime was, 
in one way or another, accepted by Turkish governments no matter whether they 
were from the left or right wing. And when the civil authority was unable to do 
so, the Army, acting as the guardian of the existing regime as is the norm in other 
Third World countries to which Turkey was no exception, stepped in and restored 
the rule of law and order in 1960,1971 and 1980. These coups may 
have been 
disliked, but it was the only way to maintain the Kemalist regime. 
200 Ba§kaya, op. cit., P. 19. 
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4.1.6 The Kemalist Perception of Civilisation 
As explained earlier, the modernisers or westernisers of the Ottoman Empire 
and Turkey all tended to perceive civilisation in more or less the same way. While 
the Ottoman reformers believed that it was possible to reform the state and society 
without touching the Caliphate and the sultanate, Mustafa Kemal and his com- 
panions realised that as long as these fundamental institutions lasted the chance 
of transforming Turkey would be slim. Some further explanation may help to con- 
vey what the reformers meant when they spoke so enthusiastically about civilising 
Ottoman or Turkish society. 
Mustafa Kemal and his companions, like their predecessors, had tried hard 
to westernise their society by all possible means. But the atmosphere was not 
conducive to Westernisation before the multi-party system was introduced. 
In general the westernisers were not content with the existing state of society 
and therefore, searched for a new national identity. But this completely eluded 
the pre-Republican reformers and personally eluded Mustafa Kemal. The Turks 
remained a people in search of a personality. Kemal made the crucial decision on 
behalf of the nation and introduced his western reforms in order to mould a new 
Turkish identity. Many Turks were not happy with this decision, but there was 
little they could do to oppose it. Once the multi-party system started to operate 
in the country the majority of the people began to adopt the reforms willingly, 
unlike the former generation during the establishment of the Republic. With the 
exception of a negligible number of Islamists, they forgot all about their Islamic 
past. After three decades of one party dictatorship, Turkey underwent its first true 
multi-party elections in 1950, but the democratisation process was interrupted 
by the Turkish Armed Forces at the beginning of the next two decades. The 
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more warmly Turkey embraced a true democratic regime, the stronger became the 
opposition of extremists from Right and Left. 
Consequently, Kernalism itself took a different shape adapting to the changing 
social and political conditions. It was interpreted by the Republicans and the 
non-Republicans differently. This can be seen in detail when we discuss Kemalist 
principles later in this chapter. 
Though Kemal was one of the most radical reformers, he reflected the general 
mood of the educated class and, to some extent, of all Turkish society when he 
said "They [the Western Countries] shall know that we are as good as they are! 
They shall treat us as their equal! Never will we bow our heads to them! ""' This 
approach indicates that while he was trying to inject confidence into the hearts 
of the people he himself revealed the frustration and the inferiority complex that 
all Turks shared towards Western civilisation. The These words gained popularity 
among the Turkish authorities and affected their attitudes in their international 
conduct. In another words, unlike many rulers of former colonies, the Turkish 
rulers succeeded to overcome their "inferiority" complex. 
Kemal had already decided to create a new state as well as a new nation from 
the remnants of the theocratic Empire and its peoples. Vali accurately commented 
that Kemal's aim was 
"to turn Turkey into a European state and the Turkish people into a European 
nation, because he believed that there was only one type of real civilisation; the Western 
one. ... 
he did want them [the Turks] to adopt Western European principles and 
attitudes which had become secularised following the Middle Ages. 'O' 
As a consequence of such a perception of civilisation the de-Islamisation and 
Europeanisation reforms soon extended to all political, social and cultural fields. 
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As mentioned earlier, many reforms had been carried out to serve this very aim. To 
give some apparently trivial but nonetheless revealing examples, for years Turkish 
music was banned from broadcasts on the "Turkish" radio; men wearing headgear 
associated with Islam (i. e. kiilah and sarik or kefiye) were often barred from 
entering various cities until very recently; 203 Arabic inscriptions on some gateways 
and in entrances of house were removed since they were regarded as traces of the 
past. Many historical buildings were damaged in this way, for example, Bursa lost 
many of its prized buildings. 
To the reformers, there was one condition for being objective and scientific 
(evrensel ve bilimsel): estrangement from anything and everything belonging to 
themselves and their past or preserving Islamic traditions, since all of that was 
regarded as "backward, " "nonsense, " "unscientific, " "crude, " "bad, " and "worth- 
less. " The only solution was to embrace anything "western. ""' 
It was, and is, thought that oriental culture in general and Islamic culture in par- 
ticular, was the [fundamental] reason for backwardness. According to such a primitive 
logic, estrangement from oriental culture was perceived as identical with getting free 
from backwardness. Whereas, in that case, backwardness would only have been limited 
to the Islamic countries. Then it would be hard for us to understand backwardness in 
many Latin American, Asian and African countries. 'O' 
One of the main aims of the Kemalist reforms was to complete the final 
process of two-centuries of Westernisation of Turkish society. This was by and 
large achieved through the famous Kemalist principles, the "six arrows, " though 
it brought about an irreversible dependence on the West. For instance, it was 
a consequence of such policies that the constant cry of the new civil- bureaucrats 
203 For example, zealous gendarmes would not allow peasants wearing the 
k0ahto enter even the 
small eastern township of Ergani in the late 1960s and even in the 1980s sanks were confiscated 
and destroyed. Such restrictions were imposed in eastern Turkey where Kemalist reforms had yet 
to take effect; in western Turkey the situation did not then arise, because most inhabitants had 
abandoned their traditional headgear following the 'Hat Law' of 25 November 1925. 
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became (and still remains) "what will Europe think of us? " 
206 
20'3 Lewis, G., op. cit., P. 114. 
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4.1.7 Kemalist Principles 
There are six Kemalist principles, which define the aims of the reforms. One 
can say that these principles are the fundamentals of the Kemalist school of 
thought. The new regime was based on these six arrows, which were incorpo- 
rated into the constitution in 1937 before Kemal died. A brief explanation of 
them is necessary as they influenced foreign policy insofar as that was directed 
at creating conditions favourable to the implementation of Kemalism. They are 
also important in defining the boundaries within which Turkish foreign policy is 
pursued. 
(a) RepublWanism (Cumhuriyetqilik): This principle provided for the demise 
of the Ottoman Sultanate and Caliphate and their replacement by the sovereignty 
of the Turkish nation as expressed through the National Assembly. This was the 
main principle preventing any opposition from challenging the new rulers and/or 
proposing any other sort of administration for the country. 
(b) Nationalism (Milliyetgilik): This has actually more than one aspect. First 
of all, unlike other movements such as pan-Ottomanism, pan-Turkism and pan- 
Islamism,... it denounced the irredentist ambitions and recognised the borders of 
the country as constituted at the end of the War of the Independence. Secondly, it 
was invoked to prevent expression of internationalist ideologies, namely, Commu- 
nism, Socialism and Islamism. The third and probably the most important aspect 
of nationalism was that it became the basis for numerous efforts and exhortations 
to heighten "Turkish" self-esteem and pride. For example, statements such as 
"Turkey is for the Turks, " and "Blessed is he who can say, "I am a Turk... were in- 
tended to eliminate the Turkish inferiority complex and instil national pride. 
The 
207 Karpat, op. cit-, P. 252, also, Kili., op. cit., p. 
82. 
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reformers believed the peasants should be made to narrow their universalist -Alus- 
lim" identity and the educated class should cease to see themselves as Ottomans 
and identify with the Turkish nation as a whole and take pride in being part of the 
West. The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were intended 
to serve these lofty aims. Finally, it was based on the assumption that Turkey was 
a modern nation-state with no "ethnic" group. In fact, the policy of nationalism, 
in Karpat's words, "was carried out in many cases by deliberately attempting to 
assimilate non-Turkish Muslim minorities, such as the Kurds. "... It was only after 
the 1980s that this assumption proved to be wrong and in 1991, the year of the 
US-led war against Iraq, the Turkish authorities admitted for the first time that 
there was a separate Kurdish ethnic identity in Turkey. 
(c) Populism (Halkýilik): This principle especially emphasised the sovereignty 
of the people, as in Kemal's much-quoted phrase "sovereignty belongs uncondi- 
tionally and without reservation to the people. " Also, it stressed the mutual re- 
sponsibilities of the state and individuals toward each other, and the absence of 
social classes in the Turkish state... and rejected special privileges for any indi- 
vidual family, class or organisation. "' During the single party period, however, 
populism in practice was seen more often as "government for the people" to the 
relative neglect of "by the people. " Denial of the existence of social classes was 
politically utilitarian in that it helped to legitimise the single party as the sole 
representative of all elements of the society. "' In practice, until the emergence of 
the Cyprus issue in the mid-1950s, the general public's role in foreign affairs was 
purely passive. 
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(d) Laicism (Laiklik): This was explained earlier due to its importance and its 
overwhelming relevance to the whole subject. Briefly, the principle of secularism 
was seen as "an indispensable component of modernisation""' by the reformers 
who refused the acceptance of a state religion, any Islamic institutions and most 
importantly any involvement of Islam in state affairs. Laicism meant separation 
of religion from educational, cultural and legal affairs too. In fact, this principle 
was at the very heart of the matter and permeated the spirit of all the reforms. "' 
Once this was instilled into the hearts and minds of society, then all other reforms 
would be safe and secure from any potential danger. Therefore, most of the reforms 
were carried out to create a fertile soil for this principle. Indeed, as a consequence 
of Kernalist reforms in general, and secularism in particular, today the Turkish 
nation is second to none in being a secular "Muslim" nation in the world. Thus, 
the Turks took upon themselves the task of weakening the political impact of Islam 
in the Middle East. This principle had an important impact on Turkish foreign 
policy, removing the need to heed Muslim opinion. One illustration of its effect is 
the prompt Turkish recognition of the state of Israel in less than year time from 
its declaration of independence. 
(e) Etatism (Devletcilik): Etatism (or statism) was the name used to describe 
the economic system that was intended to develop the country. Speaking to some 
journalists on 16 January 1923 Kemal said, "the Turkish state will not be a military 
state. But the new Turkish state will be an economic state. "2" He made similar 
statements at the 1923 Economy Congress in 
izmir. This was another change from 
Ottoman policy and a far cry from the early days of the Empire when the spoils 
212 Ibid., p. 103. 
213 Kili, op. loc. 
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of conquest were the main source of income for the Ottoman economy. The etatist 
principle, which was interpreted quite differently from time to time by different 
parties, gave the state an active role in economic development and stressed the 
public sector's primacy in industrialisation, though private enterprise was also to 
be encouraged. 
It can be argued that one purpose of etatism was to create a bourgeoisie to 
replace the dominant non-Turkish bourgeoisie. Indeed, it was this nascent petty 
bourgeois class that took over power and to some extent replaced the classical 
civil-military bureaucratic rule in the 1950s. 
Etatism was, in fact, the only one of the "six arrows" the DP challenged, but 
they did so, because none of the other "arrows" could survive if the economy failed, 
and the economy was bound to fail unless the etatism principle was modified. in6nii 
had begun to modify the principle but more drastic change was dictated by external 
influences, particularly the demands of the US administration that was reluctant to 
give aid to countries not pursuing a liberal economic policy. By adopting etatism 
Turkey signified that prosperity was to be sought not by conquest as in the golden 
age of the Ottomans but by internal development. This facilitated better Turkish 
relations with the outside world. Later, as the alliance with the West developed, 
the preponderance of state economic enterprises in Turkey was in stark contrast 
to the principles of private enterprise embraced so firmly by the Americans. 
(f) Revolutionism (Devrimcilik): This was one of the vaguest principles. It 
enabled any potential opposition to be eliminated before it became a real threat. 
Essentially, it meant identifying traditional concepts and institutions that Ke- 
malists considered inimical to the progress of the state and people and replacing 
them with modern ones and thereafter protecting these reforms. 
The Republicans 
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generally considered Revolutionism the summation of Kemalist reforms, because 
"modernism was the goal of the new regime and reformism was the only means to 
achieve it. ""' But the Democrats and their successors challenged this interpreta- 
tion and said that the true revolutionaries were those who exercised the popular 
sovereignty during the multi-party period by reflecting "the will of the people. ""' 
As for the effect of this principle on Turkey's foreign policy, unlike the revolu- 
tionism of, say, China or Iran, Turkish revolutionism was not intended for export. 
Turkey wanted to be left in peace to perfect her own internal revolution. 
All in all, Kemalism helped the Turkish nation towards Westernisation and 
secularisation (which is what Kemahsts meant by "civilisation") even though this 
was not achieved in Kemal's lifetime. Kemalism has demonstrated remarkable 
durability. Even up to the present any party (including the former so-called Is- 
lamist NSP (National Salvation Party), later Welfare Party) coming to power has 
had to legitimise its actions by claiming that what it has done does not conflict 
with Kemalist principles. Despite the ending of the Cold War and the collapse of 
communism, Kemalism remains the dominant ideology in Turkey. The New World 
Order is taking shape, but one way or another, it seems, Kemalism will live for the 
foreseeable future. No doubt it will continue to be interpreted in different ways to 
suit changing fashions; that is how it survives. 
215 Karpat, op. cit., p. 324. 
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4.2 Turkey's Politics to 1950 
4.2.1 Introduction 
The founders of modern Turkey reoriented the internal socio-economic and 
external policies of the country from the theocratic and expansionist base to a 
democratic and non-expansionist one. The internal policy objectives were, inter 
alia, to transform the society according to the new de-Islamisation and Westerni- 
sation reforms. The foreign policy objectives were, among other things, to obtain 
support for this package of reforms and to protect Turkish territory. Therefore, 
the internal and external policies were closely interlinked, particularly, in the case 
of Republican Turkey. "'The success, if not the very survival, of the new regime 
partly depended upon finding a solution for economic and social problems of the 
people that had been neglected for centuries. 
Under Mustafa Kemal Turkey concentrated on implementation of the reforms 
and as far as this permitted it was engaged in establishing good relations with 
neighbouring countries. Turkey was not as involved in the global affairs as it 
became in the 1950s by which time it was assumed that the implementation of 
reforms was complete and changes had occurred in the international order. Since 
Turkey's foreign policy was mainly motivated by the need for foreign aid for its 
economic development and territorial security alike, its economic policy must be 
considered before we turn to foreign policy. 
217 Interview with Gillek who said "since Kemal's time, internal and 
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4.2.2 Economic Policy 
The modern Republic of Turkey had an unenviable economic legacy from the 
Ottoman Empire. Following the Crimean War of 1853-1856, Turkey started re- 
ceiving international loans from the Western Powers, namely, Britain and France. 
The sultans, however, were incapable of translating these millions of francs and 
pounds into an economic development to catch up with their European rivals in 
material well-being. The Palace attempted to establish state-supported industries, 
but this policy had little effect on the economy as a whole. Railway construction 
was probably the only basic improvement in the economic infrastructure of the 
Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In short, manufacturing industry was mainly dominated by the non-Muslim 
subjects, while agricultural production was carried out in a primitive fashion 
mainly by the Muslim subjects. The Empire was, like any other developing country, 
exporting raw materials and importing finished products from abroad and, there- 
fore, she had a persistent deficit in her balance of trade. The Empire died, but left 
Turkey, its main inheritor, with an infrastructure almost completely destroyed by 
war against Russians and Armenians in the East and war against British, French, 
Italian and the Greeks in the West. As a res41t of the successive wars between 
1912 and 1922 Turkey lost most of its qualified male population. The exodus of the 
Armenians and the exchange of the Greek population of Anatolia and the Turks of 
the Western Thrace caused an enormous loss of experienced business and technical 
talent since the Turks were mostly soldiers, government employees and farmers. In 
addition, Turkey undertook payment of sixty six per cent of the Empire's foreign 
debts. 
Actually, the M-eaty of Lausanne included several provisions which had influ- 
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ence over future Turkish economy. On the whole, the Treaty was less damaging 
than the Treaty of Sevres, but in accordance with a protocol attached to the Treaty 
of Lausanne Turkey still undertook to maintain all economic concessions granted 
to foreign companies before October 1914. "' Turkey was also obliged to maintain 
until 1929 the Ottoman customs tariff which some argued restricted the central 
authorities' ability to raise revenue. On the positive side, the 'Iýeaty of Lausanne 
formally abolished the capitulations and Turkey's share of the Ottoman debts was 
reduced to 78 million pounds sterling from 118 million. 219 
The founders of the Republic were reluctant to adopt either a capitalist or 
communist economic system, the two major alternatives of the time, and followed 
something in between: the revised Ottoman economic system. The governments 
exerted immense efforts to establish a state-supported industry and alleviate the 
position of the peasants, who were completely cut off from the outside world. The 
government could do very little to achieve these economic aims in 1920s owing 
to the internal revolts against the new secular regime and heavy international 
restrictions imposed on her in Lausanne. George Harris alleged that "the Turks 
found their economy lagging farther behind the level of Europe than it had been 
two decades earlier. ))220 
On 1 March 1922, Mustafa Kemal presented a six-point program of economic 
development: Its aims were 
[to] resuscitate and modernise agriculture and industry, ... to develop the forests, 
to nationalise - in accordance with the ability of the state - those economic institutions 
and enterprises most directly concerned with the general welfare, ... to exploit the 
mineral wealth of the country, ... to protect and reinvigorate existing 
industry and to 
218 Hale, William, The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey, Croom 
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consider protective measures for ... new industry ... to secure financing of the national 
revolution by creating ... a balanced budget suited to the national economic structure. "' 
However, most of these objectives still wait to be achieved. 
Turkey adopted a policy of "state capitalism" in order to bolster up its in- 
dustrialisation in the absence of a Turkish entrepreneurial class. The attempt to 
construct a railway network was one of the first indications that such a policy 
was needed. Apart from such practical reasons, there was a set of psychological 
factors that forced Turkey to embrace etatist policies. From the Ottoman experi- 
ences with the West, the Turkish authorities concluded that political independence 
had to be complemented by economic protectionism and autarky. Turkish foreign 
trade had a deficit throughout the 1920s for reasons already explained. Signifi- 
cantly, consumption goods constituted the bulk of imports instead of investment 
goods. 222 
After the world-wide depression of 1929, the year the international restrictions 
imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Lausanne expired, Kemal moved towards 
establishing a form of state capitalism based on the creation of state-run manufac- 
turing enterprise. This policy of etatism could be defined simply as the interven- 
tion of the state in economic matters to achieve rapid economic development and 
protect the general welfare. For these reasons, the government established state 
monopolies in most of the economic areas: the production of salt, coal, cellulose 
and papers, chemicals, iron and steel, tobacco products, alcoholic beverages ex- 
cept wine, matches, tea, sugar, explosives, gas, rail, post al-telegraph-telephone and 
the maritime passenger services . 22 1 Turkish etatism invaded the field of 
labour- 
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management relations as well. Yet it seems safe to conclude that these efforts 
induced relatively few new investments. It was only in 1947 that the right of ei- 
ther employers or employees to associate freely in the formation of associations 
and unions was formally recognised. In fact, even this recognition did not mean 
much to either employers or employees until 1960s, when a new constitution was 
introduced to guarantee these rights. 
Apart from a private American loan in 1930, Turkey received international 
loans for the first time from the Soviet Union in 1934, when Turkey started to 
implement its first five year development plan. Then British loans followed in 
1938 and French and German ones in 1939. 
New industrial enterprise enjoyed almost complete freedom from state interven- 
tion until the end of the Second World War. The law required the city, provincial 
and national governments to buy home-made commodities. Several banks, namely, 
ý Bank, Siimer Bank, Ziraat Bank, Eti (Hittite) Bank were established for the pur- 
pose of implementing the state industrial program, more specifically for industry, 
textiles, agriculture and mining and power respectively. 
As a part of the etatist policy, Turkish governments made great efforts to 
realise the expressed six objectives, but there was little they could 
do as long as 
they could not get international loans. Therefore, 
in6nii, the second president of 
Turkey, decided to align with the victorious powers and in February 1945 
declared 
war against the Axis Powers and thus, Turkey 
became a founder member of the 
United Nations. 
A general characteristic of the governments of 
Kemal and in6nii was neglect 
of agriculture and thus, also of the peasants. 
They applied oppressive policies in 
Praeger, New York, 1965, p. 79, and Robinson, op. cit., p. 110. 
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agriculture and industry alike. "' There had been a few new investments in industry 
and some improvements in the textile industry and enlargement of the state farms 
during one party rule, particularly during the Second World War. All attempts to 
create a self-sufficient economy were doomed to fail. Consequently, there had been 
little progress until 1945 as far as the ordinary people were concerned. According 
to Robinson, "if Turkish income estimates bear any relevance to reality, per capita 
real national income was very little higher in 1945 than in 1929, if at all. ""' 
Apart from 1938, there had been no deficit in Turkish foreign trade from the 
World Crisis of 1929 until the endorsement of the new policy of international 
economic co-operation after World War II. This change of policy, among other 
things, prepared the ground for the liberal open market economic policy of the 
Democratic Party in the 1950s. 
Amid the "severe pent-up demand, high rates of inflation, an eroded and in- 
adequate industrial base and an infrastructure insufficient to meet communication 
and energy demands, ""' Turkey faced the Soviet demands over the Straits and 
eastern provinces. This threat... made it easier for the West in general and the 
US in particular and Turkey to co-operate against international communism. As 
a result, Turkey obtained a considerable amount of economic and military assis- 
tance from the US, thereby strengthening Turkey's international position and its 
domestic investment load in accordance with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and 
the Marshall Plan in 1948. By the end of the 1949-1950 fiscal year, Turkey had re- 
ceived 180 million dollars as American economic assistance. The 
loans were spent 
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on major projects such as improvement of the road and rail networks, modernisa- 
tion of iron and chrome mines, expansion of irrigation and an ambitious technical 
assistance program. "' 
The Turkish authorities had already decided to align with the West when 
the new republic was founded. Alignment with the West, however, took different 
forms depending, inter alia, on the dominant figures of the successive governments 
and international order. So, during one party rule, the governments were mainly 
engaged in transforming state apparatus and society into a modern and European 
shape. When these objectives were by and large achieved in the domestic field, 
the authorities, helped by the international order, decided to integrate into the 
Western liberal economy too. However, the Western capitalists were reluctant to 
invest in Turkey as long as it was ruled by the same party, "' the Republican 
People's Party. It can be argued that Turkish politicians were cognisant of this 
fact and thus, had no choice but to let the multi-party system proceed. 
On 14 May 1950, in Turkey's first, honest, contested, general election, the 
opposition Democratic Party swept into office with an impressive majority. This 
success was to a considerable extend due to the frustration of the people with 
what people especially peasants perceived and called, the "Allahsiz", anti-Islamic 
Republican People's Party. Of course they were unaware that Bayar assured 
in6nii 
about secularism, education and foreign policy when he was allowed to establish 
the Democrat Party. "' 
Generally speaking, the Turkish economy boomed in almost all sectors during 
22'a Robinson, op. cit., p. 138. 
229 Interview with Ahmet and Niliifer Giirsoy. 




the first three years of Democrat Party rule, with the combined help of interna- 
tional loans and very good weather. Turkey underwent an enormous process of 
industrialisation as well as modernisation in the field of agriculture. Turkey, an 
importer of wheat until 1950, became the world's fourth largest exporter of it in 
1954 . 
231 The cultivated areas increased owing to the mechanisation in agriculture. 
In industry, factory units increased from 2,335 in 1950 to 4,527 in 1954. Agricul- 
tural as well as industrial production rapidly increased throughout the 1950s. In 
short, heavy investment continued in all sectors. 232 This rapid economic advance 
especially in the early 1950s strengthened the hope of the Turkish authorities and 
the people themselves of catching up with the West in material well-being, which 
was one of Kemal's aims. To cite one instance of this optimism, in 1957, President 
Bayar said, "we hope that thirty years from now when our blessed country will 
have a population of 50 million, it will be a little America. ""' One can observe 
this premature satisfaction from Orga's views as well: "Were he [Kemal] to see his 
changed people today he would indeed realise that from the ashes of the past has 
truly arisen the bright phoenix of a new Turkish nation. ""' 
Foreign experts warned Turkey not to move so fast, but, the Turks ignored 
the advice. Menderes was determined that "in 50 or 80 years Turkey would be 
within the general economic range of Western Europe. That was the target. 
)1235 He 
believed "that in the absence of such a development, Turkey would be swallowed 
up either by her friends - through growing dependency - or by her foes - through 
23 l Hale, op. cit., p. 104. 
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subversion and ultimate aggression. "' 
He showed more concern for Turkey's economy than any Turkish leader other 
than Turgut bzal in the history of the Republic. His fear of the consequences 
of dependency of the Turkish economy led him to resist American demands con- 
cerning economic policy. This resistance contributed to the fall of his government, 
though this was just one of the reasons for the Democrats' demise. 
The Democrats could not have conducted such an accelerated development 
program without substantial foreign aid. These funds came in response to Turkey's 
assumption of international military obligations in the Western defence system and 
continued even after the Menderes government was overthrown. 
Indeed, it is difficult to deny the importance and contribution of the interna- 
tional economic and military assistance to Turkey's economic development. Yet 
one should remember that this process of seeking and acquiring United States aid 
started irreversibly in 1947, not in 1950, even though the amounts were lower. 
This policy of economic development with international aid was enthusiastically 
followed throughout the 1950s as well. The United States sales and grants to 
Turkey reached a total of about 1,616 million dollars between 1950 and 1962.237 
However, this inevitably entailed a complete dependence upon the West not only 
in economic matters but also in foreign policy. 
In short, the United States has never been satisfied with the liberalisation 
policy in Turkey and Turkey has never been satisfied with the amounts of economic 
and politic al- military support from the West in general and the United States in 
particular. To cite one example of this dissatisfaction, Menderes did his best to 
236 Robinson, op. loc. 
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obtain 300 million dollars for his development projects at the end of the 1950s, 
but he received only 30 million dollars. Moreover the growing Islamisation of the 
bureaucracy due to the liberalisation policy was to the liking of neither the United 
States nor the Turkish leadership, including the Democrats. This was another 
source of conflict between the allies. It happened without government intent. 
Toward the mid-1950s the weather cycle turned unfavourable and once again 
Turkey became a wheat importer in 1955 and remained so until the end of the 
Democrat rule. The effect of weather on agriculture had a great impact on one of 
the basic sources of revenue. In addition, the 6-7 September 1955 disorders, which 
had some negative implications on the Turkish economy, were another setback 
in the Democrats' relations with the West. Besides, the Democrat government 
pegged the value of Turkish currency at an artificially high level and imposed 
heavy customs duties thereby fostering the evolution of a protectionist import- 
substitution regime. Foreigners were naturally reluctant to see this shift of policy. 
Moreover, some "disputes with the World Bank and the United States over the 
political orientation of certain development projects led to a reduction in essential 
inputs of funds from abroad. ""' Also, the growing economy had suffered from 
the failure of the oil and mining sectors to meet their potential. Finally, the lack 
of any precise plan for economic development was probably the major economic 
factor that led to the downfall of Democrat Party rule in Turkey. 
The deficit in Turkish foreign trade had continued to increase since 1947. "' 
"Despite American warnings, the government felt compelled to intervene more 
actively than ever in the economic life. ""' At the same time, there were heated 
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criticisms from the opposition, but Menderes disregarded them. The Democrat 
Party in general, and Adnan Menderes in particular, increasingly closed their eyes 
to criticism regardless of whether it was destructive or constructive, and by so 
doing, they prepared their fate with their own hands. "' 
During 1955 and 1956 Menderes found himself increasingly preoccupied with 
Turkish foreign relations as he realised that Turkish diplomatic support was worth 
a great deal to the West, possibly even large scale economic subsidy. However, as 
will be explained later under the title of Foreign Policy, the importance of Turkey 
in terms of global interests of the United States had changed by this time and 
thus, American aid to Turkey was reduced accordingly. Aside from the internal 
problems, this perception of Turkey by the United States and American reluctance 
to support Turkey subsequently helped to bring Menderes' rule to an end on 27 
May 1960. 
241 For details see Birand, Mehmet Ali, 
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4.2.3 Foreign Policy in General 
In order to place the Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1950s in a proper perspective 
it is necessary to review first the major factors which produced Turkey's alignment 
with the West, second the objectives of her foreign policy, and third the way Turkey 
perceived and implemented her foreign policy. 
As already explained, the leadership of modern Turkey, taking lessons from the 
process of Westernisation of the Ottoman Empire, decided to reform the state as 
well as the society. Headed by Mustafa Kemal, they introduced a series of reforms 
to achieve these goals. This is why there has been a strong link between domestic 
and foreign policy of the country. A successful foreign policy that would secure 
international support and aid was, the reformers thought, essential for the im- 
plementation of her package of reforms and the solution of economic problems. "' 
Indeed, as Vali pointed out, the Turkish foreign policy was mainly aimed at im- 
plementing domestic policy. 243 
One could say that all these arose partly from Turkey's need for time and 
peaceful conditions which would allow the reformers to concentrate on domestic 
affairs. Both her domestic and her foreign policies were therefore aimed at making 
Turkey a fully-fledged member of the European family of nations on an equal basis. 
This has always been a driving force for the Turkish foreign policy makers. "' 
Turkey has been using all available means to achieve these objectives since the 
establishment of the Republic. 
But aside from the reforms, Turkey also felt the need to align herself with the 
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West in order to secure effective support in resisting all territorial demands (such 
those as on the eastern provinces by the USSR, Hatay by Syria, the western part 
of Turkey by Greece and later Enosis of Cyprus with Greece. ) At the same time, 
certain changes made Turkey a more congenial ally for the West. First, the secular 
Republic refused to enter any international organisation or alliance on the basis 
of a common religion, namely Islam. Second, Turkey's disavowal of all irredentist 
claims and official restriction of its territorial ambitions to the area delimited in 
the National Pact. Finally, Turkey's active support for genuine international co- 
operation. 
Although the Kemalist foreign policy objectives had required Turkey's align- 
ment with the West, her close association with the West actually developed through 
the Truman Doctrine of 1947, and accession into NATO in 1952, as well as through 
membership, at various dates, of most of the major Western European organisa- 
tions such as the Council of Europe, OECD and finally through application for 
Common Market membership in 1959. Turkish authorities used all available means 
and opportunities in the international arena to achieve the country's integration 
with the West. The moment the United States realised that it needed Turkey to 
accomplish her global policies in the Balkans and the Middle East Turkey began 
emphasising, if not overstating, its geostrategic importance and the role that it 
could play. Both sides had their own national interests, so they had a close re- 
lationship from the Truman doctrine in 1947 and throughout the 1950s. Quite 
understandably this relationship became a patron-client relationship in time. 
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4.2.4 Kemalism and Foreign Policy 
The Kemalist principles and reforms were previously explained to demonstrate 
the ingredients and boundaries of the Kemalist ideology, which has been the most 
dominant factor in forming the Turkish internal as well as external policy of modern 
Turkey. Here we shall attempt to explain the guidelines of the Kemalist foreign 
policy and its possible impact on the Turkish foreign policy after Kemal's death. 
There were three major watchwords that expressed the guiding principles of 
Kemalist foreign policy. The first and most important of these were "peace at home 
and peace in the world". Therefore, Kemalist foreign policy was dedicated to the 
idea of co-existence between all nations in the world. On the internal front, this 
belief assumes that there is no class conflict and on the external front, it rejects any 
irredentist or expansionist aim. In this respect, Mustafa Kemal in the congress of 
the Republican People's Party in 1927 said: "for us there can be no question of the 
lust of conquest" . 
24' According to the Foreign Minister, T. R. Aras, this "pacific 
quality of Kemalism" was because of necessities of the Kemalist revolution and 
of the special geographic position of Turkey. Kili, a staunch Kemalist academic, 
noted that Mustafa Kemal wanted "peace at home and peace in the world" so 
as to "concentrate on his supreme goal which was the realisation of the complete 
modernisation of Turkey. )1246 
In pursuit of this goal of universal peace and avoiding embroilment in the dis- 
putes of other nations, Turkey, particularly influenced by the alliances that 
brought 
about World War I strove to remain aloof from alliances. Addressing the 
National 
Assembly in June 1930, T. R. Aras said: "Believing that every separate alliance 
245 Atatfirk, S6ylev, p. 379. 
246 Kili, op. cit., P- 113. 
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brings about others, Turkey has abstained from participation in such initiatives. 
But she hastened to subscribe to the Kellogg Pact which required a universal en- 
tente among all the nations". Similarly, Turkey's aversion to military alliances 
at that time did not extend to treaties that involved no, such commitments. So) 
Turkey was happy to sign Treaties of friendship and co-operation and did so with, 
among others, Albania (December 1923), Bulgaria and Yugoslavia (October 1925), 
the USSR (December 1925), Iran (April 1926), Iraq (June 1926), Afghanistan (May 
1928), Balkan Pact members - Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia- (February 1934), 
Sadabad Pact members - Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq - (July 1937). 
Therefore, one can argue that the motives of the foreign policy decision makers 
in the 1950s were not much different from those of Kemal's time. In their interna- 
tional conduct, decision makers of both periods believed that they were promoting 
the cause of peace in the world. Thus, the main line of Kemalist foreign policy 
that did not change in the 1950s. 
The second and third watchwords of the Kemalist foreign policy were "national 
independence" (istiklal-i milli) "complete independence" (istiklal-i tam). In short, 
this meant a "national" foreign policy. In elaboration of this, Mustafa Kemal said: 
when I speak of a national policy I mean it in this sense: to work within our 
national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, 
above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. But not to lead 
the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could only bring them 
misfortune, and expect from the civilised world civilised human treatment, friendship 
based on mutuality. "" 
By "national independence" Mustafa Kemal meant the preservation of the Re- 
public's territorial integrity and by "complete independence" he meant the preser- 
vation of "Turkey's political, economic, legal, financial and ideological 
indepen- 
247 Atatfirk, op. cit., pp. 378-370. 
144 
dence". 248 
Thus, after Turkey's declaration of national independence) as Mustafa Kemal 
was against the use of force as a means to achieve a foreign policy goal, he tried 
to solve international problems of the country by peaceful means. For example, 
the important questions of Mosul, the Straits and Hatay were left unresolved at 
the Lausanne Conference, but he succeeded in reaching agreement on all of them 
without the use of force. 
In short, Mustafa Kemal made a revolution in order to westernise the Turkish 
society and state. The magnitude of the job and the internal reforms required time 
and energy. Therefore, he himself in particular and his governments in general, 
during all his life concentrated on internal policy rather than external policy. As 
most of the Turkish interviewees stressed the aim of Kemalist policy was to west- 
ernise the society and thus the Turkish foreign policy was directed to achieve this 
very internal objective. 
Atatiirk who ruled Turkey with an absolute power until he died in 1938, pur- 
sued neither a completely pro-Western nor pro-Soviet policy in the field of foreign 
affairs. This was mainly due solely to his personal characteristic: he wanted to 
be his own man. Though the Turks never forgot that they were the sons of an 
imperial nation, they restrained themselves as far as their irredentist ambitions 
were concerned. Officially, as previously explained "peace at home, peace in the 
world" was one of the fundamentals of Kemalist foreign policy and Turkish politi- 
cians remained loyal to this principle in general. Nonetheless, when the 
Turks saw 
an opportunity to regain their imperial territories they could not stop themselves 
248 Kili, op. cit., P. 117. 
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from military intervention as happened in Cyprus in 1974.111 
After Kemal's death, when first the RPP in the late 1940s and later the DP in 
the early 1950s supported the idea of alignment with the West and NATO mem- 
bership, both believed that the Soviet or international communist expansionism 
was threatening Turkish independence and world peace. Joining NATO seemed 
the only way to secure the independence of Turkey and that of the peace loving 
countries. 
The onlY change that did take place during that period was that Turkey be- 
came more actively involved in international problems. This did not represent a 
fundamental change in the Turkish foreign policy, in fact, as explained earlier, it 
sprang from the belief that the internal transformation reforms were completed 
and now it was time to shift to the international platform how to the whole inter- 
national community that Turkey was really a European nation, "' in the service 
of universal peace. 
When the Democrats were accused that their economic and foreign policy 
violated the Kernalist watchwords, they rejected these claims on the grounds that 
the changing conditions of the international system required a reinterpretation of 
the Kemalism and what they followed was the "real or pure Kemalism". "' 
Eventually when the proponents of Kemalism concluded that the Kemalist 
regime was irreversibly established, they decided to move forward and become 
actively involve in international problems. All Turkish interviewees argued that 
alignment with the West was the eventual objective of Kemalism and thus 
Ak§it 
249 Mango, op. cit., p. 63 and Harris, op. cit., pp. 181-182. 
250 See the section on Kemalist Reforms for the objectives of the Kemalist reforms. 
251 Interview with the Giirsoys and Mr Aklit. 
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and Giirsoy vigorously denied all allegations that the DP foreign policy was a 
divergence from the Kemalist foreign policy and claimed further that it was a re- 
quirement of Kemalist foreign policy. These views are in agreement with those 
expressed by Zorlu and reported by Burrows "Turkey had chosen her foreign poh- 
cies, and had joined NATO and founded the CENTO in order to preserve her 
independence and democratic principles". He added that "it was Ataturk's policy 
that Turkey should cooperate closely with the West". 2'2 
252 PRO, FO, 153039, RK1022/1,18-1.1960, Ankara. Also interview with 
the Giirsoys and Erkmen. 
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4.2.5 Pre-1950 Foreign Policy 
Having reviewed the general picture of Turkish politics, before analysing Turkish- 
Western relations in detail, we should study the pre-1950 political situation in 
Turkey and its international problems and their influence on Turkish foreign pol- 
icy in the 1950s. Shorn of most of the Ottoman territories in the Balkans, Cau- 
casus, the Middle East and North Africa, the new Turkish Republic fearing that 
the Big Powers might attempt further division of Turkey itself, quelled all irreden- 
tist thoughts. It was painful for the Turkish statesmen to see the Empire lost to 
their minorities, but, they knew that there was no choice but to accept the reality. 
Therefore, they restrained themselves in respect of their former territories and even 
abandoned the Turkish people left behind in former Ottoman lands except those 
in the Balkans where there was at least a partial exchange of populations. "' 
Turkey was internationally recognised after the Treaty of Lausanne, which 
was considered a national triumph in Turkey. In fact, it was not so in reality 
at least not to the extent that the government presented it to the people. The 
National Pact endorsed by the Ottoman Assembly was not fully implemented. 
The Dodecanese Islands were lost to the Italians, Hatay to the French, Cyprus 
and today's Northern Iraq to the British, Batum to the Soviet Union and the 
Straits were left to the International Administration. Customs duties were to be 
left at the 1917 level for years. Turkey had to pay sixty per cent of the Ottoman 
debts. She could not get any war reparations from Greece. In the opinion of its 
253 It is worth mentioning here that Turkey did nothipg to exchange the Turks in the Middle East. 
The reasons for that were probably that the Turks in the Middle East were religious, whereas 
those in the Balkans were thought to be progressive and Western. So, this would have helped the 
Westernisation of the society. Secondly, The Middle Eastern Turks were less qualified than the 
Balkan Turks, which made the latter more attractive. Thirdly, the Turks in the Middle East were 
under Muslim rule unlike those in the Balkans who were under Christian rule, which could have had 
undesirable consequences. Finally, Turkey thought that the Turks in the Middle East had already 
felt that they were superior to, the indigenous people, which was not the case in the Balkans where 
they needed help. 
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critics, the Treaty of Lausanne was simply a document that officially buried the six 
centuries-old Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate and allowed the establishment 
of a secular and Western state, Turkey, headed by Mustafa Kemal and his right- 
hand man ismet in6nil. Turks, these critics claimed, were a people who found 
themselves only and when they became Muslim and led the Islamic ummah for 
about a millennium. Now, after a victory in the battlefield of the War of Liberation 
the Turkish Republic meekly accepted most of the demands of the victors in the 
First World War and accepted all Western ideals in almost all fields. 
When Turkey withdrew from the Balkans, she left behind a great number 
of ethnic Turks. In order to protect their rights, Turkey subsequently had to 
compromise with the Balkan States. Both that necessity and increasing fascist 
danger in Europe increased the need for the Balkan Pact signed between Turkey, 
Greece, Rumania and Yugoslavia in 1934. "" 
After the Atatiirk era, in6nii tried to follow a similar neutralist foreign pol- 
icy. In Fox's words, "thanks to competition among three great powers to influence 
Turkey, the Turks' skill in bargaining, their immunity to propaganda, their un- 
derstanding of the military and economic position of the parties involved at each 
stage, and their lack of sentiments Turkey stayed out of the war. ""' However, 
following the war, the Turkish decision makers felt that they were left with no 
option but to adopt a pro-Western foreign policy, since internal policy had been 
directed towards westernising Turkey since its establishment in 1923. "' At the 
end of the war Republican Turkey sided with the Allied Powers by 
declaring war 
against Germany and Japan in order to ensure admission to the United 
Nations. 
254 urkey, London, Cass, Shorter, Frederic C., (ed. ) Four Studies on the Development of T 
1967, p. 119. 
255 Fox, op. cit., p. 42. 
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Turkey's neutral policy during the Second World War left her vulnerable to Soviet 
territorial and ideological expansionism. 
Both military vulnerability and economic weakness were powerful factors prompt- 
ing the in6nii government to seek American support. The Republicans noticed the 
fact that Franco's Spain had been excluded from benefit of Marshall Plan because 
of her persistent authoritarian practices. These external factors led to internal 
changes. In order to establish democratic credentials in6nii agreed to the intro- 
duction of multi-party politics in 1945. This in turn led to further softening of 
hard-line Kemalism; religious education was reintroduced to Turkish schools in 
early 1949, and the Faculty of Theology was opened in October the same year, 
and so on. Though the West was very sceptical of the Republicans' commitment 
to the multi-party system and liberal economy, the Republican government worked 
very hard to convince the West that they were sincere in their pro-Western policy. 
Fortunately, for the Turks, the Americans' desire for 'Eirkish support for contain- 
ment policy and their wish to ensure the security of Israel made the US willing to 
give a large amount of economic and military assistance to Turkey in return for this 
support. This aid was particularly welcome to the Turks as, in addition to the So- 
viet threat, Turkish territorial integrity also seemed at risk from the establishment 
of the Mehabad Kurdish Republic in north-western Iran. 
150 
4.2.6 Post-1950 Turkish Politics 
Eventually, under the internal and external pressure, "' the Republicans were 
obliged to adopt a multi-party system which was to end their dominance and 
brought the Democrats, apparently a sincere liberal party, to power in 1950. "' 
This bloodless transition in Turkey from a single party authoritarian regime 
to a multi-party democratic system deserves some more elaboration. The main 
factors inducing this radical change were the following: 
(a) the character of the Turkish leadership; 
(b) increasing popular demand for greater participation in government by a 
growing middle class; 
(c) the Soviet threat to the integrity of the country; 
(d) the Turkish need for Western aid and support for her economic development 
and securitY; 
(e) the victory of the liberal nations over the authoritarian ones in the Second 
World War; 
(f) the obvious growth of corruption within the single party system and 
in6nii's 
personal reaction to this state of affairs; 
(g) unpopularity of the Republican People's Party, particularly in the rural ar- 
eas, due to economic hardship, political pressure and the restriction, if not absence 
of, religious freedom and excesses committed in the villages by the gendarmes. 
257 Timur, op. cit., p. 26. 
2'58 Emre claimed that there was no difference between the two parties as far as the 
Kemalist regime 
was concerned. He said their differences were artificial and only on the surface. 
In respect to 
Turkey's relations with the West both were the same. Aklit also agreed with the 
last point. 
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With regard to the leadership of the DP, Robinson commented that it "came 
from a marriage of the new middle class and the traditional, pre-Republican social 
elite. The Republican leadership had been derived from the new military group 
which came into power with Kemal plus a substantial number of intellectuals and 
idealists. 11269 
The new Democratic leadership was eager to take part in a campaign against 
"international communism", because they believed that this would help to secure 
economic and military aid from the West. Developments in Turkish politics in 
the 1950s pertaining to involvement with the West can be summarised as follows: 
The Democrat Party pursued an unconditional pro-Western foreign policy dur- 
ing most of the 1950s and accordingly increased Turkey's popularity and prestige 
internationally and secured economic and political support for its modernisation 
program. In 1950, Turkey sent Turkish troops to Korea to protect the "free world" 
against the "international communism". In 1952, Turkey managed to become a 
NATO member and, in return, she led attempts to establish the Balkan Pact and 
the Baghdad Pact in 1954 and 1955 respectively. She also supported the British in 
their dispute over the Suez with Egypt and the French in their dispute over North 
Africa with North African Arabs. Most importantly, despite her desire and efforts 
to improve her relations with the Arabs in order to form a Western sponsored de- 
fence system, she managed to maintain good relations with Israel throughout the 
1950s. However, when the Western friends realised that, among other things, the 
Turkish politicians had a nationalist tendency and were attempting to industrialise 
the Turkish economy in addition to modernising agriculture, the West decreased 
its economic and political support. This meant the end for the Democrat Party 
259 Robinson, op. cit., p. 143. 
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as its political and economic reform program mostly depended on external sup- 
port backed by the West's collaborators within the country. Consequently, the 
Democrat Party era ended on 27 May 1960 as the Turkish Army, shown the green 
light by the West, staged the first of its three successive military coups in order to 
put an end to the increasing reactionary, nationalist, communist and/or separatist 
currents in the state apparatus. 
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4.2.7 Factors and Events Affecting Turkish Foreign Policy 
We should now turn to specific factors affecting the Turkish foreign policy 
orientation and direction. Though the westward orientation of the Turkish foreign 
policy has never changed, it has slightly fluctuated from time to time due to 
some specific factors and events. Those factors and events that contributed to 
the formation of Turkish foreign policy could be summarised as follows: 
First of all, Turkey's geostrategic location was one of the main factors forming 
the Turkish foreign policy. Turkish politicians sometimes overstated or exploited 
this feature to get the most out of it. Simply on account of its geopolitical location 
Turkey has received a great amount of economic and political support from the 
West, but never enough to satisfy the Turks. 
Turkey's proximity to the USSR, one of the superpowers, could be considered 
as an advantage as well as a disadvantage depending on how the Turkish politicians 
portrayed it. At the beginning it was an advantage for the reformers to keep the 
masses under a constant pressure in order first to implement the reform plan and 
second, by pointing to such a formidable external enemy, the government could 
manage to strengthen national unity and integrity. Though in fact there were many 
religious, ethnic and ideological groups in Turkey almost all of them believed that 
the Turkish state must survive in any case. 
Turkey, for one reason or another, adopted a "bridge policy""' for decades. 
The emphasis was on the point that Turkey was, without having her own particular 
identity, a bridge between the West and the East, the Christians and the 
Muslims, 
Europe and Asia, democracy and monarchies, stability and instability 
depending 
260 Soysal regarded the Sadabad Pact and the Baghdad Pact as the 
first and second bridges between the 
East and the West respectively. See Soysal, 
ismail, 'the Sadabad Pact,, Rýrk-Arap IliqUe7i 
Vakfij Ankara, 1988, p. 153. 
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on the current valid ticket in the Western market. Indeed, the West took Turkey 
quite seriously in these arguments as long as their interests permitted. It was for 
these reasons that the West admitted Turkey to the Western family of nations by 
accepting her membership in various western organisations. 
Secondly, the Turks attribute more importance to national integrity and se- 
curity than to anything else. The influence of the Western diplomats over the 
istanbul Government during the previous two centuries and the memories of the 
West's partition of the Ottoman Empire never left the Turkish authorities per- 
manently wary as they feared the prospect of a further division of Turkey itself 
between the Greeks, the Armenians and the Kurds. The bitter consequences of 
previous friendship with the West had influenced the thinking of a large section 
of society. Atatiirk did not align with the West, due, inter alia, to the fear of a 
dangerous popular reaction. When such a strong reaction was no longer a threat 
to the regime, the authorities openly sided with the West as they did in the 1950s. 
One of the main factors, which formed the foundations of the Turkish foreign 
policy was the demand of founders of the modern Turkey to westernise the society 
as well as the state. As explained earlier, on one hand, the founders of the Republic 
were hostile to and afraid of the Western Powers because of the involvement of these 
powers in dividing the Ottoman Empire and their hatred against Islam in general 
and the Turks, the representatives of Islam for last six centuries, in particular. But, 
on the other hand, the rulers of the Republic felt obliged to corporate with the 
West to complete the transformation and modernisation process in the country. 
Another factor, which is partly linked to the previous one and explains the for- 
eign policy of the first two decades of Turkey, was the principle of non-alignment. 
This was due mainly to the "peace at home, peace in the world" principle. Also, 
155 
three major factors contributed to the formation of this Non-Aligned foreign policy 
in 1920s and early 1930s: the existence of international order for peace between the 
First and Second World Wars, the nature of relations with neighbouring countries 
and the need for a peaceful period to carry out the internal reform package. The 
articles in the Lausanne Treaty about customs tariffs, Ottoman debts, and the 
position of the minorities justified Turkish fears and reluctance to co-operate with 
the West in the early years of the Republic. Most Turks thought, and actually 
still think that the whole world is against them and is poised to divide or erase 
Turkey from the map of the world. Though Misiro'lu claimed that the West in 9 
general, and Britain in particular, promised Atatiirk full support if he abolished 
the Caliphate and thus, dropped leadership of Islamic World, Atatiirk was not so 
sure that the West would keep its promise if their national interests required oth- 
erwise. To the founders of the Republic, the Mosul affair and Kurdish insurgence 
led by Sheikh Said proved Atatiirk right and produced some justifiable pretexts 
for Turkish relations with the West. So, being engaged with social and political 
transformation, Turkey kept a low profile during the Republic's first three decades 
in the international arena. 
Turkish control over the Straits was another factor contributing to the forma- 
tion of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey lost control over the Straits in Lausanne. 
Having successfully carried out social and political transformation and 
diminished 
any prospect of internal disturbances, e. g. ethnic 
(Kurdish) or religious (Islamic) 
danger, Turkey prepared herself to regain control over the Straits. Eventually, with 
the help of the changing international order, Turkey achieved control of 
Bosporus 
by the Treaty of Montreaux in 1936. 
Another factor influencing Turkish foreign policy was the Western support 
in 
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Turkey's regional conflicts against her neighbours until the end of 1950s. British 
support in co-operating with Turkey against any possible Kurdish rebellion, 161 
against which Sadabad Pact between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan was set 
up in 1937, was one of such examples and this made the prospect of the Anglo- 
Turkish-French friendship more certain. Turkey eventually signed a Treaty of 
Friendship with France and Britain in 1939. 
Last but not least, Turkish need and demand for Western aid and alignment 
was another factor affecting the formation and orientation of Turkish foreign policy. 
Being vulnerable to any international conflict in Europe and in the Middle East 
due to its geostrategic location and its historical links both with Islamic countries 
and European states, Turkey tried hard not to become involved in World War 11. 
By staying out of the war Turkey managed to increase her exports to both sides 
and avoided the destructive results of the war. When the war was about to end 
a new world order was going to be established and Turkey felt ready to take a 
role in it. Realising that the Western democracies would have an absolute victory 
over the European dictatorships, Turkey overtly sided with victorious party and 
declared war on Germany and Japan without firing a shot. By so doing, she 
became a founder member of the United Nations. Her subsequent alignment with 
the West brought her a considerable amount of aid and credits under the Marshall 
and Truman Doctrines. Facing the Soviet demands over the Straits and the eastern 
provinces of Kars and Ardahan, Turkey had had no option but to align with the 
West. Therefore, Turkey also had to embrace Western ideals and principles fully in 
order to get necessary economic and political support from the West to maintain 
the integrity and welfare of the state, which was based on the Western model. 
261 Shorter, op. cit., PP. 123-125. 
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So, for both internal and external reasons, in6nii was obliged to allow the 
democratic process to begin. "' Internally it was no longer possible to keep so- 
ciety under oppressive secular control. As a consequence of twenty seven years 
of oppression, a social explosion was highly likely at any time. Secondly, social 
transformation was believed to have been nearly completed so that there was no 
need any more to continue the dictatorial pressure over the people. Thirdly, the 
Kemalist regime itself was believed to have become firmly established. Therefore, 
it seemed time to allow certain opposition groups to operate openly within the 
boundaries of the law. This process brought the Democrat Party to power and 
this allowed the liberal capitalist system to begin operating irreversibly in Turkey. 
In this brief survey of factors affecting Turkish foreign policy we should mention 
the following events. The Mosul question was one of the most important events 
that highly influenced the foreign policy in short as well as long term. Following 
Turkish compliance with British demands over Mosul, Turkey felt obliged to have 
friendly relations with Britain in order, inter alia, to avoid any potential Kurdish 
danger coming from the South. 263 Turkey tried hard to obtain similar close co- 
operation with Iran for the same reason. Indeed, Turkey managed to crush the 
Kurdish rebellion of 1930 in A'ri only with Iranian co-operation and subsequently 9 
the two sides signed a Treaty of Friendship in 1932. The Kurdish issue has always 
been one of the main factors influencing the foreign policies of Turkey, Iran and 
Iraq. It was one of the factors that helped to create the Baghdad Pact. 264 
Another specific event affecting Turkish foreign policy was Hatay's annexation 
262 Zfircher, Erik J., 'The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodisa- 
tion, Dze Welt des IslaMS, 32(1992), p. 252. 
263 Kruger, op. cit., pp. 177-178. 
264 Eren., op. cit., p. 240. 
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to Turkey. This has remained as a problem between Turkey and Arab countries 
up to the present day. Five main reasons led to the cession of Hatay from Syria to 
Turkey: the first was the good relationship between the French and Turkish foreign 
policy decision makers. Second, both sides, the Ottoman and French, had been the 
dominant or ruling powers and reasonably close friends for two centuries. 265 Third, 
the success of modernising measures in Turkey changed French views regarding the 
future of Hatay. Turkey's insistence on regaining Hatay due to its strategic location 
had a considerable effect too. 266 Last but not least, the possible alliance between 
Turkey and France against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, which was concluded 
in 1939, made it possible for France to hand over Hatay267 from the backward and 
religious Arabs to the secular and modernising Turks. The Assembly of newly 
independent Hatay decided to join Turkey under the shadow of Turkish military 
might which was concentrated on the borders. 268 
Although the Turkish government hailed alignment with the West between 
1946-1959 as a one-sided triumph for Turkey it was actually the mutual interests 
between Turkey and the West in general, and the United States in particular 
that brought them together. The United States did not need Turkish territory or 
its political support until the cold war started. It was only after witnessing the 
expansionist Soviet policy in Eastern Europe that the United States re-evaluated 
her policy towards Turkey who demanded full support from the West against 
her 
265 Robinson, op. cit., p. 169. In this respect Giilek explained that the 
French culture has always 
been dominant in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
266 Sanjian, Avedis K., 'The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian 
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"accompanied by some western diplomats, Atatiirk 
himself went to Adana to join a protest, during which supposedly 
'men and women from Hatay' 
cried out and asked for Turkish help in 1938. 
" He suggested that Atatfirk said that --the Europeans 
especially the Germans were busy with war preparation, 
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northern historical enemy and also needed a great amount of economic aid to 
modernise her economy which had been seriously affected by the Second World 
War. Washington tried to implement a containment policy and secure the Western 
oil interests in the Middle East in accordance with its global policy. Therefore, 
it attached high importance to Turkey during this period well above its actual 
military and political potential. The United States expected Turkey to play a 
major role in defence of the Middle East and Balkans, because Turkey's unique 
position enabled her to defend the region as part of a string of military bases and 
a sophisticated network of int elligence- gathering devices located near the Soviet 
border. Turkey was treated almost as if she were a Big Power during the early 
1950s. One enthusiastic American pointed out that she really was. "Obviously 
such compliments pleased enormously at that time some foreign ministry officials 
in Turkey, whose exaggerated Big Power complex inherited from the Ottoman 
times had not been trimmed to its realistic size yet. ))269 
Soon after the Second World War, the Soviets launched an expansionist policy 
towards Eastern Europe and to the warm seas of the South. This sowed the seed 
of the cold war in international relations, which was to affect the patterns and 
perceptions of the way in which international relations have functioned. In brief, 
it forced the small powers to align with one of the Big Powers. The small powers, 
made important concessions to the Superpowers in order to obtain this association 
with the Western or Eastern Power, depending on their geostrategic 
location (as 
was in the case of Turkey) and/or economic resources 
(as in the case of most of 
the Middle Eastern countries). 
As the cold war atmosphere prevailed in international relations, 
the US, intent 
269 Karpat, op. cit., p. 3. 
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upon containing international communism within the Soviet Union and its allies, 
felt obliged to change her attitude towards Turkey. Turkey was to fulfil a historical 
obligation which would change the course of events in international relations in 
favour of the western democracies . 
2" Thus, as soon as the United States promised 
Turkey NATO membership, Turkey wholeheartedly pledged the United States and 
Great Britain that she would become involved with the Balkans and Middle East. 
Having being urged by the West, 27' Turkey took the leading role in establishing 
the Balkan Pact on 28 February 1953 (became Bled Alliance on 9 September 1954) 
and the Middle Eastern defence pact in 1955 after long simultaneous negotiations 
with neighbouring countries. However, both would disappear from the active scene 
of international politics before the end of the decade. 272 
Turkey was seeking every possible way to assure the West that she wanted to 
have close relations with the Western world. The Korean War was a golden oppor- 
tunity for Turkey in this regard. The Democrat Party government was aware of 
the fact that the West had overwhelming military and strategic interests in Turkey 
and would, without any serious resistance, finance Turkey's economic development 
project. In return, the government outdid itself in fulfilling its share of the bargain 
by meeting fully its military and political obligations as attested by numerous and 
very generous bilateral agreements signed with the United States. Some historical 
and sentimental factors also played a considerable role in this process of improving 
special relations between the two. The American public greeted with undisguised 
admiration the bravery of the Turkish soldiers fighting in the Korean War of early 
1950s. They had sailed on American ships thousands of miles away from home to 
270 Interview with Erkmen and Qaglayangil. 
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defend freedom, democracy and ultimately Western civilisation on the far shores 
of Asia. 
Turkey's membership of NATO is one of the main milestones on the way to 
Westernisation. Turkish decision-makers believed it to be more important than 
anything else, for NATO had rebuffed Turkey's first application to join, because 
members considered that Turkey was not a Western nation in terms of location, 
economic development and religion. As we have seen, soon afterwards two devel- 
opments led the Americans to a change of mind. Turkey, intent on establishing her 
western credentials, contributed a contingent to the UN force in Korea, thereby 
greatly enhancing her prestige through the valour of her troops. Simultaneously, 
increased Soviet pressure on Eastern Europe alarmed the US government, which 
in turn persuaded other NATO members to accept Turkey as a member of the 
alliance. Turkey's second application was eventually accepted in 1952, and within 
Turkey this was hailed as a DP achievement. 273 
r., L- 
From 1952 onwards alignment with her NATO allies was a main plank in 
Turkey's foreign policy and she took a particularly prominent and active role in 
promoting what she deemed to be Western interests in the Balkans and Middle 
East. In the opinion of some critics like Mehmet Ali Bozarslan, NATO member- 
ship became a more important factor than Kemalist principles. 274 If the Kemalist 
principles had been intended to transform the society into a western one, NATO 
membership was to irreversibly accelerate this process and ensure its completion 
forever. So, Turkey was prepared to do anything to please and rushed into the 
international arena so naively that this caught the eyes of developing countries. 
273 Interview with Gfilek. 
274 Bozarslan, Mehmet Emin, Hilafet ve 
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The image of Turkey as an American satellite within NATO was a disadvantage of 
NATO membership. One commentator claimed that "after joining NATO Turkey 
was used by the western powers as an instrument to protect their interests in 
some of the developing countries. She was one of the few states that posed as 
the spokesman of the West at the Bandung Conference of 1955, and attracted the 
scorn of all the developing countries. ""' This is so evident from the speech given 
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rii§tii Zorlu who said that "I was obliged 
to attend the Bandung Conference, because our Western friends said that if we 
did not participate it would have been disastrous. ""' Indeed, Turkey became so 
isolated from the rest of the developing world because of this unlimited support for 
intimate association with the West and her blistering attacks on non-alignment, 
neutralism, socialism and communism. 
With respect to Turkey's relations with Middle Eastern countries the following 
could be said: Turkish rulers were extremely pleased with Turkey's new role and 
declared that it was national policy to defend western interests in the region. "' 
This led communists to claim that Turkey had become an instrument for the 
protection of Western interests in neighbouring countries. 
The new role as partner of the West and especially the uninhibited 
friend 
of the United States, the defender of the Western civilisation was, 
in the eyes 
of some Turks, the proof that they were finally accepted and 
had become part 
of the Western world. With an almost total dedication to a cause encountered 
only among the new converts to a faith, Turkey appeared 
to have become more 
275 Karpat, op. cit., p. 30. 
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pro-Western than the West itself. "" 
278 Karpat, op. cit., P. 6. 
164 
4.2.8 The Cyprus Question 
The rising Cyprus question was another factor that began, in the late 1950s, to 
affect Turkey's foreign policy. According to J. Landau, Cyprus had been "one of the 
pet issues of Pan-Turkists in Turkey" since the end of the Second World War. 279 
Nationalist Turks organised themselves under the name of several organisations 
such as Kibris Tiirk Kiiltiir Derne'i (Cyprus Turkish Cultural Association) in 1946, 9 
Tiirkiye Milliyetqiler Derne'i (Association of Nationalists of Turkey) in 1951, Kibris 9 
Tiirktiir Cemiyeti (Cyprus is Turkish Society) in 1954 and Milli Tiirk Talebe Birlig-i 
(Turkish National Student Federation) in 1954, in order, among other things, to 
promote the Turkish cause in Cyprus. In the 1950s, the most influential group was 
Cyprus is Turkish Society. It was secretly supported by the DP and RPP as well as 
some conservative groups . 280 However, neither the Republican nor the 
Democrat 
government was officially willing to admit that there was Cyprus question. As a 
result of public pressure some MPs raised the question of Cyprus in the National 
Assembly on 23 January 1950. In reply to criticism, Sadak said "gentlemen, there 
is no such thing as s Cyprus question ... because this 
island is under British rule". 
Later, when K6priffli replied to a question in the same way, he was badly criticised 
by the public. "' 
On 29 August 1955 the London conference began between Turkey, Greece and 
Britain. On'2P August the London Conference began between Turkey, 
Greece 
and Britain. A few days later, on the night of 
6-7 September 1955, anti-Greek 
riots iij istanbuil and, on a smaller scale, 
in izmir were allegedly prompted by 
a requqst from Foreign Minister Zorlu 
for demonstrations that would strengthen 
279 Landau, op. cit., P. 132. 
280 loannides, op. cit., pp. 80-81. 
281 Dikerdem, op. cit., P. 122. 
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his negotiating position by indicating the strength of Turkish public opinion on 
the subject. "" 1956 was an eventful year for Cyprus. Relations between the two 
communities went from bad to worse everyday. Eventually Turkey began to adopt 
the "Taksim" policy (division of the island between the two communities) as an 
alternative to the Greeks' "Enosis" policy (unification of the island with Greece). 
The question was discussed in the UN General Assembly between 25 November 
and 4 December 1958. But there was no real progress towards a solution until the 
Turkish and Greek leaders met in Zurich in early 1959 and agreed a bi-communal 
constitutional framework for the island that was subsequently accepted in London 
on 19 February 1959 in a Treaty that was later criticised for paying insufficient 
heed to the wishes of the Cypriots. The Treaty appointed Greece, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom as guarantors of the island's independence. (Turkey's intervention 
in the island in 1974 to "restore law and rule of order" was based on this treaty. ) 
Cyprus declared her independence on 16 August 1960. 
As regards to the effect of Cyprus question on Turkey's relations with regional 
members of the Baghdad Pact, one could argue that it did not have much effect, 
because all Turkey anticipated from the regional countries, at that stage, was 
to listen to the question from the Turkish standpoint. In fact, the Turks were 
not as anxious to publicise and promote their views on Cyprus as the Iraqis and 
Pakistanis had been to canvass support on Palestine and Kashmir respectively, 
because, according to the British Ambassador in Ankara, the 
Turks were of the view 
that "Britain's occupation of the island was necessary to enable 
her to carry out 
her treaty obligations in the Middle East, and that as 
long as British sovereignty 
was maintained there was no Cyprus question as 
far as Turkey was concerned. ""' 
282 Weiker, Turkish J? evolutzon, op. cit., pp. 33-35. 
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The Turks believed that to the British) sovereignty over Cyprus was absolutely 
paramount, because the British considered the Cyprus problem within the broader 
context of the Middle Eastern and especially eastern Mediterranean politics. 
The conincidence of British and Turkish interest in Cyprus strengthened Turkey's 
role as an interested party in the dispute. Through membership in the Baghdad 
Pact, Turkey slowly emerged as one of the staunch allies of the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America, thus, on the one hand, preventing Soviet pene- 
tration into the Middle East and, on the other, helping preserve British oil interests 
in the region. The then British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden emPhasised the im- 
portance of the British-Turkish partnership when he said: "I regard our alliance 
with Turkey as the first consideration in our policy in that part of the world. ""' 
Moreover, Turkey's policy concerning the Cyprus problem, namely defending 
the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and safeguarding Turkey's vital interests in 
the Eastern Mediterranean region were, Ioannides claims, seen as coinciding with 
those of NATO and the Baghdad Pact. "The position of the UK was much closer 
to Turkey's view that the Cyprus problem was not of the self-determination, but, 
rather, one to be settled among three NATO allies, namely Turkey, Greece and 
the UK. 77285 
The E. O. K. A. campaign in the late 1950s also "became a catalyst for the 
strengthening and consolidation of an Anglo-Turkish alliance against the Greeks 
I 
at all levels and in 411 fora. " 
286 
Additional British setbacks in the region, namely the 1956 Suez Crisis, Jordan's 
284 Eden, Anthony, Full Circle, CasseU, London, 1960, p. 414. 
285 Ioanuides, op. cit., P. 99. 
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dismissal of Glubb Pasha (the British military commander of its Arab League), the 
Lebanese civil war of 1958 and the 1958 Iraqi coup weakening the Baghdad Pact, 
increased Britain's dependence on Turkey and increased the importance of Cyprus 
as an advanced British base in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the membership of 
Britain, Turkey and Greece in NATO made the Cyprus question more complicated. 
In view of these imperatives, the most important development of this time was 
a distinct change in British strategic requirements. By late 1957, it became clear 
that the British government decided that it no longer needed the island as a base 
but rather it needed "bases" in Cyprus. This change of strategy facilitated the 
eventual solution in 1959. 
Additional factors facilitated this change in British policy concerning Cyprus 
dispute. The E. O. K. A. guerrilla warfare became an increasingly serious operation 
and the intercommunal violence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots forced 
the UK to play the role of policeman. As a result, there was increasing pressure in 
Britain to relinquish this task of keeping peace between the two communities on the 
island. The Turks were satisfied by the eventual solution of the dispute. Kyriakides 
claimed that "there is a reason to believe that the increasing importance of Turkey 
as a strategic factor to the US and Great Britain resulted in the corresponding 
weakening of Greece's position concerning the Cyprus dispute. "' 
In support of this, Anthony Eden, speaking in the House of Commons, stated: 
"I have never felt ... that 
Cyprus is an Anglo-Greek question. ... Our duty, if called 
on) ... is to safeguard the strategic needs of our country 
and of our ally (Turkey). 
Neither the NATO obligations... nor the Baghdad Pact nor any agreement in the 
287 Kyriakides, Stanley, CI yprus: constitutionalism and Ciis, s Government, 
University of 
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Middle East ... can 
be speedily and effectively carried out today unless we have 
the assured and unfettered use of bases and the use of facilities in Cyprus. ))288 
Turning specifically to the Cyprus question within the narrower context of 
the Baghdad Pact, one can argue that it did not have as important a place as 
the Kashmir and Palestine problems. There were many reasons why the Cyprus 
dispute was not brought into the Baghdad Pact meetings until the late 1950s. First 
of all, as previously explained, until Britain agreed to abandon her sovereignty over 
the island, Turkey had believed that it was a British problem and thus there was no 
need to carry it to the Baghdad Pact. Second, unlike Pakistan and Iraq who had 
Kashmir and Palestine problems in their minds respectively, Turkey did not join 
the Pact with the Cyprus question in mind. Third, the Turks tried to find a solution 
for the island through bilateral negotiations with Britain, because they believed 
that regional members could not do much about it. "' Finally, even when they 
brought the question to the Pact meetings in the late 1950s, "' they just wanted to 
inform their allies in the Pact and nothing more. In fact, without the British and 
American support, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, regional 
members knew that nothing could be done about these three questions. But the 
reason why Pakistan and Iraq had always emphasised the Kashmir and Palestine 
issues, while Turkey did not raise the Cyprus dispute were due to different causes. 
For Pakistan, internal public pressure played a major part, for Iraq, the radical 
Arabs' propaganda against pro-Western Iraq policy compelled 
her to do so, with 
the hope that lip service to the Palestinian cause would avert criticism that 
Iraq 
was betraying the Arabs. However, in the case of 
Turkey, both public and the 
`8 Parliamentary Debates, 1956-1957, Vol. 550, op. cit., pp. 403-409. 
289 Interview with Giinver. 
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government were aware that the solution for Cyprus did not lie in the Baghdad 
Pact. But, after Cyprus gained her independence in 1960 and the Greek Cypriots 
were reluctant to implement the constitution, Turkey felt a desperate need to 
obtain support of the Third World and especially Mushm-Arab countries. 
In fact, regional countries did not want to make enemies because of their co- 
operation in the Baghdad Pact. All they had done was to pay lip service for each 
other's problem. "' For example, Turkey did not want to alienate India and Israel 
because of her close relations with Pakistan and Iraq respectively. When Turkey 
signed the bilateral agreement with Pakistan in April 1954, instead of taking sides 
with Pakistan and attacking India, she declared that "now it is time to mediate 
between Pakistan and India to find a peaceful solution for Pakistan. ""' Similarly, 
with regard to Palestine, although Turkey reduced her diplomatic representation 
to a lower level in order to appease the nationalist Arabs, she consistently contin- 
ued to maintain good relations with Israel and support a UN sponsored peaceful 
solution. 293 Moreover, Turkey did not support Egypt in her dispute over the Suez 
with Britain in 1956 and also failed to support the independence of the North 
African Arabs against the French . 
2" Therefore Turkey was not in a position to 
ask regional countries to do much about the Cyprus question. 
Meanwhile, voting patterns in the UN were another indication of Pact mem- 
bers' solidarity or lack of it. With the possible fxception of voting in 
the UN 
General Assembly on 23 November 1955, when the spirit of the 
Pact was at its 
peak, Iraq never voted for Turkey in its dispute over the 
Cyprus with Greece. She 
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either abstained or joined the Egyptian group of Arab countries. "' Pakistan con- 
sistently voted with Turkey on the Cyprus issue, but this had nothing to do with 
membership of the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish- Pakistani friendship dates back 
to pre-Pakistani days when the then Indian Muslims supported Turkey's national 
independence. Because of such historical cordial relations it is difficult to say if 
the Pact affected the attitude of Pakistan when the Cyprus problem emerged in 
the second half of the 1950s. 
In conclusion, as far as Pakistan and Iraq were concerned the Kashmir and 
Palestine problems were important alliance dynamics, the opportunities the Pact 
provided for Pakistani and Iraqi governments to raise these issues at international 
level gave them a degree of psychological satisfaction and enabled them to counter 
internal and external critics of their Pact membership by pointing and how they 
were using that membership to urge support for these national issues. On the other 
hand, Turkey raised the Cyprus issue in the Baghdad Pact only in June 1958... and 
one month later the Pact collapsed. Compared with these two alliance dynamics 
for Pakistan and Iraq, the Cyprus dispute partly became an alliance dynamic for 
Turkey when Britain declared that she might abandon her sovereignty in early 1958. 
Had the Pact not prematurely collapsed in July 1958 one could have expected that 
Turkey would have more enthusiastically discussed the Cyprus question in the Pact 
meeting and like Pakistan and Iraq would have asked for a more active support 
from her allies. However, by the time the Turkish leaders realised that the 
Cyprus 
issue was an international problem, the Pact was weakened 
by the coup in Baghdad 
and later replaced by the CENTO in 1959 and Turkey 
began to attach even less 
.1 
295 Armaoglu, Fahir H., Kzbms Meselesi 1954-1959: Tiýrk Hukiimett ve 
Kamuoyu 
Davraniqlarz, Seviný Matbaasi, Ankara, 1963, pp. 98,178,386, and 502. 
296 Vatan 7.6.1958. 
171 
importance to the Pact. Nevertheless, the Cyprus question became an alliance 
dynamic for Turkey even if it was for a short period of time. 
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4.2.9 Turkey's Relations with Regional States 
Turkey's pro-Western stance in her relations with Arabs in the 1950s also af- 
fected her foreign policy. The sharp contrast between Turkish and Arab attitudes 
and aspirations made mutual understanding difficult. The Turks eagerly sought 
closer relations with the West and their psychology was not affected by the experi- 
ence of colonial subjugation. The Arabs, however, were fearful of Western power, 
eager to rid the region of all vestiges of colonialism forever and to demonstrate 
their own independence. In a mood of increasing nationalism in Egypt, Egyp- 
tian rulers demanded that Britain should evacuate the Suez Canal and cease to 
administer Sudan. At the same time the financing of the Aswan Dam became a 
heavy burden for the Egyptian economy and a major problem between Egypt and 
the West. When Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal in order to implement her full 
sovereignty over her territorial land and sea and to finance the Aswan Dam project, 
Britain, France and Israel, having common interests in the region, attacked Egypt. 
The stand taken by Turkey during the Suez Crisis of 1956 was due solely to her 
NATO membership. This policy led to a further deterioration in relations between 
Turkey and the Arab countries which were already poor. It could be argued that by 
siding with the Big Powers in international conflicts the Turkish authorities made 
a realistic assessment that Turkey would be more secure and economically 
better 
off but psychological factors also influenced this preference; they 
had inherited a 
superiority complex from the Ottomans and it would 
have been unimaginable for 
them to side with non-European developing countries, several of which 
had previ- 
ously been their colonial subjects. As the 
founders of the modern Republic were 
the admirers of Western civilisation and created a society with 
the same mentality, 
successive rulers too pursued the same 
line of policy. So, the Turks looked down on 
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the non-European nations yet felt inferior to the Europeans, as the Westernisation 
process had still not been fully and comprehensively completed. 
Turkey's relations with Iraq had been more than cordial because of the role 
played by Nuri Said and Hashemite royal family. Exceptionally in the Arab world, 
both were inclined towards Turkey. Having a common threat, the Kurds, also 
helped them to improve their relations. After the Second World War Turkish 
diplomacy began to appreciate the importance of a gradual improvement of re- 
lations with the Arab countries. Accordingly, a Treaty of Friendship and Good 
Neighbourly Relations was signed with Iraq on 29 March 1946. In October 1946 
both the Turkish President himself and Foreign Minister Hasan Saka reiterated 
Turkey's desire for friendly relations with all the Arab countries modelled after the 
Turco-Iraqi Treaty. Turco-Iraqi co-operation reached its peak when both declared 
formation of the Baghdad Pact in February 1955, but came to a halt with the Iraqi 
coup in 1958. 
Turkey's relations with Jordan had also been cordial due to the Hashemite 
royal family. Turkey's good relations with Iraq had a positive effect on Turkey's 
relations with Jordan. After the Turco-Iraqi Treaty of 1946, Transjordaman King 
Abdullah expressed his desire for Turco-Arab rapprochement. On 10 January 1947 
King Abdullah stressed the necessity for a Turco-Arab bloc in which 
Turkey could 
assume a leading role and announced his support 
for Turkey in its dispute with 
Syria over Hatay as did so Nuri Said. "' On 11 
January 1947 a Treaty of Friendship 
was signed by Turkey and M-ansjordan- 
Turkey's relations with Jordan remained 
cordial, but fell short of attracting Jordan 
into the Baghdad Pact due to the latter's 
fear of Arab nationalism led by Egypt. 
297 New York Times, 11 January 1947. 
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Already affected by territorial conflict over the Hatay province, Turkey's rela- 
tions with Syria deteriorated further when the eventual Syrian independence was 
declared on 28 September 1941. The situation was further aggravated by numerous 
demands for the unequivocal restoration of the territory to Syria. Relations were 
partly improved when Turkey recognised Syrian independence on 16 March 1946 
as a result of mediation by Nuri Said. "" This secured Turkey's consent not to 
insist on formal Syrian recognition of annexation of Hatay and Syria's agreement 
not to present formal demands. Finally, deterioration of relations reached its peak 
in 1957 when the prospect of a so-called communist danger surfaced because of a 
power struggle between rival political groups in Syria. As will be shown in more 
detaillater, 29' Turkey followed the events closely and prepared to intervene if the 
anti- colonialist nationalists and/or communists took power. The Americans had 
difficulty in preventing Turkish military intervention in Syrian affairs, just as they 
later found it hard to restrain the Turks after the 14 July coup in Baghdad. 
In 1958 a problem of presidential succession appeared in Lebanon and President 
Chamoun invited the Americans to the country in accordance with the Eisenhower 
Doctrine. That opened the way to American intervention to prevent a communist 
danger against any regional country that requested help from United States. Unlike 
most of the Muslim and Arab countries and even the Lebanese people, 
Turkey 
supported the Christian President Chamoun of Lebanon. 
Turkey went further by 
allowing the Americans to use the military 
base in incirlik, Adana, "O to intervene 
in the Lebanese crisis, while the British paratroops landed on 
Jordanian soil for 
the same purpose of protecting pro-Western governments. 
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The part played by Turkey in the Syrian and the Lebanese crises of 1957 and 
1958, neither of which fell within the responsibilities of NATO, could be called an 
indirect consequence of her membership in NATO. As the years went by the Turks 
became alien to the Muslims in general, and the Arabs in particular. 
The 14 July military coup in Iraq increased the already high tension iii the 
region and gave the Turkish military ideas and made Turkish politicians fear the 
same fate as their Iraqi counterparts. Also, relations with the US began to dete- 
riorate with every passing year after the general elections of 1957 in Turkey and 
eventually the Turkish army seized power to reinstate the "true Kemalist regime. " 
As can be seen, our study in this chapter showed that the Ottoman Empire 
tried to survive, but failed. After the War of Independence the Turks managed 
to form a Republic based on Kemalist reforms. These reforms were intended to 
westernise the Turkish state and society. By Kemal's and his successors' efforts, 





TURKEY'S ROLE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A 
WESTERN DEFENCE SYSTEM IN THE MIDDLE 
EAST 1950-1955 
5.1 General 
In this chapter, after recalling the events, which led the cold war to dominate 
the international politics, we shall concentrate on the rivalry of the two superpowers 
and early Western defence initiatives in the Middle East. Having discussed these 
abortive attempts to establish a Western defence system in the early 1950s, we 
shall study the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, the first ever successful Western 
defence Pact in the region, paying particular attention to Turkey's involvement in 
the process. 
With the elimination of Germany, Japan and Italy and the weakening of Great 
Britain and France in the Second World War, the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics emerged as the two superpowers. Their 
rivalry in such a bipolar world led to the cold war which was to intensify in the 
period under the discussion. 
Already visible at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, their conflict of 
interests became more acute after the death of F. D. Roosevelt and the succession 
of Harry S. Truman as president of the United States in April 1945. 
The American 
monopoly of the A-bomb, first successfully detonated on 16 
July 1945, increased 
tension and after the inconclusive Potsdam Conference of 
July-August 1945, the 
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Soviet Union under Stalin decided to consolidate Communist control of Eastern 
Europe,. In 1947, Soviet dominated governments were set up in Albania, Hungary, 
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and finally, in February 1948, in Czechoslovakia. When 
civil war broke out and an attempted Communist take-over occurred in Greece in 
December 1947 and the Russians threatened in April 1948 to freeze out the Western 
sectors of Berlin, the United States reacted vigorously. (Even earlier in 1947 the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had been established as the American 
reply to the alleged Russian threat. ) 
Starting as a conflict over Central Europe and divided Germany, the Cold War 
spread to Asia following the Communist victory in China in 1949 and developed 
into a global conflict. For the United States the Korean War of 1950-1953 was 
evidence of a world-wide Communist conspiracy. Facing this expansionist Soviet 
policy, the United States decided to "contain" the Soviet Union by a series of encir- 
cling alliances and bases around its frontiers in 1949. These were the South East 
Asian Treaty Organisation (henceforth called SEATO) in 1954 and the Central 
Treaty Organisation in 1959 (henceforth called CENTO, replacing the Baghdad 
Pact of 1955). By this time the United States had over 1400 foreign bases in 31 
countries, including 275 bases for nuclear bombers. 
The most intensive phase of the cold war occurred during the period 1949-1961 
when Dean Acheson and J. F. Dulles were United States secretaries of state. 
After 
the Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955 the cold war spilled over into the Middle 
East. The conflict was manifest in the Eisenhower Doctrine, the 
Syrian Crisis of 
1957, and the United States intervention in Lebanon and 
the British intervention 
in Jordan in 1958. The cold war proved a divisive force in the Middle 
East where 
some countries sought Soviet and others 
American support. During the late 1950s 
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the two monolithic blocs were showing signs of strains. Uprisings in Hungary and 
Poland in 1956 had shaken Soviet self-confidence. Eventually both superpowers 
seem to have concluded that they had more to lose than to gain by the conflict) and 
after the settlement of the Cuban Crisis in 1962, Soviet-American tension gradually 
relaxed. A first sign of this was the signature of a nuclear test ban treaty in 1963. 
With this outline in mind, we should now turn back to the beginning of this 
intensive cold war period and note the milestones in the process of the superpowers' 
rivalry in the delicately located oil-rich part of the world, the Middle East) and 
the Turkish involvement in it. 
Starting with the declaration of war on the Axis Forces in 1945 Turkey came 
increasingly under the influence of the United States. This process gained mo- 
mentum when the Soviet Union officially demanded that Turkey return Kars and 
Ardahan provinces in the east to Russia and modify the Montreaux Treaty to allow 
a joint defence of the Straits. "' As Turkey had already decided to integrate into 
the Western community, she understandably, turned to the West in general and the 
United States in particular to consolidate her power in order to defend her national 
integrity and sovereignty. The more the cold war intensified, the more Turkey re- 
alised that she had to align with the West even at the expense of abandoning some 
of the Kemalist principles and accept a free market economy, in place of etatism, 
association with the West instead of a neutral foreign policy and more democracy 
instead of the three-decade-long one party dictatorship. Britain, gravely weakened 
by World War 11, was struggling to reconstruct her devastated national economy 
and was not in a position to protect Turkey and Greece. She therefore sought to 
transfer this responsibility to the United States fearing that otherwise she might 
301 McGhee, op. cit., p. 14. 
180 
lose control of the whole Middle East and Africa, including former colonies. This 
decision was immediately followed by the Truman and later Marshall Doctrines to 
counter the threat of Communist expansion in Europe including Turkey that was 
to be not only the regional backbone for the defence of the Middle East but also 
to have an important role in the defence of Western Europe. 
As the superpowers began dominating the course of events in international 
relations, the small powers like Turkey lost their ability to manoeuvre even when 
their vital national interests were at stake. 302 The whole international community 
including the middle-ranking powers thus became dependent on one or other of 
the superpowers to protect their national interests or to solve the world conflicts. 
A miscalculation regarding American support in the Suez Crisis cost Britain dear 
and led to the complete British withdrawal from Egypt. Without having one of the 
superpowers' support none of the small powers was able to solve any international 
conflict in the cold war period, especially in the 1950s. 
Turkey, though it was a small power, played a crucial role during this critical 
period. By siding with the Western world Turkey probably changed the destiny 
of the world in favour of the West. "' Had she not associated with the West the 
Soviet Union could have easily controlled the Mediterranean Sea, the Suez Canal, 
the lifeline of the West, and the oil resources in the Middle East without which 
the West could not have survived for long. It was for these reasons that the 
West 
treated Turkey so gently in the 1950s and sometimes, pretended that they consid- 
ered Turkey as a "Big Power. " Therefore, one could easily say 
that it was neither 
the Turkish desire to join the western club nor the Western endorsement of 
Turkish 
westernisation that brought about the mutual understanding 
on the world conflicts 
302 The famous L. B. Johnson letter dated 5 June 1964 was one of 
the best examples in this regard. 
303 Interviews with Qaglayangil and Erkmen; 
both former Turkish Foreigu Ministers. 
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during the cold war. It was in reality the mutual interests of the two parties, stim- 
ulated by the Soviet threat to Turkey and other parts of the world, that forced 
Turkey as well as the West to work together in international affairs. While the 
West, by so doing, partly recognised Turkish westernisation, Turkey abandoned 
pristine Kemalism, "" adopted the multi-party system and offered the West many 
military bases and considerable economic concessions. In return, Turkey guaran- 
teed her national security while the West secured the free flow of oil to the West 
and maintained its control over many strategic places in the region. 
Generally speaking, the West won the rivalry in the short run, but, it failed 
in the long run to achieve its objectives in the Middle East. Briefly, the West 
attempted to contain the Soviet Union and therefore it exerted great efforts to 
set up a defence mechanism in the Balkans and the Middle East, and though it 
succeeded in establishing them on paper, it failed to maintain them or to make 
them function as intended. Also it failed in long term because it created a deep- 
rooted hatred towards the US in the region and lost Iran in 1979. "' 
Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s cannot be studied on its own as it became 
an integral part of the West for the first time, full of enthusiasm due to the satis- 
faction it felt from becoming a full member of NATO. Therefore, although this is 
a study of the Turkish involvement or contribution to Middle Eastern defence, 
306 
304 See for details on Kemalism Chapter IV. 
3 Or, Gerner, Deborah J., 'Missed Opportunities and Roads not Taken: the Eisenhower Administra- 
tion and the Palestinians, ' 
Ara`ý Studies Quarterly, (Winter-Spring 1990), pp. 78-92 and 
Gasiorowski, op. cit., p. 279. 
306 It is interesting to note that Issawi made a remarkable point when 
he pointed out the parallelisms 
between the Crusades and their aftermath and their modern version in the 
1950s: the establishment 
of the Crusader states and a modern parallel, 
the establishment of the State of Israel; Egypt's 
attempt to secure a monopoly of the spice trade and 
the similar contemporary attempts to control 
the petroleum trade; and the Crusaders' attack on 
Alexandria from Cyprus and the Anglo-French 
attack on Port Said. Perhaps he missed one point, which was 
related to the Turks who then opposed 
the Crusaders but now support the Western world. 
Issawi, Charles, 'Crusades and Current Crises 
in the Near East: A Historical Parallel, 
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International Affairs, ' (July 1957), p. 271. it should be made clear that this can 
only be analysed by studying the "independent" Western initiatives. The Turkish 
initiatives compared with the Western ones were dependent and subsidiary, vital 
though they were. They were inspired, if not directed, from the United States 
and sometimes from Great Britain and France. Turkey did not try to form her 
own Middle Eastern or Balkan policy. It was evident that those regional countries 
were unable to guarantee Turkish defence. Therefore, it did not create any major 
difficulty for the Turks to adopt a completely identical foreign policy. In addition, 
apart from her national integrity and sovereignty, Turkey did not have any major 
problem as far as her foreign policy was concerned. This made it easier for the 
Turkish decision makers to oppose any Soviet initiatives and give full support to 
the West. Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s is full of the examples of this unre- 
served Turkish support to the West. After some time the Turkish authorities came 
to think that if anything was in the interest of the West it must be in the interest 
of Turkey as well. The time came when the American Ambassador to the United 
Nations felt obliged to tell his Turkish counterpart that it was against Turkish 
interests always to vote in favour of the United States in the UN. "' It was this 
Turkish attitude that left Turkey isolated when it later faced a major international 
problem, the Cyprus question. "' Then the Turks realised that they were 
being 
manipulated too much by the Americans in the 
field of the foreign policy and for 
the first time they turned to the Third World countries to seek their support in 
the UN where the issue was discussed on 18 
December 1965.309 It was too late 
307 McGhee, op. cit., P- 140. 
ir 8 due to her 308 Gfinver stated that Turkey was completely 
isolated from the Th d World countrie 
pro-Western policies in the 
19508. In the 1960s, the only possible way for Turkey to break this 
isolation was, he said, to improve relations with 
the Muslim countries in general and Arab states 
in paxticulax. 
309 Tamkoý;, Meti., The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of the National Security and 
Modernisation of Turkey, University of 
Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1976, p. 273. 
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for Turkey to get any support from either the Arab or the other Islamic countries 
that had seen Turkey become secular and sever her relations with her Islamic past. 
Moreover, the Third World countries that had observed Turkey working for the 
West at the Bandung Conference in 1955 were not disposed to support her. 
Why did the West desperately need Turkey for its own defence? The West 
appreciated that Turkey was strategically located between Europe and Asia, the 
Christian world and the Muslim world and more importantly, between the Soviet 
Union and the oil reserves of the Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey's geostrategic 
location enabled the West to listen to and observe developments in the Soviet 
Union. Turkish territory also represented a natural barrier between the Soviet 
Union and warm-water ports of the Mediterranean and secured the Middle East 
from international Communist danger. "' Finally, the 600,000 strong Turkish army, 
the largest in the area, with its historical enmity towards the Russians was another 
appealing factor for the West. Once the West came to know that it was much 
cheaper to maintain a Turkish soldier rather than to feed a western one in the 
region, 311 it preferred to help Turkey to maintain her army. 
Thus, this Middle East defence project had four aspects. One was the West 
with its objectives and expectations from the project. Another was the 
Soviet 
Union, the West's rival in the region. The third was the Middle Eastern countries 
for whose support the rival powers were competing. 
And the fourth was Turkey 
which had no particular interest in the region 
but felt obliged to do the West's 
bidding even when this was occasionally contrary 
to Turkish national interests. 
310 McGhee, OP. cit., pp. 88-89. rAukish soldier cost Americans 235 31 1 The cost of one American soldier was 
6,500 dollars while one 
dollars only. Robinson, op. cit., P. 
181. 
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5.2 Expectations from a Middle Eastern Defence Organisation 
Great Britain, the former colonial power, faced great difficulties in the process 
of negotiations to renew her agreements or extend her privileged position especially 
in Iraq and Egypt. It was, Britain foresaw, no longer possible to sign an agreement 
on the previous conditions with these countries. Therefore, she decided, in Nasser's 
words, to cover her imperialist face and get agreement signed under disguise of 
a collective defence pact. So, to the British, the defence pact was nothing but 
a means to achieve her objectives that she was not able to achieve by herself 
alone. Those objectives were mainly to renew her agreements with Egypt and 
Iraq to prolong continuing British interests there, such as oil, other raw materials 
and cheap agricultural products. The area was also a good market for British 
products. Another objective for the British was to maintain British control over 
the Suez Canal. 
To the Americans, it was a means to keep Soviet Communism out of the region 
where many American oil companies had vital interests, and in common with the 
British, secure the free flow of oil to the West as well as to evict the other powers 
from the region. 
To the Turks, participation in the Middle East defence organisation would be 
seen as fulfilment of their promise or a payment of the price that she had to pay 
for becoming a full member of NATO. "' 
For, most of the Arabs, a Middle East defence organisation was an imperialist 
tactic to prolong imperialistic exploitation. Exceptionally in the Arab world, Nuri 
Said thought that he would receive considerable Western economic and military 
aid if he entered a defence pact sponsored by the West. He did not sincerely believe 
312 Intqrview with Giinver, Erkmen and Caglayangil. 
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that there was any communist threat to any Arab country but being well disposed 
to the British, he tried to convince other Arab leaders that the Soviet Union was 
more dangerous than Israel to the Arabs, which nobody then believed. "' 
The Israelis regarded the Western defence project favourably since they saw 
its effect would be to divide their Arab and other Islamic enemies. Nevertheless 
they still feared that it could backfire and turn out to be a real Islamic threat to 
Israel. 
Bearing in mind this general picture about the western defence initiatives, we 
may now turn to the process of the attempt to establish first, Middle East Treaty 
Organisation, Eastern Mediterranean Pact, Middle East Command, later Middle 
East Defence Organisation and the Baghdad Pact which in 1959 was to be called 
the Central Týreaty Organisation. 
At the very beginning the British and the Americans always agreed first on any 
plan that was put forward concerning Middle East defence and then they would 
open it for discussion. Following the transfer of responsibility for Middle Eastern 
defence to the Americans, many meetings were held between the high ranking 
military and political authorities from the United States and Britain. One of them 
was held at Malta in January 1951. The main object of the meeting was "to adjust 
the respective lines of approach between the Americans and the British over the 
defence policy in the Middle East. ""' It is interesting that the conditions favouring 
the establishment of joint B ritish- American military missions did not exist in any 
Middle Eastern country with the exception of Saudi Arabia . 
315 However, two basic 
assumptions preoccupied the minds of the British; "the supreme importance of 
313 Interview with Ak§it. 
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Egypt and the vital need to defend Middle Eastern oil and communications. ""' 
These assumptions were naturally due to British expectations from Egypt 
which was strategically located and the most populated and influential Arab coun- 
try. It is needless to repeat the importance of oil for Britain, the first industrialised 
country. Having lost her imperial power, Britain yet managed to maintain direct 
or indirect control in various parts of her colonial territories in different degrees up 
to quite recently. 
The expectations of the parties concerned as revealed in the British documents 
in the Public Record Office, London, reveal Britain as the driving force behind 
Middle East defence. "Our Middle East defence plans aim at defending as much of 
the Middle East and of the Middle East oil as possible, and as a whole (the outer 
ring), and that in the view of the Chiefs of Staff Egypt still constitutes the only 
suitable wartime base from which to conduct the operations for this purpose. ""' 
As seen, the British objectives were quite naturally limited to their own national 
interests in the region. It had in reality nothing directly to do with Turkish defence. 
In another words, the problem in British eyes was not the defence of Turkey itself. 
This was considered only as far as it could help the British objectives in the region 
and admittedly nothing further. 
Although the US accepted the responsibility to defend the area against any 
external or internal threat, she was not still sure how far to commit herself for such 
a purpose. Therefore, she preferred to let Great Britain, the experienced colonial 
power in the region, keep her leading role ia the Middle East while she almost 
fully supported the British initiatives aiming regional defence. The US was briefly 
316 PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 4.1.1951 and Raleigh, J. S., 'The West and the Defense of the Middle 
East, ' Middle East Affairs, (June-July 1955), p. 177. 
317 PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 10-1.1951. 
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interested in the defence of the region and by agreement with the UK, the latter 
had the primary responsibility for regional defence, but "America is solidly behind 
the UK in her dealing with the problem. ""' 
As seen, the US had many reservations about Middle Eastern defence. She had 
intimate relations with Saudi Arabia on one hand and she had more than intimate 
relations with Israel on the other. The US, therefore, had to be very careful about 
her role in the region. Any policy antagonising Israel or the Arab countries could 
have catastrophic consequences for her own national interests. It was not actually 
a matter of liking the Jews or the Arabs, it was only a matter of material interest. 
In fact, in the Middle East the political and military problems were and are so 
inextricably intermingled that neither could be considered in isolation. Citing the 
importance of the Middle East for the West in general and the reasons why the 
Americans were reluctant to defend the area a British document recorded that the 
strategic importance of the Middle East (briefly) derives from: 
(a) its oil resources, 
(b) its importance as a base for ultimately developing offensive action against one 
of the most vulnerable areas of the Soviet Union, 
(c) its importance as a bastion defending the African continent with its sources of 
strategic raw materials (including uranium), 
(d) the importance of denying its sources to the enemy, and 
(e) its importance as a centre of communications. "' 
The continuing need to maintain security on the basis of Western influence 
in the region derives from the fact that in Hoskins' words "no segment of the 
earth's surface so greater significance in international affairs than that which binds 
together the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, bringing into juxtaposition not 
only people of the eastern hemisphere but also - in this age of technology - those of 
318 PRO, FO, 371, E1192/24G, 10.2.1951. 
319 PRO, FO, 371, E1192/11G, 4.1.1950. 
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the western hemisphere as well. ""' The CIGS explained that the American view 
"that defence of the Middle East was a commonwealth responsibility arose not 
from lack of conviction as to its strategic importance but from the inadequacy of 
their existing military resources in view of their other commitments. 
)1321 
Explaining the reasons why the West was not even interested in any regional 
pact discussion with all the Arab states, a document recorded that "the argument 
against bringing in any other Arab states, other than Iraq and Egypt, at this stage 
is that, if we had any more, we should have to have them all; this would make the 
conference unmanageable, would confront us with an Arab League bloc within it 
and would highlight the exclusion of Israel. " 322 The West was very careful about 
their relations with the Arab states pertaining to the regional developments on the 
ground that it should not have incited the regional rivalries and Arab nationalism 
and that it should not have been assumed that it was against Israel. Otherwise, 
the West rightly presumed that it was not going to be an applicable project. 
Western eagerness for the participation of Iraq and Egypt is very clear from 
the British documents: 
(a) that Iraq alone of the Arab states had shown a keen and friendly interest in our 
approach to the problems of Middle East defence, 
(b) that after Egypt, Iraq is the most important Arab state in terms of size and 
economic potential, 
(c) that Iraq forms with Turkey the Northern bastion for the defence of the Middle 
East, with Egypt as the natural base. 
(d) that Iraq is in a position to provide the command with forces and facilities 
superior to those of any Arab state outside Egypt. "' 
The Arab east, of which Iraq was an integral part, has historical importance in 
320 Hoskins, Halford L., 'Changing of the Guard in the Middle East,, 
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the Arab eyes. In spite of its multi-racial and multi-sectarian structure, Iraq con- 
tested with Egypt and Saudi Arabia for Arab leadership due to her "eastern front" 
position from where she would save Arabs from non-Arab invasions. Therefore, 
as H. M. Ambassador in Baghdad commented, Iraqi pro-Western policy regarding 
the Middle East defence "was due purely to the personal vanity of Nuri Said or 
perhaps Jamali" rather than a general "Arab" policy. Besides, it was common 
knowledge that Nuri Said, who became prime minister fourteen times, had been a 
pro-western leader throughout his political life. Indeed he was so pro-British that 
one of the British dispatches sent from Baghdad stated that "Nuri may be told 
that his assurance that the Iraqi Army will fight with us wherever we are is very 
welcome, though we should, of course, have expected nothing less of him. ""' 
Iran was under British influence right up till the time when Musaddeq came 
to power through general elections. As J. H. Huizinga stated, "even now ... no 
provincial governor in the South could be appointed without British approval. 
)1325 
Iran remained under Musaddeq till the CIA had a successful operation there and 
restored the Shah to his throne. The West was confused and frightened for their in- 
terests in Iran during Musaddeq's rule, fearing that he could align with the Soviets. 
According to British diplomats, for Musaddeq neutralism meant, "towards Russia; 
a policy of friendliness and appeasement, towards the West; a policy of diminishing 
Western interests in the oil industry and influence generally in Persia. ""' When 
the Shah began to rule his country he knew to whom he was indebted. "' There- 
fore, he, too, against the will of his people, aligned with the West, though he was 
324 PRO, FO, 371, EQ1071/1,12.1.1951. 
325 PRO, FO, 371, EP 1022/4,9.2.1951, quoted from Manchester Guardian dated 9.2-1951. 
326 PRO, FO, 371, EP1022/8,18.10.1951. 
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persuaded to do so only after long negotiations with the Turkish and Pakistani 
leaders. 
Pakistan, a state established because of religious conviction like any other con- 
cerned power had her own expectations from any defence pact in the Middle East. 
Her national security was under threat from India. She had other problems of sec- 
ondary importance with Afghanistan. The new state of Pakistan had a formidable 
economic burden due to the immigration of millions of Muslims coming from India 
and establishing her infrastructure, which was still almost non-exist. She was too, 
like other would-be members of the Baghdad Pact, in need of international aid and 
thus alignment with the West seemed a reasonable price to pay for it. The satis- 
faction the various members obtained from their membership and this alignment 
and its consequences will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Turkey constituted the most important country in the region for the West: 
geostrategically, Turkey had control over the Straits and the Eastern mountains, 
which constitute natural barrier against Soviet expansionism towards the southern 
warm seas and Middle Eastern oil. Economically, it was part of the free market 
economy with the largest population in the region. Politically, Turkey was well 
inclined to the West and it was democratic, compared with other Middle Eastern 
states. Militarily, it was the strongest country with the largest army in the Middle 
East. Having an Islamic background and a western objective, Turkey was the 
ideal candidate to mediate between the regional Islamic countries and the West 
with whom she shaTed the secular ideals. As the cold war began to dominate the 
international system, Turkey's need for the West as well as West's need for Turkey 
grew stronger and eventually brought them both together in NATO. As will be 
explained later, Turkey's membership of NATO required her to become actively 
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involved in Middle Eastern defence projects, which after a few abortive attempts, 
took the form of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and later CENTO in 1958 when the 
Baghdad Pact was left without Baghdad as a result of the military coup in Iraq. 
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5.3 Early Western Defence Initiatives in the Middle East 
Although the British were obliged to hand over their responsibility to the 
Americans in Turkey and Greece, they could not easily give up all their national 
interests in the region at once. Britain wanted the Americans to shoulder the eco- 
nomic burden but not to harm the British position in the region, if possible. As 
American economic and military aid in area grew the more the British were forced 
to defer to American wishes their interests there. These partly conflicting interests 
caused great rivalry between the two powers. As L'Observateur, recorded, "the 
greatest obstacle to the realisation of a regional security system in the Eastern 
Mediterranean is Anglo-American rivalry; and that London is by no means dis- 
posed to yield to Washington the leadership in this area. ""' Turkey, expecting a 
lot from the country's NATO membership, was ready to do anything she could 
do to achieve this objective. She mediated not only between the Western Pow- 
ers and the Middle Eastern countries to settle their differences, but also mediated 
between the US and the UK in order to remove the differences concerning Mid- 
dle Eastern defence. The notes added that "The Government of Ankara hopes to 
arrive at a settlement of these differences by stressing the strategic importance of 
Turkey. " 329 In reply to this dispatch, British Secretary of Defence admitted the 
lack of co-ordination, saying, "we fully appreciate your anxiety concerning the lack 
of co-ordination with Americans which is at present apparent in defence planning 
in your theatre, with particular reference to Turkey. 11311 
In search of candidates for a possýble pact the British Ambassador consulted 
Ki5priilii. When asked by Sir Noel Charles what countries he hoped should be 
328 PRO, FO, 371, RK1192/12,11.5.1950. 
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included in the Pact, K6priilii replied that "he referred in the first instance to the 
Arab countries, Israel and Turkey. He pointed out later when I mentioned to him 
that His Majesty's Government hoped Turkey would assist us in improving our 
relations with Egypt, that a pact would put Turkey in a better position to 'help 
) ))331 us . 
In reply to K6priilii's question whether Egypt would be included in a system 
of regional defence, the British Ambassador in Ankara, said that he "had been 
considering for some time the possibility of the countries of the Middle East them- 
selves suggesting a regional system in association with us. It might be possible to 
replace the Anglo-Egyptian Alliance by a multi-lateral one. ""' This dispatch is of 
crucial importance for an understanding of the British view on the issue, because 
it was clear that it was no longer possible to sign a bilateral agreement with Egypt. 
Therefore, instead of signing bilateral agreements, a multilateral agreement would 
be wiser and it would be easier to conceal its imperialistic nature. 
Having considered their national security and sovereignty in the face of the 
Russian threat, the Turks wanted to secure this by aligning themselves with the 
West. That is why the Turkish authorities put great pressure on their western 
friends to accept Turkish demands. In order to convince the West that Turkish 
defence was vital for the defence of the West, the Turks emphasised the strategic 
importance of the Turkish Straits and soil for Western defence, their secular and 
democratic system and the deterrent power of Turkish army. The Turks, according 
to Sir Noel Charles, "do not much mind whether this guarantee is obtained by 
their inclusion in the Atlantic Pact (though they would prefer this) or a new 
Mediterranean Pact or some other arrangement, but they want the US to be legally 
331 PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/10,26.5.1950. 
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committed. ""' 
It took long time for the West to make up its mind whether to accept the Turks, 
a Muslim and Asiatic nation and for centuries a deadly enemy of the Christian 
World, into a western defence pact. The western countries had many reservations 
about the Turks as they recalled the Huns invading Europe in the fifth century and 
the Ottomans invading from the fifteenth century. Having considered the necessity 
of the Turkish army as well as territory for the defence of the Western Europe and 
the Middle East, the Western countries were inclined to believe that the social and 
political changes in Turkey were real and persuaded themselves that it was possible 
to accept such a nation into the North Atlantic Pact. The Turkish insistence and 
threats by some of the opposing elements such as extreme leftists to remain neutral 
had helped the West to make up its mind more quickly. For example, Esat Adil 
Miistecabi was a prominent representative of the neutralist circles and defended 
his neutrality policy on each and every occasion that the West gave a negative 
reply to the Turkish demands and after any negative statement made in the West 
in this regard. "' 
Until the summer of 1950, however, there was not any positive sign for Turkey's 
admission to NATO. This was basically due to the following reasons: First of all, 
the US was not in position to enter any politico-military commitments because of 
her other commitments in other parts of the world. "' Second, without military 
commitments it was impossible to enter into military understandings with Turkey. 
Third, since the British and American plans for the Middle East were dovetailed 
together, without the participation of the US, the British saw no benefit in military 
333 PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/14,17.8.1950. 
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understandings and staff talks with Turkey. Finally, the British strategy in the 
region had not fully been decided by the early 1950. "' 
Nevertheless the West was anxious to maintain Turkish support, so Western 
diplomats conspired to refresh the Turkish fear of the Russians by fabricating some 
stories that the Russians still intended to launch an attack against Turkey. Some 
rumours accordingly appeared in western diplomatic circles that "two trains with 
guns, vehicles and estimated one battalion of infantry each passing south last week 
taking branch line to Erivan. "33' These reports were later found to be groundless. 
In reply to a negative approach by Sir Noel Charles, concerning Western sup- 
port for Iran, K6priilii strongly and nervously reacted that had the West accepted 
the Turkish application for NATO membership, Iranians would not have reached 
an agreement with the Russians, who were quite happy about the refusal. Sir Noel 
Charles had the impression that, according to the Turkish authorities, Iran turned 
to Russia because if the West refused to accept Turkey's NATO membership Irani- 
ans had nothing to expect from the West as far as genuine economic and military 
aid was concerned. 
338 
"M- 
From various observations in the Chiefs of Staff telegram, it was assumed that 
what was being contemplated was the eventual formation of a Middle East Treaty 
Organisation (METO, a Middle Eastern version of NATO) as a parallel organ- 
isation to NATO and that "METO would guarantee Turkey all the advantages 
that she would receive from full membership of NATO as without such guarantees 
it seemed unlikely that she would co-operate wholeheartedly with the proposed 
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Allied Command. )7339 
Turkey's decision to turn her attention towards the East was not a change of 
policy, but an attempt to strengthen her position vis a vis the western front. 340 
Turkish foreign policy pursued since its establishment had all along aimed to align 
with the West by every possible means. From the very first day of the modern 
Republic, Turkey had always been ready to perform her role to achieve these 
objectives as far as possible unless it was thought that the integrity of the state and 
national interests would be prejudiced. And the West was prepared to permit such 
an association with the Turks whenever and as long as it was in Western interests. 
In supporting this view, for example, a dispatch addressed to the Foreign Office, 
having referred to Turkey's possible contribution to the stability and security of 
the Middle East, pointed out "what was needed was that Turkey should be brought 
into the Atlantic Pact. This would improve her moral and material situation and 
would enable her to play a more active part to the advantage both of herself and 
her allies. She would, of course need further US economic assistance. ""' It also 
stated that K6priilii agreed with Mr Bevin's view that the area from Persia to 
Pakistan was of great importance for the security of the Middle East. And if 
Turkey's application for NATO membership could be accepted it would have a 
most beneficial effect in the whole Middle Eastern area. It recorded that K6priilii 
was confident that Turkey and Britain working together could do a great deal for 
the maintenance of the peace of that area. He wished to assure Mr. Bevin that the 
Turkish government would always work closely with His Majesty's Government and that 
they wished their relations to be as frank and sincere as possible. "" 
But one should not forget that Turkish pro-Western Policy in general and pro- 
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American in particular did not start with the DP. Such a policy had already been 
virtually adopted by the RPP. This was clear from Mr. Sadak's speech given in the 
National Assembly. Commenting on that speech, Sir Noel Charles wrote that "he 
[Mr. Sadak] had failed to bring back a treaty from the US by explaining America's 
traditional reluctance to enter into bilateral military agreements. )1313 He pointed 
out that a regional arrangement to which the US could adhere was not at present 
possible in Turkey's geographical area, 344 but said that "the government would 
continue to urge their point of view on the Americans. Mr. K6priilii endorsed this 
policy on behalf of the DP. 
))345 
Similarly, Turkish willingness to act in an intermediary role to reconcile West- 
ern powers and Middle Eastern countries was not a DP innovation but was also a 
continuation of RPP policy. The RPP promised the UK to help solve the conflict 
between Egypt and Britain and wanted to form a Middle Eastern organisation to 
which the US was to become a member. 
346 However, as Sir Noel Charles, writing 
to Attlee from Ankara, stated, "it was possible that the IVrks over-estimated their 
influence in the Arab world. " And he was cognisant of the fact that Egypt, in 
common with other Arab states, had, among other things, felt resentment towards 
Turkey by reason of the Turkish recognition of Israel. He was also aware of the 
fact that, as he put it, 
in any approaches made by Turkey to the Arab states with a view to influencing 
them towards alignment with western policy, the states would recognise Turkey's anx- 
ieties about her own security and, while considering Turkey justified in getting all the 
support she could ftom the Western Powers, they would hardly be likely to see any 
343 PRO, FO, 371, RK1013/4,28.2.1950. 
344 Ak§it pointed out that when Bayar became the president he asked 
in6nii why he did not accede 
to NATO. in6nii replied "Do you think they agreed to let us in and we did not enter? " (aldilar da 
mi girmedik? ) He also complained that in Sadak's visit to the US, he waited for days to be able 
to see the American authorities. 
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reason to abate their national aspirations for the sake of Turkey's security. 347 
Sir Noel Charles' view was confirmed by later developments in the Middle East, 
when the West encouraged the establishment of a Western sponsored Pact in the 
region. In fact, Egypt used the very same argument in refusing to join the Western 
defence initiatives in the 1950s. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sadak, talking 
to his constituents about the recent meeting of US representatives in the Middle 
East, said that Turkey was "no longer standing alone as the defence of Turkey and 
her territorial integrity was vital to the defence of the 
US. "348 
The Turks had proved their loyalty and usefulness to the Americans before the 
DP came to power. That is why General Collins declared to the Turkish press that 
"the Turkish Army would not be left to stand alone in the event of a major war. " 
There were some fears in the minds of the American diplomats that these words 
were to be interpreted by the ordinary Turkish readers as an American promise. 
This declaration was later clarified as "the US would help the Turks with the long 
range bombing of the USSR but not with troops. " It is interesting to note that this 
same top secret dispatch also recorded that "everywhere in official circles Turkey is 
regarded as America's 'surest bet' in Europe. US aid has taken root. The Turks are 
the 'best boys. "' 349 In fact these words were no groundless according to Arcayiirek 
who pointed out that in6nii said to General Collins that "we are working with the 
US, there is nothing to hide from yoU. 11311 
The Turkish economy had been devastated by the heavy military budget which 
was among the highest in the world. Turkey's military budget was incredibly high 
347 PRO, FO, 371, RK1023/5,18.5.1950. 
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during the Second World War although it did not join in. This did not decrease 
even when the war was over. Even in 1950, "no less than 75 per cent of the Turkish 
budget was devoted to military purposes. ""' Being cognisant of the nature of the 
Turks, the West knew that the Turks would anyway resist any Russian attempt to 
penetrate into the Middle East. 
In the 1950s, it was quite evident that without the Turks, the West's pioneer 
in the Third World countries in general and in the Middle East in particular, 
Britain, which the Muslims considered a Christian, outsider, alien and imperialist 
power, could not alone even attempt to form a regional pact. "' Being the former 
masters and coreligionists of the people in the region, the Turks were immensely 
useful for the West in gathering intelligence and giving useful advice... on how 
to make friends with and rule the Arabs and other peoples of the region. Having 
appreciated, among other things, the value of the indispensable Turkish role, the 
British were of the opinion that "we shall gain the Turks' full adherence, " for the 
regional pact, which was to be "linked" to NATO "by one superior body concerned 
with world-wide planning against possible communist aggression. ""' 
The DP leadership, which was well-known for its staunch pro-American incli- 
nation, demonstrated its loyalty to the West by its decision to send Turkish troops 
to Korea. This was one of their first acts after they came to power and was in- 
dicative of their eagerness to be accepted into NATO. As explained earlier, there 
were many factors that contributed to Turkey's admission to NATO. The Turks 
351 PRO, FO, 371, RK1071/1,20.2.1950. 
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believed the Turkish role in the Korean War was one of the major factors that had 
convinced the West that the Turks could perform an important role in the Middle 
East on behalf of the WeSt. 3" 
In criticism of the Turkish policy towards the Korean War, i. Bilen, writing 
in Pravda, claimed: 
Turkey has become a selling market for the American arms manufacturers and a 
supplier of cannon fodder for the Pentagon. General Wyman who drove thousands 
of Turkish soldiers to their deaths in Korea, has calculated with the cynicism of a 
businessman that 'a Turkish soldier costs four times less than an American soldier' And 
the Turkish press, which "has sold itself for dollars, " - being bought by the US with 
dollars - wrote no less cynically! 'We have set up a company. The Americans are giving 
money, we give the blood of the Turkish soldiers. "" 
This was of course an extreme criticism of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish 
press. However, it is true that after Turkish alignment with the West, Turkey began 
to pay more and more for the arms imported from the West. It was also true that 
the Turkish press rarely tried to criticise American policy or pro-American Turkish 
foreign policy during the 1950s. Pravda also alleged that the Turkish government 
sent 20,000 soldiers to Korea of whom 14,000 have been killed, wounded or taken 
prisoner. 357 The Turkish authorities acknowledged that 4,500 soldiers were sent to 
Korea and 2400 of them were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. "' The generally 
accepted figures are that a total of around 25,000 men served at some time in the 
5,000-7,000 strong Turkish brigade, of whom 617 were killed in action, 100 died 
355 All Turkish interviewees agreed that Turkey was accepted into NATO chiefly as a result of the 
role of the Turkish troops in the Korean War. Giilek mentioned that Turkish participation in the 
Korean War was also a part of a new vision of Turkish foreign policy that 'Turkey should join 
anything that civilised nations are involved in' and this was necessary. " He also suggested that 
apart from the security reasons, this mentality was responsible for Turkish involvement in Western 
defence initiatives in the Middle East. 
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from other causes and 2,156 were wounded. 359 
We should now turn our attention particularly to Turkey's involvement in the 
early western defence initiatives in the region. Faced with Soviet threat after 
the Second World War, Turkey tried to obtain Western support to defend her 
territorial integrity. After the establishment of NATO Turkey tried to convince 
the West, especially the US that Turkey should join. However, this effort "was 
unsuccessful, because security of Turkey was seen within the context of the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East. ))360 
Therefore, understandably, it was not Turkey's choice to devote her energy 
to the formation of a Middle East defence system or to become an intermediary 
between the UK and the Arab world. "She was cast in this role by the West and 
more specifically by her own desire to establish a firm alliance with the western 
bloc at almost any cost. ""' However, Turkey's relationship with Israel and her 
dispute over Hatay severely limited her suitability for the part. 
When the Democrats came to power they "fully" supported the main themes 
of the previous government's foreign policy, namely to resist the Soviet threat 
and to align with the western bloc. In fact, the new government was more eager 
than its predecessor to align with the West. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
K6priilii stated that the new government was determined to ensure that Turkey's 
post World War II orientation towards the West would "take a more energetic 
form in this direction. ""' Moreover, a pro-government daily newspaper, Zafer, 
359 Lewis, op. cit., p. 199. 
360 Puza, Billent Ali, Turkish Participation in the Middle East Defence Projects and 
its impact on the Turco-Arab Relations, May 1950-June 1953, Unpublished PhD 
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recorded that Turkey would therefore "do everything in her power to bring about 
a rapprochement between the Western powers and the regional countries. ""' 
Meanwhile, since the end of the Second World War, discussions between the 
US and the UK on the defence of the Middle East had been going on. In Septem- 
ber 1951 these focused on a specific plan. On 3 September, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Herbert Morrison, wrote to his Turkish counterpart "reminding him of 
his earlier commitment to help in the defence of the Middle East. " Once Turkey 
had joined NATO the Turkish Foreign Minister stated, she "would help in the 
establishment of a Middle East defence system. ""' 
However, Turkey's backing for the Middle East Command (MEC) project was 
not welcomed in Egypt where the MEC was seen as an "ill-disguised" attempt to 
perpetuate the British occupation of Egyptian territory. On 27 October Egypt 
officially rejected the MEC and declared the continuing British military presence 
to be a forcible and illegal occupation of Egypt. "The Egyptian rejection had 
effectively scuttled the MEC project and the sponsor of the project were not in 
position to proceed with its establishment. Nevertheless, "the continuing Turkish 
commitment to assist in the establishment of a regional defence system as well 
as the genuine Turkish concern about the security vacuum""' in the Middle East 
drove the Turkish government to maintain its support for the project. The principle 
reasons which had driven the UK to try to organise a MEC was the Egyptian threat 
to her Suez canal Zone base And the need to strengthen her position in the Middle 
East through allied support. 
Commenting on reactions of the Arab states on 1 November, Bayar declared 
363 Zafer, 14.9.1951. 
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that he was saddened to see that Turkey's recent political activities in the region 
were misinterpreted by some of their Arab friends in a way which did not reflect 
Turkey's "genuine and sincere feelings. " 366 
Turkey supported the MEC project for a number of reasons: first, "Turkey was 
committed by the promise which had been made to the UK that she would play her 
part in the defence of the Middle East after joining NATO and the US prevailed 
upon her to ensure that she did so. ""' Second, Turkey took a stand against the 
USSR and international communism and could not logically refuse to participate 
in such a defence system in the region. Finally, the Turkish government believed 
that the Arab world was not so opposed to the defence project as the attitude of 
Egyptian government on the MEC suggested and that therefore, it was, at least 
in the long run, amenable to Turkish persuasion. 
Riza claimed that Turkey's backing for these Middle Eastern defence systems 
"was to have greater effect on Turco-Arab relations, particularly in the longer 
terms, than the Turkish government could have possibly anticipated at the time. " 
He also claimed that Turkey was unable "to take any major steps on the Middle 
East defence independently of the UK. ""' 
Following Turkey's admission to NATO the Turkish rulers continued to suggest 
that Turkey intended to promote co-operation between NATO and Arab world "as 
she believed that this would improve the Arabs' prosperity and satisfy their defence 
requirements. "' 
As regards to the struggle of the Arabs in North Africa, the Turkish view 
366 Ibid., p. 120. 
367 Ibid., p. 123. 
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was, it seems, highly affected by the propaganda war between the West and the 
East. The Turkish policy on North Africa stemmed from the Turkish government's 
narrow interpretation of the North African situation as a struggle between an ally 
and "communism", which was seen as a threat to peace and stability of the free 
world. For example, the Turkish press was claiming that the withdrawal of the 
French from the region would cause instability and threaten the peace of the Middle 
East. 370 
Turkey's relations with Arab world slightly improved in the first half of 1952 
partly as a result of the waning of the MEC initiative. Therefore, supported by the 
West, Turkey tried to seek support for a western defence project, this time called 
the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO) in August 1952. Riza noted that 
"the main features of the proposed MEDO were significantly different" from those 
of the MEC. "The intended scope and functions of MEDO were comparatively 
modest". MEDO's main task was to be "only the facilitation of detailed military 
consultation between the member states. " 371 
During this period, the US was in favour of waiting for the Arabs to change 
their mind and then to establish a defence project, while the UK wanted to es- 
tablish it and wait for the Arabs to join. Change of government in Egypt led to 
a more optimistic view in the West, but Egypt continued to thwart all western 
defence initiatives in the Middle East throughout the 1950s. 
Turkey always seemed eager to help the West in its defence projects in the 
370 Zafer, 30.3.1952. 
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Middle East. As well as the MEC, even before the British informed the Turks that 
they were willing to accept the American view in favour of yet another attempt to 
persuade the Arab states to join MEDO, the Turkish leaders had initiated their 
own campaign to this end. They intensified their visits to Arab capitals, starting 
with Cairo, to persuade the Arab rulers. The Turkish press was in the service of 
the Turkish government as it had usually been. For instance, Zafer suggested that 
undoubtedly "the Arab countries have welcomed the fact that Turkey has taken 
over the planning of Middle East defence. " 372 
However, all Turkish efforts were hampered by the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over 
Suez Canal base and the Arabs, Egypt at the lead, hardened their policy concerning 
the defence initiatives in the region. This process was further highlighted by the 
Turkish stance in the UN on the question of North Africa. While Arab and Asian 
countries agreed to include the question on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, 
Turkey failed to support this initiative. 
By the end of 1952 it was clear that Turkish diplomatic initiatives to persuade 
the Arabs to enter into negotiations on a general Middle East defence arrangement 
had not been successful. The British realised that it was difficult to gain Egyptian 
support for a Middle East defence organisation and solve the Suez Canal base 
dispute and subsequently slowed down its activities in this respect. It is possible 
to argue that the 4evelopment of the hydrogen bomb and its effect on western 
strategic thinking was also responsible for changing the perception of the value of 
the base, because the base was gradually becoming less important at a time of 
increasing reliance on the deterrent capability of nuclear bombers. 
The change of government in the US affected the Turkish policy towards the 
372 Zafer, 25.10.1952. 
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Middle East, because the new government was more determined to fight interna- 
tional communism and this determination necessitated the further development of 
American air bases in the countries bordering the USSR and the establishment of 
new ones. This naturally meant even greater American interest in Turkey, Iran 
and Pakistan. 
However, there were some obstacles in implementing this American policy. One 
of the main obstacles was ambiguity in the American position, which stemmed 
from the desire to support the UK as an ally and to encourage an Anglo-Egyptian 
settlement of the Suez base dispute while avoiding total identification with the 
British policy towards Egypt and maintaining good relations with Egypt and other 
Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. This was understandably regarded by the 
British as factor which undermined their position in the region, especially in the 
dispute with Egypt. 
Having had an experience of two unsuccessful attempts to persuade the Arab 
leaders to join a western defence organisation, Turkey prepared for yet another at- 
tempt, at the beginning of 1953. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a report, 
which examined the attitude of five Arab countries, namely Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, 
Syria and Lebanon to the question of Middle East defence and drew conclusions 
on the likelihood of their participation in Middle Eastern defence. "' 
The report suggested that Egypt would eventually overcome their hesitation 
and agree to join a Middle East defence organisation. Turning to the other Arab 
states, it suggested that, with the exception of Iraq, they were unlikely to join any 
Middle East defence arrangement before a general improvement of relations be- 
tween the West and Arabs states, "even though the leaders in these countries were 
373 Puza, op. cit., p. 204. 
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personally in favour of collective defence. ""' All sides were aware that Iraq was 
ready for co-operation, but concentration on Iraq would have been an admission of 
a major setback, if not outright failure for Turkey as well as the West. Although 
the support of Turkish leaders for a regional defence arrangement had not been 
successful during the first three years of 1950s they continued to believe that they 
are able to convince the whole Arab world to share their views on the international 
communist threat to the region, to contribute to reduction of the tension between 
the West and the Arab world, which they rightly regarded to be the major obsta- 
cle to the formation of such a defence system. However, in April 1953, as Zafer 
noted, the Turkish government slowed down its campaign until the tour of J. F. 
Dulles at the end of May 1953. "' This marked the end of the prolonged attempt 
to establish a defence system for the Middle East. Dulles was convinced that the 
Arab opposition to the planned MEDO made it impossible to bring into existence. 
The subsequent change of policy of the US undermined the defence schemes which 
had been initiated by the UK and supported by Turkey. 
The American Secretary of State had been impressed by the desire of Iraqi 
leaders to establish closer co-operation with the US to confront the Soviet threat 
and he had found a similar attitude in Pakistan during his trip. Dulles believed 
that it made sense to build on the determination to resist Soviet aggression which 
he had observed in Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq. He added that the US "would play 
her part in this process by supplying increased military aid to these countries. " 376 
Pakistan and Iraq were equally ready for co-operation with the West. When 
Operation AJAX ousted the anti-western leader, Musaddeq, in Iran and replaced 
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the Shah on his throne, it was hoped that Turkey's new effort to establish a re- 
gional defence system would be successful. "' The emergence of the Northern Tier 
scheme reflected a divergence between American and the British policies on re- 
gional defence. In fact, it also reflected the steady replacement of British power 
and influence in the Middle East by that of the US. 
Briefly, Great Britain initiated a policy in the Middle East, among other things, 
to replace her bilateral agreements with Iraq and Egypt with a multilateral one 
and in order to do so, she was obliged to ask the US and Turkey for various 
reasons to help her accomplish her objectives. However, starting from 1949, first, to 
form Mediterranean Pact, later, Middle East Command and Middle East Defence 
Organisation, all attempts failed, due, among other things, to Egyptian opposition. 
After the last Egyptian rejection of the British proposal for a defence pact, the 
British was obliged to accept the American proposal of a Northern Tier and to 
wait, in vain, for Egypt to join the Pact at a more appropriate time. 
377 It is interesting to note that one day after Dulles arrived in the Middle 
East, on 30 May Molotov 
informed the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow that the USSR formally renounced her claims on the 
Turkish territory and was ready for a new agreement on the Turkish 
Straits. Turkish government 
regarded the new Soviet initiative as a ruse to weaken its policy of steadfastness against 
the USSR. 
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5.4 Baghdad Pact 
To establish some of the main factors which contributed to the formation of 
the Baghdad Pact one should start with the importance of Egypt and the vital 
need to defend Middle Eastern oil and communications for the West in general and 
for the British in particular. 
Another equally important factor was the American containment policy against 
International Communism, without which the formation of the Baghdad Pact 
would probably not have been realised. This policy required the Americans to 
change their minds about the Middle East and subsequently give aid to the re- 
gional countries. 
Another factor that contributed to the formation of the Baghdad Pact was, 
one could argue, the Kurds, the common threat to the regional members of the 
Pact. As the New York Herald Tribune stated, "potential source of trouble is the 
Kurdish minority. ... Though for the time being the Iraqi Kurds are tractable, they 
are, as always, an unstable and uncertain element. Their pan-Kurdish aspirations 
are kept alive by a steady flow of Moscow-inspired propaganda broadcast by the 
so-called Azerbaijani radio, which is believed to operate in Soviet territory. " 
378 It 
was asking to the Kurds to awaken and liberate Kurdistan from the imperialist 
powers. 
Having observed such a provocative broadcasts the West as well as the regional 
countries were persuaded to follow a common policy against the Kurds and this 
was partly achieved by the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. As Turkey agreed 
with the West to establish what would be later called the Baghdad Pact, Adnan 
I 
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Menderes, the Turkish prime minister, arrived in the US on an official visit ac- 
companied by a large and varied team of advisers to discuss, among other things, 
military collaboration, Middle East affairs and the proposed Balkan Alliance. The 
main objective of the visit was "to obtain some continuing aid from the US over 
the next four years to enable Turkey to keep her armed forces at their present 
level. " 379 However, the presence of large and varied a team of advisers indicates 
that other subjects were discussed "including military collaboration, Middle East 
affairs and the proposed Balkan alhance. "'80 
It was quite understandable that the regional countries were reluctant to form 
a defence pact with Turkey and Britain as members, because the regional coun- 
tries regarded both countries as the former 'exploiters' and this was well known to 
the Turks as well as the British; "that the British and the Turks are undoubtedly 
the two nations most disliked in that area. 
11381 Yet the partial success that Adnan 
Menderes achieved was partly due to his popular image and persuasive diplomatic 
personality and partly due to the attractive generous American military and eco- 
nomic aid to the regional members. It was not, in another words, a matter of 
liking or not, it was, to the decision makers of the relevant countries, a matter of 
national interests to follow the steps of the US. 
Following Turkiph shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, Turkey managed to 
.o 
reach an agreement on the fundamental problems of the region. Turkey exerted a 
strong influence on the possible candidates for what would 
be called the Baghdad 
Pact to signify their alignment with the West under a regional pact. 
Turkey pur- 
sued a "step by step" policy to achieve her goals. The 
first concrete step was taken 
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by signing an agreement with Pakistani government on 2 April 1954. It provided 
that both countries should refrain from interference in the internal affairs of the 
other; that they would co-operate closely in matters of common interest and in cul- 
tural, economic and technical matters. They would exchange military information 
and help one another in the production of arms and co-operate in the accession 
of other powers. The new pact had been given a cordial welcome in the Turkish 
press which generally regarded it as the possible basis for a regional defence sys- 
tem and some commentators were hopeful of Iraqi and Iranian participation. Some 
were more optimistic hoping until the end of 1954 to enlist Jordan, Lebanon and 
even Egypt. "" On 5 April 1954, Altemur Kihq, wrote in Turkish daily newspaper 
Vatan that two realist countries had come together to fill the defence vacuum in 
the region. No country with good intention should worry because of this pact. 
Undoubtedly, it is not an aggressive pact, it is a defensive one. Everyone will soon 
realise how right the two countries were and the best evidence for it was, he stated, 
the Soviet protests to both countries. 383 
Menderes and Nuri Said were both willing to conclude a treaty with certain 
Arab states in place of the Turkish- Pakistani Treaty. They wanted to sign a new 
agreement that would be more attractive to Arab countries. 
What they considered 
the first step towards this goal was the signing of the 
Baghdad Pact. Before 
Menderes left for the final tour to the Arab states on 27 December 1954, he made 
a statement on Middle East defence in which 
he said: "if the area enjoyed a certain 
security, it was thanks to NATO. But the 
Arab states must take steps for their 
own security and it was not enough that they should unite among 
themselves to 
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obtain security they must co-operate with the free world. " 384 
One can see from the statements made by different authorities that at the 
beginning of 1955 the atmosphere for Turkey's move to form a regional pact was 
more convenient than ever before. In a statement welcoming the prime minister's 
forthcoming visit to Iraq between January 6 and 14, the Iraqi Ambassador in 
Ankara "has stressed the strong friendship between Turkey and Iraq and declared 
that Iraq's security is linked with that of Turkey and Iran. " The Ambassador of 
Pakistan in Ankara also made a statement on Turkey's move to conclude a treaty 
with Iraq in which he, "welcomed Turco-Arab friendship, " which he believed would 
"serve the cause of peace in the Middle East and the whole world. " The Jordanian 
Minister in Ankara "welcomed" the recent statements about Turco-Arab friendship 
and pointed out that relations between Turkey and Jordan were "already very 
close. " The Egyptian Prime Minister was reported to have told journalists that the 
Turco-Egyptian "co-operation should be extended beyond the limit of cordiality 
and should develop into close economic and cultural relations. " The Egyptian press 
went on to say that "it is unrealistic to rely on the Arab League for the security 
of the Middle East. 7)385 Yet there had still been some negative voices as well. For 
example, Major Salah Salem said that "neither Egypt nor any Arab country was 
prepared at this stage to join in a defence system with the western powers. 77386 
Mendere§ and Nuri Said managed to reach such a level of understanding that 
they could is§ue to the world a joint communique on 13 January. The communique 
announced that the two governments had decided to conclude a treaty under which 
they "will co-operate against aggression from any quarter, whether from within the 
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Middle East or from outside. " The two powers considered it "useful and necessary" 
that "those other countries should participate in the treaty, who had given proof 
of their determination to resist aggression to co-operate in ensuring the stability 
of the Middle East, and were able to further ends in virtue of their geographical 
position or the means at their disposal. " 387 
Sir James Bowker, writing from Ankara, mentioned that the communique was 
regarded in Turkey as a "source of great satisfaction that a member of the Arab 
League has finally been won over to co-operation in Middle East defence. British 
approval of the Turkish initiative has been quoted in the Turkish press". "' 
By mid-February Egypt once again broke with Turkey and resumed propa- 
ganda against her. The Egyptian reports alleged that Turkey had concluded a 
military agreement with Israel. Turkey denied not only this but also the existence 
of ordinary commercial relations with Israel. Ironically, an "Israeli delegation has 
in the meantime arrived in Ankara for "routine trade talks""' though the Turkish 
government denied that they have any official status. ""' 
Commenting in Rome on the approaches of Middle Eastern countries, Adnan 
Menderes emphasised the "special position of Iraq, referred to understanding shown 
by the Lebanon and Jordan, and praised the helpfulness of Syrian statesmen. " 391 
The Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Turkey and Iraq providing secu- 
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rity, co-operation and defence and open for accession to "any member state of the 
Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace in 
this region and which is fully recognised by both of the high contracting parties" 
was signed in Baghdad on 24 February 1955. Turkey had received many strong 
reactions from various countries for her involvement in the Middle East and these 
rearctions reached a peak with signing the Baghdad Pact, which was allegedly di- 
rected at the Soviet Union, while protecting the Western interests in the region. 
The Prime Minister's efforts towards concluding the Pact had met with general 
support in the country and its conclusion had been greeted with great satisfac- 
tion. On 26 February the National Assembly unanimously ratified the Pact. The 
accession of the UK and later the US were now expected. "2With the accession of 
Iran, the Northern Tier had been established and a "link formed between NATO 
and SEATO through Turkey and Pakistan. The US had given continuous assis- 
tance and encouragement, lately reinforced by increasing aid on the occasion of 
the accession of Persia. ""' 
The external reactions were strong, especially those of the Soviet Union and 
Egypt. Turkey was not disturbed by criticism from outside. This was mere propa- 
ganda which did not affect the fundamental regard of the Arab countries for Turkey 
nor Turkey's friendship for them. It was to be hoped that others would soon ad- 
here to the treaty. It was noteworthy that K6priilii "avoided any recriminations 
against Egypt or Saudi Arabia over their hostile attitude to the 
Treaty. ""' 
To sum up, the Soviet expansionist intention towards the end of the 
Second 
World War and her expansionist policies towards eastern Europe and the 
Far East 
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after the war led the US to encourage the formation of collective security systems 
from Atlantic to Pacific, namely NATO, SEATO and Baghdad Pact in order to 
contain the spread of "international communism. " In this chapter, we particularly 
studied Turkey's involvement in Western defence attempts to contain the Soviet 
Union in the Middle Eastern part of the World. Despite initial failures in forming 
a Western defence Pact in the early 1950s, Turkey succeeded forming the Baghdad 
Pact by signing the Mutual Agreement with Iraq in February 1955. In establishing 
this Pact, Turkey was motivated by a desire to consolidate her national integrity 
and secure her national independence against the internal and external threat 
by obtaining more economic and military aid from the West as a reward for her 
endeavours to secure the Western interests in the region. As previously explained, 
Turkey did not have any particular interest in the Middle East, but she was aware 
that by co-operating with West in the Middle Eastern affairs she would more 
strengthen her relations with the West. Turkey's strategy to achieve these goals 
were to persuade the West that Turkey was a useful ally and that her geostrategic 
location was vitally important for the security of the free world especially Western 
Europe. To this end, Turkey sent the Turkish troops to Korea to prove usefulness 
of the Turkish army and launched a diplomatic campaign of persuasion in the 
West. As has been seen, when the US realised that both parties needed each other 
as a result of changing American global policy, Turkey was admitted to NATO 
and she started to become actively involved in Western defence initiatives in the 
Middle East. 
The long term reactions to the Pact and its positive and negative consequences 
for the countries concerned will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter VI 
FORMATION AND EXPANSION OF THE PACT: 
SUCCESSIVE CRISES AND COUPS 
6.1 General 
In this chapter, we shall discuss the Western efforts in general and Turkey's 
efforts in particular to recruit as many regional countries to the Baghdad Pact 
as possible. We shall also study the means and incentives that were available for 
those who were willing to join and the means and tactics that were used to attract 
more members or failing that, to render opponents harmless as far as the Western 
defence initiatives were concerned. Finally, we shall follow the successive crises 
and coups that took place immediately after the formation of the Pact, namely 
the Suez crisis in 1956, the Syrian crisis in 1957, the landing of the American and 
British troops in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 respectively and coups in Iraq and 
Pakistan in 1958 and in Turkey in 1960. We conclude the chapter by studying 
developments that took place in regional member countries after the collapse of 
the Baghdad Pact. Turkey's motives and aims after the formation of the Baghdad 
Pact were to expand it as much as possible. Turkey's interests in doing so were to 
show her usefulness and her loyalty and to build confidence in the West 
by fulfilling 
her promise. ""' To this end, Turkey supported Great Britain in the 
Suez crisis, 
France in her struggle with North African Arabs, and the US in her global policy, 
namely anything to curb "international communism" all over the world especially 




in her own region by voting on American side in the UN all the time, providing 
military bases on her national soil and maintaining a large army. 
The establishment of the Baghdad Pact opened a new page in the Middle East 
for the regional countries as well as the superpowers which were bitterly contesting 
with each other from Eastern Europe to the Far East. The rivalry in the Far East 
where the Korean War took place just two years before and Eastern Europe where 
the situation had not settled was carried to the Middle East by the formation of 
this Pact. 
As was explained in the previous chapter, the Pact was only formed after five 
years' hard work during which many attempts were made to establish a defence 
pact under different names namely, Mediterranean Pact, Middle East Command 
and Middle East Defence Organisation. None of these attempts was successful. 
This insistence on establishing a political as opposed to a purely military pact in 
the region was mainly due to the insistence, for their own individual reasons, of 
the future members of the Pact. 
The credit for the theoretical initiative might be given to Great Britain who 
was trying to find a way by which she could replace with a new treaty the bilateral 
ones she had with Iraq and especially Egypt. The credit for the practical initiative 
might be given to Turkey396 who needed a way to integrate with the Western world 
politic4lly, militarily and socio-economically. Having been threatened by the Soviet 
Union r>he applied for NATO membership to gain protection from the Soviets but 
had been refilsed. Turkey was, therefore, open to any option which could help 
her 
to associate herself with the West. The British need 
for a regional defence pact 
was, thereforp, seriously assessed by the Turkish authorities 
but they were always 
396 Kyle, Keith, Suez) St. Martin's Press, New York, 1991, pp. 56-59. 
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trying to find a way to combine it with NATO. Otherwise the Turks would never 
have been interested in such a regional pact as they knew none of the possible 
regional members would be able to defend Turkey against the Soviet Union. 
As explained in the Introduction, first hand material on the Baghdad Pact is 
not available from the regional members. Therefore, their views on the issue are 
studied here mainly from the British and American documents which are available 
for research. Pakistan and Iran had a secondary role to play in the Baghdad Pact 
as the initiative was basically directed to the Arab countries in general and Iraq 
and Egypt in particular. This is why the emphasis will be mainly on Iraq and 
Egypt not Iran and Pakistan. 
Admitting Western failure concerning the strong demand to form a pact com- 
prising all Arab countries, HM Ambassador in Tehran noted: "we have still not 
succeeded in promoting a regional defence policy acceptable to all the Arab States, 
though the Baghdad Pact, unlike any of our previous efforts, has succeeded in cre- 
ating a strong line from Turkey to Pakistan. The trouble is lack of depth. ""' But 
even the Baghdad Pact "failed to achieve its original objective of bringing together 
the main Arab states in a common front with Turkey, Iran and Western powers - 
on the contrary, it actually pushed them towards the Soviet camp. ""' 
Turkey's actions at this time should be seen in the context of the Cold War 
which largely explains what now may seem the irrational mentality of the contem- 
porary political thoughts and attitudes. For example, commenting on the Turkish 
stance towards the Russian desire to improve her relations with Turkey, Orhan 
Eralp, Head of the Second Department at the Minister of Foreign Affairs, said 
397 PRO, FO, 371,121233, V1054,14.1.1956. 
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"Turkish policy had definitely not changed, ... if the Russians wished to improve 
relations with Turkey, they must do so by improving relations with the West as 
a whole. ""' The British Ambassador in Ankara reported that Turkey was against 
"accepting even invitations for cultural or sporting contacts, because they were 
afraid that this might give the impression that they were weakening in their gen- 
eral policy. ""' 
Having realised the dangers the Pact had faced, the American Ambassador in 
Baghdad admitted that the Pact nations "are still confronted by a strong current 
of anti-Pact propaganda and there is need from time to time to give the Pact 
a new impetus, either by having the US formally join or by new ideas and new 
objectives. " 
The Ambassador, seeking for some new positive step by the nations in the Pact, 
suggested that a cultural committee might be formed. He proposed a "cultural 
offensive which would emphasiso that through that Pact the Moslem nations were 
ready to co-operate with the Christian nations to meet the Communist threat. " He 
emphasised that "the Pact needed an ideology to combat Communist ideology. 
" 401 
The British considered that if the Pact was to achieve its objectives it needed 
not only an ideology but it also had to be expanded because the more 
Arab states 
were committed to the Western sponsored Pact the stronger the 
West would be- 
come against the "international communism" - 
It was also important to bring more 
Arab states into the Baghdad Pact, because otherwise the only 
Arab member of 
the Baghdad Pact, Iraq, would be increasingly isolated from the rest of the 
Arab 
399 PRO, FO, 371,124010, RK10338/1,10.1-1956. 
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world, which was dominated by the nationalist policy of Egypt. Finally, without 
working to expand the Pact, the British were afraid that she might lose the confi- 
dence of regional member countries. In support of this, HM Ambassador in Tehran 
wrote to the Foreign Office saying that there were several considerations in favour 
of trying to extend the Pact, for example: 
(a) It is a good thing in itself. The more Arab States we can commit to this multi- 
lateral association with us the better. There is no alternative instrument of association 
in sight. 
(b) It is arguable that if we want to avoid a fall in our prestige we must redress our 
recent defeat over the Pact in Jordan. 
(c) It is important that Iraq should retain her attachment to the Pact and that 
Iraq's influence should grow, and be seen to grow through her association with us. 
Unless we can get other Arab members, Iraq may feel increasingly isolated from the 
rest of the Arab world and the Pact might not stick. 
(d) If we do not actively pursue a policy based on the Baghdad Pact we might lose 
the confidence of its present non-Arab members, and in particular Turkey's. " 
They realised how difficult it was to establish a Western sponsored Pact in the 
Middle East in the early 1950s. After establishing the Baghdad Pact in 1955, the 
West came to realise it was still more difficult to expand or even to maintain it. 
Moreover, there were also disadvantages in attempting to expand the Pact. First 
of all, it was difficult to persuade smaller Arab countries in the Fertile Crescent 
to join the Baghdad Pact while Egypt was vigorously opposing to it. Second, 
even if the West was successful in expanding the Pact, this would possibly push 
Egypt further into the arms of the USSR. Finally, the British were of view that 
"the policy of pressing Arab States to join the Pact now finds little support with 
Western public opinion, even in the UK. This tends to discredit the 
Pact itself. 1)403 
However there were some other factors the Ambassador had not mentioned. 
It should be added that Mr Morse [the Director- 
General of the ILO, who vis- 
402 PRO, FO, 371,121233, V1054/9,3.1.1956. 
403 Ibid., op. loc. 
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ited Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel] was, the Ambassador reported, 
convinced that "one of the reasons why things are going badly in that region is 
because American and British policies are not in harmony there, largely because 
they are, in his view, governed by the conflicting commercial interests of the two 
countries. ))404 
Peter Grubbe, the London correspondent of Die Welt devoted a lengthy article 
on January 20 to the UK's Middle East policy. He stated that one of the main 
causes of Anglo-American differences over the Middle East was that the "Middle 
East was of special importance for the UK, as a focal point for British commu- 
nications with her colonies and with commonwealth countries in Asia and Africa. 
For the US, it was merely a "weak spot" in the defence belt around Soviet Russia. 
1)406 For this reason London was striving to maintain its Middle East position. In 
reply to the Russian intrusion in that area, the UK had not, Grubbe said, "given 
strong support to Israel, as had been expected, but had entered into competition 
with the Kremlin for the favour of the Arabs. Israel was too small for use as a 
bridgehead. ""' A second factor was that the UK needed Middle East oil supplies 
if she did not want to become dependent on the US in this respect. 
407 
One of the major factors affecting any kind of political decision was definitely 
the Palestinian question. It was recorded that the Palestine problem "is generally 
admitted to be the biggest thorn in the flesh in the Middle East today. 
And no 
policies embracing the whole region are likely to be successful while this thorn 
remains. ""' 
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Another matter forcing the Western members of the Pact to be more cautious 
was the Kurdish factor. This was not as serious as other factors, yet it deserved 
to be taken into consideration when the West tried to make a decision about the 
region. As HM Ambassador in Tehran recorded: 
Two new factors affected the attitude of the Kurds in Iraq after the Suez 
crisis. The first was a "kind of a ambivalent attitude to the Baghdad Pact. " He 
thought that the Kurds "feared that close co-operation between the Iraqis, the 
Turks and Persians may lead to a combined squeeze by the authorities of all three 
governments on their Kurdish nationals. " The second trend was, he noted "that 
the exaggerated emotional reaction of the Arabs to the Anglo-French attack on 
Egypt "accentuated in Kurdish eyes the difference between them and their Arab 
neighbours and has given a consequent fillip to Kurdish national feeling. """ 
The following dispatch sent to the Foreign Office, showed that the fear was not 
due to an independent Kurdish revolt but the Soviet agitation and support for a 
united Kurdistan. It pointed out that: 
the Baghdad Pact can only strengthen the tendency of Kurdish malcontents to 
look to Soviet Russia for support. Our view about this is that the Kurdish peasants 
and tribesmen probably neither know nor care very much about the Baghdad Pact. 
... However 
it is of course useful to make the point that the Russians may be able to 
develop anti-Pact themes in their propaganda for Kurdistan, and be listened to by some 
of the mullahs and tribal leaders. "" 
Such fears grew stronger later when broadcasts in Kurdish from anti-Western 
countries had increased influence on the Kurds in the late 1950s. As a consequence, 
Western support for the regional countries against the Kurds increased. "' 
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6.2 Expansion of the Baghdad Pact 
Although the US had overthrown Musaddeq, and rethroned the Shah, it was 
still not an appropriate time to force Iran into a Western sponsored alliance. The 
question of Iran joining a Western pact arose in the summer when the only Pact 
available was the Pact between Turkey and Pakistan. The British Ambassador 
reported the result of a meeting as follows: 
We saw no military advantage in Persian adherence, but definite political advan- 
tage, principally, because the appearance of so traditionally neutral a country on the Western side might have been useful psychological support for our defence plans for the 
Middle East as a whole. We had, however, two very firm reservations; first, that we 
must not be drawn into any military commitment to Persia, and second, that Persian 
adherence must not provoke either Soviet attack or so much opposition inside Persia 
that the Government could not control it. "' 
ClearlY) the West wanted the advantages of Persian adherence to the Baghdad 
Pact, but was not prepared to pay a high price for them. The same arguments were 
later used with respect to proposed membership of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. 
The British were anxious about the possibility of the Russian-Iranian Treaty 
of 1925 being extended and were also aware of other outside pressures on the 
Persians. They did not underrate the influence of Nehru and his policy on Per- 
sian thinking. The British Ambassador, seeking to know whether the Pakistanis 
were endeavouring to counterbalance the influence of Nehru and his Non-Aligned 
policies, asked Entezam, the Iranian Foreign Minister, whether he had any confir- 
mation that Pakistan was planning to bring Persia into any kind of defence pact, 
e. g. was planning to work on Persia in the same way as Turkey on Iraq. Entezam 
"said that he had no information. His attitude suggested, however, that he was 
rather nervous at the possibility. """ 
412 PRO, FO, 371,114820, EP1071/18,10.6.1955. 
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It is understood from the documents that American as well as Pakistani and 
Turkish efforts were needed to persuade the Shah. As one note suggests, the 
diplomats were not sure if the Shah really had decided to join the Pact. Before 
the Shah left the US, he informed the American government that Iran would join 
the Pact. However, the British documents recorded that it was difficult to see "to 
what extent the Shah has been influenced in this decision by absence from Persia 
and an American atmosphere ... but it seems possible, if indeed not'probable, that 
his views may change when he gets back to Tehran. ... Nevertheless we should 
hesitate to discourage him. """ 
Turkey and Pakistan also worked hard to convince the Shah to join the Pact as 
quickly as possible. The presidents of both countries told the Shah "if you face any 
aggression we will be the first to protect you and the US is also ready to support 
you. )1415 
A few weeks before joining the Baghdad Pact Iran signed an agreement with 
the US and began receiving economic and military aid. After a long period of 
hesitations due to internal and external opposition, Iran eventually decided to join 
the Baghdad Pact and formally became a member in October 1955. As a result, 
the flow of aid increasingly continued until the Islamic revolution put an end to 
the Shah's regime in 1979. 
The US and the UK wanted regional members to do more to convince other 
Arab countries to join the Pact, but according to the Ambassador, the influence of 
the Saudi finances and Egyptian political activities had to be stopped at all costs. 
Detachment of Saudi Arabia from Egypt would solve many problems at a stroke 
414 PRO, FO, 371,114820, EP1071/5,21.2.1955. 
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if it could be affected within a matter of months, but time was of the essence, and 
if these efforts failed, there would be strong pressure on the Americans to "starve 
Saud into submission" if not for more drastic measures. And at that stage: 
their argument, which is in effect that it is worse for them to be accused of economic 
imperialism than for their money to be used to destroy the Pact is not likely to carry any 
conviction whatever. ... HM Ambassador in Washington might be requested to follow 
up the indications given by Mr Henderson that the US Government might shortly send 
a special emissary to King Saud, to ascertain more closely what particular form of 
persuasion (bribery or threats or both) the US Government has in mind, and to express 
our views as to the urgency of the operation. "" 
As the document recorded, having been aware of the effect of the Saudi money 
on the regional countries, the British tried to put pressure on the Americans to 
stop the Saudis, who have since the Second World War been under American 
influence, "' from working against the Baghdad Pact. The Saudis were paying a 
subsidy of 500 pounds per month to any four-page newspaper which would accept 
the subsidy. In the face of this challenge Abdul Jehl Beg suggested a possible 
means of influencing opinion in Syria: the provision of 20,000 pounds a year for 
this purpose. "He thought that with 15,000 pounds he could keep the press sweet 
by paying the friendly paper 100 pounds a month. ""' 
To contain the influence of Nasser, the US Secretary of State thought it overly 
ambitious to try to establish a charter for the Arab countries' relations with 
the 
Atlantic Community; he thought "it would be better to ride a rising tide of Arab 
nationalism by some such means as endorsement of the 
Arabs' own efforts to main- 
tain their independence and security against international communism and 
West- 
ern imperialism. ""' He thought the US could give 
financial support to a balanced 
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organisation of Arab countries perhaps through some mechanism analogous to that 
of the Marshall Plan. The Eisenhower Doctrine was only the implementation of 
this policy commencing in 1957. 
There was some discussion in the State Department about Saudi Arabia tak- 
ing the lead in establishing such an organisation and bringing Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan in. The Secretary of State thought that since Turkey was already covered 
in NATO and Pakistan in SEATO, for the West, it would be better to keep the 
organisation Arab. The only problem was Iran. The American documents noted 
that " while the long-term objective would be to get all the Arab states together, 
it might prove desirable as a preliminary step to exclude and thus isolate Egypt 
and Syria as a means of diminishing Nasser's influence so that he could not aspire 
to take over leadership of the larger group. " 420 
The British were still doing the job in the Middle East on behalf of the West 
until the Suez Crisis. Thereafter they practically left the region clear for the US 
which took the full leadership on behalf of the Western world. Therefore, it was 
the Americans who suggested the policy and implemented it after the Suez Crisis 
in 1956. "US prestige in Middle East has never been higher. At the same time 
British prestige has dropped sharply as a result of the Suez intervention. ""' 
The major phenomena affecting the US since the ill-fated British- French-Israeli 
invasion of Egypt in November, 1956 had been the emergence of the US as the 
leader of Free World interests in the area and 
tacit recognition of that fact by Britain and France in A areas except the 
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Gulf American action opposing the British-French attack on Egypt was generafly 
appreciated by the Arab countries at the time, but the strong position which the 
US achieved began to fade quickly, because the Americans made it clear that 
the US would under no circumstances permit developments in the Middle East to lessen its support of the Western European alliance. This continuing and necessary 
association with the West makes it impossible for us to avoid some identification with the powers which formerly had "colonial" interests in the area. "" 
Another American document rightly said "how could we possibly support 
Britain and France if in doing so we lose the whole Arab world. ""' US State 
Department documents from this period reveal that long-term US aims in the re- 
gion were twofold: to preserve peace and to improve political stability. To achieve 
the former aim it was proposed to strengthen Iran mihtarily with emphasis on 
internal security and countering infiltration and guerrilla activities. To increase 
political stability it was proposed to take every suitable opportunity to reduce 
Nasser's prestige and influence, help Iraq to expand its influence in Syria and Jor- 
dan and possibly encourage a North African confederation. The US policy makers, 
recognising that the British and French had been seriously disadvantaged by their 
Suez adventure, urged the US to assume leadership and maintain and restore the 
Western position in the area. ""' Their stated aims were: 
(a) The elimination or reduction of Soviet Bloc influence in the area. 
(b) The production and transit of oil through the area of the Middle East to the 
satisfaction of Free World requirements. 
(c) Denying the Soviet Bloc access to the resources, markets, and lines of commu- 
nication of the Middle East. 
(d) The development of pro-US governments in all nations of the area (defence). "' 
FR US, Vol. 12, Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, Tehran, 14 November 1956, p. 
322. 
423 VD US. 
IR- __ 
1955-1957, Suez Crisis, V61.16, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC., 
1990, P. 910. 
424 FRUS, V61.12, Memorandum from the Acting Secretary of State to the President. 21.11.1956, 
pp. 349-350. 
... FR US, Vol. 12, Memorandum from the Director of the National Security Council 
Secretariat to the National Secu- 
rity Council Planning Board, Review of Long 
Range US Policy toward the Near East Policy Questions, 8.10.195T, 
228 
As a result, "the US has formally assumed Free World leadership in the Near 
East. 7)426 
The US now assumed practical responsibility for protecting the Western in- 
terests in the Middle East. Since the only instrument by which to influence the 
regional politics and to maintain the Western position was the Baghdad Pact, the 
American State Department started to calculate American advantages and disad- 
vantages in adhering to the Pact. The views of the NSC Planning Board Assistants 
were set out in detail in a document dated 2 May 1956 and entitled "immediate 
US adherence to the Baghdad Pact. " Since this is of great importance, the text is 
given in full:. 
Advantages; 
(1) Would make continued public acceptance of the Pact in the Middle East member 
countries more certain by 
(a) Removing doubts concerning US support which our present relationship to the 
Pact appears to engender, 
(b)Lessening the criticism of the Pact throughout the Middle East on grounds that 
it is essentially a British plan. 
(2) Would enable the US to exercise greater influence in development of Pact activ- 
ities by permitting formal participation with the full weight of membership in Council 
meetings and Council deputy meetings. This would 
(a) Facilitate and accelerate military planning in consonance with US interests, 
(b) Give the US a more authoritative voice in political deliberations. 
(3) Would strengthen the position of Nuri Said and the other pro-West elements in 
Iraq and the Shah and other pro-West elements in Iran. 
(4)Would help to stem growing criticism and dissatisfaction within Pakistan of that 
government's policy of alignment with the West. 
(5) Would strengthen the Pact's appeal to pro-Western elements in Syria, Lebanon 
and Jordan and might increase the chances of accession to the Pact 
by Lebanon and 
Jordan. 
(6) Would demonstrate the firm, consistent and continued support by the US of the 
concept of collective security which the US has promoted and encouraged 
throughout 
the world to counter the Soviet Communist threat. 
p. 613. 
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(7)Would strengthen NATO's southern flank and facilitate co-ordination of plan- ning between NATO and the Baghdad Pact. 
(8) Would increase the possibility of developing adequate capabilities to resist ag- gression with a minimum expenditure of US resources. 
(9) Failure to adhere could well result in; 
(a) The collapse of the Pact and the victory of neutralism in the area [thus con- fronting the US in the event of hostilities with the necessity of undertaking military 
operations in a neutral or hostile environment. ] 
(b) The collapse of the south-eastern flank of NATO. "" 
Turning to the disadvantages of American adherence to the Baghdad Pact, the 
State Department document went on record that it 
Disadvantages: 
(1) Would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a US security 
guarantee and for armaments. 
(2) Would cause Nasser and possibly Saudi Arabia and Syria to seek greater support 
from the USSR. 
(3) Would stimulate the USSR to give even greater support to the Egypt, Syria 
and Saudi Arabia axis [formed on 2 March 1955 and Yemen joined it few days later]- 
(4) Might provide a pretext for a coup d'etat in Jordan that would take Jordan 
firmly into the Egypt-Syria- Saudi Arabia camp. 
(5) Would provide a pretext for increased attacks on the Baghdad Pact in some of 
the Arab States and Israel. 
(6) In the absence of an Iraqi-Saudi rapprochement would cause possible compli- 
cations in Saudi-US relations and in forthcoming negotiations for the extension of air 
base rights. 
(7) Might involve the US more directly in the Hashemite- Saudi and Iraqi-Egyptian 
disputes and would complicate US relationship to the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
(8) Would bring a new wave of dissatisfaction with US policy in India 
(9) [Would increase expectations and demands of Pact members for increased US 
military and economic aid. ] 
(10) Would further exacerbate US-USSR relations. 
(11) Might lend some color to charges of US imperialism in a new form. 
(12) Would tend to give the impression that the US continues to place priority 
emphasis on military pacts in the face of the new Soviet economic diplomatic offensive. "' 
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Meanwhile, there were also some reasons for an early American adherence to 
Pact. In support of this, Ambassador Chapin telegraphed from Tehran "now is 
golden opportunity while situation is still fluid to consolidate US position by early 
adherence to Baghdad Pact. " The following appear to be the basic reasons why 
US adherence would be desirable, the telegraph says: 
(1) Adherence would strengthen the general stability of the governments of the 
Asian Pact members, all of whom are staunch US friends. 
(2) Adherence would give convincing evidence to the USSR of the deep US interests 
in the security of the area. It might deter the USSR from manoeuvres against the 
independence of the Pact members. 
(3) Adherence might strengthen US leadership in the Middle East thus lessening 
the damage to the Western position resulting from the UK-Rench action in Egypt. 
(4) US adherence would strengthen the Pact itself and make its operation more 
efficient. 
(5) Adherence would formally close the last major link in security arrangements on 
the peripheries of Russia. 
Reasons against US Adherence 
(1) The US has given its full support to the UN effort to stabilise the delicate and 
critical situation in Egypt resulting from the British, French and Israeli military actions. 
Any change in the current US relationship with the powers in the area might seriously 
jeopardise these efforts. 
(2) The Soviet Union has stated firmly its strong opposition to the Baghdad Pact. 
US adherence might be taken as a pretext for further and stronger Soviet moves against 
the West in the Near East. US-USSR relations would be further exacerbated. 
(3) There is serious doubt concerning the effectiveness of the Baghdad Pact in 
preventing Soviet penetration of the area. The Soviets appear to be capitalising on 
existing tensions in the area and using psychological, economic and covert military 
measures rather than direct threats of armed force. By so doing, they are in effect 
hoping over the "northern tier" line. 
(4) The US must, in framing its policy, consider its position in the entire Near East 
where the uncommitted Arab nations are hostile to the Pact and are being seriously 
threatened from within by the Soviet exploitation of the British and Rench actions in 
Egypt. Adherence would involve the US more directly in the Hashemite- Saudi-Iraqi- 
Egyptian disputes. 
(5)While public support remains strong for the Baghdad Pact in Turkey and Iran, 
the British and French action in Egypt has seriously weakened public support for the 
Pact in Iraq and Pakistan. Serious doubt remains as to the advisability of the US 
adhering to a Pact which has lost a strong measure of support 
in two of its important 
members. 
(6) Adherence would provide Israel with a pretext for renewed demands for a US 
security guarantee. 
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(7) While the US might gain some psychological benefit from adherence, this step 
might well be followed by strong demands for further US aid to member countries on 
grounds that, as a member we should demonstrate even more dramatically our support 
for these nations. 
(8) Adherence would be strongly opposed by Saudi Arabia where the US has im- 
portant interests. 
(9) The original concept of the "northern tier" was one of an indigenous organisa- 
tion. The Baghdad Pact, unfortunately, has been regarded by the non-member states 
of the area as in large part UK dominated. The decline of UK prestige in the Middle 
East will probably be so serious that some other vehicle must be found for exerting US 
leadership if we are to maintain our position. We must at least wait until we know what 
changes in UK personnel and policy will take place in HMG. 
(10) We can strengthen the security of these countries through our present rela- 
tionship in the Economic Committee of the Pact and through our bilateral military and 
economic programs without risking the serious disadvantages which would be created 
by adherence to the Pact itself. 
(11) The immediate pressure upon the US to adhere to the Baghdad Pact arises 
from the difficulties and apprehensions of the four area members resulting from the 
Israel-UK- French military action against Egypt. We should not undertake the long 
term commitment inherent in adherence to the Pact to meet this current and short 
term crisis which can be and is being dealt with by other means. 
(12) The problem of obtaining senate ratification of US adherence to the Baghdad 
Pact, particularly without concurrently extending a security guarantee to Israel, dis- 
cussed in the Secretary of State's letter of April 23,1956, to the Secretary of Defence, 
is still with us. Recent developments in the Near East may have eased this problem, 
but we have no evidence that the Congress would be amenable to our adherence to the 
Pact. "" 
After further general comments, the telegram concluded "we are proposing 
immediately; the immediate supply to Iraq of mobile radar, with training crews. 
This equipment would serve, also, south-eastern Turkey and parts of 
Iran. ""' 
Thus) the document presented to the policy makers with a difficult decision. 
The balance of advantages and disadvantages was uncertain. As a result, the 
US remained reluctant to adhere to the Pact and this, as expected, resulted 
in 
destruction of the Pact when the military coup occurred 
in Baghdad in 1958. 
4 29 FR US, Vol. 12, Memorandum from Rountree (the Assistant Secretary of State 
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Israel saw some advantages in US adherence to the Baghdad Pact and prob- 
ably also favoured Lebanese and Jordanian membership. Israel regarded these 
developments as blows to Egypt's prestige and strength in the area and probably 
hoped that they would serve to lessen the likelihood of a co-ordinated Arab attack 
on Israel. However, Israel still remained apprehensive about the consequent mili- 
tary build-up of the Arab Baghdad Pact members by the US and of Egypt by the 
USSR. 431 
When the sponsor powers came to the conclusion that it was hardly possible 
to persuade other countries to join the Pact, they then threatened them to make 
them do so, and when that did not work either, they attempted to apply military 
force as in the case of Egypt and Syria. Of course, this was not to force them to join 
the Pact any more but at least to force them to stop their activities to undermine 
the Pact. After the Suez Crisis, Turkey by itself was thought to be after a forceful 
solution in Syria 432 hoping thereby to establish still more strongly her credentials 
as a vigorous and useful ally of the West in the region. In the words of an American 
report, "Turkey ... is anxious that some positive action 
be taken to overthrow the 
Syrian coalition that to be politically successful intervention in Syria must appear 
to be Arab, and awareness that Iraq would be unlikely to commit itself, makes 
it unlikely that Turkey will act without prior assurance of US support. 
Turkey's 
concern will not abate, however, and the possibility of precipitate action 
by Turkey 
cannot be ruled out. ""' The report continued: 
431 DD 
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"His [Nuri's] attitude had been that once Nasser had been brought down all 
would be well, Dust like K6priilii]. ... They [the Turks], therefore, regarded Syria 
as the core of the problems whether or not we were going to establish a sound 
position in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Lebanese were also much afraid that, 
unless Syria could be saved, all would be JoSt. 1)434 
In the 1950s, the Arab world was divided into two camps: pro-Western coun- 
tries led by Iraq and anti-Western countries led by Egypt. While economic and 
military aid appeared to be attractive to the smaller Arab countries such as Jordan 
and Lebanon, the influence of Egyptian political activities, especially the broad- 
cast of Egyptian radio of Sawt al Arab, was strong enough to deter those regional 
countries from joining the Pact and even influenced the Western countries concern- 
ing their defence initiatives in the Middle East. Recalling the political atmosphere 
in the Middle East in the 1950s will enable us to appreciate the nature of the 
criticism made by Egypt and its relevance to the Baghdad Pact. The following 
passage gives us an idea why the Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact was 
taken so seriously. 
The BBC, the mouthpiece of the aggressors against Egypt, the conspirators with 
Israel, and of the colonisers of Bahrain, ... Tel Aviv radio, the mouthpiece of the Zionists, the enemies of the Arabs, the cat's-paws of British and French imperialism, 
and those who rendered the Palestine Arabs homeless, [are] gloating over the free Arabs 
because of Nuri al-Said's statement. ... 
0 head of the Iraq Government, you who wish to 
mislead us into believing in the existence of a vacuum in our Middle East, we the Arabs 
are the Middle East ... so why do you deny our existence and 
ignore our nationalism, 
and why do you pretend to forget 100,000,000 Arabs living in the most important and 
richest spots of the world, from our Arab Gulf to the Atlantic? Why are you doing all 
this, Nuri Al-Said? So that we may agree with your alliance with Britain and accept 
imperialism? Or so that we may keep quiet before Zionist aggression? ... There 
is no 
vacuum, therefore, in the Middle East; we, the Arabs, are still alive and dignified, we 
know what is good and bad for us. ... There 
is no good at all for the Arabs in a pact 
whose proprietor is Britain, a state which continues to murder the Arabs of Egypt, and 
whose main instrument is Turkey, a state which supports Israel in rendering our Arabs 
homeless. ... 
There is not dignity at all in accepting a pact which plots against our 
independence and freedom, for investigations in Syria and Jordan have uncovered the 
434 Ibid., op. loc. 
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plots of the states of this pact against Syria and Jordan. ... Turkish ports provided 
shelter for the enemy's ships during that time. President Abd al-Nasser rejected the 
participation of the Arabs in the imperialist pact, because he saw, with his wisdom, 
that it was a base for imperialism in the Middle East and means of pressure in the 
Arab countries whenever they advanced forward with their liberation movement. ... Britain on the one hand, and France, the USA and Turkey on the other, persisted in 
putting forward one proposal after another for joint defence. These proposals were for 
something which in fact was merely a new form of the colonial bonds which linked the 
Arab world with Britain. 
The Baghdad Pact was a link in this chain. ... This treaty was described by the 
British Prime Minister, Eden, as stronger than the previous treaty. ... The significance 
of this agreement is evident from the statement made by the British Prime Minister 
about it in the British House of Commons, when he said; ... among other things the 
Turkish-Iraqi pact, and Britain's accession to it, will safeguard Britain's interests in a 
much better and more useful way than the treaty. 
The dangerous aims of the Baghdad Pact, as far as the Arabs are concerned, are 
the threats it presents to Arab nationalism and the Arab renaissance. ... They 
[British 
and French] realise the strength of the Arabs and their nationalism, and have thus 
established bases round the Arabs to prevent their march forward, [and he gives the 
example of British bases in Cyprus, Israel and Iraq]. ... 
The Western Powers which are supplying you with arms are doing so to make you 
serve the aims of the Pact, and they will prevent you from using these arms for any 
other purpose. It is not possible or feasible that after the conclusion of this pact Iraq 
will be able to give any aid to Jordan and Syria or to rally to the defence of these two 
countries. ... 
When the aggression [on Egypt] occurred, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia 
supported Egypt. The Iraqi Government, however, was the only Government which did 
not do so. Indeed, it gave permission for the use of Iraqi air bases - in accordance with 
the Anglo-Iraqi treaty - for supplying aircraft with fuel and ammunition 
in order to 
enable them to bomb Port Said and its struggling Arab people. "" 
As this extract shows, the arguments that radical Arab nationalists were using 
were expressed in language designed to persuade the Arabs masses. It proved 
extremely influential, as was admitted even by the Western authorities as well. 
The British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn George recorded in his personal diary that 
he hated the efficacy of the Egyptian radio of Sawt al Arabs 
(Voice of Arabs), 
because, in his view, it was "as powerful as Goebbels. """ 
Unsure whether TVrkey was satisfactorily doing what was expected of 
her in 
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the region, the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs sent a memorandum to the 
British Embassy in Ankara. It posed three basic questions: 
(a) Was the Baghdad Pact still the best means at our disposal for achieving stability in the Middle East? 
(b) If so, what should be done next? and 
(c) the general position of Turkey in relation to the Baghdad Pact and her other commitments. "' 
We do not know what the reply was but shortly after this the West's position 
in the Middle East suffered a severe setback as a result of the Anglo-French Suez 
adventure in 1956 in collaboration with the Israelis. "' The regional countries 
which the West had urged to join a defensive alliance to protect the area from 
external aggression considered that the would-be "protectors" had in fact proved 
to be aggressors. "" This was an embarrassment to the Turks who could no longer 
convincingly urge the advantages of a Western alliance upon reluctant Arab States. 
Thereafter it was futile to consider expanding the Baghdad Pact. 
The US steadily withdrew her economic aid from Turkey and searched for a 
new government when she realised that it was ceasing to be as fully submissive as 
it had been. Zorlu also had his part to play in this context. "' The policies of the 
Democrat Party since it achieved power in 1950 had been directed towards a rapid 
expansion of the Turkish economy and a consequent improvement in the standard 
of living of the Turkish peasant. "' 
This expansion was based largely on American economic aid, which had been 
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generously granted up to early 1955. At that point, Washington indicated that 
further American economic aid "could only be granted on condition that certain 
remedial measures were applied to Turkish economic planning. The overtone to 
the whole picture has therefore been of American assistance in the economic field 
with a particular emphasis on aid to the Turkish defence effort. " 442 
The Ministry of State had drawn attention to reports that "US policy in Turkey 
is at present directed towards achieving the downfall of the present Turkish gov- 
ernment and returning the opposition to power. ... In the process of forming a 
new government M[r] Menderes was forced to abandon his closest associates, on 
whom he had hitherto relied for the execution of his policies. ""' However, all 
these changes were not to help him few years later when he was ousted by the mil- 
itary and eventually executed with his staunch associate, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
Sir Charles Hambro told Mr Nutting that they had it on very good authority 
indeed that 
the American Government were working for the downfall of the present Turkish 
Government and trying to get the opposition back into power. No particular reason 
was given for this save that they had more trust and confidence in the opposition party 
than they had in M[r] Menderes. ... He 
[Nutting] was told that they were operating 
in a very ham fashion and that their activities had got to the notice of the Turkish 
government and consequently made them extremely unpopular. "" 
In order to make the Baghdad Pact more viable Great Britain tried to appease 
the opponents of the Pact by trying to persuade them that the Pact had nothing to 
do with them or it was even in their interest too. For example, British Ambassador 
to Israel Sir Hoyer Millar told the Israeli Ambassador Mr Elath that one of the 
442 PRO, FO, 371,124012, RK10346/1,10.2.1956. 
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Pact's principal virtues from the Israeli point of view was that "it turned Iraqi and 
no doubt other Arab eyes away from their preoccupation with Israel. I said that 
it would be quite contrary to the whole idea underlying the Pact if its members 
were to take advantage of its meetings to organise an Arab attack on Israel. The 
Ambassador seemed reasonably reassured by all this. ""' 
Campbell, agreeing with such a policy suggested to Washington that one of 
the principles on which the United States, "must stand is that it will not permit 
441 the destruction of Israel by force". Campbell seemed quite realistic as well 
as cautious in approaching Arab-American relations, as he stated, "we need not 
object to their clinging to the idea of eventual victory as a matter of faith. But 
we should make it clear that, so far as the present and the foreseeable future are 
concerned, they will not be allowed to wipe Israel off the map. "' 
As for the Palestinian question, it was the first time since 1947 that an Arab 
country had accepted the UN partition plan. "The acceptance of the 1947 plan as 
a basis for solution suggests realism in the Baghdad Pact more constructive than 
the introversions of the Arab League. " 4411 
In order to secure the survival of pro-Western regimes, internal matters were 
considered to be within the scope of the Military Committee's interest. As the 
dispatch clearly mentioned, from the point of view of the Military Committee, 
"the political directive would be required to assess the chances of global war, of 
local troubles, the internal security aspect and generally to say what troops in the 
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Pact area are hkely to be needed for. """' 
On the positive side, one could argue that there was only some economic benefit 
of the Baghdad Pact, even though it cost the regional countries quite dear. For 
example, the Pact planned to form a Fund to sponsor capital projects in the area 
and thus to show the economically beneficial and attractive side of the Pact. This 
was to be achieved by forming a development consortium of the oil companies in the 
Middle East under the Baghdad Pact for the purpose of developing the resources 
of the area as well as constructing capital projects of a joint nature. According to 
the British Ambassador in Baghdad, this plan anticipated to have the following 
benefits: 
(1) It would have strengthened the Pact immensely in the eyes of the world, par- 
ticularly in the economic field, drawing attention away from its controversial aspects; 
(2) it would restore public confidence of the Arab world, not least the Iraqi people, 
in Pact affairs, the Western Powers and the oil companies, as it would bring about 
actual economic development of their countries; 
(3) It would attract other Arab countries, and especially Saudi Arabia in view of 
its connections with ARAMCO, to the Baghdad Pact. 
(4) It would frustrate subversive elements and confound the adversaries of the Pact. 
(5) It would restore the UK to favour with the Arab people. 
(6) It would deflect from the insistence on immediate joining of the Pact by the US 
if she is unable to do so at present. 
(7) It might render unnecessary the review of the oil fabric in the Middle East, as it 
would demonstrate additional benefits to the Arab and Middle Eastern countries 
from 
this project. "'O 
However, after the effects of the Suez crisis steadily disappeared when the two 
superpowers urged the invaders to withdraw from the area and 
Nasser skilfully 
turned his military defeat into a political victory, the West no 
longer considered it 
necessary to spend money creating this Fund. 
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6.3 The Israeli Factor 
As mentioned earlier, the importance of Israeli factor was crucial as far as 
Middle Eastern defence was concerned. Therefore, the West was very anxious not 
to provoke the Israelis while working to bring regional Islamic countries together 
to form an alliance against the internal and external threats. Unlike the West, 
Turkey had no influence on Israel, but after her involvement in Western defence 
projects, she felt the need to try to pursue a balanced policy towards the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. This was not seen satisfactory by the Arabs, so the Israeli factor 
had a negative effect on Turkey's relations with Arab countries. Meanwhile, it has 
to be mentioned that although the western support for Israel made it harder for the 
West to obtain Arabs' support for the defence initiatives in the region, the British 
documents show that the West tried to consolidate its position in the Middle East 
by using the Israeli card. 
Ever since the famous Arab rebellion against the Turks in 1915, the Arabs 
have been confused and began to suspect a foreign finger both in their internal 
and external affairs. Some western plans and assessments also had part in making 
them more cautious and suspicious of any western involvement in the Middle East. 
In supporting this conspiracy theory, one typical dispatch stated: "there are risks 
in prompting the Israelis to attack the Baghdad Pact and Nuri. 
" First, as the 
British Ambassador in Tel Aviv, Sir John Nicholls suggests, "it would not be in 
our interest in the long run to work up Israeli opinion against 
Iraq; secondly I 
doubt very much if we can trust the Israelis sooner or 
later not to leak the fact 
that we have prompted them if they ever found it would be advantageous 
to them 
to do so. There is thus a risk of further charges of collusion. 
""' 
4'51 PRO, FO, 371,127822, VB1071/1,31.12.1956, Tel Aviv. 
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The British diplomats decided to provide the Israelis with suitable material 
but the Ambassador in Tel Aviv thought that the best hope of getting it was to 
suggest to Israel privately that a few suitable attacks on the Baghdad Pact and 
on Nuri would be useful to the British and indirectly to them. He also said that 
"I cannot be sure that Israel would play, but I think they probably would. You 
may feel, however, that it would not be in our interest in the long run to work [up 
omitted] Israel opinion against Iraq. """ 
British authorities suggested that they had no wish to incite the Israelis to 
make suitable comments simply to have the "texts of anything which may from 
time to time appear in the daily, weekly or monthly papers in Israel and on the 
Israeli radio. """ It is interesting to note this way of making alliances with so called 
friendly countries. "" 
As noted earlier, the Pact mainly served the foreign nations, namely the 
British, the Americans, the Russians and the Israelis rather than the indigenous 
regional countries. The West managed to exploit the region through some pro- 
Western leaders in the region. In support of these allegations that the Pact did 
not serve the regional member countries, Sir Anthony Eden, the author of the 
Pact, said at a meeting: 
The goal which we seek from the Baghdad Pact is very simple. By our adherence, 
we have consolidated our influence and raised our voice in the Middle East. Britain's 
452 PRO, FO, 371,127822, VB1071/1,31.12.1956, Tel Aviv. 
453 Ibid., . /lA, 3.1.1957, Baghdad. 
454 Ibid., 3.1.1957, Baghdad. Why did the British think it useful for the Israelis to condemn the 
Baghdad Pact? It was to make the Arabs think that the Pact was against Israeli interests. So, 
the British cleverly envisaged that the Arabs witnessing such developments in Israel would tend 
to support the Pact. Secondly the Arabs would think that the West was not supporting or was at 
least ignoring Israel as far as regional defence was concerned. Thirdly, this fear of Israeli attacks 
would oblige the Iraqi authorities, already facing the strong reactions from the radical 
Arabs, to 
make more concessions to the British or at least continue to accept the status quo. 
Fourth, it 
was assumed that other Arab countries would no longer accuse Iraq of 
being on the Israeli side, 
etc. 
241 
adherence to the Baghdad Pact provides her with continued interference in the affairs 
of the Middle East. " [Eden also said] "I believe that a simple geographical glance will 
make the Israeli Government believe that the object of the Baghdad Pact is to direct the 
attention of both sides to something other than Israel. And since the Israelis are very 
intelligent I had imagined that this pact would leave them in security and stability. """ 
Finally, the Egyptian pamphlet concluded that "this is the Baghdad Pact and 
this is the Nury Elsaid Bilateral Agreement with Britain. ... It made of Iraq a 
British colony and Els. Nury Elsaid not only sold Iraq to Britain but wanted to 
make us drink from the same CUp. 
71456 
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6.4 Reactions to the Baghdad Pact 
The American Ambassador admittedly said "I realise that the Baghdad Pact 
is in a feeble condition. It is being attacked by Moscow, the anti-West Arabs, and 
by the neutralists led by Nehru. One of its weaknesses is that it has the reputation 
of being a British instrument. ... It would be unfortunate if the British should 
reappear in the Middle East full of bitterness stemming from the fact that when 
they seemed to be down and out in that area we treated them as pariahs and did 
nothing to help again to become respectable. """ 
In the course of a television interview which Tito gave to Ed Murrow and to 
CBS and which was broadcast in the US on June 30, he ascribed the unsatisfactory 
situation in the Middle East largely to the disruptive influences of the Baghdad 
Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine. About the Pact he said: "The Baghdad Pact 
itself was an error. The Pact, in fact, represented a move aimed at disuniting the 
Arab countries, and following the attack against Egypt that process of disuniting 
Arab countries and nations, was further intensified. )1458 
Even the American press agreed on this point. The Philadelphia Bulletin, 
for example, commented briefly that the Pact had been assailed as divisive, since 
it split Iraq from other Arab states and its value was questioned when Russia 
leapfrogged it to develop relations with Egypt and Syria. The paper said "In recent 
months, however, the Pact has twice shown itself, in the Suez and Jordanian crises, 
FR US, Vol. 12, pp. 388-389. The same document goes on to say "take Iran for example. For 
years we have been endeavouring to persuade the Iranians that it would be impossible for Iran to 
continue as an independent state if it should try to play the role of a neutral as between the free 
world and the Soviet bloc. In 1955 we actually brought pressure on Iran to join the Baghdad Pact. 
At the last moment, however, when Iran had already decided to join the Pact, we suddenly drew 
back and advised the Iranian Government that it must follow its best judgement. Iran, therefore, 
joined the Pact somewhat puzzled as to what our real feelings were with respect to the Pact. " 
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to be an effective "stabilising influence" in this area"" by supporting the Western 
countries not her Arab fellow countries in their rightful national causes. 
Commenting on the US politics in the Middle East, the Chinese radio noted 
that the four countries received American aid for a long time but its only result 
was to raise their military expenditure and create financial difficulties. "Taking the 
Middle East as a whole the policy of the American aggressive bloc is to divide the 
Arab countries, weaken the popular anti-colonial struggle and threaten national 
independence and peace in that area. ""' 
The Egyptian reaction was the fiercest of all. Egypt was of the view that the 
West was able to gain support of some regional countries only through a handful 
of collaborators within the elite of the countries involved. In Pakistan, Iran, Iraq 
and even partly in Turkey, it was a limited number of people who decided to 
work with the West against the Soviet bloc. 461 It seems difficult to say that this 
decision had popular support of the people with a possible exception of Turkey. 
Expressing Egyptian reactions to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact and its 
impact on the Middle East, with specific emphasis on Iraq's involvement Egyptian 
radio broadcast: 
All Arabs know that events which had taken place in the Arab nation in 1955 and 
1956 were the result of the signing of the Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact was the 
starting point in the strong controversy between supporters of the policy of complete 
indpendence based on liberation and the consolidation of Arab nationalism and the 
supporters of imperialism who were seeking to enable British imperialism to have a firm 
footing by any means and at any price. ... 
Nury Elsaid had failed in achieving his 
objective and in performing the task entrusted to him. He had failed even in deceiving 
the free and haughty Iraqi people who had firmly believed that the Baghdad Pact was 
nothing but a "large prison" set up by British with Elsayed Nury Elsaid as its chief 
Gaoler. 462 
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Joining the Egyptian campaign against Nuri, Falastin, a Jordanian newspaper, 
complained that Nuri only blamed France and Israel but not Britain, who led the 
aggression against Egypt. Nuri, "attacked the tail instead of the head of the snake, 
thus maintaining Iraq's ties with Britain, the enemy of the Arabs. )1463 
From the very beginning the US had serious reservations about the Baghdad 
Pact. She realised the problems it raised in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Therefore, the US never became a full member of the Pact. She tried to find a 
way to convince the regional members that she was with them in the case of war 
coming from outside of the region. The distinction between "membership of' and 
"active participation in" the committees may, in practice, be quite meaningless, 
but, as the British Ambassador in Washington, recorded; "it would be unfortunate 
if the regional members were to become aware of it and to deduce that the US are 
getting cold feet about the Pact. The State Department are well aware of this and 
I hope you will agree to let sleeping dogs lie. """ 
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6.5 Developments Following the Iraqi Coup of 1958 
Following the Iraqi coup, the Americans completely lost their faith in the Pact, 
but yet again tried very hard not to lose the region completely to the Russians. To 
achieve such an objective, the US started to reach an agreement with each single 
member of the Pact. However, having seen the bilateral agreements as a sign of 
weakness for the Pact, Turkey opposed the initiative at the beginning. The US 
Charge d'Affairs, Hall, told the British Ambassador in Ankara that Zorlu had in- 
dicated that the Turkish Government "would like to see a multilateral agreement 
between the US and regional members of the Pact rather than separate bilateral 
agreements, [Zorlu] admitted in replying to a remark by Hall, that the purpose 
was to align the US more closely to the Pact. " Hall volunteered that he doubted 
whether more than fifty per cent of Zorlu's ideas would be acceptable to the State 
Department. Indeed, the US views were implemented in 1959 by signing the bilat- 
eral agreements with every individual regional member. "" The British diplomats 
agreed that the bilateral agreements would strengthen the Pact as it was recorded 
by a Foreign Office document that the Pact was very greatly strengthened 
by 
the decision of Washington "to accept the same responsibility and commitments 
towards individual members which they had undertaken towards one another 
by 
signing the Pact, and this was given effect to in the London 
Declaration" signed 
by delegates of the remaining four member countries of the Baghdad 
Pact and the 
Secretary of State of the USA on 28 July 1958.466 
The US in the London Declaration agreed to co-operate with Pakistan, Iran, 
Turkey and the UK for their security and defence and would, 
in due course, enter 
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into agreements designed to give effect to this co-operation. 467 
The UK agreed that "there seems to be no practical advantage in a similar 
bilateral agreement being signed between the US and the UK. We also thought of 
the proposed bilateral agreements simply as an alternative to US membership of 
the Baghdad Pact. """ 
Eilts confirmed the British belief that the US Government "would not regard 
themselves as technically members of the Pact if and when the bilaterals are 
signed and Iraq has left the Pact. The whole object of the agreement is to bolster 
up the morale of the regional members without the US joining the Pact. They are 
essenticadly in lieu of. 
))469 
As regards Iran, "we have stated publicly that we are vitally concerned in the 
independence integrity and security of Iran, but we have not been prepared to enter 
into an "open-ended" agreement guaranteeing Iranian territorial integrity. " 
470 
As regards Pakistan, almost the same attitude towards Iran was adopted. In- 
deed, when India attacked Pakistan in 1965, the West in general and the US in 
particular, did nothing to support their ally, Pakistan. "' 
As regards Turkey, "there is no reasonable doubt that this is so, " although 
Article 5 of NATO does not in fact oblige members to go to war in each other's 
defence. "It recognises that armed attacks on any of the parties would endanger 
the "peace and safety" of other parties, who will each act to meet the common 
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danger in accordance with its constitutionc-d processes. " 472 
It seems to be the general military conclusion that the Pact without Iraq "is if 
anything stronger rather than weaker. To have Iraq as an uncertain neutral rather 
than an ally increases the danger to Iran of subversion from the south, but hardly 
that of armed attack. 
))473 
The Afghan drift toward the Soviet Bloc may be regarded as dating from the 
visit to Kabul in December 1955 of Messrs Bulganin, Khrushchev, this resulted 
in a promise of a Russian credit of 100 million dollars. In short, he said that 
"Afghanistan has already moved towards the USSR" (in 1955-1956), but that she 
had not recently moved any further. "Any further mortgaging of Afghanistan to 
the USSR will clearly be unwelcome to us, but it is not easy to see how to prevent 
this""" he concluded. 
Having thought over all aspects of the Baghdad Pact, the British were of 
the view that there was great administrative advantage in retaining the same 
organisation. The British Ambassador in Washington reported that 
legally it would be tidier to have a new instrument and there might be political 
advantage if such a new instrument took the form of a treaty among the three regional 
members (to which the UK would then accede) and could therefore be described as a 
regional initiative. But if, despite the absence of Iraq the US were unable to accede, 
much of the political value of a new treaty would be lost, even though in theory the 
Americans could use their bilateral agreements already enabled them to participate fully 
in týe work of the Pact (or whatever the new alliance was called. )"" 
As can be seen, the British were aware that the Pact should be initiated by 
the regional ýnembers rather than imposed by the West. They believed that the 
success of the Pact partly depended on the extent to which the regional countries 
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were made to believe that it was a regionally inspired initiative. 
As Iraq left the Pact, the UK took the opportunity to change the name of 
the Pact to make best use of it according to the changing balance of power. This 
was suggested by HM Ambassador at Tehran who said the US wanted the name 
changed. He also noted that the US were against Iraqi membership"' due to their 
relations with Israel, because the US realised that it was detrimental to the US 
interests to have Iraq within the Pact rather than outside. "' 
The Americans began suggesting new possible names for the new pact. A pos- 
sible name they suggested, was "Northern Tier Defence Organisation. " As regards 
the actual name, the Ambassador agreed with the State Department that they 
should avoid the term "Middle East. " He was not sure that "Northern Tier" was 
really very suitable since it was only "northern" in a limited sense, i. e. when looked 
at from the South. Other possible terms were, he noted, "West Asian or Aryan 
though the latter probably does not apply to the Turks and still suffers from its 
use by Hitler. West Asia Co-operative Defence Organisation would make possible 
word in initials. TIPUCDO (initials of members) is pretty awful. ""' 
The British thought that to introduce the concept of Middle East might be 
interpreted by other Arab States "as the beginning of a new attempt to coerce 
them to join the Pact. " The only suggestion the British Ambassador in Tehran 
made were the Middle East Regional Organisation (MERO) and South West Asia 
Regional Organisation (SWARO). "' The remaining members of the Baghdad Pact 
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tried to find a more acceptable and popular name for the Baghdad Pact as the Pact 
was left without Baghdad. Some of the suggested names taken from the British 
documents were as follows: METO, SWARO, MERO, NTDP, Aryan, TIPUCDO, 
WACDO, TIPTO, SWATO, UKTIPUS, ATODEC, ATOMEC, DA, MAP, EDCG, 
WADO, WATO, ADETO, ATO, NORMETO, ALTO. 
At the beginning, without an official answer from Baghdad, the West could 
not decide about the Baghdad Pact. One of the dispatches sent from the British 
Embassy in Washington stated that unless the Iraqi government's intentions were 
not clear to the British, the dispatch suggested, a change of name for the alliance 
and no decision whether to recast the Pact or not should be considered. If Iraq 
stayed in, it would be more difficult for the US, because "The US would be un- 
able to work with Iraq on the "sensitive" committees, i. e. all but the Economic 
Committee""' the British believed. 
Having realised that the situation was hopeless in Iraq, the governments of Iran, 
Pakistan, Turkey, the UK and the US decided to establish a provisional Baghdad 
Pact HQ in Ankara including the Council, the Secretariat and combined military 
staff. This transfer was an administrative step designed to ensure continuity of 
Pact activities and was entirely without prejudice to the eventual Iraqi decision 
with respect to membership of the Pact. The Government of Iraq was informed of 
the above decision. 481 
As soon as the transfer of the institution was put on the agenda, the regional 
members started to contest with each other to move some important 
institutions 
to their own countries. Pakistan and Turkey demanded the Nuclear 
Centre be 
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moved from Iraq to themselves but the UK preferred Iran as the latter needed 
more gestures than other two. But this decision had to be "defended on technical 
grounds. """ In this dispatch the Ambassador went on to explain the reasons why 
it was unacceptable to move the Nuclear Centre to Turkey or Pakistan. 
Following many discussions, at a meeting of delegations on August 13, the draft 
communique was revised as follows: "By the decision of its Council in Ankara the 
Organisation hitherto known as the Baghdad Pact has adopted the name of Central 
Treaty Organisation (CENTO). 1)483 
With Pakistan both a Commonwealth colleague and in SEATO, and Turkey a 
member of NATO, the chief political purpose of the organisation was to encourage 
4114 Iran to resist persistent Soviet pressure and propaganda. 
Though the Turkish politicians were normally careful not to spell out the truth 
behind their policies in the region, Zorlu openly stated that the main reason for the 
foundation of CENTO was to save Iran from communism. He also said that "it was 
Turkey's duty to save Iran and to establish close ties between Iran and the West. " 485 
The British Ambassador reported this remark, since although it went no further 
than the line which Zorlu had frequently taken in private, it was "apparently the 
first made in public by a member of the Turkish Government". ` It was a candid 
expression of Turkey's genuine motives as regards the establishment of CENTO, 
and her estimate of the position of Iran 
487 
and was accepted as such by Sir Bernard 
Burrows. 
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Since Iraq left the Pact, the British Ambassador in Ankara said that the ab- 
sence of Iraq meant that "we need not lay such stress on Palestine and other Arab 
problems, but this is offset by the fact that the situation in Iraq will itself be a 
major item for discussion. 7)488 
The new position of the Pact was not very promising. Therefore, Britain 
wanted to decrease her role accordingly. However, any move "towards a reduction 
to observer status of the one non-regional member of the Pact would be regarded 
here as the beginning of the end of the Pact. 
17489 
Britain thus decided to change the function of the Pact as well. Writing from 
Ankara, the British Ambassador entirely agreed that "we should aim to build 
up the economic side of the Pact. Although the regional members still regard it 
primarily as a source of additional aid for projects in their individual countries, 
they are also, beginning to value it as an organisation for economic co-operation. 490 
Britain was of the view that "a Baghdad Pact without Iraq is not a practical 
possibility. " Indeed, though even the Baghdad Pact, too, had not been popular, 
CENTO never functioned even as the Baghdad Pact did. "' 
The Iraqi coup carried out by Qassem radically changed the course of events in 
the Middle East. Unlike most of the suppositions, the actual impetus and initiative 
for the July Revolution in Iraq was not Communist, let alone Soviet inspired. The 
Communist Party in Iraq had, however, contrary to what the old regime and the 
British believed, not been entirely destroyed by Nuri's repression and it was quick 
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to come out into the open and fall in behind the banner of the revolution. 
492 
The West usually consulted the Turkish politicians in respect to Middle Easteril 
matters. This time the Turks were upset with what they expected to happen. 
Menderes indicated at an interview that there was a reasonably good prospect 
that Iraq might stay in the Baghdad Pact. The Turkish representative at the 
meeting of CSO on November 6 mentioned that he was convinced that Qassem 
wanted the friendship of Iraqs allies in the Baghdad Pact. "' One week later, the 
Egyptian newspaper Al Messa quoted the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo, Mr Fayel al 
Samarai, as saying that Iraq had "withdrawn de facto" from the Baghdad Pact. 494 
The Karachi evening "Leader" of September 10th, however, carried an article 
datelined Baghdad September 10th which opened as follows: "Iraq's Foreign Min- 
ister, Siddik El Shanshal, said here that he felt his country will have to quit the 
Baghdad Pact in order to obey the universal public opinion, 
11415 
wrote a special 
correspondent of PPA touring the Middle East. Mr Shanshal was also the Min- 
ister for National Guidance and a very important and influential member of the 
Revolutionary government. 
Six weeks later, the news came up "from well informed sources that Iraq had 
decided to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact after the term of the Pact expires 
next February [in fact, it was to expire in February 1960. ] 
7)496 
Finally, the Iraqi Ambassador in Cairo was reported by the New China Press 
Agency as having commented to Al Messa as regards the US bilateral agreements 
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with members of the "crippled Baghdad Pact, my country is in fact considered 
outside the Pact. Iraq's policy is based on positive neutrality and will not tie itself 
to any military bloc. When the Pact expires in a year and a few months' time, 
Iraq will officially notify the parties that she wishes to cease membership. ""' 
Iraq abrogated three of the former regime's treaties with the USA too. Three 
agreements were signed by the previous regime under the proviso that the US 
Government "conducted Iraq's foreign policy. ... The abrogation of these agree- 
ments opens a new chapter in the history of Iraq's complete withdrawal from the 
Baghdad Pact. 11498 
With the overthrow of the monarchic rule which was subordinate to the "in- 
fluence and directives of imperialism and which depended on the Baghdad Pact as 
one of the pillars of the imperialistic policy in the Middle East, the Baghdad Pact 
became, in a de facto sense, a bygone affair as far as Iraq was concerned. ""' But 
this was not so in respect to the other member countries as the causes which had 
prompted these countries to form the Pact still existed in respect to them. How- 
ever, the Iraqi revolution "has considerably weakened the Pact. ""' Cognisant of 
this fact, thereafter, even these countries started to focus on bilateral negotiations 
in meetings of the Pact. "' 
One of the points made at the Iraqi Prime Minister's second Press Conference 
on March 24 in which he announced withdrawal from the Baghdad 
Pact was as 
follows: On 14 July 1958 the Pact was "destroyed" and on 24 March "uprooted". 502 
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Not only was the withdrawal itself detrimental to the Western Powers but also 
the conduct of the new Government, in persecuting the former authorities was also 
harmful. For instance, the Iraqi Government made public use of what they were 
told in strict confidence during a pact ministerial session, contrary to the security 
regulations and to the accepted rule of behaviour governing such meetings. The 
Ambassador complained, "Nor do I think we should wish to make use of this Iraqi 
lapse for public relations purposes, as is suggested, unless there is a drastic turn 
for the worse in our relations with Iraq. ""' Under the Baghdad Pact security 
regulations such information should be safeguarded by Pact members and that 
this public use of protected information, the Ambassador suggested, "should not 
go unchallenged. ""' 
Great Britain was ready to adjust herself to the new atmosphere in Iraq. While 
the State Department were prepared to agree that for the moment, it would seem 
that the preservation of Qassem's regime was the lesser evil, they were not op- 
timistic about his chances of being able to avoid Communist influence and the 
British thought that the US "may therefore reach the conclusion sooner than we 
might do that the success of pro-Nasser forces would be preferable. ""' In the event 
of a further sudden deterioration in the situation, he emphasised that "you should 
take the opportunity to discourage strongly any thought of possible intervention 
by our allies, apart from our general position that we do not think the matter 
should be even discussed let alone recorded owing to the danger of 
leakage. ""' 
In fact, the time came when Britain could not stop herself from thinking of a 
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military intervention in order to prevent any possible integration of Iraq and the 
UAR. However, the likely long term consequences were quite sufficient to deter her. 
"A joint Anglo- U S- Turkish intervention in Iraq might well be militarily feasible. 
The political consequences of such intervention would however be serious. Were the 
object of overthrow or prevent the establishment of a pro-UAR regime it would 
unite the whole Arab world (and much of the non-Arab world) against us and 
jeopardise all our oil supplies from Arab sources. " 507 
When the British could not, as usually happens in international relations, 
direct the Iraqi foreign policy by threat they tried to be more friendly and made 
some concessions to keep Iraq on a reasonably acceptable line. Such an attempt 
can be seen in the supply of arms to Iraq. In answer to a question in the House 
of Commons, Mr Profumo said then that "some requests from Iraq for arms had 
been met, others were under consideration. " 508 
At the beginning Turkey had little interest in Middle Eastern defence but her 
inability to pursue an independent defence policy had profound consequences for 
herself, so Turkish involvement in these initiatives, though destined ultimately to 
be futile, needs special scrutiny. 
As stated earlier, the three-decade-long dominance of the Republicans was 
over but nothing changed in the field of the Turkish foreign affairs. The new rulers 
signalled to the West that they, too, would pursue the same line as the Republicans 
as far as foreign relations were concerned. They went even further to say that 
it 
was essential to establish a Mediterranean defence system 
linked to the Atlantic 
Pact. -'09 
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The DP adopted a pro-western policy, especially an active Turkish partici- 
pation in the western defence initiatives in the region. The Minister for Foreign 
Affairs was reported to have said that the Sadabad Pact should be revived for the 
Middle Eastern neighbours and Turkey could participate in a Balkan entente. "' 
Turkey's main aim was to demonstrate its usefulness to the West. 
Despite all the American military and non-military aid Turkey had received, 
and the military prowess of the Turkish people, if Russia firmly resolved to conquer 
Turkey at any cost, she eventually could. "" That was known to the Western 
politicians, if not to the Turks themselves. To the most Turks, Turkey guaranteed 
her national integrity and security by joining NATO. 
Meanwhile, Turkey was believed to have an important influence over the Middle 
Eastern countries. Also it had shown a constancy of policy that had made it the 
most reliable American ally in the Middle East. The West also believed that 
should Turkey waver or be reduced to desperate measures by economic troubles, 
the entire defence of the Middle East would crumble. Later, however, Western 
countries realised that Turkish political influence was virtually non-existent, owing 
to Arab distrust of the Turks as former Ottoman overlords and present partners of 
the West and to Turkish contempt for the weakness and indiscipline of the Arabs. 
Following five years' hard work, what Turks had in their hands was the Bagh- 
da: d Pact, which was supposed to include most of the important Arab countries 
especially Egypt and the Fertile Crescent countries. But, only Iraq joined the 
Pact 
in the end. In 1958, the Iraqi revolution happened and considerably weakened the 
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Pact. "" 
If the Turkish initiatives were said to have aimed to defend the Middle East and 
thus to defend her own national territories against the expansionist Soviet threat) 
the so called architect of the Baghdad Pact itself, Adnan Menderes, admitted the 
failure by saying in a conversation with the UK Defence Minister that he thought 
that the position of the West had declined during the last ten years and the position 
of Russia had grown stronger both as regards technical superiority and as regards 
the extent of Russian subversive influence. "" 
Being more pro-Western than the West, Turkey always demanded that the 
West be less compromising with the Arabs in the course of the negotiations. How- 
ever, Turkey was aware that without strong American support she would not be 
able to make the regional member countries commit themselves to the Western 
cause. The United States Charge d'Affairs, Hall, told HM Ambassador in Ankara 
that Zorlu had indicated that the Turkish Government would like to see a mul- 
tilateral agreement between the United States and regional members of the Pact 
rather than separate bilateral agreements that the US wanted to sign. He admit- 
ted, in replying to a remark by Hall, that the purpose was to align the United 
States more closely to the Pact. Hall doubted whether more than fifty per cent of 
Zorlu's ideas would be acceptable to the State Department. "" In 1959 the United 
States' signed the bilateral agreements with every individual regional member. In 
another words, the Pact was replaced by bilateral arrangements. "' 
In the end Turkey, with her Western friends, failed to maintain a viable de- 
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fence organisation in the Middle East and they were to let the defence measures 
fade away in time. This was partly because of the mutual understanding of the 
superpowers that the escalative methods to maintain their interests in the areas 
where they had conflicting interests were self-defeating and they abandoned in the 
early 1960s. So, the world entered into a new phase, which was later to be called 
detente. (In this transitional period too, Turkish territory was to play another 
vital role due to the Jupiter missiles, though the Turks themselves were not privy 
to the decision-making process. ) 
On the internal front, the Americans came to realise that it was no longer in 
the interest of America to maintain the Democrats in power, among other things, 
because Adnan Menderes and his Democrats were determined to radically and 
rapidly industrialise the country, while the Americans demanded that Turkey re- 
main an agricultural country. 516 Turkey's rigid refusal to accept American advice 
on the measures which she should take to put her economy in order lost her a 
good deal of the abundant good will which she had hitherto enjoyed in America. 
Matters were not improved by Zorlu's visit to Washington in early June. This 
was to be the apparent reason why the Americans withdrew their economic and 
political support for the Democrat Turkey. 
This loss of popularity was, mainly due to "economic factors" (the rising cost of 
living and recurrent shortages of certain necessities including some foodstuffs), but 
partly also to "political causes" (dissatisfaction with repressive press regulations 
and with threats to the independence of the universities and judiciary). 
"' Dis- 
satisfaction with Menderes' economic and financial policies, particularly 
his "over- 
516 Erkmen suggested that "the West believed that Menderes would modernise the agriculture, 
but 
when he attempted to industrialise the country, they started to 
hesitate giving economic aid. " 
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ambitious and insufficiently selective industrialisation program", "' budgetary deficits 
and high agricultural subsidies, precipitated the deterioration of relations. 
We should glance at Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s in order to understand 
and assess better the advantages and disadvantages of the policy pursued in the 
1950s. It was only in the early 1960s that Turkey slowly began questioning her 
foreign policy. Both the Cuban missiles crisis and developments in Cyprus were 
important factors in prompting Turkish reassessment of foreign policy. "' Hence- 
forth, the Turkish leadership, regardless of political affiliation, accepted the need 
to explore all foreign policy options, one of which was certainly better relations 
with the USSR. A tentative examination into the assumptions underlying Turkey's 
post World War II foreign policy began to appear gingerly in the Turkish press 
and was actively discussed in private among the elite. The people concerned began 
to ask the following questions: 
Had the departure from Atatfirk's antipathy to entangling alliances been really 
necessary? How valuable was NATO membership? Could greater flexibility and 
scope be introduced into Turkish foreign policy? Was the Soviet threat really 
? 520 
serious. 
Indeed) following the military coup of 1960, Turkey tended to improve her re- 
lations with Non-Aligned countries. For example, in October 1964 Turkey sent two 
observers to the Cairo Conference of Non-Aligned states, which was the 
beginning 
of a flexible attitude towards closer association with the 
Afro-Asian countries. 
On 23 January 1963, when Washington announced that the Jupiters were to 
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be removed the effect on Ankara was nothing less than electrifying, though this 
was not immediately evident, except to keen observers of the Turkish scene. But 
when in6nii received the Johnson letter on 5 June 1964 Ankara was shocked by 
the crude implication that it might find itself alone should the USSR intervene in 
a local dispute that Ankara but clearly not Washington, regarded as impinging 
on its own security and as being quite divorced from East-West considerations. 
Once again, as in 1956 during the Suez Crisis, Washington had shown itself self- 
righteous in dealing with close allies, insensitive to their regional interests, and 
indifferent to the domestic consequences for the pro-United States governments of 
these countries, and to the future of the alliance. Therefore, Turkey's reappraisal 
of its relationship with the United States and its fresh assessment of prospects 
for Soviet-Turkish relations may be said to date from the Johnson letter. "" As 
a result, many Turks came to believe that the United States was less concerned 
with Turkey's security than with its own superpower game and when they looked 
back at the 1950s with the benefit of hindsight they were less enthusiastic about 
the alliance. 
Briefly, the factors prompting Turkish authorities to understand the disadvan- 
tages of their "unreserved and unconditional" association with the West may be 
stated as follows: removal of the Jupiters from the Turkish soil without the knowl- 
edge of the Turks; the Johnson letter regarding the question of Cyprus; and the 
general drift towards detente in the international order. Those factors changed the 
way in which the United States perceived Turkey and consequently it relatively 
diminished the importance of Turkey and this led the United States to give less 
and less military and economic aid to Turkey with every passing year. 
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On the economic and military aid front, Turkey was perhaps in a better position 
compared with other regional members. However, apart from the incomparably 
greater aid offered to Israel, -"' another important fact was that aid given to Turkey 
was mostly military and had nothing to do with the welfare of the people at 
all. For example, the original 100 million dollars appropriation for Turkey was 
allotted ninety five per cent to military requirements and five per cent to improve 
transportation and communications facilities with the hope of thereby increasing 
Turkish military efficiency. 523 Yet the effect of this improvement on social and 
economic life in Turkey was quite considerable. 
Indeed, it was also more economic for the Americans to invest their money to 
Turkey rather than anywhere else. 
Many American in Turkey will tell one - and the more the individual official's work 
gives him an overall grasp of the picture, the more likely he is to hold this view - that 
there is no other place in the entire world where the American tax dollar spent abroad 
for military purposes buys as much as it does in Turkey today, and also that there is no 
place in the world where the American tax dollar spent to strengthen a foreign country 
... finds a better potential use than it does in Turkey. "" 
Thus it can be acknowledged that US military aid to Turkey was actually even 
more beneficial to the Americans than it was to the Turks. Calculations based on 
the comparative costs of different nations' troops reveal that it cost the Americans 
27 times as much tQ employ one of their own soldiers to carry out the same duties 
as one Turkish soldier in the region. "' 
The British also agreed with this point when HM Ambassador noted that their 
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present contribution was rather small in proportion to the intimacy of their general 
relations with Turkey and "its importance to United States for our Middle Eastern 
policy, in Cyprus and for the strategic facilities, mainly in terms of over-flying, 
which we now enjoy. ""' 
Another important point in respect to the foreign aid given to Turkey was that 
political strings were always attached to it. "' The Board of Trade, for example, 
wrote to the Foreign Office that the economic departments should not seek to 
impose on Turkey a debt settlement out of step with their current friendly relations 
with the Turks, or affecting those relations adversely. The report stated that, 
"this is no very onerous task for United States, since the other Departments are 
well aware of the political considerations involved (indeed the whole OEEC rescue 
operation has been undertaken mainly for political reasons) and in any case they 
are well aware that the Turks simply cannot afford a debt settlement which is 
generous to the creditor. ""' 
In fact, the Turks themselves were well aware of this feature of international 
aid. Armstrong claimed that foreign aid is "the single most important influence 
on the pattern of political compliance. " '2' The Turks tended to look at the whole 
question of aid as primarily political in character. The Turkish authorities, there- 
fore, took it amiss when the United States adopted a narrowly economic approach 
to their requests for assistance, admonishing them to put their economy 
in order, 
while offering more to neutrals or to less stalwart allies. 
The experiment of a com- 
bined bailing-out operation, shared by the IMF, the OEEC and the 
United States, 
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provided desperately needed financial aid in 1958 and also some means of control 
for the future. (A total of 359 million dollars was made available; 234 minion 
dollars by the United States, 100 million dollars by members of the OEEC, and 25 
million dollars by the IMF). 530 
Since 4 August 1958, the Turkish economy was operating under a stabilisation 
program involving a fairly high degree of internal austerity. This was introduced 
as a result of consultation with the OEEC. The credits amounting to the equiva- 
lent of 359 million dollars (including "normal" United States defence support aid 
amounting in 1958 to perhaps 100 million dollars) were extended to Turkey by the 
United States and the principal OEEC countries in 1958. "The last instalment 
of these credits had just been made available to Turkey. Agreements to consol- 
idate Turkish debts to the principal OEEC countries and the United States and 
Canada had also just been concluded and others were in final stages of negotiation 
in 1960 . "531 These agreements were to provide 
for the repayment of commercial 
obligations totalling about 450 million dollars over the next 12 years. 
Despite all efforts, the economic situation in Turkey irreversibly deteriorated 
and reached a level where the Ministry of Finance was obliged to suspend the 
import of foreign periodicals, books and newspapers, except American ones. This 
was a measure taken by the Turkish authorities in an attempt to prevent a 
further 
increase in Turkey's arrears of trading debts. "The American trade is excepted, 
because it is paid for in currency made available under the American aid pro- 
gram. " 532 
On the other hand, the Russian press took the opportunity to evaluate the 
Department of State Bulletin, V61.39,25 August 1958, pp. 321-324. 
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Turkish foreign policy and its implications on the economic policy. Izvestia at- 
tributed the "hopeless conditions" of the Turkish budget to the Government's for- 
eign policy. Zorlu was said to have disclosed that Turkey was receiving 200 million 
dollars annually from the United States as military aid, in addition to 90 million 
sterling under the NATO infra-structure program. The article ended by alleging 
that the questions put to the Foreign Minister and his replies showed that Turkish 
foreign policy was "actually shaped by the ruling circles of another state. " 533 
The policies of the Democrat Party after it achieved power in 1950 were di- 
rected towards a rapid expansion of the Turkish economy and a consequent im- 
provement in the standard of living of the Turkish peasant. This expansion was 
based largely on American aid, which had been liberally granted up to the spring 
of 1955. At this point the United States Government indicated that further eco- 
nomic aid could only be granted on condition that "certain remedial measures" 
were applied to Turkish economic planning. The overtone to the whole picture had 
therefore been of American assistance in economic field with a particular emphasis 
on aid to the Turkish defence effort. 
Having stated the economic and political situation in Turkey we may now con- 
clude our discussioij on Turkey by looking briefly at British view of the possibility 
of a military coup iýi Turkey. In February 1959, Sir Bernard Burrows, the British 
Ambassador in Ankara, assessed the situation in Turkey in a dispatch he sent to 
the Foreign Office. Having cited the economic and political situation in Turkey 
and the RPP's views on the Middle East, he noted the reactions to and the vicar- 
ious excitement caused by the military coups in Iraq, Pakistan and the 
Sudan. He 
reported that "the exchange of violent polemics 
between the Prime Minister and 
533 PRO, FO, 371,144747, RK10338/1,23.1-1959, Moscow. 
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in6nii634 in the autumn on the subject of the analogy between the old regime in 
Iraq and the regime in Turkey, " "'caused a speculation among the western diplo- 
mats about the possibility of a coup in Turkey. In spite of this, the Ambassador's 
view remained that "such a possibility was extremely remote. " In his view, there 
were many factors preventing such a possibility to happen. In explaining why a 
military coup could not possibly take place, he said: 
(a) The Turks are a disciplined people with an ingrained respect for constituted 
authority. 
(b) The genuine Turkish nationalistic patriotic spirit would make anyone think 
twice before risking a major upheaval in the country, surrounded as it is by hostile and 
potentially hostile neighbours. 
(c) The Turkish people learned in 1950 that they have the power to get rid of an 
unpopular government by constitutional electoral means. 
(d) Both the main political parties are based on large elements of solid popular 
support. There should therefore be no need for either of them to consider calling in an 
instrument like the army to achieve their ends. 
(e) Even if the will existed to organise a coup amongst, say, certain senior or middle 
rank army officers, the execution would be appallingly difficult, taking into the account 
the size and the dispersion of the armed forces. In an Arab country it is possible to 
control events with a handful of tanks, but any such attempt in Turkey might well lead 
to civil war. "' 
Finally he predicted, partially correctly, that the only possibility that he could 
foresee, "and this was remote, " of military intervention in politics would be some 
form of intervention designed to "protect the constitution, the established electoral 
processes, or Turkey's national honour. ""' Although he was mistaken in predicting 
the possibility of a coup in Turkey, his prediction about the pretext that the 
military would use to justify the coup was correct. 
The Birmingham Post of the 18th September, 1959, commenting on Turkish 
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relations with the US wrote that signs of hard feeling against Americans were 
noticeable for the first time in Turkey, the US's closest friend and ally in the 
Middle East. Irresponsible acts by some Americans stationed in Turkey, and the 
sensitiveness of the Turkish people, were the main reasons for this. 
According to the paper, a few incidents that occurred in 1959 seem to have 
changed the opinions of many Turks about Americans. There was in Turkey a feel- 
ing of widespread sympathy and gratitude towards the US. Substantial economic 
and military aid, totalling two billion dollars, strong political ties within NATO 
and CENTO and extensive cultural exchanges, had largely contributed to that end. 
The arrest of four American sergeants serving with NATO's South-eastern HQ, in 
the city of izmir, and its political implications, "have been the drop that made the 
cup overflow. Minor incidents earlier aroused nation-wide indignation. ""' 
It is not clear whether the religious developments in Turkey were among the 
reasons affecting the attitude of the Americans negatively, but what was clear was 
that the US increasingly distanced herself from Turkey from the mid-1950s. One 
of the occasions indicating the Islamic revivalism in Turkey was also quoted by the 
above paper. The paper reported that it had received a letter, posted in Alexandria 
and dated 2 November, stating that a "very well known Turkish personality" had 
been writing letters to members of the former Ottoman dynasty, including Prince 
Faruk (former King of Egypt) informing them that the "situation in Turkey was 
now ripe" for a restoration of both the Sultanate and the Muslim Caliphate, and 
advising members of the royal family to be ready to take over. It went on to say 
that the day was fast approaching when the "flag of the Caliphate will once again 
fly over the Ottoman homeland. " The reported letter also alleged that 
the present 
538 PRO, FO, 371,144748, RK10345/3,18.5.1959, Birmingham Post, 18.9.1959, Turks 
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Government of Egypt was supporting these aspirations for a Turkish restoration. 539 
Turkish relations with the US in particular and the West in general deteri- 
orated and this caused tension between the two and strained the nerves of Ad- 
nan Menderes who worked to improve Turkish- American relations and protect the 
Western interests in the Middle East. In a conversation with the UK Defence Min- 
ister, the Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes said that even he thought that 
"the position of the West had declined during the last ten years and the position 
of Russia had grown stronger both as regards technical superiority and as regards 
the extent of Russian subversive influence. ""' 
When the T`urkish politicians realised that detente would probably take place 
and they felt disappointed with the American economic and military aid, the Prime 
Minister of Turkey announced his intention to visit Mr Khrushchev in July, with 
the prospect of a return visit later. "Both the Iranian and Pakistani Ambassadors 
in Moscow were shaken and very apprehensive of the effect of the Turkish move 
on the Shah and the Iranian Government. " 
541 
Finally one should remember that the Democrat Party had fulfilled its mis- 
sion by the end of the 1950s. In Zorlu's words, "Turkey's policy today centred 
around integration with the West. Turkey and Greece, which had originally been 
left outside the two economic groups formed in Europe, had decided to join the 
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Common Market. 1)542 Indeed before Zorlu, together with his Prime Minister, Ad- 
nan Menderes were ousted from power and executed, they applied for membership 
to the Common Market. And it was this application that concluded the DP's 
westernising mission for Turkey. Since then, for more than forty years Turkey has 
been working to attain the necessary conditions to become a full member of the 
Common Market, though it still seems very unlikely to achieve this. It is an irony 
that as soon as DP performed its westernising role its rule in Turkey ended. 
Against a background of widespread urban unrest and a mounting national 
deficit, the Turkish Armed Forces assumed the direction and administration of the 
country on 27 May 1960. The Presidency of the Committee of National Union set 
up by the Armed Forces was given to General Cemal Giirsel. "' The Turkish Armed 
Forces are the most loyal organ of the state, and therefore, whenever the Kemalist 
regime has been in danger either from rightists or leftists or from Islamists, they 
assumed the administration as happened in 1960,1971 and 1980. Since then they 
have accepted that this is no longer the way to protect a regime, so, the army 
has tended to force the politicians to compromise for the sake of Kemalism and to 
eliminate the unwanted elements in the country. 
The objectives of the 1960 coup had not much to do with foreign policy of the 
country. That policy remained the achievemeilt of westernisation of the country as 
had been. To reassure the Western friends and allies, the Turkish representative 
made a statement in a special restricted meeting of CENTO, in which he said 
that he did not wish to enter into a discussion on the internal situation, but there 
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was one point of importance for CENTO: He wished to declare categorically that 
although "there had been a change of government and of political philosophy and 
of regime, the foreign policy of the Turkish Government and in particular their 
attitude towards CENTO, had in no way changed. ""' It was later declared that 
Turkey's attitude towards NATO was not to change and the westernisation process 
of Turkey was to continue as had been commanded by Kemal Atatiirk. 
Iraq's importance for the West especially the UK was due basically to its oil 
reserves, its military bases granted to the British and its role in the Arab politics. 
Baghdad was one of the centres of Arab power like Cairo and Riyadh. "' It was also 
geographically a gate to the Arab oil sources, if the USSR ever tried to occupy the 
region. Its relations with Britain historically had a special role to play as far as the 
Western defence initiatives were concerned. Iraq was in the hands of a handful pro- 
British rulers led by a King placed on his throne by the British. Therefore, Britain 
wanted to prolong its privileged position in Iraq as long as possible. However, the 
new wave of the Arab nationalism, it seemed, was powerful enough to threaten all 
colonial powers in the Arab lands. Britain, therefore, wholeheartedly urged the 
United States to join her in defending the region against the external Communist 
threat and most importantly against the internal nationalist or any anti-Western 
or anti-colonial elements. 
Being ruled by the pro-British oligarchy, Iraq had never created any major 
trouble for Britain ijince its establishment in the 1920s. The government kept the 
country under strict control in the face of the opposition. Freedom of expression 
had been mercilessly suppressed especially during the two years since Iraq 
had 
started to contemplate joining the Baghdad Pact. 
Two conflicting trends emerged 
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in Iraqi Arab policy: an "anti-imperialism trend in defence of national rights and 
national honour, and an artificial pro-imperialism trend sponsored by the few sup- 
porters of the Baghdad Pact (Nuri Said in the lead) which, they will know, win 
546 
not live long". The special bilateral agreement concluded with Britain as an ad 
dendum to the Pact, "made Iraq in time of peace as well as in time of war, subject 
to British domination, " and isolated her from the other Arab states. Britain was 
aware that Nuri Said was forced to pursue a fundamentally different foreign policy 
and thus recognised that any situation that brought the West against the Arabs 
would oblige Nuri Said to abandon his pro-Western policy. 
The sponsors of the Pact tried to impose on Jordan, but failed. They launched a 
campaign against Egypt and withdrew their offer of aid for Aswan Dam only to provoke 
the nationalisation of the Canal. ... This situation in Iraq cannot last long. Should the 
West resort to force against Egypt the Iraqi people would be the first to "terminate" 
the Baghdad Pact, hasten to support Egypt and threaten the British oil interests in 
Iraq. An [sic] Saudi Arabia also "will cut the oil flow" to the Western Powers. "" 
As can be seen, the British tried hard to bring other Arab countries in, but 
failed. They were even aware that the pro-Western situation in Iraq could not 
last long, therefore, Britain treated Nuri Said quite gently, whenever required. For 
example, HM Ambassador in Tehran recorded that the apparent feeling in Iran 
was that Iraq was the British "favourite son" and Iran, the Cinderella, might well 
benefit not so much from the name of the Pact as from the policies Britain had 
pursued towards her during the past year or two. He also said that "we 
have found 
it necessary, in order to keep Iraq aligned with the West and inside the 
Baghdad 
Pact, to make a fair number of gestures to her, notably in gifts of arms and 
in such 
matters as deciding that the Baghdad Pact Nuclear 
Centre should be located in 
Baghdad. We have not felt it necessary to make similar gestures to 
Iran. ""' 
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Despite all the gestures Iraq could not avoid a military coup and its subsequent 
consequences. The West felt quite uneasy about what had happened in Iraq and 
frustrated by it. Despite a vague attitude showed by the Iraqi administration to the 
USSR and UAR, Britain even considered a counter military intervention against 
Qassem. But, as was stated in a British document, the inestimable consequences 
were feared: 
"A joint Anglo-US-Turkish intervention in Iraq might well be militarily feasible. 
The political consequences of such intervention would however be serious. ""' The 
West was afraid that an attempt to overthrow the suspected pro-UAR regime in 
Iraq "would unite the whole Arab world (and much of the non-Arab world) against 
United States and jeopardise all our oil supplies from Arab sources. ""' 
The withdrawal of Iraq, finally announced on 24 March 1959 seemed to have 
given the Baghdad Pact a greater unity of purpose and eliminated its involvement 
in inter-Arab quarrels and Arab-non-Arab problems such as Arab-Israeli and Arab- 
French conflict, but in fact it remained a rather artificial combination of three 
Middle Eastern states which had few natural ties with each other. 
Britain eventually admitted that total loss of Iraq was due completely to the 
Iraqi involvement in the Baghdad Pact. Iraq's joining the Baghdad Pact "proved 
to be a fatal mistake for Nuri, since it ignored the strong Arab nationalist trend 
sweeping the Middle East under the leadership of Egypt's popular Prime Minister 
Gamal Abd-al-Nasser and resulted in the break up of the Arab League. "-, " 
Also, the British interests in the Persian Gulf were threatened as a result of 
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the Iraqi revolution. In terms of the prevalent nature of rulership, the Gulf was 
truly a unique area in the world. Of all of the states or sheikhdoms ringing the 
Gulf, only one was non-royal or "non-traditional" in its form of government; the 
overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq had thus far been the only break in the chain 
of ruling tradition that linked the littoral states of the Persian Gulf. Moreover, 
"since 1958 Iraq has been an energetic exporter of its brand of Arab nationalism 
and movements that seek to overthrow Idugly and sheikhly rule. " 552 
The new administration caused also a series of new problems between Iraq and 
Iran. Apart from the Kurdish question, these included the dispute over the Shatt al 
Arab and the matter of the Persians who had settled in Iraq. Something never seen 
as a problem, suddenly became a problem after the coup: The Shah was asking for 
fifty-fifty rights over the Shatt al Arab. He said "whatever the law might be, it was 
illogical and unreasonable that Nuri Said claim full control. He [the Shah] would if 
necessary abrogate the 1937 agreement. " . 553 One could argue that this was purely 
due to the boosting of the Shah by the Western world, because Iran had never 
before claimed such a right over the Shatt to this extent. In addition, Iranians in 
Iraq were being required within a period of three months to become Iraqi citizens 
or to leave the country. Such developments caused some alarm and indignation in 
Iran. A total of 500,000 persons of Iranian stock were living in Iraq (some put this 
figure at 800,000), and about 300,000 retained Iranian citizenship. "' 
For the West, Iran was perhaps more strategically situated than Iraq. Its closer 
location to the USSR, rich oil reserves and large population were some of the other 
reasons for Western concern. Therefore, the destabilisation of 
Iran accompanied by 
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an increase of Soviet influence in the country would affect the security of the West 
in a two-fold way: first of all, given the geopolitical situation of the country and 
its size, it is obvious that, whoever dominates Iran, has a dominating influence in 
the Gulf area. The nature of the system in Iran has a bearing on the politics of her 
neighbours. With increasing influence in Iran the Soviet Union would gain a great 
say in all vital political, strategic and economic decisions in the area. Secondly, 
with a Soviet dominated cordon stretching from Afghanistan via Iran and Syria 
into Lebanon including probably Iraq, pressure on Turkey would tremendously 
increase. In addition, playing on the minorities, i. e. the Kurds, in Western Iran 
a spillover effect into Turkey could be generated and domestic problems could be 
created. This, to a certain extent, already existed after the Iranian and central 
governments partly lost control over the adjacent area. 
At the beginning Iran had no strong desire to ally with Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan 
or Great Britain. Without American adherence the Pact had limited significance 
in the eyes of the Iranian Government as well as all the other Asiatic members. 
Actually, with the co-operation of the United States, Iran's aims might have been 
as well or better attained without joining. The equivalent of an American guarantee, if 
it did not already exist in the deterrent effect of Washington's long-expressed interest 
in Iran on the Soviet leadership, was later provided by the Eisenhower Doctrine and by 
bilateral treaty of March 1959. The desired increase in United States aid could have 
been provided without a formal treaty tying Iran to other states in the Middle East. "" 
However, once Iran decided to align with the West then, it requested and re- 
ceived military, economic and technical assistance from the United States. Iran, 
backed by the West, felt more confident and ignored Soviet threats and blandish- 
ments. Finally, in October 1955, she joined the Baghdad Pact. The reaction 
from Moscow was a strongly worded note calling this step "contrary to Iran's 
good-neighbour relations with the Soviet Union and to certain of Iran's treaty 
'555 Campbell, op. cit., p. 233. 
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obligations. """ But Iran stood firm. And in 1959, Iran declared her treaty with 
the USSR no longer valid. 
557 
A brief glance at the amount of aid received by Iran demonstrates that it had 
a really great influence on the Shah and his government decisions. For example, 
for two years after the overthrow of Premier Musaddeq in 1953 the United States 
bolstered Iran's sick economy with monthly grants of 5,250,000 dollars to cover the 
Government's monthly deficit alone. Combined military and economic aid to Iran 
since 1951 totalled "about 400,000,000 dollars". "' 
In his dispatch, HM Ambassador in Tehran, included some recommendations 
that Britain should briefly make "a token gift of say five jet trainers to be followed 
by a few obsolete or obsolescent jet fighters"; obsolete or obsolescent surplus radar 
equipment might be granted as a gift; some led-down radar facilities might be 
supplied free or on favourable credit terms. Finally it concluded that they were 
"certainly interested in the development of an early warning Radar system to 
provide some security to UK air forces deployed in the Middle East". "' 
Regretting what happened to their friends in Iraq, the British authorities were 
more careful about their relations with other regional countries. They tried not 
to repeat the same mistakes in other countries to avoid a similar fate there. They 
therefore tried to persuade the rulers of those countries that they should not follow 
the same policy as the old regime in Iraq had followed. After dinner at Buckingham 
Palace on 5 May 1960 one British official referred to the Iraqi tragedy and said to 
the Shah that he was convinced that it had nothing to do with the foreign policy 
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of the old regime. The causes, the British thought, were that the rich had not 
been taxed sufficiently and that Nuri had not allowed the middle classes to share 
the responsibility of running the country. He had sat on the lid far too tightly. if 
there had been a moderate system of taxation of the large landowners and if some 
kind of expression of opinion had been allowed to opposition elements, he believed 
that Nuri would have remained in power and the regime lasted a long time. "' 
He said that after what had happened in Iraq one "could not help wondering 
whether the same thing was true of Iran. Some people said it was so. I hoped 
that HM would permit me to enquire from him his views. The Shah said that he 
was inclined to agree with me about Iraq but I must remember that Iraq was a 
new country without national loyalty and that the royal family were Hashemite, 
not Iraqi. ""' They were regarded as foreigners. In Iran the situation was quite 
different. Iran had 2,500 years of history. As the Shah predicted it did not happen 
then, but despite more US support and this long history of loyalty, Iran fell into 
the hands of the Mullahs in 1979. 
One of the Ambassador's old Oxford friends, Hussein Garagozlou, who was the 
brother of the Shah of Persia's Chamberlain, and whose sister was Mrs Ata, and 
whom he had always considered to be well-informed on what was going on in Iran, 
said, among other things: 
American financial aid can have no real effect in cementing the stability of any of 
the Middle East countries, because the money offered only sticks in the hands of the 
ruling class: "Like oil on water". Yesterday I met my colleague, the Iranian Ambassador 
to the Holy See... [who] is also apprehensive about the future, but he told me that the 
Iranian Government were doing their utmost to exert a restraining hand in Iraq through 
the channel of the Kurdish population. One or two highly placed Moslem ecclesiastics 
in Iraq were themselves Kurds, and the Iranian Government had lately sent to 
Baghdad 
a Kurd as their Ambassador [Hussein Jamil]. "' 
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In fact, like the British Ambassador in Italy, many Western diplomats shared 
Hussein Garagozlou's views about the effect of the Western aid to Iran. As other 
documents also suggested... after the coup in Iraq, the Kurdish question once again 
gained a momentum in threatening the regional stability. 
For Iran the most important development of the period was the coup d'etat in 
Iraq of the 14th of July. Not only had the Iraqi revolution substantially changed 
Iranian relations with Iraq, but it had affected the internal situation in Iran also. 
In so many obvious respects the situation in Iraq before the revolution was so 
similar to the situation in the neighbouring kingdom that the sudden collapse of 
the Iraqi monarchy made a profound impression in Iran, "' and neither the regime 
nor its critics and opponents were slow to take note. 
The Iranian armed forces were at once alerted and remained in a state of 
alert until the 18th of August. The Shah's Palace Guard was reinforced. On the 
21st of September an unusually long list of military promotions was published. 
Negotiations for the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which 
took place in London, went unexpectedly well and a draft text was initialled in 
August. UK exports to and imports from Iran showed satisfactory increases. 
"' 
The documents imply that the effects of the Iraqi coup on Iran had swiftly 
been reduced to a harmless level for various reasons. For example, the 
British 
Ambassador, ' reporting from Tehran on a conversation with the Iranian 
Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Hekmat, Said the Minister considered the revolution in Iraq 
had made a great impact on Iranian public opinion, 
but: 
fortunately, the brutalities committed in Baghdad and the hostile attitude which 
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the new regime had adopted toward Iran had largely destroyed any initial sympathy which had been felt in Iran for the revolution. ... The minister urged that the West- ern Powers should strengthen the present Government which was fundamentally anti- Communist and pro-Western. ... His view was that the situation [in Iraq] was still fluid. Kurdish ambitions had been aroused and Arab opinion in Iraq was divided be- tween pro-Nasser and Iraqi Nationalist factions. ... Dr Hekmat expressed particular concern about the attempts which the Iraqi radio was making to stir up the Kurdish tribes in Iran, urging them to unite with Iraqi Kurds etc. I said that I thought the Iranian Government ought to bring this situation to the attention of the UN. ... Dr Hekmat said he would act upon my advice. "" 
As can be seen from the document, the impact of the Iraqi coup was initially 
doubled by the use of the Kurdish factor against Iran. The emergence of disagree- 
ment between the Kurds and Baghdad in 1959 also helped to reduce the negative 
impact of the coup on Iran. However, one can argue that apart from the global 
conflict between the two superpowers and the British interests in the Middle East, 
there was another important factor which promoted the alliance at least between 
the regional members of the Pact. This was the Kurdish problem. . 567 As soon as 
the Pact was divided, the Shah said he was afraid of the Soviet Union stirring up 
trouble in Kurdistan and spoke of the possibility of several tens of thousands of 
Kurds being infiltrated over the Iran-Soviet border. He wished to know "how far 
he could count on British and American support in dealing with an act of indirect 
aggression of this nature. ""' One of the conclusions in one of the contemporary 
papers on the Kurdish problem was that 
if the Soviet Union made trouble among the Kurds in Iran we should give uncondi- 
tional diplomatic and moral support to Iran. US concurrence in this conclusion is being 
sought and HM Embassy at Tehran are aware of it. When we have American agreement 
I think Sir Geoffrey Harrison should be instructed to reply to the Shah along those lines. 
There is no other form of help which we can promise since intervention is out of the 
question. We must expect the Iranians to press the US further on the Kurdish question, 
because the Turks also are clearly worried about communist activities among the Kurds 
566 PRO, FO, 371,133010, EP1022/6,25.8.1958, New York. 
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identical with American global 
interests and therefore Turkey "accidentally" was obliged to align with the 
US. 
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and the two Governments are no doubt comparing notes and working on each othefs 
anxieties. "' 
Although Sanandaji did not go into details when he had a talk with the British 
Ambassador in Tehran, he indicated that "talks between the Turks and the Iranians 
about the Kurds had not made much progress, presumably because of TýJrkish 
dislike of anything which smacks of a forward policy and which might stir up the 
Kurds in Turkey. " 570 
Apart from the common Kurdish issue, there were other relatively less impor- 
tant problems. One of them was the status of the Iranians in Iraq. Under the new 
regulations, Iranians in Iraq were being required within a period of three months 
to become Iraqi citizens or to leave the country. "' 
One of the diplomatic dispatches sent from Iran is particularly interesting, 
because it reveals how the British looked upon the Middle Eastern countries and 
their rulers: 
The Shah though he may sometimes behave childishly, expects adult treatment. 
He is not content with the role of a minor satellite, and is determined to assert himself. 
At the same time it would be unwise to assume that, in fundamentals, his head is not 
properly screwed on, or that his hand has lost its cunning. He can be expected to play 
most of his cards with skill. But the sort of game he will play depends to some extent 
(but to some extent, because of the limitations imposed on both sides by the rules of 
the game) on what cards are dealt to him by the Americans and ourselves in the next 
few months and not least on what happens at Ankara in January 1958. And on the 
foreign, as on the domestic, front it is he who will be in charge here. "' 
Angther document shows how Great Britain used every opportunity to align 
a country with the West. 
I Attracting Iran towards Europe and the West. By this Iran means we must seize 
every opportunity'to help Iran to choose as Turkey has deliberately chosen 
during the 
past forty years - to regard herself more as a member of the 
European, rather than of 
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the Afro-Asian, group of nations. To this end any strengthening of Iranian links with 
Western Europe, e. g. with Italy or Spain, should be welcomed by us in principle. ... We cannot, therefore, afford to forget that the westward orientation of Iran rests on the 
narrow basis of the Shah and the upper class. And, so long as this basis remains narrow, 
internal stability as well as westward orientation can never be taken for granted. We 
must rather regard Iran as still largely uncommitted in the ideological sense; as in part 
leaning towards, and in part reacting against, the West and ourselves, the British. 573 
It is sentiments such as these that persuade anti-Western elements in Turkey 
that Turkey was encouraged, if not forced, to Europeanise itself. Be that as it 
may, the westernisation achieved in Turkey seemed impractical in Iran, and the 
regime eventually collapsed in 1979. The British Ambassador wrote from Tehran 
that "as you are aware, politics in Iran today begin and end with the Shah. During 
the past four years he has steadily concentrated power and executive authority in 
his own hands. ""' All his rivals had been pushed or had fallen out of the way. 
Giving details on how the Shah eliminated his opponents it claimed that there was 
no outstanding figure capable of rallying opinion or initiating policies against the 
Shah's wishes. "Like Eclipse, the Shah truly comes first and the rest nowhere. ", "' 
Another dispatch clarified the dominance of the Shah by giving more details 
about how he handled his ministers, officials etc. "The political plane has been 
dominated by the ascendancy of the Shah, not merely over his ministers, but over 
every organ of government. " 576 The patterns of his personal rule were 
"steadily 
becoming clearer. He alone determined policy; all the strings of control were 
firmly in his hands. Through his trusties in the Army and the newly formed 
Security Organisation, he kept himself minutely informed of everything. ""' He 
interested himself "increasingly and unhealthily" in the "minutiae of government 
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contracts and private (notably Royal Family) business deals. Even when away he 
still pulled all the strings. """ 
The British were naturally delighted with the suppression of the opposition. 
However a time came when the Shah felt obliged to make more concessions to the 
opposition to secure his place in his Palace. That is where the trouble started 
for the British as the British Ambassador in Tehran recorded: "The trouble is 
that the Shah is unlikely to draw the opposition's teeth by making a few harmless 
concessions. " 
579 
The Shah had various means to secure his position. A Government commu- 
nique was issued on 27th of February. A foreign news agency reported rumours 
to the effect that a plot "has been recentlY uncovered in Iran. These rumours 
have caused speculation among the public. ... There are indications of growing 
concern on the part of the Shah at the extent of the plot, and the Americans fear 
an attempt to pin the blame on foreigners and on themselves in particular. ""' 
Indeed, it was true that the Shah played a successful game. On 28 February 
the arrest of General Qarani, and hints of other arrests were announced. On 1 
March the extensive circulation of a scurrilous forged letter, purporting to have 
been written on 8 October 1957, by Mr F. Dulles to Mr Chapin, US Ambassador 
in Iran, clearly designed to implicate the Americans in a conspiracy against the 
Shah. The Ambassador said he had "no doubt at all that the leak was specifically 
designed to prepare for the communique, " though it was by no means clear what 
precise object the press campaign was intended to serve. 
He went on to say that 
presumably the Government wanted to give the 
Americans a fright (they have 
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certainly succeeded) but then the Shah may have got cold feet. The principal aim of 
the publicity however may be to frighten off Iranians from seeking contact with, or at 
least support from, foreigners. ... The Americans, on the other hand, are not yet out 
of the wood. ... If the Shah were to fall out with the mullahs at this juncture, the 
consequences might be much more serious than anything which has developed. "' 
The British Ambassador in Tehran was perfectly right in his assessment of the 
situation in Iran and indeed the leak served its purpose in the short term7 but this 
was not enough for the long term health of the regime. Eventually when the Shah 
was toppled from his throne the consequences were, as the British Ambassador 
rightly predicted , much more serious than anything, which has developed in the 
Middle East, as it entirely changed the course of events with respect to American 
relations with the region. 
The so-called Qarani conspiracy was, the British Ambassador noted, "a fasci- 
nating affair - currents of right-wing opportunism and idealism" leading to vague 
theories of reform and the drawing up of a shadow cabinet list, followed by ap- 
proaches for support and guidance first to the US Embassy and then to HMG's 
Embassy; discovery and denunciation; investigation and arrests by the security 
organisation, exaggeration, rumour and governmental anxieties that the Anglo- 
Americans, particularly the latter, had been planning a "coup to establish a strong 
Prime Minister to balance the power of the Shah; the circulation of a cleverly forged 
and maliciously anti-Shah letter designed to promote an Iran-American crisis, and, 
then, anti- climax. """ 
When he allied himself firmly with the West by joining the Baghdad Pact, the 
Shah made a number of calculations; he could swing an unenthusiastic public; he 
would be associating with the sort of people who would be congenial; he would have 
581 Ibid., . /7,4.3.1958, 
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rich friends who would give him ample loans to tide over the financial difficulties of 
the next few years; given Iran's exposed strategic position, he would be entitled to 
receive massive military aid. This would help to make Iran secure against internal 
troubles as well as external aggression. After two years, only the first two of these 
calculations had been fulfilled according to expectation. He wanted to show his 
people that he could record dramatic progress. "The Western alliance has not 
served this purpose as effectively as he hoped. In his heart of hearts) he must 
know that he is too deeply committed with the West to go fully into reverse. The 
risks would [be] too great. ))583 
When Washington announced its program of non-military aid to Iran in early 
December, an impressive total of 112 million dollars for the July 1957-1958 period, 
the Shah was dissatisfied with this amount. This dissatisfaction found an outlet in 
a critical attitude towards the Baghdad Pact which he claimed had yielded little 
benefit to Iran, notably on the military side. He had gone so far as to hint that 
"Iran might have to consider withdrawing from the Pact". ` 
In fact, there were other reasons for the Shah to reconsider his attitude about 
the Baghdad Pact, though the British were not happy with what was seen as source 
of dissatisfaction. Writing from Tehran, for example, the British Ambassador 
stated that "for obvious reasons Government must decline absolutely to discuss in 
public the precise plans which the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact would 
work out. ... Dr Amini 
[Iranian Prime Minister] professed complete agreement". "' 
This secret plan was about the defence of the Middle East in general and Iran 
I 
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in particular. The mere mention of the Zagros line'16 suggested to the Iranians 
the abandonment of the greater part of Iran to Soviet Russia and "the occupation 
of the remainder by UK troops and their allies, " in order to retain control of 
the oil-producing areas as happened during the two world wars. As regards the 
presentation of the problem, however, no Iranian Government could admit that 
their plan f9r the defence of the country involved abandoning two-thirds of it 
without a serious attempt at resistance. If it was widely believed in Iran that this 
was thq, Baghdad Pact strategy, it would deal a fatal blow to Iranian morale, would 
destroy any prospect of a loyalty to the western alliance and would encourage them 
to revert to neutralism or to come to some arrangement, e. g. a non-aggression pact, 
with the USSR. 587 
In his report describing the opinion of the Iranian Government, HM Ambas- 
sador in Tehran noted that, Zelli's views "if not of Iranian people and their gov- 
ernment, " briefly were: 
a- The Americans had made it known some two years ago, and never withdrawn, 
that the line of defence in Iran was the Zagros Mountains, since the important thing 
was to protect the oil. 
b- The British could certainly not provide the troops to protect Iran, nor would 
the other Baghdad Pact powers. Consequently the military value of the Pact to Iran 
was zero. It 
c- No econoi-qic benefits seemed likely to occur to Iran from the economic side 
of the Pact. It w" ridiculous to suggest that "peaceful uses of Atomic Energy" had 
any application t9ý Iran with its vast resources of energy in the form of oil. Britain 
had admitted that, she could make no financial contribution. Therefore, the Pact was 
economically zero to Iran. 
d- Far greater help had been extended by the West to neutrals, such as Egypt and 
India, than to ally Iran. I did my best to answer the above changes, although 
I did not 
feel on very secure ground in doing so; particularly since, 
if I were an Iranian, I would 
feel like Mr Zelli. "' 
Samsun-Hatay line was proposed by the Western allies but Turkey categorically rejected 
it. The 
US and the UK wanted to leave east of Samsun-Hatay 
line to the responsibility of CENTO, which 
was planned to have its own armed forces. See Yavuzalp, op. cit., p-69. 
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The Shah was frightened by a growing Arab nationalism and unity under 
Nasser. Therefore, he did not create any trouble for the Anglo-Iranian Treaty. In 
order to balance the growing weight of the Arab World) he intended to recognise 
Israel and/or form an Aryan Confederation with Pakistan and Afghanistan, group- 
ing of over a hundred million Muslims which would be able to deal with both the 
Arab World and India on more or less equal terms. "' "Fanciful as this idea may 
appear, it has already gained a number of adherents in Tehran" the Ambassador 
noted. Anot4er embroidery on this theme was that the British Ambassador envis- 
aged that "Pakistan would agree to an Iran-Pakistani Federation under the Shah's 
sovereignty in return for a share of Iranian oil revenues. Later, so it runs, the two 
countries would, with British and American assistance, swing Afghanistan into 
line. Iran's application to join ECAFE, presumably at the instigation of Pakistan, 
has some relevance here. "590 
As is clear from the documents, the Shah began to adhere to anything and 
anybody to save his regime. The more Iran was squeezed between the revolutionary 
regimes around herself and rebellious social forces inside the country the more the 
Shah's nerves strained and saw no limit to his search for a way out. 
The Shah's military Adjutant, General Yazdanpanah, even went so far as to 
claim that Israel was an Iranian shield against Arabia. He also suggested that "it 
may well be that the Shah's insistence on expanding and modernising his army 
is 
based to some extent on his belief in its role as the defender of his southern, rather 
than his northern frontiers. "591 
When he became aware of the fact that neither foreign aid nor a strong army 
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were sufficient to secure his throne he formulated policy of "positive nationalism. " 
This slogan was a typical piece of royal ingenuity, and had much to recommend it 
from a tactical standpoint. Its objects were to steal the clothes of the nationalists, 
to cash in on the development program and the oil revenue, to show at once that 
the Western alliance was to Iran's advantage but since it was also to a large extent 
on Iran's terms, it was no master-slave relationship. "' 
Despite all these efforts to avoid a possible coup taking all the Western interests 
away, Qreat Britain was not satisfied with these measures. The British feared that 
the "danger was that if the Shah continued with his present policies at home there 
might well be an internal explosion. " 
593 
Quite understandably the West employed counter-tactics to restrain the Shah. 
A timed leakage of an event was the traditional way of sending a message to friends 
as well as enemies. A note sent to the Foreign Office was as foRows: "An attempt 
to assassinate Shah Reza Pehlevi will be made exactly three weeks from today. 
At this very moment the Russians are planning a coup in Iran. Get ready for 
something sensational to take place in Teheran in the last week of September or 
the first week of October. " 
594 
Meanwhile the New York Times wrote that, "If Iran collapses it will mean 
the end of the rump Baghdad Pact, a need to revise our own basic strategy and, 
perhaps war. "595 
The fact is that most Iranians were convinced that "Iran is effectively in the 
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hands of foreign powers and that nothing can happen in this country at present 
but by foreign initiative. Whereas the paramount power was formerly the British 
Empire it is now the US, supported by the UK. ""' Many Iranians believed that 
those two powers upheld the Shah and his regime; and that if Iran was a poor and 
backward country it was because the Americans and the British wished it so or 
because they were grudging of more generous assistance. 
Great Britain had learned enough lessons from the coups that had been taking 
place in the colonies as well as in this part of the world and she was determined 
not to repeat similar mistakes in Iran. The British Ambassador stated in this 
respect that "I should have hoped we might all have learned our lesson from Iraq. 
I cannot believe it would suit our interest or the Americans' to have here a July 14 
blood-bath, followed by a Qassem-like figure teetering between Communism and 
Nationalism. " 597 
The Shah was aware that in spite of all the foreign aid guarantees it might not 
be possible to secure his throne. His efforts to implement the "land reform" project 
as well as "Providing jobs for the unemployed" and his attempts to remove the feu- 
dal atmosphere, bribery and corruption gnawing at the administrative machinery 
are worthy of notice. However, "the presentation of all these efforts as favours 
for the people and the non-existence of structural changes towards democracy will 
cause the Shah difficulties in getting rid of the nightmare in which he is living. ""' 
On Western advice the Shah let the elections take place to avoid a social 
explosion or a military coup. Yet, he tried to shape even the political parties in the 
way he wanted. He did not allow the real opposition to participate in the elections. 
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Yet it was a sort of relief in the political atmosphere of the country. The August 
elections were the first held in Iran on the basis of a two-party system. They were 
between the Nationalists, who won, and the People's Party. But as the American 
Ambassador observed, "actually there is no genuine difference between the two 
parties. ""' Both the social classes they represented and their goals were similar. 
Of course this development was not seen as sufficient and further reforms were 
needed the following year. The Shah called these reforms the White Revolution 
in ordqr to give the impression that a revolution was being carried out in Iran as 
wqll. As the Western Powers had enough experiences in the region concerning the 
coups and their possible consequences this so called revolution was successfully 
carried out and by doing so, a social explosion incited by the intellectuals, clergy 
and unhappy military elements, was avoided. As the British Ambassador wrote 
from Baghdad, Mr Strachey "said that he did not meet a single person in Iran 
outside their Embassy who believed that the Shah and the present regime had 
the remotest chance of surviving. ""' Because he perceived that middle class and 
upper class youth looked around and saw Turkey, Iraq and Pakistan all, in their 
eyes, making some degree of progress and all having their revolution. "They were 
all convinced that nothing could be done until Iran too had its revolution. Mr 
Strachey thought that this might come at any time, next week, next year or in 
three or four years. ""' 
Indeed afteT siMilar discussions on a "rescue operation" both decided that "we 
and the Americans should go to the Shah and formally tell him that unless 
he 
carried out the sort of reforpis which we all know to be necessary we, or rather 
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the Americans would stop subsidising him. ""' Asked about the reactions of the 
intellectuals, Mr Strachey told the British Ambassador that he thought that they 
would welcome it. The British thought that "the withdrawal of the Iranians would 
presumably mean collapse of the Baghdad Pact and a major defeat for the West. ""' 
As mentioned earlier, the United States was aware that any move for an in- 
tervention to encourage reform in Iran would backfire. The aid program could 
have some influence toward reform, but it was hampered thus far by a measure 
of waste and lack of direction for the Americans in addition to obstacles on the 
local scene. Yet the Americans preferred to put pressure on the Shah to choose his 
policy wisely when the choice was between reform today and revolution tomorrow. 
Indeed, the Shah was persuaded to carry out a reform package that he was to 
call the "White Revolution" later in 1961. Speaking in terms of the Middle Eastern 
defence, Iran was much weaker and more unstable than Turkey and Iraq. It added 
no significant military strength to the Middle Eastern defence. She gave little 
solid assurance of continuity either in internal or foreign policies. Her negotiations 
with the USSR on a non-aggression pact early in 1959 conveyed a message to the 
Western powers that her reversion to neutrality and a balancing of the great powers 
was not out of the question. This would not be to the Western liking. Yet Iran's 
membership of CENTO was important only as it served the end of greater strength 
and stability; it was considered harmful if it tended to generate internal conflict 
and to increase opportunities for outside meddling. More than 
formal allies Iran 
needed encouragement, help and time to settle down and build sound 
institutions 
to keep up with the Western alignment. 
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As the detente era began to operate in the international system, Iran, too, 
like Turkey, began to change her priorities, even if she was not forced to do so by 
changing United States priorities in the Middle East. By the mid-1960s, therefore, 
the Iranian foreign policy started to move away from earlier and overwhelming 
preoccupation with the Communist threat to the north and "tended to pay more 
and more attention to threats to Iranian interests in the south, particularly in the 
Persian Gulf. "'P' The US attached increasing importance to oil supplies from the 
Persian Gulf area. ýIer growing interest, backed with military and naval presence, 
increased tension in the area. The US saw Iran as its outpost in the region, and 
Iranians were happy to turn their attention south at American behest. Iran had 
vital interests in the Gulf (oil, trade and security). She felt strong enough, with 
Western support in reserve behind her, to assert some of her claims by the end 
of 1950s: the demand for joint control of the Shatt al-Arab, proper representa- 
tion in Kuwait, occupation of any unoccupied islands, closer relations with the 
Sheikhdoms and Bahrain. Those were, of course, understandably encouraged by 
Great Britain and the US, because Iraq already fell out of the way by the coup 
in 1958 and the Arab nationalism led by Nasser was still against the British pres- 
ence in the region. Therefore, the Shah was the preferred ruler in the region to 
support. Thanks to the generous American moral and material support, the Shah 
maintained his rule over his country until the Islamic Revolution in 1979. In fact, 
before the decade ended, the Middle East in general ceased to be the main centre 
of interest and attention had moved to the Far East, to Europe and to Africa South 
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Pakistan with its geographical location and large population was another im- 
portant country for the West and an indispensable part of the defence chain linking 
SEATO to the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and thus to NATO via Turkey. The 
West therefore wanted to control Pakistani foreign policy. Its strategic importance 
was enhanced by its closeness to three most populous nations in the world, China, 
India and the USSR, all of which were against the Western designs globally as 
well as regionally. Pakistan was a country with a military potential, a dislike of 
communism, and a willingness to stand up and be counted. 
On the other hand, Pakistan had its own problems; Kashmir7 border disputes 
with its neighbours and Canal waters with India. She was aware that she was 
not able to solve them alone neither through bilateral nor via the UN. Indefinite 
postponement was not obviously helping to solve the Kashmiri problem. Indef- 
inite continuance gave the advantage to the party in occupation, namely India. 
Therefore, Pakistan was in search of international support and this, the Pakistani 
rulers believed, could be obtained by alignment with the West in general and the 
US in particular. 'O' For Pakistan, her alignment with Turkey and SEATO in 1954, 
and the Baghdad Pact in 1955 meant military, economic and diplomatic support. 
Pakistan, a recently established country was really not expected to interest herself 
in Middle Eastern defence initiatives. Her apparent alignment with the West or 
her estrangement from other major forces was more than enough for the West. At 
least one could say that Pakistan engaged in the defence of the Middle East not 
because of her realisation of the need for the Middle Eastern defence, but rather 
for more immediate reasons such as Kashmir and border disputes with her neigh- 
bours. If all these border disputes were settled in her favour Pakistan would get 
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approximately four times more than India. "" There was stalemate in this respect 
too. 
Commenting on the problem, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr Manzur 
Qadir noted that within the last eleven years there had been fourteen proposals. 
He suggested that "if the interested parties cannot agree, the only other peaceful 
alternative is to let someone else decide. Indefinite postponements are not solu- 
tions. They are only means for indefinite continuance of the advantage gained by 
the party in occupation. " 608 
In Pakistan, it was actually just a few strong persons who aligned the country 
with the West, just like its other friends in Iran, Iraq and perhaps to a lesser extent 
IVrkey. Campbell summarised Pakistan's position accurately: 
Behind them, and behind the front of solidarity with the West, is a nation that 
has not yet found political stability. Handicapped by its geographical division into 
two separate territories dissimilar in population, history and outlook, it has been held 
together by the bonds of religion, by antipathy to India, and by the leadership of men 
like Jinnah, Luiaqat Ali Khan, and Mohammed Ayub. How well it will weather the 
inevitable crises of the future is an open question. ... Moreover, if Pakistan is to have a 
role in the Middle East it will not be because of its armed strength or its membership in 
the Baghdad Pact but primarily because, as an Islamic nation of 70 million souls that 
has preserved some part of its British heritage and found strength in its own institutions, 
it may exert a healthy influence on other Moslem nations and help to bring Arab and 
non-Arab states closer together. "' 
The expectation that Pakistan would positively influence coreligionists in the 
Arab world persuaded the British, albeit reluctantly, to accept the American pro- 
posal of a Nort4ern Tier project after the abortive attempt to establish MEDO in 
1953. AlthouF4 Pak istan worked quite hard to bring the Middle Eastern countries 
closer and aligned With the West but in the end like its fellow Muslim country 
Turkey, it inevitably failed to achieve any expansion of the Baghdad Pact into the 
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Arab world. 
Ten years of difficult diplomacy in the UN made Pakistani authorities lose faith 
in the international community in respect of solutions to their problems. In addi- 
tion to the foreign policy difficulties, the internal problems too remained without 
solution for a decade. The Army headed by Ayub Khan, decided to take power in 
1958. The Pakistani Ambassador in Tehran noted that "changes of regime in Pak- 
istan caused some anxiety. The coup d'itat was interpreted by some as a British 
device to anticipate a revolution, and was generally not welcomed. Discussion 
of the Aryan Union of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan was discontinued. ""' One 
wonders whether this coup was planned to disrupt such an attempt. "' 
She, too, was disillusioned with the economic, military and diplomatic support 
that she received from the West and eventually neither the Western Powers nor 
the regional member countries were satisfied with the various Middle East defence 
initiatives and all lost ground to the Soviet political and diplomatic counter attacks. 
The headworks of the Pakistan canals, which were under India's control, were 
turned off and people in Pakistan faced famine conditions. This was a very serious 
problem for Pakistan and resulted partly from her pro-Western policies. Although 
Pakistan managed to maintain her independence, she was not in a strong position 
with regard to her neighbour India, her other neighbour, China or the Soviet Union, 
which was not a neighbour but a potential danger to any country in the world if 
it was suffering from poverty. 
She even sometimes failed to defend her national cause in the meetings of the 
Baghdad Pact, while pretending that the Baghdad Pact was "for" this aim. For ex- 
610 PRO, FO, 371,133003, EP1013/4,6.11.1958. 
611 It is worth noting here that compared with other members of the Baghdad 
Pact there were quite 
few documents on Pakistan in Public Record Office as well as in the Library of 
Congress. 
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ample in April 1956 Mohammed Ali, Pakistani Prime Minister, insisted that some 
references to Kashmir in the conference communique were essential to reassure 
Pakistan public opinion. If there was no such reference, the Pakistan public would 
doubt the value of membership of the Pact. What he got was complete exclusion 
of Kashmir from the communique. HM Ambassador defended this attitude when 
he wrote to the Foreign Office on the ground that "any more public references will 
ruin any chance we have of influencing Nehru in London in June". 612 
When the Americans did not give careful attention to their demands Ayub 
Khan began seriously to reconsider his foreign policy line. lkramullah confirmed 
that Ayub Khan's statement was intended to convey that "if there were no expan- 
sion of military aid from friendly countries, Pakistan would be unable to undertake 
any external military obligations under the Pact. " 613 However, Pakistan, like any 
other small power, had no option but to align herself with one of the superpowers 
and the US was destined to be her ally regardless of her own genuine wishes. 
One could not easily claim that the revolutions in this part of the world were 
all planned by the imperialist powers and they were taking place at the time and 
in the way that the imperialists wanted. However, whatever reasons or motives 
were behind the revolutions, the imperialists were clever and capable enough to 
influence, if not dir'gct, the new rulers of the countries involved. Therefore, revo- 
lutions rarely changpd the course of events drasticall y. 614 On the other hand, one 
should not forget týat it was all these revolutions that considerably changed the 
course of relations with the Western World in favour of the exploited nations 
in 
long term. 
612 PRO, FO, 371,123674, DY1071/2,13.4.1956. 
613 PRO, FO, 371,140714, EB1071/9D, 13-8.1959, Karachi. 
614 The Iranian revolution is almost the only cxceptioný in this respect. 
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As well as the Muslim members of the Pact, Jordan had a special place as 
far as the security of Israel was concerned. Jordan was also important for the 
Baghdad Pact, since it was the most likely candidate for membership if the Arab 
countries would ever join. Having cordial relations with Turkey, the Hashemite 
King of Jordan, together with Iraqi rulers, constituted a pro-Western bloc against 
the radical nationalist Arab countries led by Nasser's Egypt. When Egypt united 
with Syria in 1958 Hashemite rulers of Jordan and Iraq reacted to this by forming 
a federation between themselves. As the July coup swept away the rulers of Iraq, 
King Hussein declared himself the King of both Jordan and Iraq, but it soon 
became clear that federation would not work. Eventually, in order to maintain 
friendly relations with Jordan, the US and the UK came to an agreement to grant 
the former economic and military aid. Reacting to this, Al Shaab's account of 
the Anglo-American agreement with Jordan, said to have resulted from the visits 
to Washington and London of King Hussein and the Jordanian Prime Minister, 
Samir Rifai, was, the British thought, more plausible, being largely a repetition 
of known or assumed facts. Thus, America and Britain were to grant financial 
and military aid to Jordan of the order of 50 million dollars, but in return, 
Al 
Shaab said, "Jordan will maintain her estrangement with the UAR, will 
be used 
9 
as a military base to stop the infiltration of communism, and will adopt a neutral 
attitude in týe pre4f-nt dispute between the Arabs and 
Israel. " For Al Shaab "it 
has become quite clp'ar that there is a tacit pact between the 
imperialists and their 
stooges in this part of the world, including communist agents. 
""' 
Always there is pufficient apparent conviction expressed 
to inspire the question 
how njuch is policy, how much suspicion, how much plain neurosis; 
Probably as 
usual in the Middle East there is a 
bit of everything involved; and some diplomatic 
observers have eyen adopted the plausible 
belief that Russian intelligence is deliberately 
615 PRO, FO, 371,140946, EQ10338/10,6.5.1959. 
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planting stories about collusion with the West against Arab nationalism in order to keep 
President Nasser in a state of physiological isolation. 616 
Such plans and assessments indicate how truly convoluted the politics of the 
Middle East are and serve as a timely reminder that the situation is usually more 
complicated than it may seem on the surface. Indeed they may help to explain why 
the Arabs arp so often confused about their problems, both internal and external. 
A foreip finger can usually be found in any problem in the region. So the Arabs 
have always been cautious and indecisive in their policies ever since the famous 
Arab rebellion in 1915. 
ý Having no friendly relations with Turkey due to the question of Hatay, the 
Syrian government was reluctant to participate in any defence initiatives in the 
Middle East. Syria was also unhappy about Iraq and Jordan because both of 
them supported Turkey in its dispute with Syria over the Hatay question. This 
eventually led the Syrians to seek external help, which was generously granted 
by the Soviets. When the Turks suspected that some communist elements had 
infiltrated into Syria, where an anti-western government was in power, Turkey 
began to calculate the possibility of external intervention, thereby hoping to win 
the American favour and build up credit for the future, but they worked hard to 
stop Turkey from such intervention in 1957. In 1958 Syria ended her isolation by 
uniting with Egypt, but it lasted only three years. 
Lebanese politics had always been dominated by pro-western governments. 
However that was not sufficient to bring Lebanon into the Baghdad 
Pact. Turkey 
as well as the West initially hoped that Lebanon would adhere to the 
Pact, but the 
internal turmoil and Egyptian opposition prevented this 
from happening. When 
616 Ibid., . 
/lO, 6.5.1959, FO, London. 
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the coup took place in Iraq, the US felt obliged to land American marines to the 
country in order to save Chamoun's rule in Lebanon. When the Americans realised 
that the possibility of revolution in Lebanon was over they evacuated their forces 
from there. 
As Ali Sabri, the Director of Political Office of Egyptian Presidency, said, the 
situation in 1959 was very different from the situation in 1951; the USSR was 
incomparably stronger militaridy, economically and diplomatically; in 1951 the 
UAR had not been in a position to act freely, whereas in 1959) it could, and so it 
was a factor in the situation. "" 
In short, Turkey used all means available to bring more Arab countries into 
the Baghdad Pact, but failed. Although Turkey did her best to maintain West- 
ern interests in the region, her efforts were thwarted by strong Arab nationalism, 
successful Soviet diplomatic manoeuvres and miscalculation of the West about the 
influence and power of the radical Arabs. As a result, none of the Arab countries 
joined ýhe Mutual Agreement between Turkey and Iraq and instead of improving 
relatiolls between the West and the Arab countries the Western defence initiatives 
alienated these countries from the West more than ever. These initiatives also 
created an opportunity for the USSR to penetrate into the Middle East with the 
help of local nationalisms, namely Arab and Kurdish nationalisms. In the late 
1950s, Turkey found herself strongly aligned with powerful Western countries but 
completely isplýted from the rest of the world. 
The reasons whY the West's influence had declined and the Communist Bloc 
was winning the coptest in the Middle East in the 1950s and also the extent to 
which this happened and the consequences of this contest will be discussed in the 





THE COLLAPSE OF THE BAGHDAD PACT AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES 
7.1 General 
Despite all political and diplomatic efforts of Great Britain and generous fi- 
nancial support of the US the failure of the Baghdad Pact was inevitable. In this 
chapter, we should focus on the causes of this failure, the political consequences 
of the Pact for the West as well as for the Middle East, long term measures taken 
by the West after the collapse of the Pact, and finally concentrate separately on 
the position of each regional member of the Pact, paying particular attention on 
Turkey. 
The British, whose goal was to hold on to the military value of British treaty 
rights in Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, for as long as possible, perceived the defence 
of the Middle East as a means of continuing British influence in the region. This 
was their "inner defence" strategy centred on the "inner ring" whose locus was 
Suez. ""' This was not because the Suez was under Communist threat, it was due, 
understandably, to British imperial interests. 
For Britons, especially those long associated with the Middle East, there was no 
joy in retreat from the last British strongholds in the region. Yet it was pertinent 
for them to consider whether the reasons for taking the strongholds in the first 
place and for keeping them since were still valid. The original purpose was to 
McGhee, op. cit., P. 54. 
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protect India and the routes of the British Empire; but India was no longer a 
British responsibility and most of the empire in Asia was gone. The last efforts 
were intended to safeguard Britain's vital oil supplies in the area of the Persian 
Gulf; but this was an interest of all Western Europe and of other countries as well, 
including the United States. 
Despite the renunciation of "imperialist" aims and privileges, Soviet policy 
maintained many of the traditional conceptions of Russian strategic interests fol- 
lowed by the Tsarist regime, e. g., control of the Black Sea, egress for Russian naval 
power through the Straits, and spheres of influence in the Balkans and toward the 
Persian Gulf. Soviet policy had been dynamic and actively expansionist. "' 
Britain was obliged to transfer her responsibility in the Middle East to the 
United States, but this did not mean that both countries were to agree on every 
single point concerning the protection of the Western interests in the region. So, 
their differences remained even when they desperately needed a "united Western 
front" against the USSR. In time, the breakdown of unity between Britain and the 
United States was less noticeable but even more serious. Yet, despite differences 
of approach the two powers seemed to be agreed on the importance of defence of 
the Middle East against the Soviets. Both supported the Baghdad Pact. Minor 
troubles reflecting differences in attitude toward Iran, Egypt or 
Saudi Arabia were 
not permitted to shake the general agreement on the main 
lines of policy. That 
policy, judging by the British acceptance of the withdrawal 
from the Suez base in 
1954 and later from those in Iraq, seemed to envisage a gradual 
Western retreat 
from positions that local nationalism would no 
longer accept. No agreement existed 
on how far and how fast the process was to go. 
As in the past, the degree of pressure 
619 Campbell, op. cit., p. 25. 
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which nationalism could generate would probably be the determining factor. But 
the idea of a gradual transition to a new system based on consent seemed to be at 
least tacitly accepted by both Great Britain and the United States. Indeed, when 
the decolononisation process started in 1960s, the whole Arab world was eager to 
enjoy independence as a result of such strong nationalism. 
Measures to ensure continued access to Middle East petroleum resources were 
seen as necessary, because it was, at least for the next ten years, vital to the 
security of Western Europe. Now, it depended only on the maintenance of friendly 
and influential relations with those countries. In this connection, the Baghdad 
Pact, the Eisenhower doctrine, the British position in Kuwait and the Persian 
Gulf in general and finally United States' relations with Saudi Arabia were very 
important. 
Underlying the West's involvement in the Middle East throughout the 20th 
century were its interests first in the oil and second in the survival of the Israeli 
state and perhaps finally in its strategic geographical location, though this used to 
have the first priority till the beginning of the century. Western politicians were 
anxious to prevent the USSR gaining control over Middle East oil or over the routes 
by which it was transported to the West. Although the United States could get 
along without Middle Eastern oil, Western Europe could not. A few figures will 
I 
illustrate the extent. .1 of Western European dependence, and vulnerability. Their oil 
requirements by 1959 were over 3,300,000 barrels a day, (over 20 per cent of the 
total energy used). Between 70 and 80 per cent of European imports of crude oil 
came from the Middle East. 620 
620 Ibid., p. 250. Ashton recorded that according to t4e British figures, this 
figure was 90 per cent. 
Ashton, op. cit., p. 124. 
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The crisis of 1956, when the Suez Canal was blocked 621 and the pipelines from 
Iraq to the Mediterranean were cut, showed how vulnerable the Western European 
economy was to the interruption or sharp diminution of these supplies. They were 
not entirely cut off: some 200,000 barrels still moved to Europe daily by pipeline 
from Saudi Arabia, and some of the tankers which had Previously gone through the 
Suez delivered oil by the longer route around the Cape. The crisis was surmounted, 
because the loss of Middle Eastern oil was not lasting (the canal was open again in 
May 1957 and the pipelines from Iraq were in partial operation by March of that 
year), and was almost matched by added supplies from the Western Hemisphere. 
If the whole supply from the Middle East were unavailable and/or the Soviet rulers 
had it under their control, to turn the tap on or off at their whim, it would be 
very doubtful if Europe could stand the financial strain of meeting its requirements 
indefinitely from the American continents. 
Once the British, like any other colonial power, settled in the region, they 
began to maintain their position by every available means. One of the well known 
means was the famous "divide and rule. ""' Dividing Arab territories into twenty 
two countries seems to be result of such a policy. In order to maintain their 
influence over these countries, Great Britain tried to direct affairs from behind the 
scenes by urging local allies to initiate groupings such as the Arab League and the 
Baghdad Pact too. 
611 Giinver mentioned that, only one Turkish ship was passing through the Suez Canal a mouth yet 
we interested ourselves so closely with negotiations in London. 
612 Capipbefl, op. cit., p. 308. Jordan is a case in point, a state kept in being by the rivalries of 
others both inside and outside the Middle East. Created arbitrarily by the British for their own 
strategic purposes and to establish a throne for their friend Abdullah, its original frontiers were 
but arbitrary lines drawn or left vague in the desert. It was obvious that Tran. 9jordan would never 
be able to stand on its own feet. In fact the US regarded Jordan a country which has no 
logical 
ratson d'etra. See 'The Eisenhower Doctrine, Soviet Policy and Arab Reactions, ' 
Survey of 
International Affairs, (December 1956-October 1957), p. 173. 
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Another tactic was to keep the traditional rulers in power and through them 
to maintain Western interests. Pressure was mounting on Western oil companies 
for arrangements more favourable to producing and transit countries. The Amer- 
ican intelligence service stated that, "at least as long as conservative governments 
remain in power in the producing countries, arrangements acceptable to Western 
interests can probably be worked out. ""' 
As seen already in the previous chapters, every country had its own problem 
to cope with. So, every single country tended to join the Baghdad Pact for a 
different set of reasons. As these have already been explained we shall only briefly 
recall them here since those conflicting expectations were bound to cause failure 
of the Pact. For instance, Turkey did not seriously expect the Middle Eastern 
countries to contribute to her national defence against Soviet expansionism. If 
Turkey nonetheless pressed her neighbours to form such a defence pact, this was 
mainly due to her responsibility in the region, which she assumed as a result of the 
negotiations, in which she promised the West to "defend the Western interests in 
the region" as her "national duty. " 624 On the other hand, Turkey, its forces already 
committed to NATO, could not be expected to do more in the east than try to 
hold its own territory. However, since the mid-1950s Turkey, too, had a foreign 
policy problem to wrestle with in the shape of Cyprus. "'So, Turkey, though she 
had not joined the Pact with that problem in mind, thereafter considered the 
Baghdad Pact a platform where she could publicise her views on the subject and 
gain international support. The same was true for Pakistan with regard to the 
623 FRUS, V61.12, National Intelligence Estimate, Near East Developments Affecting United States 
Interests, 8.10.1957, p. 611. 
624 Birmingham Post, 15.5.1951. Erkmen regrettably acknowledged this statement during the inter- 
view. Reading from his personal notes, Ak§it also stated that 
Turkish relations with the West 
drastically changed as Turkey accepted this role in the 
Middle East. 
625 See the fourth chapter pp. 150-153. 
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Ka-shmir and for Iraq on the Palestine question. Generally speaking, Iraq and Iran 
were woefully weak and Pakistan was absorbed in its disputes with India. All 
three had joined primarily in order to get arms from the United States rather than 
out of faith in the concept of regional security. Britain, ironically, never accepted 
those problems as being within the Pact's area of interest as she, too, had her 
own reasons to join the Pact: to save her position in Iraq and to bolster a sagging 
influence throughout the Middle East. The Pact mainly served her own interests 
since Britain was the dominant power. Therefore, the Pact understandably stopped 
even discussing the Palestinian question as soon as Iraq abandoned the Pact de 
facto 1958. Finally, the refusal of the United States to join had left all members 
with a feeling they had been deceived and let down. "' 
As seen from the above explanation, the Baghdad Pact failed, because the 
assumptions as well as the foundations were wrong: three of the regional members 
did not see the USSR as their major threat. Pakistanis regarded India as their 
main danger, Iraq proclaimed Israel the main enemy to the region, and Iranians 
felt they were being exploited more by the British and Americans than by the 
Russians. Therefore, if there was any threat to be protected against, it must have 
quite logically been the Western threat with the help of some "other nations" 
whoever they may be, not the other way around. So, Iran, too, was not genuinely 
after a Western protective umbrella, but was forced to join the Baghdad Pact and 
as far as the Shah himself was concerned, this accession was, meant to secure 
the Shah's throne against the internal elements not the Middle East against the 
external threat, the USSR. Turkey always considered the USSR as a threat, 
but 
the Turkish attitude in aligning herself with the West in the 1950s could not 
be 
626 Campbell, op. cit., p. 61. 
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explained only by this historical factor. It may have helped the process but the 
main motivation behind the Turkish alignment with the West was due to the 
characteristic of the Kemalist regime irrespective of this perception of the Russian 
threat. 627 Turkey was never sincere in attempting to defend the Middle East but 
used it as a springboard to become a NATO member in order to be able to defend 
herself against the USSR as well as become more integrated with the West in 
accordance with Kemalist aims. So, the assumptions were wrong, the foundations 
were false and thus the failure and decease were inevitable. 
627 Interview with Giilek 
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7.2 Reasons for the Baghdad Pact's Failure 
However, as the Americans admitted, the situation in certain Middle East- 
ern areas had deteriorated since the first Baghdad Pact Council meeting. Two 
interacting factors produced this result. One of them was the intensification of 
Soviet activity and the other was the further growth of "false nationalism" accom- 
panied by "irrational neutralism". The "result was that some countries had been 
weakened and had become increasingly susceptible to Soviet Communist intrigue. 
Leaders of certain countries [were] apparently willing [to] rely on Soviet promises 
to achieve success. ""' In fact, deterioration of relations between the West and the 
pro-Western countries was understandable because "those countries which caused 
trouble or disturbances, i. e. Egypt, Afghanistan, even Jordan did better than those 
which remained quiet and well- behaved""" in terms of getting economic aid. 
Another disadvantage for the West was the fact that the students, a real polit- 
ical force in the Middle Eastern countries, "have been drawn toward communism 
and xenophobia by their dissatisfaction with the existing order and their suscepti- 
bility to the argument that the West is to blame. ""' 
Much of the trouble the Western powers harvested in the Middle East, indeed, 
grew out of the impression that they were trying to dragoon nations into alliances 
against their will. So, Soviet propaganda made inroads in the 
Middle East by 
playing upon this very theme. Therefore, the Baghdad Pact 
"like the Arab League, 
might well be left to find its own level as a Middle Eastern organisation. 
Perhaps 
it will gently fade into obscurity like its predecessor, the 
Sadabad Pact of 1937, ""l 
628 FR US, V61.12, op. cit., p. 292. 
629 PRO, FO, 371,120731, EP1105/1,26.1.1956. 
630 CampbeH, op. cit., p. 299. 
631 Ibid., p. 243. 
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which linked Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. 
Moreover, the strong Egyptian opposition to the Pact also had an immense 
negative effect on the regional countries. "" The Voice of Arabs, broadcasting to 
all the Arab world, identified as Zionists those who associated with the West and 
declared them to be the enemies of the Arabs. The radio cited Turkey as "a main 
instrument of the West and a state which supports Israel in rendering our Arabs 
homeless". It said the Baghdad Pact was a link in the imperialist chain. 
Not only the nationalist Arabs but also the Kurds, one of the destabilising 
elements in the Middle East, were against the Baghdad Pact. They did not know 
much about the workings of the Pact, but, they suspected that close co-operation 
between the three governments could easily bring about the squeeze of the Kurds. 
Therefore, on one hand, the Baghdad Pact was to disadvantage of the Kurds who 
were forced to cease their national activities in each separate country, on the other 
hand, it served them to become more nationally conscious for a United Kurdistan. 
Criticism of the Baghdad Pact by Tito as one of the influential names of the 
Non-Aligned movement was another cause of failure. Like Nasser he emphasised 
on the "disruptive ilafluence of the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Doctrine" 633 
and tho Pact's disupiting influence on the Arab countries. 
Some comments, which appeared in the American Press, shared the same 
view. The Philadelphia Bulletin, for example, commented that "the Pact has 
been assailed as divisive, since it split Iraq from its Arab neighbours, and its value 
was questioned when Russia overleaped it to develop relations with Egypt and 
632 British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd noted in his personal diary that he hated the efficacy of 
Radio Cairo "as powerful as Goebbels. " Kyle, op. cit., p. 321. 
633 PRO, FO, 371,127822, VB1071/3,17.7.1957, London. 
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Syria. """ Together with other factors, these causes accelerated the failure of the 
Baghdad Pact. 
Suppression and increasing opposition in Iraq was another factor. The situation 
in the Middle East in general was not very favourable to the West. Since Iraq 
started to plan for joining the Baghdad Pact, freedom of expression of opinion was 
suppressed by the government. Besides, Nasser launched a successful campaign 
against the rule of Nuri Said. It was obvious that this situation in Iraq could 
not last long. Iraq was suspected to terminate its membership and threaten the 
Western oil interests in Iraq if the West attacked Egypt. Meanwhile, even Saudi 
Arabia was expected to cut the oil flow to the Western Powers. "' 
Indeed the situation in Iraq did not last long and the 14 July revolution, 
terminating the Baghdad Pact, occurred just three years later following its es- 
tablishment. With the overthrow of the monarchic rule, which was subordinate 
to the influence and directives of the West and which depended on the Baghdad 
Pact as one of the pillars of its policy in the region, the Pact became a matter of 
history as far as Iraq was concerned. The Iraqi revolution considerably weakened 
the Pact and compelled the Western powers that had formed it to seek out new 
ways and means of strengthening it, such as arming the regional member countries, 
establishing military bases in their territories and concluding military treaties with 
them with a view to reviving the Pact. "' 
The Baghdad Pact, as previously described, was destined to have a short life. 
It fell apart on 14 July 1958, with the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq, the only 
Arab country in the Pact. In the ensuing wave of Arab nationalism there was 
634 PRO, FO, 371,127838, VB1078/4,22.6.1957, Washington. 
636 PRO, FO, 371,121648, VQ1022/13,7.8.1956. 
636 PRO, FO, 371,140711, EB10393/3,24.1.1959, Baghdad. 
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trouble in Aden and also in Lebanon, where the United States landed troops on 
15 July at the request... of the Lebanese president, Chamoun. They were to stay 
until 25 October, a few days before the British retired from Jordan. With the Iraqi 
withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, an era in US-UK efforts to organise a Middle 
East defence involving the Arab states had resulted in failure. "' 
In fact, as HM Ambassador in Tehran noted, on the Baghdad Pact front there 
was apýthy 4nd disillusion. "It has, as you know, never been popular. " 
639 
637 Turkish Ambassador in Amman, Mahmut Dikerdem suggested that he personally conveyed the 
message from the presidents of Turkey and Pakistan and the 
Shah of Iran to King Hussein of 
Jordan to officially request the help of the West. He noted the same 
had been done for Chamoun 
of Lebanon. See Dikerdem, Mahmut, 
Ortadog'u'da Devnm Yfflan, Cem Yayinevi, istanbul, 
1990. 
638 McGhee, op. cit., p. 158 and interview with Giilek. 
639 PRO, FO, 371,140818, EP1071/9,23.7.1959, Tehran. 
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7.3 Impacts of the Failure of Western Defence Initiatives 
This development in Iraq consequently affected the neighbouring countries as 
well as the Pact itself. As previously mentioned unless Pakistan was offered more 
military aid, "" Ayub Khan was ready to reconsider Pakistan's foreign policy line. "' 
Its effects on Turkey, which will be explained later, were more than on Pakistan. 
One of the direct effects of the Iraqi withdrawal was that the British Ambas- 
sador, writing from Ankara, for example, noted that the absence of Iraq meant 
that "we need not lay such stress on Palestine and other Arab problems. ""' 
In addition to the domestic sources of unrest and revolution, the humiliation 
of Arab weakness in the conflict with Israel had created a continuing mood of 
frustration and discontent which any clever demagogue or political manipulator 
could exploit, particularly if outside assistance was available to him. Cairo's "Voice 
of the Arabs" in this respect, provided continuing incitement to revolution. But 
the basic cause of the instability and unrest was that the old static society was 
breaking up, because the presence of western oil companies affected the nature 
and tempo of life in the region in general, in Iraq and Saudi Arabia in particular. 
These economic changes were "affecting the habits and outlook of the peasants of 
Iraq, many of whom now flock to the cities to form a new floating proletariat. " 643 
Growing Arab nationalism, which was another cause for the Iraqi revolution 
and thus for the failure of the Western defence initiatives in the Middle East, 
was inspired in large degree by the Western example and grew up in 
hostility 
640 Walt claimed that Pakistan received an average of 120 million 
dollars per year between 1953 and 
1958. Walt, op. cit., p. 304. 
641 PRO, FO, 371,140714, EB1071/9D, 13.8.1959, Karachi. 
642 PRO, FO, 371,132923, EB10399/222,12.12.1958, Ankara. 
643 Campbell, op. cit., p. 291. 
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to the West. This, in Campbell's words) "without any doubt, eased the way for 
the advance of Soviet influence into the Middle East. But this has happened not 
because of any natural affinity between nationalism and communism in the Middle 
Eastern mind. It has happened, because the targets of nationalism were positions 
held by the Western powers. Recent events have removed some of those targets. "644 
Some in Europe thought that the withdrawal of Iraq gave it a greater unity 
of purpose and eliminated its involvement in inter-Arab quarrels, but in fact it 
remained a "rather artificial combination of three Middle Eastern states which 
have few natural ties with each other. """' 
The failure of the Middle Eastern defence initiatives and the Turkish involve- 
ment in it once more indicated that Turkish political influence was virtually non- 
existent, owing to "Arab distrust of the Turks as former Ottoman overlords and 
present partners of the West, and to Turkish contempt for the weakness and indis- 
cipline of the Arabs". "' In fact, Turkish support of Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, 
their confrontational policy towards Syria in 1957, Iraq in 1958 and granting per- 
mission to Americans to use incirlik base during Lebanon Crisis in 1958 all caused 
"Turkey's credibility to sink even further in the eyes of the Arabs and provoked 
the opposition at home. " 647 Turkey tried to safeguard security against the Soviet 
threat by participating in the Western and regional security systems and received 
American military aid. However as 
ibrahim Barutýuo'lu, a Turkish navy com- 9 
mander, noted that "participation in formal regional defense organisations 
did not 
add to the security of Turkey, but as in the 1950s caused Turkey's 
isolation and 
644 Ibid., p. 297. 
645 Ibid., p. 242., 
646 Ibid., p. 290. 
647 Ayhan, Mahmut Boli, 'The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy from the 
1950s to the 
1990s, ' Infernational Journal of 
Middle East Studies, (1993), p. 93. 
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encirclement by hostile states. " 
64' The Western sponsored alliances also proved 
ineffective against internal threats. For example, "neither the Baghdad Pact nor 
CENTO could prevent the Iraqi and Iranian revolutions. " 
649 
The failure also showed that supporting evidence was lacking for the theory 
that the Arab states would follow the Turkish example. At the beginning, the West 
had hoped that the Middle Eastern countries would follow the Turkish model. But, 
the West eventually realised that the Turkish model was not applicable to the other 
Middle Eastern states, which possessed a different culture and history. 
Nevertheless, the Baghdad Pact did have a number of political consequences 
for the West: 
(1) Although it made no positive contribution to regional defence it did at 
least split the anti-Western solidarity of the Arab League. "' As the Suez Crisis 
showed, neither the Arab League nor its Collective Security Pact met the security 
needs of the region. "Thus the Arab states fell into a number of different and 
conflicting alignments, although all still proclaimed loyalty to the Arab League 
and its Collective Security Pact of 1950. ""' 
(2) It accelerated the shift of power in the region from the British to the Amer- 
icans. Although the British had hoped the Pact would protect their interests in 
the region for a few more years it had the opposite effect. The Iraqi government's 
failure to condemn the Anglo-French-Israeh adventure demonstrated that govern- 
648 See' Barutý; uo6lu, Ibrahim, 'Evolution of Turkey's Security Role in the 
Middle East, ' p. 66 and 
KfirkqiioAlu, Omer, 'Evolution of Turkish-Arab Relations, ' p. 46 both in Harris, George S., 
The 
Middle East m Turkish-Amencan Relations, The Turkish Foreign Policy Institute, 
Ankara, 1985. 
649 Ibid., p. 66. 
650 CampbeH, op cit., p. 61. 
651 Ibid., p. 229. 
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ment's subservience to the West and its infidelity to the pan-Arab cause. This 
created disaffection in the hitherto obedient Iraqi armed forces and eventually led 
to the revolution that toppled the king and sent the British packing from their 
bases in Iraq. 
(3) In the aftermath of this reverse for the British and of the Anglo-French 
withdrawal from Suez, the US became the dominant Western power in the region. 
(4) The Pact exacerbated regional disappointment and dissatisfaction with the 
West. Regional members who had been under great pressure to join did not gain 
the benefit they had anticipated or been led to expect. Neither Pakistan nor Iran, 
for example, were happy with the US economic and military aid received in return 
for their support for this defence pact. 
Iraq was isolated in the Arab world and its government's position was 
gravely weakened and finally all those who were responsible for accession to the 
Pact were brutally murdered by the Iraqi masses or the army itself. 
(6) Israel was one of the chief beneficiaries. She not only survived throughout 
the decade but also increased her gains from the Arab countries and put herself in 
a better position to defeat them in the future. 
(7) The Kurds, as well as the Arabs, suffered as a consequence of the Pact. 
While Turkey, Iraq f%nd Iran were in the Pact, the Kurds were unable to promote 
their own interests against this united front and suffered a decade of inactivity and 
silence in these couiýtries. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine was, among other things, declared by the United 
States to strengthen the Baghdad Pact, but, it failed to produce the expected 
results. Then the events of 1958 brought Saudi 
Arabia and Lebanon, which had 
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moved closer to the United States at the beginning, to a more neutral or hesitant 
position, removed Iraq from the northern tier alliance, and led the United States to 
conclude bilateral treaties with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan to avoid less favourable 
consequences. 
Afghanistan, traditionally a neutral buffer state, had not committed itself to 
either side in the cold war and received economic aid from both. With Pakistan 
tied formally to the West, Afghanistan became all the more open to Soviet blan- 
dishments and penetration. The most spectacular step was the dramatic offer at 
the end of 1955, of 100 million dollars in credits, accompanied by verbal support of 
Afghanistan's territorial claims on Pakistan. Arms aid followed in due course. The 
Soviet offensive in Afghanistan, in one sense, could be seen as a reply to Pakistan's 
adherence to the Pact. It may not perhaps have been the intention of those who 
conceived and organised the Pact to consign an independent country in the Middle 
East to the Soviet bloc, but they found themselves facing the serious problem of 
how to prevent it. Indeed, it fell into the hands of the USSR in 1978 and the 
West could do nothing but rely on the Jihad carried out by the Mujahedeen for 
the following fourteen years until the communist system itself collapsed in 1990. 
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7.4 Long-term Measures After Collapse of the Baghdad Pact 
Iran was much weaker and more unstable than Turkey and it added no sig- 
nificant military strength to the defence of the Middle East. It gave little solid 
assurance of continuity either in internal or foreign policies as far as the Western 
Powers were concerned. Its negotiations with the USSR on a non-aggression pact 
early in 1959 carried a hint that its reversion to neutrality and a balancing of the 
great powers was not out of the question. "That would", Campbell mentioned, 
"not be to our liking. Yet Iran's membership in CENTO is important only as it 
serves the end of greater strength and stability; it is harmful if it tends to generate 
internal conflict and to increase opportunities for outside meddling. More than 
formal allies Iran needs encouragement, help and time to settle down and build 
sound institutions. 11652 
Therefore, when the Western countries lost their faith in the Middle Eastern 
defence pact they tried to protect at least Iran, which would not have any security 
shield against the internal as well as the external threats although Turkey and 
Pakistan had a NATO and SEATO security umbrella respectively. Therefore, with 
Pakistan both a Commonwealth colleague and in SEATO, and Turkey a member 
of NATO, the chief political purpose of the CENTO was "to keep up the morale 
of Iran in the face of persistent Soviet pressure and propaganda. ""' 
Since the coup in Iraq had given the impression that it had weakened the Pact, 
the West wanted to dispel this impression by intensified economic activities within 
the Pact. The West no longer wanted to promote politico-military aspect of the 
Pact. Promoting the economic aspect of the Pact was intended, on the one hand 
652 Ibid., p. 234. 
653 PRO, FO, 371,149696, E131051/1,3.5.1960. 
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to preserve the West's prestige and on the other hand, to keep CENTO alive and 
bolster Iran. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, Zorlu publicly pointed out that one of 
the major reasons why CENTO was established was to save Iran by establishing 
close ties between Iran and the West and he said this was "Turkey's duty. " 
654 
Transformation of the Pact into an economic and cultural affair would also suit 
the British longer term interests in Pakistan. HM Ambassador in Karachi recorded 
that by getting rid of the grounds for the Pakistani charge that the UK was arming 
them against the wrong quarter and of the Indian and neutralist charge that the 
Pact was provocative. It would also serve Pakistan's proper interests: economic 
rehabilitation and cultural and other ties with the Muslim world. But "if the 
change were made suddenly or obviously there would, " the Ambassador warned 
his government, "in fact be opposition from the Pakistan Government". "' 
Within our discussion of economic aspects of Western defence initiatives we 
should note that, as previously explained, the British were of the view that internal 
economic factors were among the chief reasons for the collapse of pro-Western 
regime in Iraq. According to them, the fall of the old regime had nothing to 
do with Nuri's pro-Western foreign policy. "' The West saw that poverty 
in the 
region made the inhabitants susceptible to Soviet propaganda, so 
it was necessary 
to improve the economic situation in order to counter this propaganda and 
deny 
the Soviets the resources of the region, especially oil, which was the real aim of 
the Western defence initiatives. Therefore the West in general, and the 
United 
States in particular, maintained aid to regional countries on a more regular 
basis. 
Nevertheless, as Campbell pointed out, the West "really 
have had no choice". For 
654 PRO, FO, 371,153039, RK1022/1,18.1.1960, Ankara. 
66r' PRO, FO, 371,140685, EB1001/19,14.4.1959, Karachi. 
6,56 PRO, FO, 371,140945, EQ10334/15,5.5. lp59. 
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the wealthiest countries not to help developing countries develop their economies 
would, the United States feared) "destroy all faith in American leadership in the 
free world, turning allies into neutrals and neutrals into enemies. A foreign aid 
program, long labelled as temporary for home consumption, has come to be an 
accepted concomitant of leadership of the free world. """ 
HM Ambassador in Ankara noted that he entirely agreed that the UK should 
aim to build up the economic side of the Pact. Although the regional members still 
regarded it primarily as a source of additional aid for projects in their individual 
countries, they were, he assumed, also beginning to value it as an oTganisation for 
economic co-operation. 658 
The United States economic and military assistance to the Middle Eastern 
countries in the 1950s was broadly as follows: 
Although it is difficult to obtain accurate details and precise amounts of Amer- 
ican economic and military aid to the Middle Eastern countries in the 1950s, it is 
useful to give some general indications. The pattern varied according to differing 
needs and political attitudes of regional countries. Campbell notes that 
Turkey, besides, getting considerable economic benefits from military aid, has re- 
ceived economic aid at an annual level of over 100 million dollars. Iraq while it was still 
a Western ally, received United States technical aid, relying on its own oil revenues for 
capital. Iran has had substantial aid since 1953, chiefly to keep the government solvent 
and to give technical help to the development program. Modest amounts have been 
granted to Lebanon and Jordan for specific public works and industries. Syria refused 
all aid on the ground that the conditions attached to it (the same as for all other re- 
cipients) were unacceptable, but now as part of the UAR shares in the assistance now 
provided to that country. Saudi Arabia accepted technical assistance for a while, then 
arbitrarily terminated it in 1954. Egypt got a grant of 40 million dollars in 1954 at the 
time of American faith and hope in the Nasser regime, but for political reasons there 
were no new grants until recently and for some time even the CARE program was cut 
off by the decision of the United States Government. Israel has received, since 1948, 
297 million dollars in grants and 326 million dollars in loans, more than all the Arab 
657 Campbell, op. cit., p. 267. 
6.58 PRO, FO, 371,140685, EB1001/4,4.2.1959, Ankara. 
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states combined, in addition to considerable sums from private American sources. The table shows the totals through the middle of 1959. "1 
Table 1: US Non-Military Aid to the Middle East 
. 
1111V V1,45--li-ilm- 1Q-rcl 
Countries Grants Loans (net) 
A B C D (from 1940) 
Turkey 586.6 12.2 1.5 633.0 270.3 
Iran 263.2 2.8 2.6 
1274.0 
204.1 
Pakistan 271.6 115.1 20.8 425.3 284.9 
Afghanistan 22.8 11.6 0.1 34.6 51.7 
Iraq 16.9 - 1.0 17.9 1.2 
Saudi Arabia 2.9 - - 4.5 32.0 
Syria 0.1 0.2 0.8 
1 
1.1 0.1 
Lebanon 47.1 10.5 2.4 60.0 1.6 
Jordan 125.5 7.0 5.0 137.5 1.2 
Egypt 45.0 1.2 36.6 83.1 29.1 
Libya 50.0 9.8 2.6 83.1 8.5 
Israel 
1 
255.41 -1 41.1 296.6 325.6 
A: Mutual Security Program (Economic and Technological Aid) B: Extraordinary Relief 
C: Agricultural Surplus through Private Agencies D: Total Grants 
Source: Campbell, op. cit., p. 269. 
Hoskins claimed that no one knows exactly what the totals of US aid may have 
been "partly because of the multiplicity of undertakings and datelines by many 
units of government, ... partly 
because of the confidential character of certain forms 
659 Campbell, op. cit., p. 267. 
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of aid. """ The measures taken by the West were intended briefly to accomplish the 
following results: to have an immediate impact on decisions of the Middle Eastern 
governments and on the views of major important sections of the population; to 
encourage those who co-operated with the United States; to counter and frustrate 
moves by the Soviet Union, both political and economic; to promote stability and 
strengthen the capacity of Middle Eastern countries to uphold their independence; 
to set habits of co-operation and mutual confidence between the West and the 
region; and to help construct a more prosperous Middle East as a means of trade 
and general economic progress throughout the "free world. " 
As the grant program faded out, except for military aid and "defence support, " 
it was the loan program that would have to carry the burden. With DLF (Devel- 
opment Loan Fund) loans to Middle Eastern countries totalling only 198.3 million 
dollars by mid-1959, the current level of aid seemed clearly inadequate for the fu- 
ture, if the United States expected some solid results. Division of this aid was as 
follows: Pakistan, 89.6 million; Turkey, 25.4 million; Israel, 20 million; Jordan 1.2 
million. An additional 72.6 million dollars had been committed to Middle Eastern 
countries and projects, but the loan agreements had not yet been signed. "' 
Meanwhile the West was now prepared to accept the Nasser regime in order 
to prevent further Soviet penetration to the region. Four years of hard psycho- 
logical war and one real war between Egypt and the West had helped only to 
worsen relations not to improve them. Wright held chiefly the Baghdad Pact re- 
sponsible for this Soviet penetration to the southern tier. "' The consequences of 
this period were more favourable to the Egyptians not to the West. Therefore, it 
660 Hoskins op. cit., p. 15. 
661 International Administration, Operations Report, 30 June 1959, pp. 42-43 quoted from 
Campbell, 
op. cit., p. 272. 
662 Wright, op. cit., p. 166. 
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was the West that initiated the normalisation of relations. A sign of the steady 
rapprochement between Cairo and the West was the final conclusion in February 
1959 of financial negotiations with Britain over the claims and counterclaims left 
over from the Suez crisis, a settlement that led to the resumption of normal trade 
and, by the end of the year, of diplomatic relations. With the United States the 
UAR Government negotiated new arrangements involving the purchase of 58 mil- 
lion dollars worth of surplus agricultural commodities for local currency, renewal 
of the CARE program, renewal of technical assistance and a new commitment of 
8.4 million dollars, Export-Import Bank loans totalling 12.6 million dollars, and 
a small Development Loan Fund credit for a textile mill in Syria. These were 
the first new grants or loans made by the United States to Egypt since 1955. In 
addition, for assistance in improving the Suez Canal the Nasser regime turned to 
the World Bank, which granted a loan of 56.5 million dollars in December 1959. 
This move was intended to balance in part the heavy dependence on Soviet aid in 
the building of the High Aswan Dam, the agreement on the second stage of which 
was announced in January 1960. "' 
As these developments between Egypt and the West indicated, the reason for 
the Western aid to the developing countries was based neither on humanitarian 
grounds nor on close understanding of the countries involved, because in many 
instances the neutral countries acquired more aid than the friendly countries did. 
One of the British dispatches rightly noted that in the Middle East, "there was 
a feeling that the Western Powers were failing to differentiate between ally and 
neutral or even foe. 
77664 
To avoid a misunderstanding it is worth recording a point 
here regarding the 
643 Campbell, op. cit., P. 156. 
664 PRO, FO, 371,120712, EP1013/4,4.7-1956. 
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amount of Western aid received by the regional countries. Annual figures tend 
to be misleading since they did not bear much relation to the actual amount of 
aid received by a country in that year; money appropriated in one year might 
not be spent in practice for anything up to three years later, so the figures could 
never show the level at which aid was actually running. "' This practice allowed 
the United States to vary the flow of aid in accordance with their appreciation 
of the situation in the countries where the aid was supposed to be used and its 
anticipated effects. 
On another front, there were international oil companies operating throughout 
the Middle East. It is worth noting that rivalries between companies, whose role 
by the very nature of their operations tended to be political as well as economic, 
did "not damage governmental relations. ""' In the post-war period the share 
of American companies in total Middle East oil production was going up while 
that of British companies was going down. In 1946 the American share was 35 
per cent and the British share 50 per cent (57 per cent including British-Dutch 
interests). In 1955 the figures were reversed, 58 per cent American and 35 per cent 
British. In Iran the crisis over nationalisation was settled to Britain's satisfaction 
in 1954, but one of its results was that an international consortium (40 per cent 
American) went into operation where the exclusively British-owned Anglo-Iranian 
had operated before. 
In 1960 the area under British control stretched around the outer edge of the 
Arabian Peninsula from Aden at the entrance to the Red Sea to Kuwait at the 
head 
of the Persian Gulf, The juridical status of the territories varied 
from a directly 
ruled colony, Aden, all the way to the nominally sovereign 
Muscat and Oman. 
6615 PRO, FO, 371,149790, EP1192/4,25.10.1960, Washington. 
666 CampbeH, op. cit., p. 350. 
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In between were the protected states of Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, the Aden 
Protectorate, and the eight "trucial sheikhdoms" of Oman. All were tied to Britain 
by treaty arrangements and by the presence of British officials or military officers 
as advisers to the local sheikhs or nominally in their employ. "All foreign relations 
were in British hands. ""' However, Britain lost a partial control or influence over 
Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Jordan and Cyprus. 
Experience showed that unless all parties concerned worked together, the de- 
fence of the region could not be effectively organised. When the West tried to 
impose its defence arrangements on the region without local support it failed. 
Similarly when the British tried without the open support of the Americans they 
failed. The only effective arrangement would have been a system that gave the 
lead to the USA, took local wishes into consideration and had local support plus 
the support of the British who had the benefit of detailed knowledge. "' 
The West wearied of the setbacks to its regional defence plans in the 1950s and 
concluded that further attempts to build a system of pacts and alliances in the 
Middle East would be self-defeating. The Baghdad Pact, the concrete expression 
of that policy, brought more trouble than it was worth. The northern tier alliance 
(CENTO) was of limited importance. Therefore, it seemed high time to accept 
neutralism, which was a force with which the United States would have to live. As 
one of the American experts, Campbell commented, nothing was gained and much 
was lost by acts that pushed genuine neutrals into the Soviet camp, or, 
"unless the 
evidence is incontrovertible, by the assumption they are already there. 
It is enough 
that they should have the will to defend their independence. ""' 
(Campbell speaks 
667 Ibid., p. 301. 
668 Ibid., p. 357. 
669 Ibid., p. 361. 
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as if it was some other nations that were violating the independence of the Middle 
Eastern countries, conveniently ignoring the fact that the actual, as opposed to 
the feared, violations were being perpetrated by the West. ) 
Many Soviet moves in the region had been reactions to those of other powers 
or the consequence of circumstances, favourable or unfavourable, as they occurred. 
As Campbell noted "At this particular juncture in history, from 1955 to 1960, 
the circumstances were especially favourable. Khrushchev and his colleagues have 
found themselves at a point much further advanced toward domination of the 
Middle East than Stalin or the Czars had ever reached. " 670 
Ali Sabri also agreed with this view and recorded that the situation in 1959 was 
very different from the situation in 1951. In 1959 "the USSR was incomparably 
stronger militarily, economically and diplomatically. """ 
The USSR was now capable of influencing Middle Eastern politics through the 
Egyptian regime as well as having the ability to use the most destabilising element, 
the Kurds, to interfere in the internal affairs of the three members of the Pact. 
Although the danger of Kurdish nationalism was potential rather than actual, it 
constituted a powerful weapon in the hands of the Russians if they should ever be 
in a position and wish to embarrass all the three countries. Therefore, they were 
natural allies in fighting Kurdish nationalism. "' 
On the contrary the British position in the Middle East had never been as 
bad as it was at the second half of the 1950s. Britain lost most of her bases in 
670 Ibid., pp. 214-15 and Issawi Charles, 'Negotiation from Strength? A Reappraisal of Western-Arab 
Relations, ' International Affairs, (January 1959), pp. 1-10. 
1371 PRO, FO, 371,140952, EQ1051/16,5.2.1959. 
672 PRO, FO, 371,140682,1081/59G, 7.5.1959. In Emre's words "the Kurds functioned like a'Japanese 
glue' as far as the foreign policy of Turkey, Iraq and Iran was concerned. " Interview with 
Emre. 
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the region and she was obliged to move her military presence to Cyprus to help 
protect what was left behind in the region, especially the Pact. And the Pact 
countries were thought to be prepared to let the British forces operate from their 
territories. In particular, as the British Ambassador noted "the Royal Air Force 
in Cyprus which is allocated to the task of immediate support to the Pact in time 
of war might be required to operate from any of the Pact countries. 1)673 So , four 
years after the establishment of the Baghdad Pact Britain was able to maintain 
her interests in the Middle East only from her bases outside the Middle East in 
Cyprus. 
Meanwhile, Britain, too, was obliged to accept the existing situation in the 
Middle East, namely the legality of the Egyptian regime and its consequences 
regarding the Suez Canal as well as the newly emerged trend of neutralism. Con- 
sequently, the announcement on 19 October 1959 of the resumption of diplomatic 
relations between Australia and the UAR and hints in Cairo of forthcoming devel- 
opments in UK-UAR relations had been rumoured in the Middle Eastern diplo- 
matic circles and aroused speculation in Iraq. "' 
The Americans had difficulties in developing their relations with the Arabs too. 
The previous ten years' attempts to form a defence organisation in the Middle East 
had alienated the Arabs instead of bringing them to a closer understanding. As 
Campbell concluded, "at the close of the year 1959 the United States had perhaps 
less direct influence in the Arab Middle East than at any time in the past five 
years". 6" 
To conclude, the collapse of the Baghdad Pact was due to the following reasons: 
673 PRO, FO, 371,140685, EB1001/20,16.4.1959, Ankara. 
674 PRO, FO, 371,140953, EQ1051/36,7.10.1959, Baghdad. 
675 CampbeH, op. cit., p. 157. 
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intensification of the Soviet propaganda, vigorous opposition of Arab nationalism, 
reaction against forceful methods of the West to bring as many Arab countries 
into the Baghdad Pact as possible and extreme suppression of opposition in Iraq. 
Failure of Western defence initiatives in the Middle East in the 1950s and Turkey's 
involvement in them showed that the Turkish political influence was virtually non- 
existent. Eventually as a part of long term measures to maintain their interests the 
US and the UK began to transform the Baghdad Pact from a pohtico-military one 
into an economic and cultural one. This transformation was aimed to make it easier 
to maintain the Pact that they had preserved their prestige in the region. As a 
result, all sides, namely regional members, the US and the UK were all disappointed 
with Western defence initiatives and the US decided to practically take-over the 
responsibility of maintaining the Western interests in the region. However, it can 
be concluded that it was chiefly the USSR and Israel who benefited from these 
attempts first to form and later to maintain a Western sponsored defence system 





The end of the Second World War was closely followed by the commencement 
of the Cold War. This was carried to the Middle East by the Western defence 
initiatives in the region in the late 1940s and more vigorously in the early 1950s. 
Great Britain was weak by the end of the Second World War and transferred her 
responsibilities in Greece and Turkey to the US in 1947. In the mid-1950s she felt 
a similar need to hand over her responsibilities in the Middle East too. Meanwhile, 
the US acted quite cleverly and exploited every opportunity to oust the colonial 
powers from the region and install herself there instead. Operation "AJAX" in 
Iran and the Suez crisis should be especially mentioned in this connection. In 
1953) by carrying out Operation "AJAX" the US paved the way for Iran to align 
with the West. Second, she signed an agreement with Pakistan and Iraq in 1954 
and began to help them economically and militarily. Finally, as a result of crises 
following the Suez intervention by the French and British in collaboration with 
Israel, the US proclaimed the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957 and after the eventual 
collapse of the Baghdad Pact signed bilateral agreements with remaining member 
countries in March 1959. By so doing, the Americans had almost completed their 
replacement of Britain as the leading power to protect Western 
interests in the 
region. In short, there were two major differences between the 
Middle East of 
1950 and 1960: first, the Americans had replaced the 
British, and second, the 
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Soviets had greatly increased their interests in the region and penetrated into it 
through local nationalisms. 
As we have seen, much of this Soviet activity was a response to Western military 
alliances and arrangements in the region. Our study of these initiatives and in 
particular of the Turkish involvement in them leads to the following conclusions 
that are confirmed by the evidence of American and British documents and the 
personal witness of a number of important interviewees. 
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8.2 Consensus Views Confirmed 
The points where the evidence led us to general agreement with many experts 
in the field and some erstwhile statesmen from the West are as follows: 
(1) In all the defence proposals that the West persuaded Turkey to promote in 
the Middle East after the Second World War Egypt was seen by all as of immense 
importance. 
(2) The existence of Israel and the consequent problem of Palestine proved vir- 
tually insuperable obstacles to the successful implementation of defence initiatives 
from the West because the West including its regional ally, Turkey, was seen as 
pro-Israeli. 
(3) The West's chief interests in the region lay in its great strategic importance 
and oil resources. Turkey herself, having secured her membership of NATO with- 
out any particular interest of her own in the Middle East, felt obliged to become 
involved in Western defence initiatives there partly to fulfil her promise and partly 
in pursuit of her proclaimed policy of defending peace loving countries throughout 
the world. For the Middle Eastern states themselves the Western defence propos- 
als were insufficiently attractive because they failed to address what those states 
regarded as their own real problems and offered the risk of new dangers for little 
reward. 
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8.3 Previous Claims Disproved 
Against this background, our study has revealed a number of areas where 
widely held assumptions should be challenged. For example, it is still commonly 
believed that Turkey sought NATO membership and involved herself in Western 
defence initiatives in the Middle East after World War II merely to defend her ter- 
ritorial integrity. However, as seen in the previous chapters, this Turkish quest for 
membership had a wider and deeper meaning and other intentions such as trans- 
forming a Muslim Turkish society into a Western and secular one, receiving more 
economic and military aid to modernise her economy and armed forces, and simply 
following Kemalist principles which aimed to demolish anything that "belonged to 
the past and reflected backwardness", as well as securing western support against 
persistent separatist Kurdish nationalism, and so on. 
It is also necessary to challenge the idea held by a large section of Turkish 
society that Turkish involvement in Western defence initiatives in the Middle East 
was due to any ideological (Islamic) belief of the DP. In fact, our study has doc- 
umented that Turkish involvement in the Middle East as well as the granting of 
some concessions to the religious circles started well before the Democrats came to 
power with tU, e4tablishment of religious schools, publication of religious books, 
and the adoption of a more tolerant stance towards religious people, and so on. 
Our study refutes the view that Turkish involvement in the Balkans and the 
Middle East was an independent and self-inspired Turkish policy. The documents 
we have quoted show that it was simply a fulfilment of a promise given to 
the West 
in return for Turkey's admission to NATO. The argument whether or not 
this was 
a price worth paying is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
It has also been shown that prior to the eqtablishment of the 
Democrat Party, 
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Celal Bayar gave assurances to in6nii on secularism, education and foreign policy. 
Without wishing to enter into arguments about whether this is an indication that 
in6nii did not intend to allow a genuine opposition to operate in Turkey, we can 
nevertheless claim that this does suggest that the change of power was not meant 
to bring about any radical change in these three fields. The apparent changes of 
government and political power and growing liberalisation should therefore not be 
regarded as fundamental and should not be seen as due to having a new party in 
power but rather due to the internal and external demands of the times. 
Our research has also demonstrated that Turkey's NATO membership was 
not a one-sided victory for Turkey but was the result of necessity and mutual 
interests. Especially it was not, as claimed by most of the Democrats and their 
contemporary sympathisers, a DP victory. Given the same international conditions 
of the early 1950s, one could confidently assert that Turkey would have become 
a NATO member even if the RPP had been in power. (Nevertheless, it must be 
admitted that the widespread acceptance of the Democrats' claim has added to 
the mythology of the period. ) 
One of the rarely mentioned but important facts that have come to light in 
this research concerns American reduction military support and of financial and 
political support for Turkey under DP rule in the late 1950s. This was to a con- 
siderable extent because of American objection to the DP's determined insistence 
upon industrialising Turkey after modernising agriculture. Many scholars and writ- 
ers have wrongly attributed the end of US support for the DP to the government's 
mismanagement of the economy. 
This research has also disproved the widely held view that the 
Western at- 
tempts to defend the Middle East were generated from fear that the Soviet 
Union 
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would occupy or penetrate into the region. Documents and interviews demon- 
strated that the West needed Middle Eastern oil for its economy regardless of any 
external threat. In fact, it is apparent that in addition to trying to deny the region's 
resources to the Soviet Union, the West was also seeking new ways to protect the 
conservative regimes in the area against anti-colonialist local nationalisms, which 
they dubbed as "international communism". 
Underestimation of the influence of indigenous nationalism in general and 
Arab, especially Egyptian nationalism, in particular, was another factor that con- 
tributed to the failure of the Baghdad Pact, and this is another fact that escaped 
the notice of many politicians at the time. 
We have shown that the expectations of each member of the Baghdad Pact 
differed one from the other and this was one of the fundamental factors that led to 
its demise. It is worth pointing out that many writers ignored this crucial factor, 
the importance of which was noted in the chapter on theory. 
The thesis indicated that the credit for devising Western defence schemes 
in the Middle East should be given to the British, while the credit for taking 
practical steps to implement them should be awarded to the Turkish leaders who 
conscientiously worked on the West's behalf. At the same time our work shows 
clearly that the initiative came from the West and not from within, as the British 
strove hard to claim. 
This thesis also showed that American and British intervention in Lebanon 
and Jordan respectively in 1958 did not, as claimed by almost all scholars, occur 
as a result of an "official request" by these countries. In fact, it was the 
West itself 
which "unofficially requested" the regional members of the Baghdad 
Pact to ask 
the King of Jordan and the President of Lebanon to "officially request" 
help from 
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the US and Britain. This message was conveyed orally to King Hussein of Jordan 
by Mahmut Dikerdem, the Turkish Ambassador in Amman. 
Our research has indicated that the two chief beneficiaries of Western defence 
initiatives were Israel and the Soviet Union. Israel was indirectly helped in its 
struggle to survive the first and most precarious period of its existence because the 
Arabs were at least partially distracted by Western involvement and interference 
in the Middle East. The Soviet Union skilfully exploited the unpopularity of the 
West in the region and managed to penetrate into it largely through Arab and 
partly through Kurdish nationalism. (Over 800 prominent Kurds, some having 
been promoted to high ranks in the Soviet Army, returned to Iraq from the Soviet 
Union after the July coup in Baghdad. ) 
The study has also shown that although in the Cold War the Turkish author- 
ities could justify keeping a large army, the maintenance of such a strong force 
appears to have been in large part due to the requirements of American global 
interests. As we have noted, the cost of keeping one American soldier in the area 
was 27 times more than it cost to maintain one Turkish soldier. Helping the Turk- 
ish army was therefore directly helping American military interests and thus the 
American economy. 
Among the remarkable discoveries in the documentary evidence were certain 
aspects of the West's collaboration with Israel and the West's tactics to maintain 
its interests in the region: advising Israel to attack the Baghdad Pact in a regular 
manner on radio, in her daily papers, and weekly and monthly magazines 
in the 
hope that this "Israeli" opposition would convince the Arabs that the Pact was 
advantageous to them is just one of several examples. 
The documents lead to the conclusion that to get economic and military aid it 
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was not necessary to align so closely with the US as Turkey and the other regional 
members of the Pact had done; some Non-Aligned countries managed to receive 
more than the member countries did. 
Other documents reveal a surprising naivety among many Western politicians 
and scholars with regard to the Arabs. In the first Place they made insufficient 
allowance for the Arab perception that Israel -a new state established on Arab 
land - was the major threat to Arab countries, and in the second place they did 
not appreciate that to the Arabs the former colonial powers seemed a much greater 
threat than did the Soviets who were thousands of miles away. 
Previous works have failed to point out that although the Baghdad Pact was 
allegedly a result of George Kennan's famous "containment policy", the West con- 
centrated on Egypt rather than Afghanistan, a Soviet neighbour with a poor econ- 
omy. This choice suggests that in addition to containing the Soviet Union the 
Baghdad Pact was intended to protect the pro-western governments so that the 
Western economic interests, especially oil interests, could be maintained. All other 
stated factors were of secondary importance. 
In the end, none of the countries involved in the Western defence initiatives 
achieved their expectations. All of them were disappointed with the result and 
dissatisfied with what they obtained at the end of the decade. All the rulers 
of the regional members lost their positions. In 1958 Nuri Said and the Iraqi 
royal family were lynched and killed in Baghdad. Their Pakistani counterparts 
were ousted by a military coup the same year. Adnan Menderes and his close 
associates fell in another military coup in 1960. The Shah struggled on 
into the 
1970s by implementing a reform program - the White Revolution - proposed 
by 
the Americans. The stateless Kurds were also losers as they did not even dare to 
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launch any campaign against any of the regional members. As has been seen, when 
it became clear that even with the help of Muslim Turkey the West could not tempt 
the Arabs to join with them under the same security umbrella, the United States 
took all the strings into her own hands by signing bilateral agreements with the 
regional members. In humiliating circumstances the United Kingdom was forced 
to leave Egypt and Iraq completely and Iran, Jordan, Sudan and Turkey partly. 
Turkish foreign policy actions in the 1950s constitute a good example of polit- 
ical behaviour of the small state within the context of alliance theories. Of course, 
it is difficult to claim that all her behaviour was in line with foreign policy be- 
haviours of a stereotypical small state. (In reality very few states conform closely 
to the theorists' stereotypes. ) However, our research has shown that Turkish for- 
eign policy in the 1950s generally fitted the patterns of the small state foreign 
policy. To cite some examples, as suggested by alliance theorists, Turkey strove 
hard to gain a reputation as a "bastion of democracy" a model of a "harmonious 
ally" or a "staunch resister of aggression". 
Moreover, T`urkey, as a small state, tried hard to use her geostrategic location 
and her proximity to a great power (the USSR) to obtain alliance with another 
great power or powers in order to benefit from the advantages of this alliance, 
which were briefly economic and military aid, the prestige of having the support of 
a illustrious great power and securing national integrity of the country and survival 
of the regime against internal and external threats and so on. 
However) one side-effect of Turkey's close alliance with the West was an over- 
willingness to identify herself with her Western allies even at the expense of her 
own interests. On a number of issues she failed to adopt an independent 
line that 
could have been justified and won her greater influence and respect 
in the rest of 
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the world without necessarily jeopardising her position within the alliance. Turkish 
policy towards Israel, the Korean war, Suez crisis and North Africa in the 1950s 
were among some the examples. 
With respect to Turkey's relations with West within the context of the patron- 
client relation approach, one can argue that Turkey formed a good example, but 
again was not a stereotypical client state. Turkey's political behaviour towards the 
US in the 1950s showed that Turkey can be considered a client state. As Turkey's 
official statements indicate, Turkey's policy towards the Soviet bloc and her stance 
towards the Non-Aligned movement, especially in the Bandung conference were 
seen by these countries as client behaviour. Voting patterns of Turkey in the UN in 
the 1950s were another indication that Turkish foreign behaviour resembled a those 
of a client state. However, one should remember that the degree of dependence 
and exploitation differs from one patron-client relation to another. Despite the 
accusation of its critics, Turkey did not behave like a politically penetrated system 
and the DP was able to insist on its industrialisation program, though it cost the 
DP leadership dear. In fact, compared with other client states Turkey was in a 
much better position, because she was chosen to play a patron role in the Middle 
East. Therefore, one can conclude that the DP aligned with the West to secure 
her national independence, complete her westernisation process and consolidated 
her integration with the West but, in long run, this led to the critics of the DP to 
accuse the party leadership of making Turkey a client state. 
Turning specifically to the Turkish case, we can now answer the questions we 
posed in the Introduction and state that Turkey became 
involved in the Western 
defence initiatives in the Middle East to pay the price of admission to NATO 
and not with any genuine expectation that these regional countries would give 
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her any greater degree of security. As shown throughout the thesis, since the end 
of the Second World War, Turkey strove hard to integrate with the West. With 
the establishment of NATO, Turkey's chief foreign policy priority became gaining 
membership of this organisation not only to resist the Soviet threat but also to 
display the West's seal of approval of Turkey as a Western country. To this end, 
as we have shown, both Republican as well as the Democrats had done their best to 
achieve this goal. Both were willing to co-operate with the West in the Middle East, 
if Turkey was admitted to NATO. By becoming a NATO member Turkey achieved 
her primary goal and what remained for Turkish leaders was to repay the price 
of this admission by launching a campaign to establish a Western defence system 
in the Middle East. As a result of Turkey's efforts over five years, the Baghdad 
Pact was formed, but it lasted only a few years. Like all member countries, Turkey 
was disappointed with the result, because her efforts to form a defence Pact in the 
region further alienated the Arab countries and left her isolated from the Third 
World due to her negative stance towards the Non-Aligned movement. 
We can also state that this Turkish policy in the Middle East did not represent 
abandonment of the Kemalist line. The traditional objective of Kemalist foreign 
policy was "peace at home and peace in the world. " Moreover, it was directed 
to secure "national independence" and "complete independence". As previously 
explained, Turkey's involvement in Western defence initiatives in the Middle 
East 
in the 1950s were meant to contain the danger of "international communism" and 
serve the security of "peace loving" countries. By securing the 
Western politico- 
military support through such activities, Turkish leaders 
hoped to guarantee "na- 
tional independence" of the country and by obtaining the Western military and 
economic aid the Democrats tried to modernise the 
Turkish army and improve 
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the Turkish economy. Only in this way could "complete independence" of the 
country be achieved. Thus, one can accept that, at least as far as foreign policy 
was concerned, Ahmet Giirsoy was right in claiming "the Democrat Party was 
reincarnation of the Kemalist philosophy. ". 
The Middle Eastern involvement was undertaken at the bidding of the West. 
It was with the West not the Middle East that the Turkish government sought 
stronger ties. There had been no change in general attitude since the days of the 
exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s (Turks from Eu- 
rope were considered worthy of acceptance whereas those in the Arab countries 
were abandoned without a mention by the Turkish authorities). Turkey's involve- 
ment in the West and in the Middle East was a natural consequence of Turkish 
aspirations to be a Western power. 
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8.4 Points for Further Study 
In the course of the present research a number of topics beyond the scope 
of this thesis were seen to merit further research. Most of them, however, would 
require access to regional records. For example, it is quite clear from American and 
British documents that the Western defence initiatives emerged from the idea that 
Middle Eastern oil had to be under Western control because it was vital to western 
economies. As the United States became involved in containing the Soviet Union, 
her desire to deprive the Soviets of the oil became an added factor. At the same 
time, the West appreciated that it was necessary to convince the regional countries 
that the Soviet Union and international communism represented a major threat 
to the region; they knew that otherwise it would take more than some symbolic 
gifts or aid to get the regional states to agree to Western policies. It would be 
interesting to see how the regional leaders actually appreciated the situation. The 
documents might also shed light on the measures taken by the West to secure 
the compliance of some of the regional states. Accurate details of aid granted are 
difficult to obtain; many of the published tables are inconsistent and conflicting. 
As British documents reveal that coercion was recommended to ensure compliance 
with Western wishes when the need was seen to be desperate, further information 
on what actual offers were made and what concessions, gifts or perquisites were 
exchanged would provide a fascinating insight into the motivations involved. 
The role and activities of the Baghdad Pact Anti-Subversion Committee merit 
special attention. Though information on this subject will 
doubtless remain secret 
for a very long time, it would shed light on whether the Pact was 
defensive, as its 
members claimed in public, or aggressive as its opponents maintained. 
Access to regional documents might also reveal the extent to which 
fear of 
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Kurdish nationalism prompted the regional members (with the exception of Pak- 
istan) to join the Baghdad Pact. Most Kurdish scholars maintain that in addition 
to their stated aims the Sadabad Pact and the Baghdad Pact were both intended 
to quell rising Kurdish nationalism. The documents would help to show whether 
such claims could be substantiated. 
On a wider field, should the conspiracy theories that have been aired in recent 
publications on the whole subject of the Cold War gain more general acceptance 
there would be a need to re-examine the factors leading to the creation of the 
Baghdad Pact to test these theorists' claim that it had been intentionally created 
to promote the interests of both the West and the Soviet Union by driving the 
smaller nations into one or other bloc, on the assumption that a state of high 
tension between these blocs made it easier to control the smaller nations. Such 
speculation can, however, be safely left for examination in a more distant future. 
For the present, it is hoped that this thesis has succeeded in utilising the light 
now available to illuminate the topic, and allow a more accurate understanding 
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Appendix 2 
TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION (SADABAD PACT): 
AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, IRAQ and TURKEY 
8 July 1937 
(Ratifications deposited, Tehran, 25 June1938) 
[League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 4402. vol. 190 (1938) pp. 21-27. ] 
Border disputes arising from the peace settlement or inherited from earlier 
centuries kept relations between Iran (as Persia became known after 1935), Turkey 
and Iraq far from friendly for more than a decade following World War 1. An agree- 
ment reached in Tehran on 23 January 1932 (text in League of Nations, Official 
Journal, February 1935, pp. 237-39) demarcated the Turco-Iranian frontier. But 
as late as January 1935 the Council of the League considered an Iraqi territorial 
complaint against Iran. Although the Council took no decision, Iraq nevertheless 
requested in January and September 1936 and again in May 1937 that the item 
be stricken from the Council's agenda. One reason for the Iraqi change of heart 
could be found in the draft treaty, initialed in Geneva on 2 October 1935 by the 
Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Turkish delegates to the League of Nations, encouraged 
in their action by the Italo-Ethiopian crisis. According to the preamble of the 
treaty, signed at Sa'dabad Palace - Riza Shah's summer residence in the northern 
suburbs of Tehran - on 8 July 1937, the four Muslim states were "actuated 
by the 
common purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Near East by means of addi- 
tional guarantees within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations. " 
An accompanying protocol (not reproduced) announced that a permanent council 
would meet at least once annually. The Sa'dabad Pact, automatically renewable 
every five years, was never formally terminated. But this was, without practical 
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significance, for the quadripartite council, whose chief function apparently was to 
press for rotational membership in the League Council of the signatory states, did 
not ever convene after the outbreak of World War II. 'Survey of International Af- 
fairs, ' 1936, pp. 793-803; M. Khadduri, Independent Iraq, pp. 247-48,261-63; A. 
Khalatbary, LIran et le pacte orientale. 
ART. 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to pursue a policy of com- 
plete abstention from any interference in each other's internal affairs. 
ART. 2. The High Contracting Parties expressly undertake to respect the 
inviolability of their common frontiers. 
ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties agree to consult together in all inter- 
national disputes affecting their common interests. 
ART. 4. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes in no event to resort, 
whether singly or jointly with one or more third Powers, to any act of aggression 
directed against any other of the Contracting Parties. 
The following shall be deemed to be acts of aggression: 
1. Declaration of war; 
2. Invasion of the armed forces of one State, with or without a declaration of 
war, of the territory of another State; 
3. An attack by the land, naval or air forces of one State, with or without a 
declaration of war, on the territory, vessels or aircraft of another State; 
4. Directly or indirectly aiding or assisting an aggressor. 
The following shall not constitute acts of aggression: 
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1. The exercise of the right of legitimate self-defence, that is to say, resistance 
to an act of aggression as defined above; 
2. Action under Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; 
Action in pursuance of a decision of the Assembly or Council of the League 
of Nations, or under Article 15, paragraph 7, of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, provided always that in the latter case such action is directed against the 
State which was the first to attack; 
Action to assist a State subjected to attack, invasion or recourse to war by 
another of the High Contracting Parties, in violation of the 'E-eaty for Renunciation 
of War signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928. 
ART. 5. Should one of the High Contracting Parties consider that a breach of 
Article 4 of the present Treaty has been or is about to be committed, he shall at 
once bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations. The foregoing 
provision shall not affect the right of such High Contracting Party to take any 
steps which, in the circumstances, he may deem necessary. 
ART. 6. Should one of the High Contracting Parties commit an aggression 
against a third Power, any other High Contracting Party may denounce the present 
Týreaty, without notice, as towards the aggressor. 
ART. 7. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent, within 
his respective frontiers, the formation or activities of armed bands, associations 
or organisations to subvert the established institutions, or 
disturb the order or 
security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere, of the 
territory 
of another Party, or to change the constitutional system of such other 
Party. 
ART. 8. The High Contracting Parties, having already recognised, in the 
344 
General Treaty for Renunciation of War August 27th, 1928, that the settlement 
or solution of all disputes or conflicts, whatever their nature or origin, which may 
arise among them, shall never be sought by other than pacific means, reaffirm that 
principle and undertake to rely upon such modes of procedure as have been or 
shall be established between the High Contracting Parties in that respect. 
ART. 9. No Articles of the present Iýeaty shall be considered as in any way 
diminishing the obligations assumed by each of the High Contracting Parties under 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
ART. 10. The present Treaty, drawn up in the French language and signed in 
quadruplicate, one copy having, as they severally recognise, been delivered to each 
of the High Contracting Parties, is concluded for a period of five years. 
On the expiry of that period, and failing its denunciation, with six months' 
notice, by one of the High Contracting Parties, the Týeaty shall be deemed to be 
renewed for successive periods of five years, until its denunciation with six months' 
notice by one or more of the High Contracting Parties. On its denunciation as 




TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND TURKEY 
19 OctoberI939 
(Ratifications deposited in Ankara, 16 November 1939) 
[League of Nations, Treaty Series, No. 4689, vol. 200 (1940-41), pp. 167-89. ] 
The 1936 Montreux Straits convention (Doc. 60) together with France's pro- 
gressive cession to Turkey between 1936 and 1939 of the sanjaq (provincial district) 
of Alexandretta - which contained a substantial Turkish population, but not a ma- 
jority, and which Ankara agreed in 1921 (Doc. 35) and 1926 might remain part 
of the French mandate on condition that the district was placed under a special 
regime erased the young republic's major surviving grievances against Britain and 
France. The rapprochement found tangible expression in the following fifteen- 
year tripartite treaty of "mutual assistance in resistance to aggression. " Article 7 
stipulated that the terms of the pact were "equally binding as bilateral obliga- 
tions" between Turkey and each of the other signatories. Attached to the treaty 
were several financial instruments (not reproduced) which provided for an Anglo- 
French credit to Turkey of 25 million pound sterling (three-fifths from France) for 
the purchase of military equipment and further loans totalling 18.5 million pound 
sterling. The two sets of obligations were to be amortized over a twenty-year 
period, the first at 4 per cent and the second at 3 per cent interest. The mili- 
tary convention, which formed an essential element of the tripartite arrangements, 
was not published with the other instruments. Despite the treaty engagements, 
Turkey remained neutral throughout most of World War II. J. C. Hurewitz, 
Mid- 
dle East Dilemmas, chap. 5; W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, The Challenge 
to Isolation, pp. 312-18; C. Acikalin, 'Turkey's International Relations, 
' Interna- 
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tional Affairs, 23 (October 1947), 477-91; N. E. Kocaeli, 'The Development of the 
Anglo-Turkish Alliance, ' Asiatic Review, (new series) 42 (October 1946), 347-51; 
Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War, chap. 12; M. Weygand, 
Recalled to Service, chaps. 1,3. 
ART. 1. In the event of Turkey being involved in hostilities with a European 
Power in consequence of aggression by that Power against Turkey, France and the 
United Kingdom will co-operate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid 
and assistance in their power. 
ART. 2. (1) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading 
to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United Kingdom are 
involved, Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom 
and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power. 
(2) In the event of an act of aggression by a European Power leading to war 
in the Mediterranean area in which Turkey is involved, France and the United 
Kingdom will collaborate effectively with Turkey and will lend her all aid and 
assistance in their power. 
ART. 3. So long as the guarantees given by France and the United Kingdom 
to Greece and Romania by their respective Declarations of the 13th April, 1939, 
remain in force, Turkey will co-operate effectively with France and the 
United 
Kingdom and will lend them all aid and assistance in her power, in the event of 
France and the United Kingdom being engaged in hostilities 
in virtue of either of 
the said guarantees. 
ART. 4. In the event of France and the United Kingdom 
being involved in 
hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression committed 
by that 
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Power against either of those States without the provisions of Articles 2 or 3 being 
applicable, the High Contracting Parties will immediately consult together. 
It is nevertheless agreed that in such an eventuality Turkey will observe at 
least a benevolent neutrality towards France and the United Kingdom. 
ART. 5. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 3 above, in the event 
of either: 
Aggression by a European Power against another European State which 
the Government of one of the High Contracting Parties had, with the approval 
of that State, undertaken to assist in maintaining its independence or neutrality 
against such aggression, or 
(2) Aggression by a European Power which while directed against another 
European State, constituted, in the opinion of the Government of one of the High 
Contracting Parties, a menace to its own securitYl the High Contracting Parties 
will immediately consult together with a view to such common action as might be 
considered effective. 
ART. 6. The present Treaty is not directed against any country, but is designed 
to assure France, the United Kingdom and Turkey of mutual aid and assistance 
in 
resistance to aggression should the necessity arise. 
ART. 7. The provisions of the present Treaty are equally 
binding as bilateral 
obligations between Turkey and each of the two other 
High Contracting Parties. 
ART. 8. If the High Contracting Parties are engaged in hosti . ties in conse- 
quence of the operation of the present 
Treaty, they will not conclude an armistice 
or peace except by common agreement. 
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ART. 9. The present Treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification 
shall be deposited simultaneously at Angora as soon as possible. It shall enter into 
force on the date of this deposit. The present Treaty is concluded for a period of 
fifteen years. If none of the High Contracting Parties has notified the two others 
of its intention to terminate it six months before the expiration of the said period, 
the Treaty will be renewed by tacit consent for a further period of five years, and 
so on. 
PROTOCOL NO. 1. 
The undersigned Plenipotentiaries state that their respective Governments 
agree that the Treaty of to-day's date shall be put into force from the moment 
of its signature. 
The present Protocol shall be considered as an integral part of the Treaty 
concluded to-day between France , the United Kingdom and 
Turkey. 
PROTOCOL NO. 2. 
At the moment of signature of the 'Iýreaty between France, the United Kingdom 
and Turkey, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, duly authorised to this effect, have 
agreed as follows: 
The obligations undertaken by Turkey in virtue of the above-mentioned 
Týeaty 
cannot compel that country to take action having as its effect, or 
involving as its 




THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE 
12 Marc4 1,947 
[The Department of State Bulletin, 16 (23 March 1974), 534-37] 
The United States Policy of containing the Soviet Union, when first announced 
in March 1947, aimed - as its immediate objectives - at frustrating Russian de- 
signs on Greece and Turkey. Nor was it surprising that the Near and Middle East 
- strategically, an extension of the eastern Mediterranean - should have been sin- 
gled out. Of all the regions on the Russian periphery this was one of the most 
exposed. Until the beginning of 1947 the Near and Middle East constituted a zone 
for whose defense Britain claimed primary responsibility. But World War II left 
the United Kingdom in a nearly prostrate financial condition. As elsewhere in 
Asia, Britain was contracting its commitments. Yet the demands of imperial and 
commonwealth defense and dependence on Near and Middle East oil and markets 
did not lessen the region's importance to the United Kingdom. American financial 
and military aid to Turkey (and Greece) was predicated on the assumption that 
the United States would shore up and supplement Britain's Near and Middle East 
defense arrangements. But the problems of defense in that region were tightly in- 
terlocked with other problems - notably, depressed economic and social conditions, 
general political instability, the legacy of hostility toward European controls, and 
intraregional rivalries and conflicts - which did not respond readily to global policy 
generalizations. Outlined below is the section on Greece. J. C. Hurewitz, Middle 
East Dilemmas, chaps. 1,5-7; H. L. Hoskins, The Middle East, Problem Area 
in World Politics, chap. 13-14; Brookings Institution, The Security of the Middle 
East, A Problem Paper, H. S. Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2, chaps. 7,16. 
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The gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my 
appearance before a joint session of the Congress. 
The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved. One t 
aspect of the present situation, which I wish to present to you at this time for your 
consideration and decision, concerns Greece and Turkey... [Section on Greece 
omitted. ] 
Greece's neighbor, Turkey, also deserves our attention. The future of Turkey 
as an independent and economically sound state is clearly no less important to the 
freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece. The circumstances 
in which Turkey finds itself today are considerably different from those of Greece. 
Turkey has been spared the disasters that have beset Greece. And during the war 
the United States and Great Britain furnished I`urkey with material aid. Never- 
theless, Turkey now needs our support. Since the war Turkey has sought additional 
financial assistance from Great Britain and the United States for the purpose of 
effecting that modernization necessary for the maintenance of its national integrity. 
That integrity is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East. 
The British Government has informed us that, owing to its own difficulties, it 
can no longer extend financial or economic aid to Turkey. 
As in the c4se of Greece, if Turkey is to have the assistance it needs, the 
United 
States must supply it. We are the only country able to provide that 
help. 
I am fully aware of the broad implications involved 
if the United States extends 
assistance to Greece and Turkey, and I shall 
discuss these implications with you 
at this time. 
One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of 
the United States is the 
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creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way 
of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany 
and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, 
and their way of life, upon other nations. 
To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United 
States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United 
Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its 
members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help 
free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against 
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is 
no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peo- 
ples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international 
peace and hence the security of the United States. 
The peoples of a number of countries of the world have recently had totalitarian 
regimes forced upon them against their will. The Government of the United States 
has made frequent protests against coercion and intimidation, in violation of the 
Yalta agreement, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. I must also state that 
in a 
number of other countries there have been similar developments. 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose 
be- 
tween alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a 
free one. 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and 
is distinguished by 
free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees, of 
individ- 
ual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and 
freedom from political oppression. 
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed 
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upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and 
radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. 
I believe,, that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peo- 
ples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures. 
I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in 
their own way. 
I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid 
which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes. 
The world is not static, and the status quo is not sacred. But we cannot 
allow changes in the status quo in violation of the Charter of the United Nations 
by such methods as coercion, or by such subterfuges as political infiltration. In 
helping free and independent nations to maintain their freedom, the United States 
will be giving effect to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity 
of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece 
should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, 
Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread 
throughout the entire Middle East. 
Moreover, the disappearance of Greece as an independent state would have 
a profound effect upon those countries in Europe whose peoples are struggling 
against great difficulties to maintain their freedoms and their 
independence while 
they repair the damages of war. 
It would be an unspeakable tragedy if these countries, which 
have struggled so 
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long against overwhelming odds, should lose that victory for which they sacrificed 
so much. Collapse of free institutions and loss of independence would be disastrous 
not only for them but for the world. Discouragement and possibly failure would 
quickly be the lot of neighboring peoples striving to maintain their freedom and 
independence. 
Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will 
be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and 
resolute action. 
I therefore ask the Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and 
Turkey in the amount of 400,000,000 dollars for the period ending June 30,1948. 
In requesting these funds, I have taken into consideration the maximum amount 
of relief assistance which would be furnished to Greece out of the 350,000,000 
dollars which I recently requested that the Congress authorize for the prevention 
of starvation and suffering in countries devastated by the war. 
In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American 
civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those coun- 
tries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the 
use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend 
that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek 
and Turkish personnel. 
Finally, I ask that the Congress provide a-4thority which will permit the speed- 
iest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equip- 
ment, of such funds as may be authorized. 
If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for purposes 
indicated 
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in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. On 
this subject the Executive and Legislative branches of the Government must work 
together. 
This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it 
except that the alternative is much more serious. 
The United States contributed 341,000,000,000 dollars toward winning World 
War IL This is an investment in world freedom and world peace. The assistance 
that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than one- 
tenth of one percent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should 
safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain. 
The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They 
spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth 
when the hope of a people for a better life has died. 
We must keep that hope alive. 
The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their free- 
doms. 
If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world - and 
we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation. 
Great responsibilities have been placed upon us 
by the swift movement of 
events. 
am confident that the Congress will 
face these responsibilities squarely. 
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Appendix 5 
TRIPARTITE (BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES) 
DECLARATION ON SECURITY IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL ZONE June 1950 
25 May-21 June 1950 
[Tripartite declaration from Department of State Bulletin, 22 (5 June 1950), 
886; Israel reply translated from the Hebrew text in Israel, 1st Kneset, 2nd sess., 
Divrei ha-Kneset vol. 5, pp-1571-72; Arab League Council reply translated from 
the Arabic text in Revue egyptienne de drolt international (Arabic section), vol. 6 
(1950), pp. 151-52] 
The conclusion of the Arab-Israel armistice in 1949 (Doc. 92) did not soon 
lead, as some optimistically had hoped, to formal peace. Britain's resumption of 
arms shipments to Egypt, Iraq and Jordan, in accordance with treaty obligations, 
was accompanied by widespread talk in the Arab East of a "second round" against 
Israel. For its part Israel continued to maintain a state of vigilance, purchasing 
military equipment wherever available and stepping up its production of small 
arms. A miniature arms race thus developed. Meanwhile, the cleavage within 
the Arab League between the Hashimi bloc (Jordan and Iraq) and the others was 
widened, and Jordan threatened with expulsion. The immediate cause of friction 
arose from the enlargement of Jordan's domain. On the eve of the signature 
of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement Iraqi troops withdrew from the interior 
of central Palestine, leaving the sector entirely to the military administration of 
King Abdallah's Arab Legion. Jordan progressively absorbed the district in the 
ensuing year. Palestine Arabs were encouraged to participate on 11 
April 1950 
in the Jordan election, and the new legislature formalized the annexation on 24 
April by adopting a resolution giving its blessing to the merger. 
Three days later 
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Britain granted de jure recognition to Abdallah's enlarged kingdom. The tripartite 
statement was intended to stress to the governments concerned that the Western 
powers would not tolerate any renewal of the Arab-Israel war or any punitive 
action against Jordan. Apart from the three-power declaration, the formal replies 
of Israel and the Arab states are reproduced below. J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East 
Dilemmas, chap. 4; G. Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, pp. 294-319. 
TRIPARTITE DECLARATION, 25 MAY 1950 
The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, 
having had occasion during the recent Foreign Ministers meeting in London to 
review certain questions affecting the peace and stability of the Arab states and 
of Israel, and particularly that of the supply of arms and war material to these 
states, have resolved to make the following statements: 
1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to 
maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal 
security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in 
the defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for 
these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. In this connection 
the three Governments wish to recall and reaffirm the terms of the statements made 
by their representatives on the Security Council on August 4,1949, in which they 
declared their opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab 
states and Israel. 
2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all 
the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied 
from their coun- 
tries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression 
against any other state. Similar assurances will 
be requested from any other state 
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in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future. 
3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest 
in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and 
stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat 
of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should 
they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice 
lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, 
immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent 
such violation. 
2. STATEMENT BY THE ISRAEL PRIME MINISTER BEFORE THE KNE- 
SET, 31 MAY 1950 
The publication a week ago of the declaration by the three great powers - the 
United States, Britain and France - on arms and security in the Arab states and 
Israel did not escape notice in our country, although the exaggerated sensitivity 
toward political declarations by foreign powers, so natural when our land was 
under foreign rule, is now a matter of history. The young state that emerged from 
a defensive war, when [Israel] fought alone against six Arab states that invaded 
the country in violation of the United Nations charter, views its existence, security 
and future as dependent primarily on its own efforts to conquer the desert, absorb 
immigrants and mobilize the spiritual and material resources of the nation. But it 
does not ignore for one moment the inescapable fact that the world in which we live 
is based upon mutual co-operation between the large nations and the small, and 
that even a great power cannot any longer live in isolated security, to say nothing of 
such a small and weak state as that of Israel. We ardently 
desire friendly relations 




The Kneset has surely noted that the three-power declaration is a unilateral 
instrument, issued to define the policy of the above powers toward the state of Israel 
and the Arab states on the question of arms and security. It is not necessary to 
stress here that the policy of the state of Israel is formulated only by the government 
of Israel in accordance with the sovereign will of the people and the consent of 
the Kneset. The declaration was transmitted to the government of Israel by the 
ambassadors of the three powers for information only. 
Insofar as the declaration is designed to strengthen security and peace, even 
if only in the restricted Arab-Israel zone, it will receive the faithful support of 
the government of Israel. In the view of the government of Israel, the bolstering 
of peace in one corner of the world will contribute, directly and indirectly, to 
bolstering peace throughout the world. The government of Israel welcomes the 
statement of the three powers against an arms race between the Arab states and 
Israel. This statement, as it is noted in the declaration, was made by the three 
powers in the Security Council as early as 4 August 1949. But the government of 
Israel must call attention, with astonishment and concern, to the fact that from 
that time to the present, as before the above date, the furnishing of arms has 
continued to one side only - the Arab states, which have not ceased to threaten a 
new war against Israel and up to the present have refused to discuss peace with 
us. At the same time there is constant refusal to furnish arms and war material 
to Israel. This discrimination undermines the security of the state of Israel and 
endangers the peace in the Near East. 
The three powers now inform us that they have received assurances 
from the 
states to which arms have been supplied that they 
harbor no aggressive designs on 
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any other state. But these assurances by the Arab states have not been accompa- 
nied by any practical guarantee. Moreover, [they] patently contradict the ceaseless 
preparations for war against the state of Israel. 
Whoever knows the truth of the situation in the [Arab] lands will understand 
without hesitation that the arms sent to these states, if used at all, will be used 
against Israel, and perhaps against Israel alone. The government of Israel expresses 
satisfaction that the three powers now recognize that Israel has no less a need than 
the Arab states to maintain armed forces of a certain level. 
Israel has never had, and never will have, aggressive intentions against anyone. 
Israel's hand is extended in peace to all the Arab states, severally and jointly. 
But Israel has the right and the duty to look after its own security, and the three 
powers have recognized this. The government of Israel hopes that this recognition 
will be translated into action, and that the discrimination against Israel in the 
supply of arms will be stopped completely by the governments that have signed 
the declaration. The government of Israel received with particular satisfaction 
the public announcement by the three powers of their deep interest in and their 
desire to promote peace and stability in the Arab states and Israel and of their 
unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of the use of force by any state 
in this part of the world. 
The three powers have pledged to take action against every violation of the 
frontiers or armistice lines, in accordance with their obligations as members of the 
United Nations. This pledge applies equally to the frontiers of the Arab states and 
to the domain of Israel, as fixed in armistice agreements with Egypt, Transjordan, 
Syria and Lebanon. 
As a government directly concerned and as a member of the 
United Nations, 
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the government of Israel feels obliged to state that it is not sufficient merely to 
prevent hostilities among neighbors. There is also a need to support and accelerate 
the negotiations for an enduring peace among all nations) among them Israel and 
the Arab states, and for this purpose it is essential to employ the full authority 
and resources of the United Nations. 
The government of Israel will lend its hand faithfully ýo any endeavor designed 
to strengthen peace among all nations, and to raise the power and authority of the 
United Nations. 
3. STATEMENT BY THE ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL, 
21 JUNE 1950 
The governments of the Arab states, severally and jointly, have studied the 
joint declaration issued by the United Kingdom, France and the United States 
on 25 May 1950. The exchange of views on this declaration was one of the most 
important reasons that prompted the Arab states to expedite the meeting of the 
Arab League Council on 12 June 1950 and was one of the most important items 
on the agenda of the meeting. The Arab states have agreed to issue the following 
statement: 
1. No one is more anxious than the Arab states about the preservation of 
peace and stability in the Middle East. The [Arab lands stand] by nature at the 
head of the peace-loving countries. Successive events have proved the degree of 
their respect for the United Nations Charter. 
2. If the Arab states have shown, and continue to show, an interest in meeting 
their military needs, this has been due to their deep sense of responsibility 
for 
safeguarding the internal security of their countries, 
insuring the legitimate defense 
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of their neutrality and fulfilling the obligation of safeguarding international security 
in this region. This is primarily the obligation of [the Arab states] and of the Arab 
League as a regional organization under article 52 of the United Nations Charter. 
3. Even before the three powers ever thought of issuing their declaration, 
the Arab governments on their own initiative had decided to express the peaceful 
intentions of the Arabs and to refute the allegations that Israel has persisted in 
circulating [to the effect] that the Arab states are requesting arms for aggressive 
purposes. [The Arab states] hereby reiterate their peaceful intentions and declare 
that the arms that have been, or may be, ordered from the three powers or from 
others will be used solely for defensive purposes. 
4. It goes without saying that the level of armed forces maintained by every 
state for defense purposes and for participation in the maintenance of international 
security is a matter that can only be estimated by the state concerned. It is also 
subject to various factors, chiefly the size of the population, the area of the country 
and the length and diversity of its frontiers. 
5. The Arab states take note of the assurances that they have received to the 
effect that the three powers did not intend by their declaration to favor Israel, or 
to exert pressure on the Arab states to enter into negotiations with Israel, or to 
affect the final settlement of the Palestine problem or to preserve the status quo; 
but that they did intend to express their opposition to the use of force or to the 
violation of the armistice lines. 
6. The Arab states declare that the most preferable and reliable measures 
for maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East would consist 
in solving 
its problems on the basis of right and justice, re-establishing 
the conditions of 
understanding and harmony that once prevailed and 
hastening the execution of 
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the United Nations resolution on the return of the Palestine refugees to their 
homes and on compensation for their material losses. 
7. The Arab states also take note of assurances given them that the three- 
power declaration, both in its manner of presentation and in its provision for prior 
guarantees from the states purchasing arms, neither signifies the division of this 
region into zones of influence nor in any way infringes on the independence and 
sovereignty of the Arab states. 
8. It is self-evident that the doubts, which the assurances mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph were designed to dispel, were raised by paragraph 3 of the 
three-power declaration, which laid down that, if the three powers should find that 
any state of this region was preparing to violate the frontiers or the armistice lines 
of another state, they would immediately take action, within or outside the United 
Nations, to prevent such violation. 
There is no doubt that action alone will dispel these doubts, if it demonstrates 
that the three powers are in fact concerned with maintaining peace in the Middle 
East impartially and on the basis of right and justice and respect for the sovereignty 
of the states and without subjecting them to domination or influence. 
9. In conclusion the Arab states can only affirm once again that, despite 
their anxiety for peace, they cannot approve any action that would 
harm their 
sovereignty and their independence. 
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Appendix 
FOUR-POWER (BRITAIN, FRANCE, TURKEY AND THE 
UNITED STATES) PROPOSALS FOR A MIDDLE EAST COMMAND 
1 October-10 November 1951 
[The Department of State BuUetin, 25 (22 October 1951), 647-48, (19 Novem- 
ber 1951), 817-18] 
The Western search for ways to develop a "situation of strength" in the Near 
and Middle East gathered momentum after the outbreak of the Korean war in June 
1950. The British defense system in that region, which had proved so invaluable 
to the allied cause in two world wars, was contracting steadily. The overriding 
Western strategic problem at the time was to keep the Suez Canal base within 
the allied orbit. Anglo-Egyptian talks (June 1950-July 1951) turned out to be less 
exploratory than explosive, so that the breach between the two positions widened 
appreciably. At this juncture the United States took the initiative in persuading 
Britain, France and Turkey to become with itself co-sponsors of an Allied Middle 
East Command with which Egypt would be invited to associate itself as a founder 
member. The projected scheme, it was hoped, by substituting a joint allied for an 
exclusive British base in the canal zone, would meet at once Egyptian demands for 
the elimination of British hegemony and allied needs for the continued maintenance 
of the vital canal base in a condition for immediate emergency use. Inasmuch as 
Egyptian territory was slated under the scheme to serve as an allied base, the failure 
to consult the Egyptian government in formulating the plans wounded nationalist 
sensitivities. But this merely added another emotional irritant to an already highly 
charged situation, for, in the final analysis, the Western powers and Egypt were 
at cross purposes. The allies were anxious to bolster their defense against the 
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USSR; Egypt, to rid itself of foreign controls. Egyptian rejection of the four- 
power proposal was accordingly a foregone conclusion. Following the Egyptian 
Parliament's enactment on 15 October 1951 of decree laws repudiating the 1899 
Anglo-Egyptian condominium agreements on the Sudan (Doc. 99) and the 1936 
treaty (Doc. 61), the four allies issued on 10 November a fresh set of principles 
under which any Near and Middle East state might voluntarily join the proposed 
allied- sponsored organization. J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, chap. 3; 
Survey of International Affairs, 1951, pp. 255-92; H. L. Hoskins, Middle East, 
Problem Area, chaps. 13- 14; R. P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 
pp. 281-93. 
1. INVITATION TO EGYPT TO PARTICIPATE IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST 
COMMAND, 13 OCTOBER 1951 
Document A 
POINT I. Egypt belongs to the free world and in consequence her defense and 
that of the Middle East in general is equally vital to other democratic nations. 
POINT II. The defense of Egypt and of other countries in the Middle East 
against aggression from without can only be secured by the cooperation of all 
interested powers. 
POINT 111. The defense of Egypt can o4ly be assured through the effective 
defense of the Middle East area and the coordination of this defense with that of 
adjacent areas. 
POINT IV. It therefore seems desirable to establish an Allied Middle East 
Command in which the countries able and willing to contribute to the defense of 
the area should participate. France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United 
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States are prepared to participate with other interested countries in establishing 
such a Command. Invitations to participate in the Command have been addressed 
to Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, who have indicated their 
interest in the defense of the area and who have agreed in principle. 
POINT V. Egypt is invited to participate as a founder member of the Middle 
East Command on a basis of equality and partnership with other founder members. 
POINT VI. If Egypt is prepared to co-operate fully in the Allied Command Or- 
ganization in accordance with the provisions of the attached annex, His Majesty's 
Government for their part would be willing to agree to supersession of the 1936 
Treaty and would also be willing to agree to withdraw from Egypt such British 
forces as are not allocated to the Allied Middle East Command by agreement 
between the Egyptian Government and the Governments of other countries also 
participating as founder members. 
POINT VII. As regards armed forces to be placed at the disposal of the Al- 
lied Middle East Command and the provision to that Command of the necessary 
strategic defense facilities, such as military and air bases, communications, ports, 
etc., Egypt will be expected to make her contribution on the same footing as other 
participating powers. 
POINT VIII. In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements Egypt would be 
invited to accept a position of high authority and responsibility with the 
Allied 
Middle East Command and to designate Egyptian officers for integration in the 
Allied Middle East Command Headquarters staff. 
POINT IX. Facilities to train and equip her forces wiU be given to 
Egypt by 
those participating members of the Affied 
Command in a position to do so. 
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POINT X. The detailed organization of the Allied Middle East Defense Orga- 
nization and its exact relationship with the N. A. T. O. have yet to be worked out 
in consultation between all the powers concerned. For this purpose it is proposed 
that all founding members of the Allied Middle East Command should send mili- 
tary representatives to a meeting to be held in the near future with the object of 
preparing detailed proposals for submission to the governments concerned. 
Document B Techinical Annex 
[1] In common with other participating powers who are making similar contri- 
butions to the defense of the area. 
(a) Egypt will agree to furnish to proposed Allied Middle East Command Or- 
ganization such strategic defense and other facilities on her soil as are indispensable 
for the organization in peacetime of the defense of the Middle East. 
(b) that she will undertake to grant forces of the Allied Middle East Command 
all necessary facilities and assistance in the event of war, imminent menace of 
war, or apprehended international emergency including the use of Egyptian ports, 
airfields and means of communication. 
[2] We should also hope that Egypt would agree to the Allied Supreme Com- 
mander's Headquarters being located in her territory. 
In keeping with the spirit of these arrangements, it would be understood 
(a) that the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to 
the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously 
become an Allied 
base within the Allied Middle East Command with 
full Egyptian participation in 
the running of this base in peace and war. 
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(b) that the strength of the Allied force of participating nations to be stationed 
in Egypt in peacetime would be determined between the participating nations 
including Egypt from time to time as progress is made in building up the force of 
the Allied Middle East Command. 
[4] It also would be understood that an air defense organization including both 
the Egyptian and Allied forces would be set up under the command of an officer 
with joint responsibility to the Egyptian Government and to the Allied Middle 
East Command for the protection of Egypt and Allied bases. 
2. FOUR-POWER STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST COMMAND, 10 
NOVEMBER 1951 
In proceeding with their announced intention to establish the Middle East 
Command, the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France, and 
Turkey state that they are guided by the following principles: 
1. The United Nations is a world response to the principle that peace is 
indivisible and that the security of all states is jeopardized by breaches of the 
peace anywhere; at the same time it is incumbent upon the states of any area to 
be willing and able to undertake the initial defense of their area. 
2. The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and its defense 
against outside aggression can be secured only 
by the cooperation of all interested 
states. 
The Middle East Command is intended to be the center of cooperative efforts 
for the defense of the area as a whole; the achievement of peace and security 
in 
the area through the Middle East Command will 
bring with it social and economic 
advancement. 
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4. A function of the Middle East Command will be to assist and support 
the states willing to join in the defense of the Middle East and to develop the 
capacity of each to play its proper role in the defense of the area as a whole 
against outside' aggression. It will not interfere in problems and disputes arising 
within the area. The establishment of the Middle East Command in no way affects 
existing arrangements relating to such matters, notably the armistice agreements 
and the United States United Kingdom-French Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. 
5. The task of the Middle East Command at the outset will be primarily one 
of planning and providing the Middle East States on their request with assistance 
in the form of advice and training. Requests for arms and equipment made by 
states in the area willing to join in its defense to sponsoring states in a position to 
assist in this connection will be filled by them to the extent possible following the 
coordination of such requests through the Middle East Command. 
6. The Supreme Allied Commander of Middle East will command forces placed 
at his disposal and will develop plans for the operations of all forces within the 
area (or to be introduced into the area) in time of war or international emergency. 
However, the placing of forces under the command of the Supreme Allied Com- 
mander Middle East in peacetime is not a prerequisite for joining in the common 
effort for the defense of the Middle East. Movement of those troops placed under 
the command of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East to or within the 
territories or states joining in the defense of the Middle East will 
be made only 
with the agreement of the state or states concerned and 
in full accord with their 
national independence and sovereignty. 
7. While details have yet to be formulated, the sponsoring states 
intend that 
the Middle Easý Command should be an integrated allied command, not a national 
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command. The responsibility of the Supreme Allied Commander Middle East will 
be to insure the effectiveness of the corporate defense enterprise represented by 
the command. All states joining in this enterprise will be individually associated 
with the command on the basis of equality through a Middle East Defense Liaison 
Organization which will be located at Middle East Command Headquarters and 
will be the link between the command and the countries ready to join in the defense 
of this area. 
8. Any facilities granted to the Middle East Command by states joining in the 
defense of the Middle East will be the subject of specific agreements. 
9. The broad mission of the Middle East Command and its cooperative char- 
acter make it necessary that all States, whether territorially or not part of the 
area, act in the best interests of the cooperative defense of the area; the Middle 
East Command naturally will not further the national interest of any particular 
state. 
10. A continuing objective of the Middle East Command is to reduce such 
deficiencies as exist at present in the organization and capacity for defense in 
a vitally important area so that the peacetime role of the states of the area in 
Middle East defense will progressively increase, thus permitting the peacetime role 
of states not territorially part of the Middle East to be decreased proportionately. 
The sponsoring states of the Middle East Command do not regard the 
initial form in which the Middle East Command will be organized as unchangeable; 
they believe that the Middle East Command through mutual understanding should 
evolve in the manner which will enable it most effectively to provide for the defense 
of the Middle East area as a whole. 
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Appendix 7 
REPORT ON THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST BY SECRETARY OF STATE 
JOHN FOSTER DULLES 
1 June 1953 
[The Department of State Bulletin, 28(15 June 1953), 831-35] 
Less than four months after entering office Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles, accompanied by Mutual Security Director Harold E. Stassen, spent two 
and one-half weeks (11-28 May 1953) in visiting most of the Near and Middle East 
lands. The unprecedented trip dramatically underscored the substantial develop- 
ment of United States interest and responsibility in that strategic region in the 
post-war period. In the following report delivered over national radio and televi- 
sion networks, Secretary Dulles demonstrated that the Republican Administration 
would not recoil from obligations in the Near and Middle East accepted by its 
Democratic predecessor. Indeed, he suggested that the United States would offer 
to the area even greater economic and military assistance than in the past. Among 
notable changes in emphasis from that of the outgoing administration, Secretary 
Dulles proposed to inaugurate an "impartial" policy in the Arab Israel zone and 
to abandon as sterile in the immediate future efforts to create a region-wide collec- 
tive security system (Doc. 97) in favor of one that would embrace "the northern 
tier of nations, " where, he felt, because of proximity to the USSR there was an 
"awareness of the [Soviet and communist] danger. " R. P. Stebbins, The United 
States in World Affairs 1953, chap. 5; 1 W. Spain, 'Middle East Defense: a New 
Approach, ' The Middle East Journal, (Summer 1954), pp. 251-66; H. L. Hoskins, 
Middle East, Problem Area, chaps. 12-14. 
About 3 weeks ago, the Director for Mutual Security, 
Mr. Harold Stassen, 
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and I and our associates set out, at President Eisenhower's request, on a trip 
to 12 countries which lie in between the Mediterranean in Europe and China in 
Asia. I shall give you our count ry- by-count ry impressions and then our general 
conclusions. 
First, let me say that everywhere we were well received. This was encouraging, 
for several of the countries feel that the United States policies have, in recent years, 
been harmful and even antagonistic to them. The Communists have vigorously 
exploited this feeling. They staged some hostile demonstrations. But these were 
inconsequential. The governments received us with warm hospitality, and as we 
drove through the streets, the people usually greeted us with friendly smiles and 
applause. The political leaders talked intimately with us, and we gained new 
friendships and new understanding which will stand us in good stead for the future. 
Also in each capital I spoke to all of the United States Foreign Service personnel. 
They are a fine body of men and women of whom we can be proud. 
It is high time that the United States Government paid more attention to 
the Near East and South Asia, which, until our trip, no United States Secretary of 
State has ever visited. Our post-war attention has been primarily given to Western 
Europe. That area was and is very important, but not all-important. 
It came as a surprising shock when the 450 million Chinese people, whom we 
had counted as friends, fell under Communist domination. There could 
be equally 
dangerous developments in the Near East and South Asia. The situation calls for 
urgent concern. 
The area we visited contains about one-fourth of the world's population. 
It 
represents about one-half of the people of the world who are still 
free of Communist 
domination. 
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The Near East possesses great strategic importance as the bridge between 
Europe, Asia, and Africa. The present masters of the Kremlin, following the lead 
of past military conquerors, covet this position. In 1940 Soviet leaders specified, 
in secret negotiations with the Nazis, that Soviet "territorial aspirations center ... 
in the direction of the Indian Ocean and ... the Persian Gulf. " 
This area contains important resources vital to our welfare oil, manganese, 
chrome, mica, and other minerals. About 60 percent of the proven oil reserves of 
the world are in the Near East. 
Most important of all, the Near East is the source of three great religions - 
the Jewish, the Christian, and the Moslem - which have for centuries exerted an 
immense influence throughout the world. Surely we cannot ignore the fate of the 
peoples who have first received and then passed on to us the great spiritual truths 
from which our own society derives its inner strength. 
EGYPT AND THE SUEZ BASE 
Our first stop was in Egypt. There we had 3 days in which to get acquainted 
with General Naguib, who heads the Government. He is a popular hero, and I 
could readily see why. He and his associates are determined to provide Egypt 
with a vigorous government which will truly serve the people. Also, they seek 
to end the stationing of British troops and exercise of British authority at the 
Suez base. Before we arrived in Egypt, a very tense situation had developed 
between the British and the Egyptian Gover4ments. Conversations looking to an 
orderly withdrawal of British troops had been suspended, and 
there was danger 
that hostilities would break out. 
We discussed the situation with General Naguib. The heart of the trouble 
is 
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not so much the presence of British troops, for both sides agreed that they should 
be withdrawn, but the subsequent authority over and management of this gigantic 
base, its airstrips, and its depots of supplies. Experienced administrative and tech- 
nical personnel is needed to keep the base in operating efficiency and the provision 
of this personnel causes difficulty. The matter has an importance which goes be- 
yond Egypt, for the base serves all Near Eastern and indeed Western security. I am 
convinced that there is nothing irreconcilable between this international concern 
and Egyptian sovereignty. We asked, with some success, that there be further time 
to find a peaceful solution. The United States is prepared to assist in any desired 
way. 
Egypt stands at the threshold of what can be a great new future. If this Suez 
problem can be satisfactorily solved, I am confident that Egypt can find the means 
to develop its land and lift up its people and add a new bright chapter to a glorious 
past. 
ISRAEL, JERUSALEM, AND REFUGEES 
Next we went to Israel. We were impressed by the vision and supporting energy 
with which the people are building their new nation. Inspired by a great faith, they 
are now doing an impressive work of creation. They face hard internal problems 
which I believe they can solve. Furthermore, the Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, and 
other Israeli officials asserted convincingly their desire to live at peace with their 
Arab neighbors. Jerusalem is divided into armed camps split between Israel and 
the Arab nation of Jordan. The atmosphere is heavy with hate. As I gazed on 
the Mount of Olives, I felt anew that Jerusalem is, above all, the 
holy place of 
the Christian, Moslem, and Jewish faiths. This has been repeatedly emphasized 
by the United Nations. This does not necessýrily ýxclude some political status in 
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Jerusalem for Israel and Jordan. But the world religious community has claims in 
Jerusalem which take precedence over the political claims of any particular nation. 
Closely huddled around Israel are most of the over 800,000 Arab refugees, who 
fled from Palestine as the Israeli took over. They mostly exist in makeshift camps, 
with few facilities either for health, work, or recreation. Within these camps the 
inmates rot away, spiritually and physically. Even the Grim Reaper offers no 
solution, for as the older die, infants are born to inherit their parents' bitter fate. 
Some of these refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by 
Israel. Most, however, could more readily be integrated into the lives of the neigh- 
boring Arab countries. This, however, awaits on irrigation projects, which win 
permit more soil to be cultivated. Throughout the area the cry is for water for 
irrigation. United Nations contributions and other funds are available to help 
refugees, and Mr. Stassen and I came back with the impression that they can well 
be spent in large part on a co-ordinated use of the rivers which run through the 
Arab countries and Israel. 
JORDAN 
Irrigation needs became most vivid as we motored from Jerusalem to Amman, 
the capital of Jordan. The road goes through the Dead Sea area, a scene of 
desolation with no sign of life other than the tens of thousands of refugees who 
survive precariously on the parched land largely by aid of United Nations doles. 
Later on, as we flew north, we observed the waters of the Yarmak River, which 
could perhaps be diverted so as to return some of this vast 
desert valley into fertile 
land. At Amman we dined with the charming and able new King Husein and his 
Government. They are preoccupied with the problem of refugees and of relations 
with Israel. The inflow of refugees has almost 
doubled the population, and the long 
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armistice line with Israel gives rise to frequent and dangerous shooting episodes. 
SYRIA, LEBANON, IRAQ, AND SAUDI ARABIA 
From Jordan we went to Syria. There we were impressed by General Shishakfi. 
He is eager to develop the resources of his country, which are substantial. Thus, the 
living standards of the Syrian people could be raised. This would, in turn, enable 
them to receive more refugees into a land which relatively is sparsely populated. 
'M. - From Damascus, the capital of Syria, we motored to Beirut7 the capital of 
Lebanon. The road took us over a mountain range, with refreshing snow in sharp 
contrast to the heat of the desert plains. 
You will recall that Beirut is the home of the American University, which 
has educated many of the Arab leaders of today. President Chamoun of Lebanon 
talked to us of his high hopes for his country and pointed to the role it might play, 
representing uniquely a meeting of East and West. 
Leaving Lebanon for Iraq, we flew over the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys. This 
was the site of the Garden of Eden. Under its new ruler, King Faisal - who 
visited the United States last summer - the Government of Iraq is beginning to 
develop these valleys and restore their former productivity. The revenues from the 
oil production are being largely directed to this and other construction purposes. 
Iraq can be, and desires to be, the granary for much of this part of the world. 
In Saudi Arabia we were received by King Ibn Saud, one of the great Near 
Eastern figures of this century, conspicpous in 4is dignity and singleness of purpose. 
He is a good friend of the United States as ýe has shown 
by deeds. Our policy 
will be to reciprocate this friendship. In Saudi 
Arabia Americans and Arabs are 
working together in good fellowship in the vast oil 
fields of the country. It is a 
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good relationship. 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
We left the Arab area to go first to India andthen to Pakistan. These two 
nations although independent for less than 6 years already play an influential part 
in world affairs. 
In India I met again with Mr. Nehru one of the great leaders of our time. We 
had long conversations together in the intimacy of his home. His calm demeanor 
and lofty idealism impressed me. We reviewed together the international problems 
which concern both our countries, including the problem of a Korean armistice and 
the threat to Southeast Asia. We did not always agree, but we did clear up some 
misunderstandings and, I felt, gained respect for the integrity of our respective 
purposes. India is now supporting the armistice position of the United Nations 
Command in Korea. 
Mr. Stassen and I also obtained a clearer view of the Government of India's 
5-year program to improve the welfare of the Indian people. India is the world's 
largest self-governing nation. It has about 2,000 miles of common boundary with 
Communist China. There is occurring between these two countries a competition 
as to whether ways of freedom or police-state methods can achieve better social 
progress. This competition affects directly 800 million people in these 2 countries. 
In the long run, the outcome will affect all of humanity, including ourselves. Our 
interest fully justifies continuing, on a modest scale, some technical assistance and 
external resources to permit India to go on with its 5-year plan. 
Pakistan is the largest of the Moslem nations and occupies a high position in 
the Moslem world. The strong spiritual faith and martial spirit of the people make 
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them a dependable bulwark against communism. 
The new Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali, whom we recently knew as Ambas- 
sador to Washington, energetically leads the new Government. We met with a 
feeling of warm friendship on the part of the people of Pakistan toward the United 
States. 
A grave and immediate problem is the shortage of wheat. Without large im- 
ports widespread famine conditions will ensue. Last year we helped India in a 
similar emergency. I believe that prompt United States wheat assistance to Pak- 
istan is essential. 
It is not possible to think about United States aid without also thinking that 
these countries cannot afford to waste their efforts in quarreling with each other 
and diverting their strength for possible use against each other. 
That thought applies to the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kash- 
mir. It is my impression from my conversations with the Prime Ministers of India 
and Pakistan that this controversy can be settled. Surely it needs to be settled. 
We tried, tactfully but firmly, to make clear that the United States, as a friend of 
both countries, hopes for an accord which would make more fruitful such economic 
aid as we render. 
IRAN 
It was not practical to include Iran in our schedule. 
However, we arranged 
that our Ambassador to Iran should meet us in Pakistan. 
Iran is now preoccupied 
with its oil dispute with Great Britain. But still the people and 
the Government 
do not want this quarrel to expose them to 
Communist subversion. They have not 
forgotten the Soviet occupation of 1941-1946. 
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The United States will avoid any unwanted interference in the oil dispute. But 
we can usefully continue technical aid and assistance to this agricultural nation of 
Iran and in that way perhaps help prevent an economic collapse which would play 
into the hands of predatory forces. 
TURKEY, GREECE, AND LIBYA 
After Pakistan, we went to Turkey and Greece. These two countries have 
clearly demonstrated their intent to stand steadfast against Communist aggression 
and subversion. Despite their heavy commitments to NATO, both countries have 
contributed valiantly to the United Nations efforts in Korea. 
We, in turn, plan to continue to help Greece and Turkey to grow stronger. 
They are valiant in spirit and hold a strategic position in Europe and Asia which 
enables them to help us. While in Greece I dined with the King and Queen and 
passed on to this charming couple President Eisenhower's invitation that they visit 
us this fall. 
Our last stop before returning to the United States was Libya, the newest 
member of the family of nations. This country is located at a key spot on the 
North African coast on the Mediterranean. It has recently become an independent 
nation by action of the United Nations. Libya is co-operating with the United 
States and the United Kingdom in strengthening its own defenses and those of the 
Mediterranean area. 
Let me turn now to conclusions. 
1. Colonialism. Most of the peoples of the Near East and South Asia are 
deeply concerned about political independence for themselves and others. They 
are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United States too is suspect because, 
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it is reasoned, our NATO alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to 
preserve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies. 
am convinced that United States policy has become unnecessarily ambiguous 
in this matter. The leaders of the countries I visited fully recognize that it would 
be a disaster if there were any break between the United States and Great Britain 
and France. They don't want this to happen. However, without breaking from the 
framework of Western unity, we can pursue our traditional dedication to political 
liberty. In reality, the Western powers can gain, rather than lose, from an orderly 
development of self government. 
I emphasize, however, the word "orderly. " Let none forget that the Kremlin 
uses extreme nationalism to bait the trap by which it seeks to capture the depen- 
dent peoples. 
2. Living Standards. The peoples of the Near East ad Asia demand better 
standards of living, and the day is past when their aspirations can be ignored. The 
task is one primarily for the governments and the peoples themselves. In some cases 
they can use their available resources, such as oil revenues, to better advantage. 
There are, however, ways in which the United States can usefully help, not with 
masses of money but by contributing advanced technical knowledge about trans- 
port, communication, fertilization, and use of water for irrigation. Mr. Stassen 
and I feel that money wisely spent for this area under the mutual security program 
will give the American people a good return in terms of better understanding and 
co-operation. 
3. Arab Good Will. The United States should seek to allay the deep resentment 
against it that has resulted from the creation of Israel. In the past we 
had good 
relations with the Arab peoples. American educational institutions 
had built up 
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a feeling of good will, and also American businessmen had won a good reputation 
in this area. There was mutual confidence to mutual advantage. 
Today the Arab peoples are afraid that ý-he United States will back the new 
State of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of Zionism than of 
communism, and they fear lest the United States become the backer of expansionist 
Zionism. 
On the other hand, the Israelis fear that ultimately the Arabs may try to push 
them into the sea. 
In an effort to calm these contradictory fears the United States joined with 
Britain and France in a Declaration of May 25 1950, which stated that "the three 
Governments, should they find that any of these states (of the Near East) was 
preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obli- 
gations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within 
and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation. " That Declaration when 
made did not reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present U. S. 
administration stands fully behind that Declaration. We cannot afford to be dis- 
trusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom. They must not further 
swell the ranks of Communist dictators. 
The leaders in Israel themselves agreed with us that United States policies 
should be impartial so as to win not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but 
also of the Arab peoples. We shall seek such policies. 
4. Peace Between Israel and the Arab Nations. There is need for peace in the 
Near East. Today there is an uneasy milit4Ty armistice between Israel and the 
Arab States, while economic warfare is being conducted by the Arab States, in 
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retaliation for alleged Israeli encroachments. The area is enfeebled by fear and by 
wasteful measures which are inspired by fear and hate. 
Isra-el should become part of the Near East community and cease to look upon 
itself, or be looked upon by others, as alien to this community. This is possible. 
To achieve it will require concessions on the part of both sides. But the gains to 
both will far outweigh the concessions required to win those gains. 
The parties concerned have the primary responsibility of bringing peace to the 
area. But the United States will not hesitate by every appropriate means to use 
its influence to promote a step-by-step reduction of tension in the area and the 
conclusion of ultimate peace. 
5. Middle East Defense Organization. A Middle East Defense Organization is 
a future rather than an immediate possibility. Many of the Arab League countries 
are so engrossed with their quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France 
that they pay little heed to the menace of Soviet communism. However, there 
is more concern where the Soviet Union is near. In general the northern tier of 
nations shows awareness of the danger. 
There is a vague desire to have a collective security system. But no such system 
can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from within out 
of a sense of common destiny and common danger. While awaiting the formal 
creation of a security association, the United States can usefully help strengthen 
the interrelated defense of those countries which want strength, not as against each 
other or the West, but to resist the common threat to all 
free peoples. 
6. Friendly Understanding. In conclusion, let me recall that the primary 
purpose of our trip was to show friendliness and to 
develop understanding. These 
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peoples we visited are proud peoples who have a great tradition and, I believe, a 
great future. We in the United States are better off if we respect and honor them, 
and learn the thoughts and aspirations which move them. It profits nothing merely 
to be critical of others. 
President Eisenhower's administration plans to make friendship - not faultfind- 
ing - the basis of its foreign policy. President Eisenhower brought with him from 
Europe an unprecedented measure of understanding and personal friendships. Be- 
fore he was inaugurated, he went to Korea. Twice since inauguration, Mr. Stassen 
and I have been to Europe. Now we have been to the Near East and South Asia. 
Later this month the President's brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower, and Assistant 
Secretary of State Cabot will go to South America. 
Thus your Government is establishing the world-wide relationships and gather- 
ing the information which will enable us better to serve you, the American people. 
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Appendix 8 
AGREEMENT OF FRIENDLY CO-OPERATION: PAKISTAN AND TURKEY 
2 Aprid 1954 
(Ratification exchanged, Ankara, 12 June 1954) [Pakistan, Treaty Series (1954), 
No. 4] 
The practical significance of Secretary Dulles' "northern tier" concept began 
to clarify early in 1954. On 2 April Turkey and Pakistan, with United States en- 
couragement, concluded in Karachi the present agreement. This was followed on 
19 May by a mutual assistance agreement between Pakistan and the United States 
[Pakistan, Treaty Series (1954), No. 9], under which Pakistan became eligible for 
American military grant aid. The Pakistan- Turkish agreement, although intended 
to serve as the nucleus of the projected "northern tier" collective security arrange- 
ment, was for all practical purposes superseded by the Turco- Iraqi agreement of 
24 February 1955 (Doc. 1073. ) Omitted below is the amendment of 19 August 
1954, effected by an exchange of notes between the Pakistan Charge d'Affaires in 
Ankara and the Turkish Foreign Minister, which altered article 4 (b) to read "pro- 
duction and supply of arms and ammunition. " J. W. Spain, 'Military Assistance 
for Pakistan, ' The American Political Science Review, (September 1954) 738-51. 
Pakistan and Turkey 
Re4ffirmipg their faith in the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the 
I 
United Nations and their determination always to endeavour to apply and give 
effect to these Purposes and Principles, 
Desirous of promoting the benefits of greater mutual cooperation deriving from 
the sincere friendship happily existing between them, 
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Recognising the need and cooperation between them in every field for the 
purpose of promoting the wellbeing and security of their peoples. 
Being convinced that such cooperation would be to the interest of all peace- 
loving nations and in particular also to the interest of nations in the region of the 
Contracting Parties, and would consequently serve to ensure peace and security 
which are both indivisible, 
Have therefore decided to conclude this Agreement for friendly Cooperation 
ARTA. The Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from intervening in any 
way in the internal affairs of each other and from participating in any alliance or 
activities directed against the other. 
2. The Contracting Parties will consult on international matters of mutual 
interest and, taking into account international requirements and conditions, coop- 
erate between them to the maximum extent. 
ART. 3. The Contracting Parties will develop the cooperation, already es- 
tablished between them in the cultural field under a separate Agreement, in the 
economic and technical fields also by concluding, if necessary, other agreements. 
ART. 4. The consultation and cooperation between the Contracting Parties 
in the field of defence shall cover the following points: 
a. exchange of information for the purpose of deriving benefit jointly from 
technical experience and progress, 
b. endeavours to meet, as far as possible, the requirements of the Parties in 
the production of arms and ammunition, 
c. studies and determination of the ways and extent of cooperation which 
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might be effected between them in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations, should an unprovoked attack occur against them from outside. 
, 
ART. 5. Each Contracting Party declares that none of the international en- 
gagements now in force between it and any third State is in conflict with the 
provisions of this Agreement and that this Agreement shaH not affect, nor can it 
be interpreted so as to affect, the aforesaid engagements, and undertakes not to 
enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Agreement. 
ART. 6. Any State, whose participation is considered by the Contracting 
Parties useful for achieving the purposes of the present Agreement, may accede to 
the present Agreement under the same conditions and with the same obligations 
as the Contracting Parties. 
Any accession shall have legal effect, after the instrument of accession is duly 
deposited with the Government of Turkey from the date of an official ratification 
by the Government of Turkey and Government of Pakistan. 
ART. 7. This Agreement, of English text is authentic, shall be ratified by the 
Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, 
and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratifi- 
cation in Ankara. 
In case no formal notice of denunciation is given by one of the 
Contracting 
Parties to the other, one year before the termination of a period of 
five years from 
the date of its entry into force, the present Agreement shall automatically continue 
in force for a further period of five years, and the same procedure will apply 
for 
subsequent periods thereafter. 
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Appendix 9 
(BAGHDAD) PACT OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAQ 
24 February 1955 
(Ratifications exchanged, Ankara, 15 April 1955) [Great Britain, Parliamen- 
tary Papers, 1955, Misc. No. 5, Cmd. 9429] 
Announcement by Turkey and Iraq in mid-January 1955 of plans to conclude 
a military alliance in co-operation with the West precipitated a crisis in the Arab 
League. The Revolutionary Command Council (military government) in Egypt was 
apparently persuaded that Iraq's contemplated action would destroy Arab solidar- 
ity in international politics, would thereby weaken the Arab League security system 
(Doc. 93 ) and would accordingly curtail in the West the bargaining influence of 
Egypt the League's dominant member. Despite mounting Egyptian pressures, in- 
cluding sponsorship in Cairo of an emergency meeting of the premiers and foreign 
ministers of the Arab League states (22 January-6 February 1955), Iraq signed 
the following military alliance, which replaced the Turco-Pakistan agreement of 2 
April 1954 (Doc. 102) as the basic instrument of the "northern tier" collective 
security arrappment. One reason for Iraq's insistence upon a fresh formula may 
be found in 4rticle 5, which lays down that the "pact shall be open for accession 
to any member of the Arab League or any other State actively concerned with 
the security and peace in this region and which is fully recognised 
by both of the 
High Contracting Parties. " The last phrase, it is clear, was designed explicitly to 
exclude Israel. Britain acceded to the Baghdad 
Pact - as the Turco-Iraqi alliance 
became known - on 5 April, Pakistan on 
23 September and Iran on 25 October 
1955. Indeed, the shah's government took its action in the 
face of a Soviet note of 
protest (Doc. 114). 
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Whereas the friendly and brotherly relations existing between Iraq and Turkey 
are in constant progress, and in order to complement the contents of the Treaty 
of Friendship and Good Neighbourhood concluded between His Majesty the King 
of Iraq and his Excellency the President of the Turkish Republic signed in Ankara 
on March 29,1946, which recognised the fact that peace and security between the 
two countries is an integral part of the peace and security of all the nations of the 
world and in particular the nations of the Middle East, and that it is the basis for 
their foreign policies; 
Whereas Article 11 of the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation 
between the Arab League States provides that no provision of that treaty shall in 
any way affect, or is designed to affect, any of the rights and obligations accruing 
to the Contracting Parties from the United Nations Charter; 
And having realised the great responsibilities borne by them in their capacity 
as members of the United Nations concerned with the maintenance of peace and 
security in the Middle East region which necessitate taking the required measures 
in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter; 
They have been fully convinced of the necessity of concluding a pact fulfilling 
these aims 
ART. 1. Consistent witý article 51 of the United Nations Charter the High 
Contracting Parties will co-operate f6T their aecurity and defence. Such measures 
as they agree to take to give effect tq this cp-operation may 
form the subject of 
special agreements with each other. 
ART. 2. In order to ensure the realisation and effect application of 
the co- 
operation provided for in article 1 above, the competent authorities 
of the High 
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Contracting Parties will determine the measures to be taken as soon as the present 
pact enters into force. These measures will become operative as soon as they have 
been approved by the Governments of the High Contracting Parties. 
ART. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any inter- 
ference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs. They will settle any dispute 
between themselves in a peaceful way in accordance with the United Nations Char- 
ter. 
ART. 4. The High Contracting Parties declare that the dispositions of the 
present pact are not in contradiction with any of the international obligations con- 
tracted by either of them with any third State or States. They do not derogate 
from and cannot be interpreted as derogating from, the said international obliga- 
tions. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any international 
obligation incompatible with the present pact. 
ART. 5. This pact shall be open for accession to any member of the Arab 
League or any other State actively concerned with the security and peace in this 
region and which is fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties. 
Accession shall come into force from the date on which the instrument of accession 
of the State concerned is deposited with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. 
Any acceding State party to the present pact may conclude special agreements, 
in accordance with article 1, with one or more States parties to the present pact. 
The competent authority of any acceding State may 
determine measures in accor- 
dance with article 2. These measures will become operative as soon as 
they have 
been approved by the Governments of the parties concerned. 
ART. 6. A Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to 
function 
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within the framework of the purposes of this pact when at least four Powers become 
parties to the pact. 
The Council will draw up its own rules of procedure. I 
ART. 7. This pact remains in force for a period of five years renewable for 
other Ave-year periods. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from the pact by 
notifyii4g the other parties in writing of its desire to do so six months before the 
expiration of any of the above-mentioned periods, in which case the pact remains 
valid for the other parties. 
ART. 8. This pact shall be ratified by the contracting parties and ratifications 
shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible. Thereafter it shall come into 
force from the date of the exchange of ratifications. In witness whereof, the said 
plenipotentiaries have signed the present pact in Arabic, Turkish and English, all 
three texts being equafly authentic except in the case of doubt when the English 
text shall prevail. 
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Appendix 10 
SPECIAL AGREEMENT: BRITAIN AND IRAQ 
4 April 1955 
I 
[Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1955, Treaty Series No. 50, Cmd. 9544] 
Because of the failure to obtain Iraqi ratification of the draft agreement signed 
at Portsmouth on 15 January 1948 (Doc. 89), the 1930 treaty of alliance (Doc. 
56) continued to govern Anglo-Iraqi relations in the decade following World War 
IL The present special agreement, which automatically came into force upon the 
United Kingdom's accession to the Baghdad Pact (Doc. 107) on 5 April 1955, 
ended Britain's preferential alliance with Iraq and established a relationship be- 
tween the two countries more closely in accord with post-war realities. Reproduced 
below are the main instrument and two subsidiary agreements in the form of mem- 
oranda, defining the conditions of military co-operation. Omitted are exchanges of 
notes declaring that the terms of the two memoranda should remain valid for the 
same period as the special agreement and that the United Kingdom would pro- 
vide pensions, gratuities, vocational training and grants to Iraqi levies and civilian 
employees of the R. A. F. under the expiring preferential alliance. 
ART. 1. The two Contracting Governments shall maintain and develop peace 
and friendship between their two countries and shall co-operate for their security 
and defence in accordance with the Pact of A4uýual Co-operation. 
ART. 2. The Treaty of Alliance between týe United Kingdom and Iraq, signed 
at Baghdad on June 30,1930, with annexure and Notes exchanged, shall 
terminate 
from the date when the present Agreement comes into force. 
ART. 3. The Government of Iraq by the present Agreement undertakes no 
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obligations beyond the frontiers of Iraq. 
ART. 4. The Government of Iraq assume full responsibility for the defence of 
Iraq and will command and guard all defence installations in Iraq. 
ART. 5. In accordance with Article 1 of the Pact, there shall be close co- 
operation between the competent authorities of the two Governments for the de- 
fence of Iraq. This co-operation shall include planning combined training and the 
provision of such facilities as may be agreed upon between the two Contracting 
Governments for this purpose and with the object of maintaining Iraq's armed 
forces at all times in a state of efficiency and readiness. 
ART. 6. The Government of the United Kingdom shall, at the request of the 
Government of Iraq, do their best 
(a) to afford help to Iraq; 
(i) in creating and maintaining an effective Iraqi Air Force by means of joint 
training and exercises in the Middle East; 
(ii) in the efficient maintenance and operation of such airfields and other in- 
stallations as may from time to time be agreed to be necessary; 
(b) to join with the Government of Iraq in 
establishing an efficient system of warning against air attack; 
(ii) ensuring that equipment for the defence of Iraq is kept in Iraq in a state 
of readiness; 
training and equipping Iraqi forces for the defence of their country; and 
(c) to make available in Iraq technical personnel of the 
British forces for the 
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purpose of giving effect to the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article. 
ART. 7. Service aircraft of the two countries shall enjoy staging and over-flying 
facilities in each other's territories. 
ART. 8. In the event of an armed attack against Iraq or threat of an armed 
attack which, in the opinion of the two Contracting Governments7 endangers the 
security of Iraq, the Government of the United Kingdom at the request of the 
Government of Iraq shall make available assistance, including if necessary armed 
forces to help to defend Iraq. The Government of Iraq shall provide all facilities 
and assistance to enable such aid to be rapid and effective. 
ART. 9. (a) The present Agreement shall come into force on the date on which 
the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Pact. (b) The Agreement shall remain 
in force so long as both Iraq and the United Kingdom are parties to the Pact. 
MEMORANDUM NO. 1 
1. (a) Command of Habbaniya, Skaiba and Margil shall pass as from the date 
of signature of the Special Agreement to the Government of Iraq and Iraqi officers 
of appropriate rank shall be appointed for this purpose on May 2,1955. 
(b) All flying units of the Royal Air Force now stationed in Habbaniya and 
Shaiba shall be withdrawn progressively, and their withdrawal shall be completed 
within one year after the date of signature of the Special Agreement. 
(c) As the withdrawal of these flying units proceeds, the Government of the 
United Kingdom shall also progressively withdraw members of their technical and 
administrative personnel and personnel of authorised service organisations until 
only those remain in Iraq who are required for the purpose of 
the Special Agreement 
and this Memorandum. 
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2. (a) Under the Special Agreement, British personnel shall be in Iraq to assist 
the Iraqi Forces with training and with the installation) operation and maintenance 
of facilities and equipment, and to service aircraft. 
(b) The command and administration of British personnel and installations 
shall be the responsibility of the Government of the United Kingdom and for this 
purpose the Government of the United Kingdom shall make available the necessary 
British staff to command and administer them under the overall authority of the 
Iraqi officer in charge of each establishment. 
(c) The senior British officer appointed in each case shall act in close liaison 
with the Iraqi officer in command. 
3. The provisions of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties 
to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in London on June 19,1951 shall apply to 
the forces of each Government in the territories of the other Government. Detailed 
arrangements for the application of those provisions shall be made by the two 
Governments as soon as possible. Until such detailed arrangements have been 
made in Iraq, the provisions at present applicable to British forces there shall 
continue to apply. 
4. (a) In accordance with Article 4 of the Special Agreement, the Government 
of Iraq shall assume responsibility for the protection of all airfields and installations 
in Iraq and to this end shall incorporate into the Iraqi Forces those members of 
the R. A. F. Levies of Iraq, who wish to volunteer. The Government of the United 
Kingdom shall, for a limited period, make available for loan to the 
Iraqi forces 
British personnel, as far as Possible from among those now serving with the 
Royal 
Air Force Levies, Iraq, to facilitate such transfer and integration. 
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(b) The two Governments shall use their best endeavours to ensure that as 
many as possible of the civilians at present employed at Habbaniya, Shaiba and 
Margil shall continue in employment there. 
5. The Government of the United Kingdom undertake, in accordance with 
Article 6 (a) and (c) of the Special Agreement and in order to facilitate the closest 
co-operation between the air forces of the two countries, to do their best: 
(a) to provide expert advice and assistance in operational and technical mat- 
ters, including the extension of Iraqi airfields, and in the construction of such 
additional airfields and facilities as may be agreed to be necessary; 
(b) to provide personnel to assist in the training of the Royal Iraqi Air Force 
and to offer continuous consultations regarding methods and techniques of training 
at all stages; 
(c) to arrange that Royal Air Force, squadrons and other British aircraft shall 
make periodic visits to Iraq in accordance with the provisions of the Special Agree- 
ment and this Memorandum, in particular for the purpose of joint training at all 
times; ' 
(d) to make available in Iraq British personnel for the servicing, maintenance 
and repair of British aircraft as well as for such airfield services as it may be agreed 
that they should provide on airfields jointly used by both parties; 
(e) to grant facilities, including instructional courses abroad, for training Iraqi 
personnel if suitable facilities are not available in Iraq; 
(f) to facilitate as far as possible the supply of necessary aircraft and associated 
equipment of modern design. 
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6. The Government of the United Kingdom shall do their best to join with 
the Government of Iraq in establishing as soon as possible an efficient system 
for antiaircraft defence, including radar warning system and a system for aircraft 
reporting. For these purposes, the Government of the United Kingdom shall make 
available to the Government of Iraq the co-operation and advice of qualified service 
and technical personnel. 
7. For the purposes of Article 8 of the Special Agreement, the Iraqi land 
forces shall be, so trained as to facilitate closest co-operation with land forces of 
the United Kingdom and suitably trained and experienced British personnel shall 
be made available to assist in the training of Iraqi land forces and to attend and 
advise on field and other exercises. The Government of the United Kingdom shall 
do their best to facilitate the supply to the Government of Iraq of arms and other 
appropriate equipment of modern design. 
8. The Government of the United Kingdom will co-operate with the Govern- 
ment of Iraq in establishing in advance and maintaining to an agreed standard such 
maintenance installations, including tank repair facilities, as may be agreed to 
be 
necessary in the event of an armed attack for Iraqi forces and British 
forces co- 
operating with them. Expert service advice on their siting and construction, and 
advice and assistance in their maintenance and manning, shall 
be made available 
by the Government of the United Kingdom. 
9. (a) The Government of the United Kingdom shall make available, as may 
be agreed between the two Governments, the co-operation and advice of suitably 
qualified service and technical personnel with a view 
to the establishment of an 
organisation for mine watching and mine clearance on 
the Shatt el Arab. 




visit the Shatt el Arab at any time on previous notification being given. 
10. The existing procedures and facilities under which aircraft, under the con- 
trol of the R. A. F., overfly, land, refuel and are serviced in Iraq, shall be continued. 
Similar procedures shall apply and similar facilities shall be made available in the 
United, Kingdom and its dependent territories to aircraft under the control of Royal 
Iraqi Air Force. 
11 - (a) The Government of the United Kingdom shall join with the Government 
of Iraq in establishing in Iraq stocks of military stores and equipment for use by 
the armed forces of the two countries for the defence of Iraq in the event of an 
armed attack against Iraq. These stocks shall be stored at sites in Iraq to be agreed 
between the competent authorities of the two Governments. 
(b) The Government of Iraq shall provide the depots necessary for the safe 
keeping of those stocks and shall assume full responsibility for their security. 
(c) For administrative purposes, stocks which are the property of the Govern- 
ment of Iraq shall be stored separately from those which are the property of the 
Government of the United Kingdom. 
(d) The stocks shall be kept in a state of readiness at all times. Accordingly, 
provision shall be made for their maintenance, turn-over, inspection and periodical 
replacement, and each Government shall provide the personnel necessary for those 
purposes with respect to the stocks belonging to them. 
(e) The Government of the United Kingdom may freely dispose of any items of 
such stocks, the property of the Government of the United 
Kingdom, which may 
become surplus to British requirements, subject to the offer of 
first refusal to the 
Government of Iraq in the case of any property to be 
disposed of in Iraq. 
397 
12. (a) The Government of Iraq shall make available essential services for the 
use of British personnel and shall, if necessary, allocate suitable accommodation 
for them and their families. 
I 
(b) Where new installations are from time to time agreed to be necessary for 
the purposes of the Special Agreement and this Memorandum, the terms of their 
provision shall be agreed between the two Governments. 
MEMORANDUM NO. 2 
(a) All immovable property now in British ownership shall either continue 
in British ownership or be handed over to the Government of Iraq, or be freely 
disposed of by the Government of the United Kingdom. Certain installations that 
will serve the needs of both Governments shall be handed over to the Government of 
Iraq free of charge. All other immovable property handed over to the Government 
of Iraq as above shall be paid for at its in situ value. 
(b) Where installations have been handed over free of charge the Government 
of the United Kingdom shall enjoy full rights of free user. Where the Government of 
Iraq have paid for immovable property, they shall be entitled to make a reasonable 
charge, to be settled by agreement, for its subsequent use by the Government of 
the United Kingdom. 
(c) Each Government shall be responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
immovable property in their ownership. The two Governments shall agree on the 
standards to be observed, and, in appropriate cases, the apportionment of costs, 
in respect of the operation and maintenance of the 
instaflations which serve the 
needs of both Governments. 
(d) Movable property required for the operation of any property 
handed over 
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under paragraph (a) above shall be paid for by the Government of Iraq at full cost, 
if new, and if used, at a fair valuation. The Government of the United Kingdom 
shall retain all other movable property and shall have the right to dispose of it in 
Iraq or elsewhere. 
(e) The Government of Iraq shall bear the cost of their air warning system and 
of improving their military airfields to standards to be agreed. 
(f) Each Government shall meet the cost of its own forces and any civilian 
personnel employed by it, except that the cost to the Government of Iraq of British 
personnel loaned or seconded to the Iraqi forces shall be mutually agreed. 




FIRST STATEMENT BY THE NATIONAL UNITY COMMITTEE 
The revolution of May 27 was completed within four hours. Strategic sposts 
were secured, the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet taken into "protective 
custody, " and military commanders placed in charge of the areas in which they 
were stationed. At 4 p. m. the curfew in Ankara was lifted, and the city witnessed 
a celebration such as it had not seen since the victory in the War of Independence. 
Istanbul was also the scene of wild celebrations. The rest of the country was less 
excited, partly because most of the disturbances had been confined to Ankara 
and Istanbul (and to a small extent Izmir), partly because there were still many 
Menderes sympathizers in the nation, and partly because few people had any idea 
what to expect from the armed forces. Most of those who initially hesitated were 
quick to get on the band wagon. Celebration and ceremony continued for the 
better part of a month, no day going by without several groups laying wreaths 
at the Ataturk Mausoleum. Then Turkey began to settle down and to realize the 
difficulty of the work ahead. 
In mid-morning on May 27 the armed forces broadcast a message to the Turkish 
nation and to the world: 
Honourable Fellow Countrymen: Owing to the crisis into which our democracy 
has fallen, and owing to the recent sad incidents and in order to prevent fratricide, the 
Turkish armed forces have taken over the administration of the country. 
Our armed forces have taken this initiative for the purpose of extricating 
the parties 
from the irreconcilable situation into which they have fallen and for the purpose of 
having just and free elections, to be held as soon as possible under the supervision and 
arbitration of an above-party and impartial administration, and 
for handing over the 
administration to whichever party wins the elections. 
Our initiative is not directed against any person or class. 
Our administration will 
not resort to any aggressive act against personalities, nor will 
it allow others to do so. 
All fellow countrymen, irrespective of the parties to which 
they may belong, will 
be treated in accordance with the laws and all the principles of 
law. 
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For the elimination of all our hardships and for the safety of our national eidstence, 
it is imperative that it should be remembered that all our fellow countrymen belong 
to the same nation and race, above all party considerations, and that therefore they 
should treat one another with respect and understanding, without bearing any grudge. 
All personalities of the C, abinet are requested to take refuge with the Turkish armed 
forces. Their personal safety is guaranteed by law. We are addressing ourselves to our 
allies, friends, neighbours and the entire world. Our aim is to remain completely loyal 
to the United Nations Charter and to the principles of human rights; the principle of 
peace at home and in the world set by the great Ataturk is our flag. 
We are loyal to all our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization] and CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] and we are 
faithful to them. We repeat: Our ideal is peace at home, peace in the world. "' 
The body formed to govern the nation became known as the National Unity 
Committee (NUC). For several days neither the names nor the number of officers 
composing the junta was officially known, other than that of General Cemal Gursel, 
former Commander of Land Forces, who became Chairman of the NUC, President, 
Prime Minister, and Chief of the General Staff. A few days later the official list of 
thirty-eight officers was published. One of the first acts of the NUC was to bring 
to Ankara a group of professors from the Law Faculty of the University of Istanbul, 
to write a new Constitution and Election Law. On May 28 the junta appointed 
a seventeen-man cabinet) of whom fifteen were civilian "technicians" who had not 
been identified with any political party. 
676 Weiker, Walter F., Turkish Revolution 1960-1961: Aspects of Military 
Politics, The Brookings Insti- 
tute, Washington DC., 1963. 
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